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Abstract 
 
In many countries, when policyholders or consumers are denied coverage by insurers in an 
arbitrary manner, it may be difficult for the policyholders to successfully challenge the adverse 
coverage determinations. They may challenge insurers in court (litigation) or via means outside 
of the courtroom (alternative dispute resolution options: arbitration, negotiation, mediation). In 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law 
(CICCL) and its Implementing Regulations provide for the creation of an administrative 
tribunal called the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC). All insurance disputes must be 
submitted to this tribunal. This study seeks to determine whether this is the best option for 
consumers in the KSA. In order to achieve this aim, the IDC is analysed at three levels: 
doctrinal, practical, and empirical.  
The doctrinal analysis reveals that the provisions of the CICCL regarding panel decision-
making are ambiguous. Also, the discretion enjoyed by IDC adjudicators is too broad, and in 
practice, they seldom appeal to Shariah principles or provisions of the legislation. The system 
is therefore unpredictable, given that cases are decided on an ad hoc basis.  
The practical inquiry provides different findings to the doctrinal analysis. The practical inquiry 
affirms the position that the IDC prioritises the interests of the parties and yields a very high 
level of satisfaction with outcomes. The disconnect between the results of the doctrinal analysis 
and the findings of the practical inquiry is explained by capturing the perceptions of a sample 
of IDC adjudicators. The empirical study reveals that IDC adjudicators have a unique 
conception of what constitutes a well-reasoned decision. However, the explanations in their 
decisions satisfy Saudi parties, specifically consumers. Thus, unlike the doctrinal analysis, the 
findings of the practical and empirical inquiries provide support to the Saudi legislator’s 
decision to compel parties to submit disputes to the IDC. 
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Glossary 
 
Akhaam al-Wad: Positive human-made rules. 
Al-Dayyah: A substitute penalty. 
Aqilah: A pool of risk and common resources. 
Dharurah: Necessity that may justify certain acts. 
Dhimmiyin: Protected non-Muslim subjects. 
Fatwa: Rulings on matters that did not exist in the Prophet’s day. 
Fiqh: Secondary sources that interpret the divine law. 
Gharar: Risk, speculation, and uncertainty. 
Hajah: A pilgrim. 
Hanbali: One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, named after its founder, ibn 
Hanbal. It is recognised as the official school of law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Hanafi: One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, named after its founder, Abu 
Hanifa. 
Hudna: Truce, armistice or cease-fire. 
Hudud: Punishment for a crime under Islamic law. 
Ijma: Consensus interpretations from the earliest generation of Islamic scholars 
Kadi: Arbitrator or mediator. 
Maliki: One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, named after its founder, Malik 
ibn Anas. 
Maysir: Gambling or immoral inducement. 
Mudaraba: A partnership where one partner provides the funds and the other partner manages 
the funds 
Nizam: Regulation or legislative act. 
Qiyas: The reasoning of Muslim judges when applying the law 
Qanun: Body of rules that regulated behaviour. 
Riba: Interest or unjust gains made in trade. 
Shafi’i: One of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, named after its founder, Al-
Shafi’i, a pupil of Malik. 
Shariah: Canonical law based on the traditions of the Holy Prophet and the teachings of the 
Holy Quran. 
Sulh: Resolution or fixing according to religious principles. 
Sunnah: The body of the traditional legal and social customs of the Islamic community. 
6 
 
Surah: A chapter of the Quran. 
Ta’awun: Mutuality or cooperative insurance. 
Tabarru: Donation or gifts. 
Tadawul: The Saudi stock exchange. 
Takaful: A cooperative system of repayment in case of loss.  
Wakala: An agency agreement where the account holder designates an agent to carry out a 
specific task on his behalf. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ADR - alternative dispute resolution 
CICCL - Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law  
DIFC - Dubai International Financial Centre 
IAT - Insurance Appellate Tribunals 
ICC - International Chamber of Commerce 
ICMIF - International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation 
IDC - Insurance Dispute Committee 
KSA – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
SAMA - Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
SCCA - Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration 
UAE - United Arab Emirates 
UNCITRAL – United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The rise of globalisation and the need for foreign investment have resulted in widespread 
reform of the legislative and adjudicative frameworks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 
over the past three decades.1 The KSA has the largest economy in the Middle East2 and has 
been taking important steps to modernise its laws and legal procedures, particularly in the 
private sector.3 One area of great importance that has received little scholarly attention is the 
development of the insurance sector, including the enactment of the Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Control Law (CICCL)4 and its Implementing Regulations, alongside the creation 
and use of the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC) and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
(SAMA) Appeal Committee to resolve insurance-related disputes.5 The expansion of the 
insurance market in the KSA has transformed this sector, that was previously a monopoly, into 
a relatively attractive area of private sector investment.6  
However, there has been a long-running debate over the introduction of insurance products into 
the Shariah-based state of KSA.7 The concern is largely centred around the Shariah-
permissibility of insurance products. Conventional insurance is deemed to be speculation on 
the incidence of the future event insured against.8 This is arguably contrary to the Shariah that 
prohibits gharar or uncertainty by requiring that the subject matter of the contract must be 
                                                          
 1 See MA Ramady, The Saudi Arabia Economy: Policies, Achievement, and Challenges (2nd edn, Springer 2010) 
25; R Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (Routledge 2004) 8; FRA El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of 
Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 21; and YA 
Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Dar Al Andalus 2000) 
34. The reforms may even be traced back to the early 1980s. See GN Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ 
(1988) 36(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 729, 729-730. 
2 Wilson, ibid, 1-2. 
3 For a critical analysis of the legal reforms, see FA Farhan, Legal Impacts and Challenges Facing Saudi Foreign 
Direct Investment Law: Reforming Saudi Foreign Direct Investment Laws as a Case Study (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of Portsmouth 2012); F Binaseed, Factors Affecting Foreign Direct Investment Location 
in the Petrochemicals Industry (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Brunel University 2009). 
4 Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law, Royal Decree No M/32, July 2003, (2 Jumada II 1424).  
5 See Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, ‘Rules and Regulations’ (2017) <http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-
sa/Laws/Pages/Insurance.aspx> accessed 14 November 2019. 
6 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Saudi Arabia 2013 (Oxford Business Group 2013) 91-99. See also, D 
Mirah and Ra’ ed Masa’ deh, ‘An Analysis of the Insurance Industry Regulator in Saudi Arabia and Jordan through 
the Comparison with Insurance Industry Regulator in the UK’ (2014) 10(3) Asian Social Science 211, 212-216. 
7 A Rahim et al, ‘Islamic Takaful: Business Models, Shariah Concerns and Proposed Solutions’ (2007) 49(3) 
Thunderbird International Business Review 371, 373-374. 
8 Ibid. 
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ascertainable. The conventional insurance contract therefore potentially violates the Shariah 
because the benefits that are to be paid under the contract depend on the outcome of a 
contingency that is unknown at the time of signing the contract. For example, a policy based 
on the lifetime of the insured cannot be ascertained given that it is not known when the insured 
will pass on. Gharar prohibits such agreements because it is unfair to expect a party to consent 
to something whose essential elements are unknown. 
Also, conventional insurance contracts are regarded as a form of maysir (gambling, which is 
prohibited by Shariah) because the insurer actually wagers on the death or misfortune of the 
policyholder.9 Where the latter takes an endowment policy, whereby the insurer promises to 
pay him a stated sum if he survives for specified period, the policyholder is betting premiums 
on the condition that he will still be alive after the specified period in order to receive payment 
or indemnity. Ismail describes this aspect of the conventional insurance contract as follows: 
It’s like putting money in a pot and rolling the dice, the lucky winner takes the 
pot. In the case of conventional insurance companies, they play the role of the 
‘House’ and the insured plays the role of the gambler by placing a bet. The gain 
for the ‘House’ is always certain, while the gain for the better is doubtful; the 
person may gain or lose. Overall, the ‘House’ is against the gamblers, and the 
insurance company is against the insured, the ‘House’ and the insurance 
company are always winners.10 
 
Ismail’s description reflects the 19th century contention by Holt that insurance contracts are 
aleatory because they essentially depend on chance or the throw of a dice.11 As such, 
conventional insurance undermines the Shariah given that it requires the parties to gamble on 
contingencies. Also, conventional insurance companies that invest collected premiums in 
interest-based projects violate the prohibition of riba (interest) under the Shariah. 
1.1.1 Takaful  
 
The Islamic Fiqh Council Decision No. 5 of 12 September 1977 (First Session) stated that 
conventional insurance contracts violate the Shariah, and only takaful contracts should be 
enforced in the KSA. The takaful (mutual guarantee) insurance is considered acceptable (in 
                                                          
9 However, it has been argued that the (conventional) insurance contract is different from a wager because the 
wager creates the risk, but the insurance contract exists independently from the risk, which is a contingency that 
may or may not occur. See D Boivin, Insurance Law (Irwin Law 2004) 28-29. 
10 F Ismail, ‘Insurance and Shariah Takaful: A Practical Alternative’ (1998) 2(2) Nida’ul Islam 1, 3. 
11 CM Holt, A Treatise on the Insurance Law of Canada, Embracing Fire, Life, Accident, Guarantee, Mutual 
Benefit, etc., with an Analysis of the Jurisprudence and of the Statute Law of the Dominion (C Theoret 1898) 22. 
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many Islamic quarters) because it addresses the above Shariah-related concerns.12 This type of 
insurance is based on the concepts of donation (tabarru) and mutuality (ta’awun), whereby the 
policyholder voluntarily transfers money to the insurer (takaful operator) without any 
consideration.13 The parties agree to share the losses and profits derived from the investment 
of the pooled fund. The fund is also used to assist participants on whom misfortune has befallen. 
The requirement to subscribe and the obligation to pay compensation in the form of returns 
reduces uncertainty. Since the policyholder does not wager his resources on a contingency, the 
element of maysir or gambling is also eliminated. The insurer or takaful operator is then 
prohibited from investing the collected premiums in interest-based projects. It must be noted 
that the takaful operator is the custodian of the pooled fund, not the owner, and all the 
participants (including the policyholders) share in the risk.  
The company is required to maintain two distinct funds, namely the participants’ or 
policyholders’ fund, and the shareholders’ fund. The former is the pool of money that 
participants or policyholders contribute, while the shareholders’ fund is the operating fund that 
holds the seed money provided by the shareholders. The latter fund pays for the administrative 
expenses of the start-up and some of it is invested. The profits from the investments are kept 
in the shareholders’ fund. The management fees paid by the participants are also kept in the 
shareholders’ fund. However, the claims by participants or policyholders are paid out of the 
participants’ fund. Remaining surpluses, after the estimated cost of future claims are deducted, 
are kept in the participants’ fund because the surpluses belong to the participants and not the 
operator. The surpluses are distributed to the participants as reductions in future contributions 
or cash dividends. 
Although there are different variations and models (such as mudaraba and wakala) of takaful 
in different Islamic countries,14 they largely seek to address the above Shariah-related 
concerns. Nonetheless, the fact that the models are based on payment for a defined loss in the 
future from a fund set up by participants (policyholders), raises the question of whether the 
takaful is not the same as a conventional insurance contract.15 
                                                          
12 Rahim et al (note 7) 374-376. 
13 H Askari, Z Iqbal and A Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Economics: Theory and Application (Wiley 2015) 
210-212. 
14 See for example, A Nana, ‘A Proposed Marriage between Endowments, Mutual Insurance and the Institution 
of Agency in Islamic Law: Introduction to the Waq-f Wakala Model of the Takaful’ in SN Ali and S Nisar (eds), 
Takaful and Islamic Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunities (Edward Elgar 2016) 82-86. 
15 See H Abdou, K Ali and R Lister, ‘A Comparative Study of Takaful and Conventional Insurance: Empirical 
Evidence from the Malaysian Market’ (2014) 4(1) Insurance Markets and Companies: Analyses and Actuarial 
Computations 22, 23-34. See also, MS Matsawali et al, ‘A Study of Takaful and Conventional Insurance 
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1.1.2 The Cooperative Insurance Structure in the KSA 
 
With the enactment of the CICCL in the KSA in 2003, the scope of permissible insurance 
products was broadened to include those that may not necessarily be considered takaful but 
that comply with the cooperative insurance model.16 Cooperative insurance, as implemented in 
the KSA, has offerings comparable to conventional insurance offerings in most Western 
nations.17 Separate accounts must also be kept for the shareholders and the policyholders as per 
Article 2 of the CICCL. Article 70 of the Implementing Regulations (Surplus Distribution 
Policy) provides that the insurance company should distribute 10 per cent of the net surplus 
directly to policyholders or participants or the 10 per cent must be given to them in the form of 
reductions in premiums. 90 per cent of the net surplus is transferred to the shareholders’ income 
statement. 
It follows that the CICCL encourages ‘associations of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise.’18 The takaful may be said to be the same as the 
cooperative insurance model because it is based on self-help and solidarity, and the 
policyholder receives a portion or share of the ownership in proportion to the amount 
contributed. Risk is shared rather than transferred. This is because the takaful may be 
implemented using different models. The takaful cooperative model adopted in the KSA shares 
more features with the stock insurance model19 given that the donation made to the takaful fund 
is accompanied by an expectation of a return or profit. This is nonetheless contrary to the 
Shariah that requires donations to be non-contingent and non-binding.20 Also, if the payment 
                                                          
Preferences: The Case of Brunei’ (2012) 3(22) International Journal of Business and Social Science 163, 169-
170 (conducted an empirical study that shows that many Muslims prefer takaful to conventional insurance 
contracts although their knowledge and understanding of the takaful is very limited). 
16 DM Barakah and SA Alsalhe, ‘The Cooperative Insurance in Saudi Arabia: A Nucleus to Health Reform Policy’ 
(2011) 21 IPEDR 6, 7-8.  
17 For examples of the range of coverage policies, see Salama, ‘Products’ (2017) <http://www.salama.com.sa/en-
us/products.aspx> accessed 14 November 2019. 
18 This is the definition of cooperatives adopted by the International Cooperative Alliance, which has since 1895 
been recognized by many countries as the competent authority for elaborating rules and principles that govern 
cooperatives. See  D Prakash, ‘The Principles of Cooperation: A Look at the ICA Cooperative Identity Statement’ 
(2003) Participatory Management Development Advisory Network 1, 4 
<http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/intl/daman_prin.pdf> accessed 14 November 2019. See also, Overview of 
Mutual Structures’ in SO Gonulal (ed) Takaful and Mutual Insurance: Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks 
(The World Bank 2013) 35. 
19 Under this model, the stockholders (who are policyholders) finance the capital of the stock-based insurance 
company, the collected premiums cover the management costs and the capital provided by the stockholders is 
used to minimise the risk of loss in the company’s operations. See Gonulal, ibid, 22. 
20 O Agha, ‘Tabarru in Takaful: Helpful Innovation or Unnecessary Complication’ (2009-2010) 9(1) UCLA 
Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 102, 103. 
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is considered a donation, then the fund is not legally obligated to compensate the policyholder 
in the event where the latter suffers an insurable loss. That is why it has been argued that the 
introduction of the concept of donation or tabarru in insurance law creates an unnecessary 
complication.21  
 
Nonetheless, the above uncertainty regarding the Shariah-compliance of different insurance 
models shows that insurance as a whole represents an uncharted territory in the KSA. As the 
Saudi legislators, insurers, and consumers have continued to move into this uncharted territory, 
it has become an issue of the utmost importance to protect consumer rights to ensure that 
consumers are not denied coverage in an arbitrary manner. The CICCL expressly 
acknowledges this and requires that insurance companies act in an honest, transparent and fair 
manner; avoid discrimination; communicate effectively with policyholders; take reasonable 
actions to resolve conflicts of interest, and quickly and efficiently address disputes over 
consumer coverage.22 An important measure introduced by the CICCL to protect policyholders 
in the KSA is the creation of a cost-effective forum outside of the courtroom in which 
policyholders can swiftly challenge the adverse coverage determinations by insurers. The 
forum, as noted above, is the IDC. As such, should a consumer have a cause of action arising 
from an insurer’s breach of its obligations and the rights of the consumer, the resulting dispute 
would be heard before the relevant Primary Committee of the IDC.23 The Saudi legislator and 
courts have not explained why all insurance disputes must be submitted to this dispute 
resolution forum. It is therefore uncertain whether it is a cheaper and more efficient alternative 
to litigation, as well as common forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) such as 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. 
 
There are a number of reasons why it is desirable for insurance disputes to be heard by the 
Primary Committees of the IDC. First, the purpose of codifying insurance law and creating a 
dispute resolution tribunal was to ensure transparency, efficiency, and predictability in the 
dispute resolution process.24 The governing IDC regulations address transparency by 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 W Hachem, S Wakerly and T Neighbour, ‘Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview’ 
(ThomsonReuters, 1 April 2017). 
<https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I1525498b9c6d11e498db8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?cont
extData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 14 November 2019. 
23 CICCL, Article 20. 
24 The decisions of the primary committees are available on the IDC website. General Secretariat of the 
Committees for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations, ‘Committees Decision’ (2017) 
<http://www.idc.gov.sa/ar-sa/CommitteesDecisions/Pages/Riyadh.aspx> accessed 14 November 2019. 
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permitting the publication of tribunal decisions,25 which, to some extent, is intended to explain 
the Committees’ rationales for such decisions.26 Second, having a dedicated system of tribunals 
for resolving sector-specific disputes creates efficiency by relieving the burden on the 
overloaded generalist court system and by empanelling legal and insurance experts to hear 
insurance disputes.27 Finally, the permissibility of the tribunals’ consideration of comparative 
jurisprudence and previous tribunal decisions ought to effectively establish a set of precedents 
on which the tribunal can rely in rendering verdicts.28 This creates more predictability for the 
parties, with regard to the way in which disputes are resolved, and should logically increase 
the level of satisfaction of the parties.  
However, despite their initial appeal, the IDC is sometimes obliged to compete with 
commercial arbitration,29 a more familiar ADR mechanism for foreign investors, when it comes 
to providing a forum for commercial disputes.30 Confidentiality, better communication and a 
more constructive atmosphere are often associated with ADR, especially arbitration, which 
provides parties with a forum to bindingly determine elements of their case.31 
SAMA sometimes recognises and enforces arbitration clauses in insurance contracts; giving 
parties the opportunity to make choices about the applicable procedural and substantive rules.32 
Some parties, particularly investors who are unfamiliar with the Saudi Arabian legal system or 
Shariah law, find arbitration to be an attractive alternative. However, arbitration clauses are 
often drafted by the insurance companies themselves for their own benefit and may form part 
of a contract of adhesion that the insured or policyholder must agree to. Hence, arbitration often 
                                                          
25 See Article 1 of Resolution No. 215 of 29/06/1430H and Article 13 of Resolution No. 190 of 9/5/1435H 
(Working Rules and Procedures of the IDC).  
26 See General Secretariat of the Committees for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations, ‘Vision 
and Methodology’ (2016) < https://www.idc.gov.sa/en-
us/CommitteesDecisions/Pages/VisionandMethodology.aspx> accessed 14 November 2019. 
27 CICCL, Article 20; General Secretariat of the Committees for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes and 
Violations, ‘About Committees’ (2017) <http://www.idc.gov.sa/ar-
sa/Aboutus/PreliminaryCommittees/Pages/default.aspx> 14 November 2019. 
28 M Beswetherick and S Alsaab, ‘The New SAMA Insurance Dispute Committee Rules in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’ (Clyde & Co, 1 April 2014) <https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/the-new-sama-insurance-dispute-
committee-rules-in-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arab> accessed 14 November 2019. 
29 Although SAMA requires all insurance disputes to be submitted to the IDC, it has in some instances allowed 
insurers to include an arbitration clause in contracts, such as where the insurer and policyholder agreed that 
English maritime law should govern any disputes that may arise under their contract. See Hachem, Wakerly and 
Neighbour (n 22) para 34. 
30 AJ Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5(1) Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 169, 169. 
31 C Duve, ‘Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Insurance Law – A Practitioner’s Approach’ (2009) 
10(2) ERA Forum 177, 178. 
32 Arbitration is not available in all cases. Insurers are required to obtain SAMA’s approval before incorporating 
an arbitration clause in an insurance policy. See Hachem, Wakerly and Neighbour (n 22) para 34. 
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favours the party with stronger bargaining power. Also, as noted above, insurance arbitration 
is not available where SAMA has not approved the incorporation of the arbitration clause in 
the insurance policy. Nonetheless, it must be noted that in many instances, parties with limited 
resources find arbitration to be an expensive option. Thus, in some countries, several insurance 
disputes still wind up in litigation although ADR options are readily available.33 Also, in such 
countries, although ADR options are readily available, there is legislation requiring state 
insurance departments to assist in the resolution of individual consumer complaints, and 
empowering the departments to force a resolution where the insurer has violated a regulation.  
 
In Australia for example, the Australian Financial Complaints Authority was established under 
the Corporations Act 2001 as an alternative to courts to resolve, amongst other disputes, 
disputes between consumers and insurers regarding insurance policies for domestic and 
personal items. In Ontario, Canada, the Ontario Insurance Commission created the Insurance 
Ombudsman under the Insurance Act and Automobile Insurance Rate Stability Act, 1996 as 
the last resort for the informal resolution of insurance disputes. Since 2002, all consumers 
across Canada have been encouraged to submit disputes regarding home, automobile, and 
business insurance policies to the General Insurance OmbudService. Lastly, in the United 
Kingdom, Parliament established the Financial Ombudsman Service under Part XVI and 
Schedule 17 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended) to resolve disputes 
between financial businesses and their customers. Given that all insurance companies are 
governed by the rules of the Financial Conduct Authority, they are required to comply with the 
decisions of the Financial Ombudsman Service. Thus, consumers can submit insurance 
disputes to the Ombudsman Service which uses mediation to resolve the disputes; and when 
mediation fails, conducts a formal investigation and makes a final decision that binds the 
parties.  
 
However, the above dispute resolution bodies are independent agencies, and parties who are 
not satisfied with their decisions may seek further resolution through litigation. This may be 
distinguished from the IDC which is a body attached to Saudi regulatory authority, SAMA, 
and whose decisions cannot be reviewed by courts. The decisions of the Primary Committees 
of the IDC can only be reviewed by the SAMA Appeal Committee, which reviews the decisions 
                                                          
33 A good example is the USA, see D Asmat and S Tennyson, ‘The Law and Economics of Insurance Bad Faith 
Liability’ in D Schwarz and P Siegelman (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Insurance Law (Edward 
Elgar 2015) 415. 
20 
 
on their merits and may not endorse the Primary Committees’ conclusions on questions of fact 
or exercise of discretion. 
 
The KSA has therefore attempted to address the shortcomings of litigation and ADR options 
by creating a potentially more effective alternative that promises stronger protection for 
consumers. Like arbitration, this alternative uses an expert panel, flexible procedural rules, and 
allows the panel to consider comparative jurisprudence. This study seeks to determine whether 
it provides a better avenue for consumers to challenge adverse determinations than litigation 
and other forms of ADR. 
1.2 Research Aim and Questions   
 
This study seeks to ascertain whether the administrative tribunal created by the CICCL as the 
official and compulsory dispute resolution forum for all insurance disputes is the most effective 
dispute resolution option in the KSA. The administrative tribunal is the IDC. It is an 
institutional architecture that blends informal industry norms with formal doctrinal precedent. 
Given that it is the compulsory dispute resolution forum, it is important to determine whether 
this forum is more effective in ensuring that consumers are consistently indemnified.  
This study is premised on the contention that the security promised by substantive insurance 
law to consumers is inconsequential if it cannot be delivered through an efficient and effective 
dispute resolution option. It follows that it is important to determine whether the IDC is an 
efficient and effective dispute resolution option. 
Detailed consideration is given to the laws, regulations and institutions of the KSA. This is 
because the researcher is most familiar with the Saudi legal system and legal culture. Hence, 
the researcher seeks to examine how Saudi insurance laws, ADR laws and the institutional 
architecture for insurance disputes resolution interact in order to propose ways of enhancing 
consumers’ access to dispute resolution in insurance cases in the KSA. The study assumes that 
Saudi law is an internally self-sustaining set of principles that may be assessed with no 
reference to any external or non-legal elements.34 Thus, the focus is on enacted laws and 
                                                          
34 This is referred to as identifying the ‘black-letter law’, see M McConville and WH Chu, ‘Introduction and 
Overview’ in M McConville and Wing Hong Chu (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 
2007) 1. 
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regulations, including the principles of the Shariah as developed and established by the Hanbali 
School of Islamic Thought.35 Moral precepts and policy are excluded.  
The procedures and decisions of the IDC Primary Committees and the SAMA Appeal 
Committee are assessed in order to determine whether blending informal industry norms with 
formal doctrinal precedent36 is more effective in ensuring that the security promised by 
substantive insurance law to consumers is not inconsequential. The IDC has jurisdiction for all 
disputes arising from insurance policies pursuant to Article 20 of the CICCL. Although Saudi 
law has traditionally been aligned with the civil law legal systems, the IDC uses adversarial 
hearings whereby the parties are required to find and present their evidence and arguments to 
an impartial panel which then decides in favour of the party that has more probative evidence 
and stronger legal arguments. Thus, although the focus is on Saudi law, this study also 
examines some foreign Islamic systems whose laws the IDC may take into account in relation 
to the settlement of insurance disputes. Article 9 of the IDC Working Rules and Procedures 
states that the Primary Committees may decide cases in light of rulings in comparative 
jurisdictions. These systems include the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Pakistan. In the 
UAE, insurance disputes are settled by a specialised body called the Insurance Appellate 
Tribunal. This body is akin to the IDC. In Pakistan, insurance disputes are settled by the 
ordinary Islamic courts of law that are akin to the Board of Grievances that settled insurance 
disputes before the creation of the IDC. 
The researcher derives principles from Saudi laws, as well as the cases that applied the laws, 
assembles the principles into a coherent framework and ascertains any order or rationality. The 
Saudi legal system is the real-life context from which the in-depth understanding of the 
complex interaction between insurance law and dispute resolution is generated. The Saudi legal 
system therefore enables the researcher to compare the litigation-based approach, the ADR 
approach, and the IDC, which involves accommodating formal doctrinal precedent within ADR 
structures in an administrative forum. Thus, in addition to the doctrinal analysis and empirical 
                                                          
35 The Hanbali teachings remain the official doctrine of the Kingdom. See J Schacht, ‘Pre-Islamic Background 
and Early Development of Jurisprudence’ in M Khadduri and HJ Liebesny (eds), Law in the Middle East: Origin 
and Development of Islamic Law (Vol. 1, Lawbook Exchange 2008) 70; JJ Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal 
Status (2nd edn, Graham and Trotman 1990) 18. 
36 Article 9(1) of the Working Rules and Procedures of the IDC provides that IDC Committees shall decide cases 
in accordance with the laws and regulations, and previous rulings. It is shown in this thesis that this represents a 
significant departure from the previous stance on the role of precedent in the Shariah system. An attempt is then 
made to determine whether it has enhanced the predictability of outcomes. 
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inquiry, the researcher is able to determine whether the Saudi legislator is justified in imposing 
the IDC by comparing this form of dispute resolution to other dispute resolution options. 
The laws governing the IDC and the decisions of its adjudicators are therefore employed to test 
the relative explanatory capacity of alternative or competing theoretical explanations.37 In this 
study, the main competing theories relate to the effectiveness of the support provided by the 
various dispute resolution options to consumer insurance law. The focus on one system has 
been said to be a suitable method for addressing explanatory research questions in social 
science.38 The research questions outlined below are explanatory questions. The questions are 
addressed in order to achieve the research aim. The questions include: 
 What is the rationale for compelling IDC adjudication?  
 Have IDC adjudicators adopted any specific measures to protect consumers?  
 Are consumers satisfied with the IDC? 
 What is the most effective ADR option for policyholders seeking to challenge the 
adverse determinations of insurers in the KSA? 
 Can an empirical study explain the disconnect between the doctrinal analysis and the 
findings of a practical inquiry of the IDC? 
The consumer-centred approach is deemed to be the best way to study the effectiveness of the 
IDC because, as shown in Chapter 3, the IDC is intended to be an accessible and cost-effective 
alternative to litigation and other forms of ADR. Thus, since previous studies have shown that 
most consumers in developing countries are at the bottom of the wealth or income pyramid,39 
the IDC may only be said to be a cost-effective alternative to litigation and other forms of ADR, 
if the IDC is accessible to the poorest socio-economic group, and most of them are satisfied 
with the procedures and outcomes.  
                                                          
37 See S Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press 1997) 88. 
38 RK Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th edn, Sage 2014) 14; R Withana, Power, Politics, Law: 
International Law and State Behaviour During International Crises (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 80-82. 
39 See Z Ismail and MS Baloch, ‘Bottom of the Pyramid Market’s Consumer Behaviour with Regard to Branded 
Personal Care Products in Karachi: A Quantitative Study’ (2015) 6(6) International Journal of Business and 
Social Science 56, 57-58; J Verghese and P Malayiya, ‘Consumer Behaviour at the Bottom of the Pyramid’ in S 
Samu, Vaidyanathan R and Chakravarti D, Asia-Pacific Advances in Consumer Research (Vol 8, Association for 
Consumer Research 2009) 123; K Davidson, ‘Ethical Concerns at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Where CSR Meets 
BOP’ (2009) 2(1) Journal of International Business Ethics 22, 22-23. 
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Consumer satisfaction is the criterion to determine the effectiveness of the IDC from a practical 
and empirical viewpoint because satisfaction has been demonstrated to be a surrogate measure 
of effectiveness and a reliable arbiter of the success of public organisations.40 Satisfaction has 
been studied from different aspects with the focus largely on the expectations of users prior to 
the experience of using the services or products and the perception of the users after using the 
service or product. Thus, satisfaction as a measure determines how services or products meet 
the expectations of users.41 Also, satisfaction data are established indicators of perceptions, and 
it has been shown that satisfaction is highly correlated with effectiveness and efficiency.42 
These may explain why the General Secretariat also used satisfaction as the sole measure of 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
1.3 Significance of the Contribution to Research  
 
This thesis explores and critically analyses the legal and practical problems associated with the 
Saudi legislation governing the IDC and the procedural rules and regulations that manifest in 
their proceedings. It seeks to determine whether these legal problems have resulted in outcomes 
of proceedings being delayed, inconsistent, and whether they measure up to the intended goals 
of the reform of the Kingdom’s insurance sector. Also, it seeks to determine whether the 
resolution process in courts is effective in relation to the cost incurred by the parties, especially 
consumers or policyholders. Given that the legislator has imposed the IDC on parties seeking 
to settle a dispute, there is a need for an in-depth study of the IDC rules and procedures. The 
researcher was unable to find any published work that performs this task.  
This study therefore critically examines the IDC and seeks to determine whether the Saudi 
legislator has achieved the aim of creating a fast and accessible resolution forum for consumers. 
It seeks to determine why this dispute resolution forum is compulsory for all insurance disputes, 
whether it is the most effective option available to consumers, and whether the latter are 
satisfied with the procedures and outcomes.  
                                                          
40 See H Hill et al, Customer Satisfaction (Cogent 2007) 18-28. See also AW Gatian, ‘Is User Satisfaction a 
Valid Measure of System Effectiveness?’ (1994) 26(3) Information & Management 119, 119-131. 
41 See RA Westbrook and RL Oliver, ‘The Dimensionality of Consumption Emotion Patterns and Consumer 
Satisfaction’ (1991) Journal of Consumer Research 84, 84-91. 
42 See E Hirons et al, ‘External Customer Satisfaction as a Performance Measure of the Management of a Research 
and Development Department’ (1998) 15(8/9) Journal of Marketing 21, 21-31; S Joo, ‘How are Usability 
Elements – Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Satisfaction – Correlated with Each Other in the Context of Digital 
Libraries?’ (2010) ASIST 1, 1-2. 
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As such, this research does more than only identify the shortcomings of the CICCL and its 
Implementing Regulations, as well as the Working Rules of the IDC. It also undertakes to 
illustrate how these shortcomings affect outcomes of cases in practice and addresses the 
implications of these results. In addition, it meets the challenge of proposing specific legislative 
changes to remedy the flaws in the CICCL and Working Rules for IDCs.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The rapid growth of economies, and the expansion of industry sectors and commerce have 
given rise to an increase in the number of disputes that need to be resolved expeditiously.43 The 
Saudi legislator requires the submission of all insurance-related disputes to the IDC. To 
determine whether this is the best forum for resolving insurance disputes in the KSA, this 
research employs three primary methodologies: doctrinal analysis, practical inquiry, and 
empirical inquiry; taking into account the socio-legal nuances of the KSA as a primarily civil 
law state whose Constitution is the Holy Quran.  
The doctrinal analysis focuses on the sources of law that guide and constrain Saudi judges, 
mediators, arbitrators, and the IDC. The line of progress for these different options available to 
policyholders is charted. The doctrinal method includes determining whether legal precedent 
has been developed, and assessing legislative reform and legislative interpretation and 
application over time.44 This study therefore conducts a critical conceptual analysis of the 
relevant insurance laws and regulations, thereby revealing the underlying applications and 
motives for legislative reform in the Kingdom.45 By systematically evaluating the rules 
governing insurance dispute resolution, the study assesses the relationship between different 
dispute resolution options as they exist, as well as their desired or predicted and actual 
outcomes.46 Doctrinal research of the existing insurance regulations provides a detailed 
analysis and creative synthesis47 of the way in which the provisions, or gaps therein, correlate 
                                                          
43 J MacFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Law (UBC Press 2008) 9. 
44 T Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 
3 Erasmus Law Review 130, 130. 
45 T Hutchinson, ‘Vale Bunny Watson? Law Librarian, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet 
Era’ (2014) 106(4) Law Library Journal 579, 584. 
46 D Pearce et al, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education 
Commission (Australian Government Publishing Service 1987) 312. 
47 Council of Australian Law Deans, ‘Statement on the Nature of Legal Research’ (May/October 2005) 3. 
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with the achievement of the KSA’s legislative reform goals and the protection of party rights 
in insurance dispute resolution. 
In addition to the doctrinal analysis, a practical inquiry is also conducted. This is a practical 
reason approach that places emphasis on decisional methodology: how the relevant parties 
perceive the process and outcome, and how IDC adjudicators decide cases.48 This is inspired 
by Bingham’s contention that ‘judicial generalizations are of questionable accuracy and 
utility.’49 Also, since the researcher seeks to depict the essential display between theory and 
practice in the complex and interconnected world of insurance dispute resolution, he heeded 
Kevelson’s advice that what is needed in such instances is not further doctrinal analysis but a 
method that demonstrates that discovery and inquiry in thought are representations of actual 
phenomenal processes in the world of experience.50 In other words, the theories and doctrines 
analysed must be integrated with the working of the IDCs in practice. 
Thus, the practical inquiry shifts the emphasis from the doctrinal analysis of the rules governing 
the IDC to assessing the practical effects of the use of the IDC option. This is also important 
because the practical inquiry may provide different findings to the theoretical and doctrinal 
analysis. Thus, it would be imprudent to submit that the IDC is a more effective dispute 
resolution option than litigation, negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, without examining the 
external observation of the IDC and determining its practical and functional utility. 
Finally, the empirical inquiry focuses on adjudication in the IDC, and more particularly how 
IDC adjudicators perceive the IDC as a dispute resolution option, and what they do to protect 
consumers or policyholders challenging arbitrary adverse coverage determinations by insurers. 
The qualitative study used the five-stage process developed by Hess.51 This process involves 
the study design and ethics, sampling, data collection, data analysis, and the report. The 
                                                          
48 JM Feinman, ‘Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies’ (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 724, 724, 
728-731 (contrasting critical legal studies and practical legal studies). 
49 JW Bingham, ‘What is the Law?’ (1912) 11 Michigan Law Review 1, 9, 15-16 (‘The lawyer, as does the 
scientist, studies sequences of external phenomena and he studies them with a similar purpose-to determine their 
causes and effects and to acquire an ability to forecast sequences of the same sort’). See also VA Wellman, 
‘Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory’ (1985) 57 Colorado Law Review 
45, 46, 90-92 (discussing the use of case studies to support the contention that the practical application of theory 
is viable); DA Farber and PP Frickey, ‘Practical Reason and the First Amendment’ (1987) 34 UCLA Law Review 
1615 (proposing the practical reason approach and criticising the assessment of the first amendment law based on 
abstract theories). 
50 R Kevelson, ‘Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and Discovery in Law from the 
Perspective of Pierce’s Speculative Rhetoric’ (1986) 61(3) Indiana Law Journal 355, 359. 
51 GF Hess, ‘Qualitative Research on Legal Education: Studying Outstanding Law Teachers’ (2014) 51(4) Alberta 
Law Review 925, 928-938. The five-stage process is based on a synthesis of two important studies on educational 
research. These are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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sampling strategy used by the researcher was purposive sampling. This is because it is suitable 
for the selection of persons with a wealth of information related to the phenomenon of 
interest.52 It also enabled the researcher to make effective use of limited resources. Specifically, 
the researcher used criterion-based purposeful sampling to describe and illustrate what is 
typical to adjudicators of the IDC. It enabled the researcher to narrow the range of variations 
in order to focus on the similarities in adjudicators’ decision-making processes regarding how 
they protect consumers who are in desperate need of money and are challenging the arbitrary 
adverse determinations by insurers. 
The size of the sample that was selected was 34 adjudicators or members of the IDC, whether 
they served as legal advisors or panel members drawn from the insurance industry. All the 
participants voluntarily participated in the study. A single criterion was used to select a sample 
of these nominees to include in the study: active IDC members or adjudicators who were 
available and willing to participate in the study. 
The researcher used the questionnaire to collect qualitative data. The questionnaire (see 
Appendix II) was delivered to participants in an electronic format via email. It was 
accompanied by instructions. It was designed with the objective of asking research questions 
in a neutral and objective manner. The original version was in Arabic. The participants were 
able to complete the questionnaires diligently in the calm of their offices or home. Their 
answers were translated into English by the researcher. 
In order to prepare the data for analysis, the data was organised into file folders, with one 
document for each of the adjudicators who participated in the study. The researcher used 
phenomenology53 to analyse the data because the research problem required a profound 
understanding of the experiences common to IDC adjudicators and their motivations in 
assessing the law and facts and arriving at conclusions. Padilla-Diaz notes that the role of the 
phenomenological researcher is to build the studied object according to its own manifestations 
and components.54 Thus, the researcher delved into the experiences, perceptions and 
                                                          
52 See MB Miles and AM Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (2nd Sage 1994) 24. 
53 This is a qualitative research method that enables the researcher to build the studied object according to its own 
manifestations and components. Thus, the researcher constructed a theory regarding satisfaction with the IDC 
using the perceptions and perspectives of IDC adjudicators as building blocks. This is explained further in Chapter 
6. 
54 M Padilla-Diaz, ‘Phenomenology in Educational Qualitative Research: Philosophy as Science or Philosophical 
Science?’ (2015) 1(2) International Journal of Education Excellence 101, 104. 
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perspectives of IDC adjudicators and used these elements to construct a theory regarding how 
consumers are satisfied with the IDC because adjudicators issue fair and just decisions. 
The analysis of the empirical data therefore involved three things: identifying common 
meanings and essences; horizontalization of the data; and textual and structural analysis of the 
data. In order to identify common meanings, the researcher excluded his own meanings, 
perceptions and interpretations and entered into the participants’ unique world. This ensured 
the objectivity of the analysis of the data.  
The researcher also extracted and isolated expressions that illuminated the researched 
phenomenon. Clusters of themes were formed by grouping the units of expressions and their 
meanings together. The textual and interpretative analysis involved linking different themes in 
order to ascertain a common and distinct perspective on the effectiveness of the IDC as a 
dispute resolution body with regard to the protection provided to consumers or policyholders. 
A summary of all the themes that emerged from the analysis provides a holistic perspective of 
IDC adjudicators. Thus, the textual and interpretative analysis essentially involved analysing 
discourse. Discourse was considered to be information or persuasion. 
Given that this research involved human participants and personal data, the researcher carefully 
reviewed and followed the University’s regulations. The researcher ensured that the study 
complied with all legal and ethical requirements, as well as the relevant guidelines. Also, the 
researcher ensured that all participants signed a consent form (see Appendix III). The 
researcher kept the participants’ answers confidential. They were only identified only by a code 
number. 
1.5 Research Limitations 
 
There are certain limitations to this study, which should be taken into account. Although they 
do not ultimately affect the findings and proposals as well as the recommendations made in 
this work, they were important obstacles to certain areas of analysis. 
From a legislative perspective, the CICCL, its Implementing Regulations and the 
complementary laws and rules are still relatively new. The IDC is a system that is still in its 
infancy and so it has yet to be challenged by the test of time and academic evaluation. As such, 
there has been little material written on the subject. Moreover, the Saudi government has failed 
to provide any additional guidance on interpreting the relevant rules and regulations, such as 
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explanatory notes and circulars of the regulator, SAMA. Also, scholars have given this area 
little attention. Given the time it takes for these mechanisms to be put in place and for parties 
to begin using them, the amount of empirical data that may be collected is also limited by time 
and the number of cases submitted to the IDC. In fact, the IDC Primary Committees did not 
begin to receive full caseloads until around 2008. This in turn means that there has been just 
one decade of decisions and societal awareness of the IDC process. 
The integration of principles of Islamic law into the Saudi legal system also makes it difficult 
to conduct a doctrinal analysis. As will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the adjudicators neither 
rely on nor develop religious constrictions. The approach adopted is largely secular, although 
they are required to prioritise Islamic law. The introduction of Islamic law into the equation 
therefore renders it difficult to properly assess the legal systems because there are no principles 
unique to the Shariah in insurance dispute resolution. Nonetheless, in assessing the various 
models (IDC, litigation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration), the researcher sought to 
determine whether they were Shariah-compliant. 
Finally, the researcher encountered some difficulties in the use of the purposeful sampling 
strategy. For example, it was uncertain what was the range of variation in the sample of IDC 
members, or adjudicators, from which the researcher took the purposive sample. Thus, the 
researcher assumed that all IDC adjudicators are potential information-rich participants without 
regard to whether the adjudicators who accepted to participate in the study were actually as 
knowledgeable as the adjudicators who did not participate in the study. Also, the researcher 
was unable to use an iterative approach of sampling and re-sampling55 in order to select a 
suitable sample of adjudicators who actually possessed a wealth of information.  
The researcher could have selected only adjudicators who had issued more than 100 decisions 
or served as adjudicators or judges for more than 10 years. However, such criteria would still 
not have ensured that the adjudicators who participated in the study were actually as 
knowledgeable or even more knowledgeable when compared to adjudicators who did not 
participate in the study. Nonetheless, since the researcher used the phenomenological approach, 
                                                          
55 This involves moving back and forth between the cases that have been selected for data collection and analysing 
the data as they are collected. Subsequent sampling decisions are then determined by what emerges from the 
analysis of the data. See MN Marshall, ‘Sampling for Qualitative Research’ (1996) 13(6) Family Practice – An 
International Journal 522, 523-524. 
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the researcher did not rely on the sampling to ensure that theoretical saturation occurred.56 The 
researcher simply relied on the theory that emerged from the data. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters; the first being this Introduction, which outlines the 
research aim, research questions, and research methodology. The following six chapters 
comprise the substantive analysis of this thesis; identifying and elaborating on the problem and 
working towards the proposal of legal and practical solutions.   
Chapter Two seeks to answer the first research question regarding the rationale for compelling 
a form a dispute resolution. It provides the background information to the substantive analysis 
of the thesis. It explains the legal sources of insurance law in the KSA in order to gain an 
understanding of how insurance legislation fits into the Saudi legal framework. It discusses the 
development of the Saudi insurance sector and looks at how the CICCL has reconciled 
cooperative insurance with Shariah principles. Stress is placed on the changes introduced by 
the CICCL, including giving insurance a formal legal status and regulating the industry. The 
Chapter also discusses the role of SAMA as the regulator and assesses the obligations imposed 
on policyholders, insurers, and brokers. It shows that insurance law in the KSA is essentially 
public interest law and argues that this justifies providing disputants with a single interest-
based process for dispute resolution rather than multiple process options that may include other 
options such arbitration, negotiation, and litigation which insurance companies may use to 
undermine the interests of policyholders and the public.  
Chapter Three seeks to answer the research question regarding the rationale for compelling 
IDC adjudication. Unlike Chapter 2, it seeks to answer this question by comparing the IDC 
adjudication to the litigation-based approach. It discusses the importance of litigation in 
enabling policyholders to challenge insurers’ adverse determinations, as well as the 
shortcomings of the litigation model. It then considers the argument that the expense and 
unpredictability of litigation could be avoided or reduced by channelling disputes towards an 
administrative system. The concept and nature of the administrative tribunal are assessed, 
followed by the use of the model in Islamic systems. It is argued that the IDC is an 
administrative tribunal. Thus, in light of the use of the administrative model in different 
                                                          
56 For a thorough discussion on how this can be achieved in qualitative studies, see B Saunders et al, ‘Saturation 
in Qualitative Research: Exploring Its Conceptualization and Operationalization’ (2018) 52(4) Quality and 
Quantity 1893, 1893-1905. 
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jurisdictions and the absence of a solidly grounded theoretical understanding of the model in 
the KSA, the profile of the archetypal administrative tribunal is mapped. It is then determined 
how the IDC compares to the archetypal administrative tribunal. It shows that the IDC lacks 
some of the fitting qualities of the archetypal tribunal and is not a better option than litigation 
for resolving disputes over insurance cover. The shortcomings identified include the lack of 
clarity in IDC procedures, and ambiguities within the empowering legislation. 
Chapter Four is the third step towards answering the research question of the rationale for 
compelling IDC adjudication. Unlike Chapters 2 and 3, it answers this question by examining 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) available in the KSA and determining 
whether they are more effective than the IDC adjudication. The ADR options examined include 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The chapter seeks to determine whether each of these 
forms of ADR may help overcome the shortcomings of the IDC identified in Chapter 3. It is 
shown that although negotiation and mediation may not be slow, laden with rules, and costly, 
they are less appealing to policyholders than administrative tribunals because third parties who 
mediate or facilitate negotiations cannot enforce their decisions or have them enforced. It is 
also shown that arbitration is effective but does not confer any unique advantage regarding 
fairness and privacy. The parties to the arbitration are provided the same protection as 
disputants in the IDC. However, arbitration has an advantage over the administrative tribunal 
model regarding timely determinations. 
Chapter Five adopts a practical reason approach, following from the doctrinal legal inquiry in 
the previous chapters. This approach emphasises decisional methodology: how parties perceive 
the process and outcome, and how IDC adjudicators decide cases. Thus, this Chapter seeks to 
answer the research questions of whether IDC adjudicators have adopted any specific measures 
to protect consumers, and whether consumers satisfied with the IDC. It shifts the emphasis 
from the doctrinal analysis of the rules governing the IDC to assessing the practical effects of 
the use of the IDC option. It stresses the importance of an objective and external observation 
of this dispute resolution option so as to determine whether, despite the shortcomings of the 
CICCL and Working Rules, the IDC has practical and functional utility, thereby justifying the 
Saudi legislator’s preference for this option. The Chapter analyses data of surveys conducted 
by the General Secretariat of the Committees for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes and 
Violations, as well as decisions of the IDC Committees. The objective is to ascertain whether 
the level of satisfaction of the users of the IDC may be correlated with the fairness of the 
decisions of the Committees. An attempt is also made to determine whether the level of 
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satisfaction of the users of the IDC may be explained by the fact that the users believe the IDC 
is better than other dispute resolution options.  
Chapter Six discusses and analyses the findings of the empirical inquiry that sought to test the 
theory that the level of satisfaction of parties, specifically consumers or policyholders, is 
strongly linked with their satisfaction with the outcomes of the hearings or whether they believe 
the adjudicator’s decision is fair. This Chapter therefore seeks to answer the research question 
of whether IDC adjudicators have adopted any specific measures to protect consumers. 
Answering this question enables the researcher to determine the relationship between the 
doctrinal analysis of the law governing dispute resolution by the IDC (conducted in Chapters 
3 and 4) and the practical inquiry conducted in Chapter 5.  
The research focused on how IDC adjudicators perceive the IDC as a dispute resolution option, 
and what they do to protect consumers or policyholders challenging arbitrary adverse coverage 
determinations by insurers. A five-stage process was used. This involved the study design and 
ethics, sampling, data collection, data analysis, and the report. This chapter explains how the 
researcher accomplished each phase. Emphasis is placed on the discourse analytic method 
which the researcher employed to capture the perspectives of the IDC adjudicators.  
Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the study by showing how the research questions were 
addressed in order to achieve the research aim. It also makes proposals for reform and 
recommendations for further studies. 
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Chapter 2: The Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing Insurance in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter lays the foundation for the substantive analysis. It explains the legal sources of 
insurance law in the KSA, in order to gain an understanding of how insurance legislation fits 
into the Saudi legal framework. It begins with a brief analysis of the structure of the Saudi 
judicial system and explains why the Quran and Sunnah serve as the Kingdom’s Constitution, 
as well as why the government’s authority is derived from these sources. It then discusses the 
development of the Saudi insurance sector and how it has moved, from being a monopolised 
system to becoming a thriving economic market, under the regulation and supervision of the 
Saudi Central Bank, namely the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA). Next, this 
Chapter looks at how the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law (CICCL) has 
reconciled cooperative insurance with Shariah principles. It emphasises the changes introduced 
by the statute, including giving insurance a formal legal status and regulating the industry. The 
Chapter also discusses SAMA’s role as the regulator, and assesses the obligations imposed on 
policyholders, insurers, and brokers. It shows that insurance law in the KSA is essentially 
public interest law and argues that this justifies providing disputants with a single, interest-
based process for dispute resolution; rather than multiple process options, which may include 
other options that can be used by insurance companies to undermine the interests of 
policyholders and the general public. This Chapter therefore seeks to answer the first research 
question regarding the rationale for compelling a form of dispute resolution.  
 
2.2 Saudi Arabia’s Legal and Judicial System 
In order to understand the nature and role of insurance law in Saudi Arabia, it is important to 
ascertain the fundamental concepts that shape the Kingdom’s legal system. It is a relatively 
new system, established in 1932 at the beginning of the reign of Abdul-Aziz ibn Sa’ud (1932-
1953), founder and first King of Saudi Arabia.57 King Sa’ud took control of Hijaz and began to 
unite the territories, with the goal of building a strong nation, while at the same time respecting 
                                                          
57 See AA An-Naim, Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book (Zed Books, 2002), 136. 
See also, GN Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) 36(4) The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 729, 730-732; AF Ansary, ‘A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (GlobaLex, 2008) 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html> accessed 14 November 2019.  
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the culture and history of its people.58 Determining that the best way to achieve this goal was 
through the application of Islamic doctrine to public life and the government’s infrastructure, 
King Sa’ud began to transform the fragmented territory into organised Provinces.59  
However, by 1926, the system had already begun to take shape with the approval of the Basic 
Regulation (al-Talimat al Assasiah) for Hijaz Province after the occupation of the Hijaz 
Kingdom.60 This law essentially served as the constitution for the area and resembled the 
constitutions of many modern states; establishing the infrastructure and system of 
governance.61 This system continued to evolve and develop, until Hijaz and the other Provinces 
were united to form a single Kingdom in September 1932.62 Thus, under the reign of King 
Sa’ud, the Saudi government continued to develop various Ministries for domains such as 
defence, internal affairs, finance and communications. In October 1953, the Council of 
Ministers was established; this basic structure remained in place, with some modifications, 
until the reign of King Fahad ibn Abdul-Aziz (1982-2005).63 
King Fahad bin Abdul-Aziz began the process of codifying Saudi constitutional principles.64 
In March 1992, the King issued Royal Orders to establish three fundamental Laws: the Basic 
System of Governance, the Consultative Council Law, and Regional Law.65 The Basic System 
or Law was arguably the most important of these statutes.66 However, it provided that the 
Quran and Sunnah constitute the Kingdom’s Constitution, and the government’s authority is 
                                                          
58 AH Dahlan, Dirasa Fi Al-Siyyasah Al-Dakhiliyyqah Li-Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiyyah Al-Sa’udiyyah [A Study in 
the Internal Politics of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] (1984) 31-33; Faisal Ibn Misha’l Al-Su’ud, Islamic Political 
Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Majlis Ash Shura: Concept, Theory and Practice (2002) 51. 
59 Ansary (n 1). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid; Dahlan (n 2), 121-126; SA Solaim, Constitutional and Judicial Organizations in Saudi Arabia 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 3-26. 
62 Ansary (n 1). 
63 Solaim (n 5), 3-26. 
64 See AM Al-Mehaimeed, ‘The Constitutional System of Saudi Arabia: A Conspectus’ (1993) 8(1) Arab Law 
Quarterly 30, 30-31. 
65 Basic Law of Governance, Royal Order No. A/90, (27/8/1412H, Mar. 1, 1992); The Regional Law, Royal Order 
No. A/91 (27/8/1412H, Mar. 1, 1992); The Shura Council Law, Royal Order No. A/91, (27/8/1412H, Mar. 1, 
1992). 
66 Ansary (n 1). Al-Mehaimeed states that it possesses the nature and meaning that are generally attributed to the 
written constitutions of countries. See Al-Mehaimeed (n 8), 30. Ghazi also contends that the Basic Law acts as 
the constitution, since it has the highest influence on the hierarchical normative order, and it organises and controls 
power, balances competing claims of individual and social interest, and mirrors the country’s culture and 
experience. See MA Ghazi, ‘Constitutional Human Rights: Saudi Perspective’ (2010) 4(3) Journal of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies 28, 29. 
34 
 
derived from these sources.67 This system is still in place today. It ensures that courts in the 
Kingdom prioritise legal principles derived from teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. 
 
2.2.1 The Saudi Legal System 
KSA is a constitutional monarchy, given that the King is bound to exercise powers within the 
limits prescribed by the Quran and Sunnah.68  Political power is shared between the King and 
the Council of Ministers, comprising the Kingdom’s executive and legislative authorities.69 The 
role of the Council of Ministers is to propose legislative acts and perform executive functions. 
However, final authority for all matters, whether legislative, executive or judicial, rests with 
the King.70 
Since the Quran represents the Constitution, the Saudi legal system is based on the principles 
of Shariah, which regulate all aspects of Muslim societies and states, including the methods by 
which legal rights are enforced.71 The Shariah foundation is reflected in Article 7 of the Basic 
Law, which provides that ‘…Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority 
                                                          
67 Basic Law of Governance, Article 7. Although there is no evidence that the King sought to embrace the natural 
law theory, it may be argued that Article 7 of the Basic Law endorses the paradigmatic natural law view that 
natural law is derived from God and is knowable by all human beings and authoritative over them, without 
exception.  For an analysis of the paradigmatic natural law view, see MC Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in 
Ethics’ (2002) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (substantive revision 27 September 2011) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/> accessed 14 November 2019. See also, MC Murphy, 
‘Natural Law, Consent and Political Obligation’ in EF Paul et al (eds), Natural Law and Modern Moral Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 70-71. It has also been contended that Article 7 of the Basic Law embraces 
the philosophy of unifying the law of God with the law of nature. See Ghazi (n 10), 30-31. The adoption of this 
philosophy in the KSA may be traced to the School of Abd Al-Wahhab, which influenced the modern development 
of the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence; rejecting judicial precedents and recommending an independent 
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah to derive relevant rules and resolve disputes. For an analysis of the 
Wahhabi School, see NJ DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
68 However, this is subject to debate. Some commentators argue that a constitutional monarchy requires a power-
sharing arrangement between the monarch and parliament. Hence, the KSA is a ruling monarchy, because the 
monarch can form or terminate the government without consulting other institutions. See K Alboaouh and J 
Mahoney, ‘Religious and Political Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Prospects’ (2017) 
6(2) MANAS Journal of Social Studies 241, 244. See also, A Stephan, J Linz and J Minoves, ‘Democratic 
Parliamentary Monarchies’ (2014) 25(2) Journal of Democracy 35, 35-51. However, Alboaouh and Mahoney’s 
argument is based on the substantial discretionary powers granted to the Saudi King by the Basic Law, which they 
describe as the ‘Constitution’. Nonetheless, the Basic Law is not the Constitution of the KSA. Instead, the Quran 
and Sunnah constitute the Constitution and provide the rules by which all Muslims, including the King, are 
required to abide. 
69 Basic Law of Governance, Article 5(a), 44. 
70 Ibid, Article 44. This reinforces the argument that the KSA is a ruling, not a constitutional monarchy. 
71 AA Al-Ghadyan, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’ (1998) 13(3) Arab Law Quarterly 235, 236. See also, A 
Amanat, ‘Preface’ in A Amanat and F Griffel (eds), Shari’a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context (Stanford 
University Press, 2009). 
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from the Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of His Messenger…’72 Nonetheless, there is 
often disagreement over the way in which Shariah law is to be interpreted and applied. This is 
reflected in the development of four main Sunni schools of thought: the Hanafi,73 Maliki,74 
Shafi’i75 and Hanbali76 schools. These schools were established by their respective leaders 
throughout the eighth and ninth centuries.77 Within the teachings and interpretations of each 
school of thought, one can identify practical differences in their approach to applying Shariah 
texts to various situations.78 Given this array of approaches, it can be difficult to determine how 
a dispute should be resolved. However, the Saudi legal system has generally adopted the 
conservative Hanbali School as its primary source of interpretation.79 Thus, the Hanbali School 
is the official school of Islamic jurisprudence. It provides guidance on how courts in the 
Kingdom should address legal questions. 
 
2.2.2 The Judicial System 
The Saudi judicial system may be broken down into three distinct forums: the Shariah courts, 
the Board of Grievances, and quasi-judicial committees.80 The judicial forums are required to 
be independent and are not subject to any outside influence in exercising their judicial 
authority.81 Meanwhile, all judicial bodies are required to apply Shariah law in resolving any 
                                                          
72 It follows that the Shariah is the main check on the King’s powers. This is why Sayen observes that the most 
successful governments in Saudi Arabia have been those that worked effectively with the religious establishment 
(Shariah scholars or Ulama), since this reassures the populace that the Shariah is being applied faithfully. See G 
Sayen, ‘Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia’ (2003) 24(4) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 905, 907. 
73 The Hanafi School was founded by Imam Abu Hanifah, Annuman ibn Thabit (699-767 AD). 
74 The Maliki School was founded by Imam Malik ibn Anas (712-795 AD). 
75 The Shafi’i School was founded by Imam ash-Shafi, Mohammed ibn Idris (769-819 AD). 
76 The Hanbali School was founded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855 AD). 
77 See D Zacharia, ‘Fundamentals of the Sunni Schools of Law’ (2006) 66 Heidelberg Journal of International 
Law (ZaoRV) 491, 493-506. See also, G Makdisi, ‘The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic 
Religious History’ (1979) 10(1) International Journal of Middle East Studies 1, 1-8. 
78 AY Baamir, Shari’a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia (2010), 
15-16. 
79 AA Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer, 2011), 602-605. The Decree issued 
by King Saud in 1345H or 1926 designated the Hanbali School (under Ibn Hanbal) as the official school for 
Islamic courts and tribunals in the Kingdom. However, the principle of stare decisis is not recognised and judges 
are required to determine what, in good conscience, best represents the will of God. This implies that judges may 
adopt the interpretation of another school of thought, where they believe it best represents the will of God. See 
CP Trumbull, ‘Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 609, 629-630. See also, FE Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill, 
2000), 142-143. 
80 For a succinct analysis, see AA Nikulin et al, ‘Judicial System of Saudi Arabia and Analysis of Jurisdiction 
Courts of First Instance’ (2017) 13(2) Revista Publicando 834, 834-842. See also, SS Solaim, ‘Saudi Arabia’s 
Judicial System’ (1971) 25(3) Middle East Journal 403, 403-407. It must be noted that although the quasi-judicial 
committees exercise judicial functions, they are mostly part of the executive or administrative branch. 
81 Basic Law of Governance, art 46. The independence of Shariah courts was affirmed by Article 26 of the Law 
of the Judiciary issued by Royal Decree No. M/64 (12/07/1975), stating that these courts have jurisdiction over 
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disputes brought before them. The courts primarily subscribe to the Hanbali school, as 
indicated above, although the judges are free to consult other schools, wherever an issue is not 
covered by the accepted Hanbali texts.82 However, it must be noted that no law governs the 
exercise of discretion by judges in the Shariah courts or Board of Grievances. The contention 
that they may consult other schools of Islamic jurisprudence where the Hanbali texts are silent 
on an issue is based on the presupposition about discretion in discerning the Shariah-compliant 
course. Hence, if the Hanbali is silent on an issue, the Shariah-compliant course is that 
prescribed by other Islamic schools. 
 
2.2.2.1 Shariah Courts 
Shariah courts were first established in the KSA in 197583 and the Law of the Judiciary 
governing these courts was amended in 2007.84 These Shariah courts comprise the Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeal, and Courts of First Instance, which include the General Court, Personal 
Status Court, Family Courts, Commercial Court, and Labour Courts. The hierarchy of these 
courts is illustrated in Figure 1, below. 
 
                                                          
all matters except those excluded by law. For an analysis of this law, see AA Al-Ghadyan, ‘The Judiciary in Saudi 
Arabia’ (1998) 13(3) Arab Law Quarterly 235, 235-236. Regarding the broader question of whether the courts in 
the KSA may be said to be independent from an objective perspective, see AM Al-Jarbou, ‘Judicial Independence: 
Case Study of Saudi Arabia’ (2004) 19(1/4) Arab Law Quarterly 5, 5-54. 
82 MI Al-Mhaidib, ‘Arbitration as a Means of Settling Commercial Disputes (National and International) with 
Special Reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (1997) Edinburgh Research Archive 1, 14. 
<https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/7243> accessed 14 November 2019. 
83 Law of the Judiciary issued by Royal Decree No. M/78 (1/10/2007). 
84 Ibid.  
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Figure 1: The court hierarchy.85 
 
2.2.2.2 Board of Grievances  
The Board of Grievances serves as the Saudi administrative court system. It was established in 
1982,86 and reformed and restructured as part of broad judicial changes that took place in 
2007.87 It is ‘an independent judicial body reporting directly to the King, and its seat [is] in the 
City of Riyadh.’88 It consists of the Supreme Administrative Court, Administrative Courts of 
Appeal, and Administrative Courts.89 These administrative courts are al-mazalim courts or 
tribunals, which are courts of special jurisdiction that are tasked with resolving disputes 
concerning specific commercial issues. They may be distinguished from the Shariah courts 
which are quda courts, which are courts of general jurisdiction tasked with the administration 
of ordinary justice. 
 
2.2.2.3 Quasi-judicial Committees 
Quasi-judicial committees are administrative committees with the authority to resolve sector-
specific disputes. The quasi-judicial committee that is analysed in this thesis is the Insurance 
Dispute Committee (IDC). Quasi-judicial committees in the KSA are created by an 
                                                          
85‘The New Court System in Saudi Arabia’ <http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-8/may-
7/the-new-court-system-in-Saudi-arabia.html#sthash.YD5m2RoZ.dpuf> accessed 14 November 2019. 
86 Law of the Board of Grievances issued by Royal Decree No. M/51 (10/05/1982). 
87 Law of the Judiciary (n 27). 
88 Ibid, Article 1. 
89 Ibid, Article 8. 
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empowering Ministerial regulation and they operate under the supervision of the relevant 
Ministry. Several quasi-judicial committees with limited jurisdiction have been established 
since 1931. It has been contended that these committees were created to reduce the caseload 
brought before the courts.90 However, Solaim argues that if the motivation for creating 
committees to adjudicate and address specific issues was simply to ease the burden on existing 
judges, then more courts would have been created and more judges would have been 
appointed.91 Hence, although the committees help to ensure that cases progress in a timely 
fashion, from the submission of the complaint to disposition, they were also created to address 
concerns over the refusal of Shariah courts to adjudicate certain issues.92 The committees are 
therefore convenient mechanisms for dealing with these concerns.93 Nonetheless, it is noted in 
Chapters 5 and 6 that although the committees have adjudicated disputes concerning contracts 
that are not Shariah-compliant, neither the CICCL nor the Working Rules direct the 
committees on how to deal with such contracts. Thus, the panel of adjudicators exercise 
discretion in determining whether the clauses of the contract are independent of one another to 
the effect that the unenforceable Shariah-compliant clauses may be severed from the rest of 
the contract. However, the adjudicators have not been helpful in explaining why they recognise 
and enforce contracts containing clauses that are not Shariah-compliant. They do not rely on 
any established principle of severability.  
Unlike the Shariah courts, the committees operate under the supervision of the relevant 
Ministry. Thus, like the Board of Grievances, they are administrative bodies that carry out 
specific judicial functions. Moreover, they are not independent of the executive, given that they 
operate in accordance with the directions of the relevant Ministry. In many cases, the Minister 
may dissolve the committee, or dismiss and replace one or even all its members. Such 
discretionary authority exercised by the Minister over the committees therefore seriously 
undermines their independence. It is therefore important that the committees to demonstrate 
that they are not subject to improper influence from the government in order to enhance their 
reputation for impartiality 
                                                          
90 M Faraj, Towards New Corporate Governance Standards in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Lessons from 
Delaware (SABIC, 2014), 40. 
91 Solaim (n 24), 405-406. 
92 Faraj (n 34), 40.  
93 A good example is the validity of conventional insurance contracts. See Amar Aljaser, Is Islamic Insurance 
Ready to Take the Lead? - A Case Study of the Saudi Arabian Insurance Law (Unpublished SJD Dissertation, 
Georgetown University, 2014), 83-89. 
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Given that the committees are administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, it is uncertain whether 
parties who are dissatisfied with their decisions may appeal to the Board of Grievances. This 
is because the Supreme Administrative Court is one of the institutions comprising the Board 
of Grievances. However, Article 9 of the Law of the Board of Grievances, issued in 1982, 
provides that the decisions of the quasi-judicial committees are exempt from review by the 
Board. Nonetheless, Article 13(b) of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 provides that the Board 
has jurisdiction over the decisions of all quasi-judicial committees, except the Committee for 
the Resolution of Security Disputes, the Banking Dispute Settlement Committee, and the Tariff 
Committees. Hence, the Board is not banned from reviewing the decisions of the IDC 
committees. Notwithstanding the above, this is confusing, in light of the fact that the SAMA 
Appellate Committee is the designated body for receiving appeals from the IDC Primary 
Committees. The judicial reform of 2007 expanded the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances 
to include appeals from all quasi-judicial committees except the three committees named 
above. However, appeals from the IDC Primary Committees are submitted to the SAMA 
Appeal Committee, but there is no provision stating that the CICCL overrules Article 13(b) of 
the Board of Grievances Law 2007.  It is due to such confusion that there was a plan in 2005 
to abolish all quasi-judicial committees and transfer their powers to special courts within the 
judicial branch.94 However, that plan has not been implemented.  
 
2.2.3 Sources of Law  
There are essentially two perspectives from which to understand the KSA’s domestic laws. 
First, there is Shariah law, which is the law that applies to all aspects of life in Islamic society. 
Next, there are the codified laws, created by the legislature and consistent with Shariah law.95 
These are used to regulate all activities within the Kingdom.  
                                                          
94 Faraj (n 34), 43. 
95 As noted above, this system mirrors the conception of natural law as that part of divine law that is knowable by 
man, while positive law is the particularisation or application of natural law to the varying circumstances of 
different societies. See NHG Robinson, ‘Natural Law, Morality and the Divine Will’ (1950) 3(10) The 
Philosophical Quarterly 23, 23-24. Thus, the Shariah represents natural law, while legislation and other orders 
represent positive law. It should be noted here that debate on the link between natural law and the Shariah is 
ongoing, with influential Islamic scholars such as Makdisi and Crone arguing that there is no natural law tradition 
in Islam. Their arguments are analysed by Emon, who shows that references to nature or rational proof, where 
these are not based on scripture, do not provide any basis for asserting divine law in the context of Islam: Anver 
M Emon, ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law’ (2005) 20(2) Journal of Law and Religion 351, 351-
395. See also Emon’s philosophical investigation of Islamic natural law and demonstration that where there are 
competing theologies of the divine, the ontological authority of reason cannot be overlooked: Anver M Evon, 
Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford University Press, 2010). As such, it is argued in this thesis that even within 
Islamic law, not all determinations of the divine find expression in scripture. Hence, there is good reason to 
associate natural law with Islamic law. 
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2.2.3.1 Shariah Law 
As noted above, the KSA is governed by Shariah law,96 which is primarily based on the Quran 
and Sunnah. Hence, all laws and regulations, as well as contracts (including insurance 
contracts) must comply with the Shariah, although there is no clear standard for determining 
Shariah-compliance. The Quran is the Holy Book of Islam, revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad and representing the word of God. The Sunnah comprises the teachings and 
lessons of the Prophet Muhammad.97 The Quran provides basic rules of Islamic beliefs and 
practices, and standards of human conduct. It is not a code that exhaustively covers a system 
of laws. Most of the verses do not deal with legal matters. Even the Sunnah is limited to the 
Holy Prophet’s interpretations of certain verses while acting as mediator and negotiator.  
As such, Shariah courts have to rely secondary sources that interpret the Quran and further 
interpret the Sunnah. These are referred to as fiqh.98 However, there are different types of fiqh, 
and no consensus on which one takes precedence over the others. They include the ijma, 
representing consensus interpretations from the earliest generation of Islamic scholars; the 
qiyas, consisting of the reasoning of Muslim judges when applying the law, and fatwa, 
consisting of rulings on matters that did not exist in the Prophet’s day.99 These sources of law 
must be taken into account and complied with by the legislature, judges and lawyers, when 
attempting to regulate or enforce activities within Islamic society. With the availability of so 
many sources, adjudicators have acquired significant discretion in deciding cases. This makes 
it difficult to predict outcomes given that judges face a number of lawful possibilities. This is 
problematic, especially in insurance cases. It remains uncertain how adjudicators rely on 
Shariah to interpret the relevant legislation such as the CICCL and the Working Rules. 
What is problematic is that, taken as a whole, Shariah represents more than just a religion, It 
is a set of rules and provisions, governing every aspect of Muslim life.100 This approach is 
intrinsic to Muslim culture and the need to comply with Shariah law is embedded in Muslim 
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society. In addition to serving as a source of guidance for individuals, its provisions empower 
the government to regulate society through laws that comply with Shariah principles.101 In fact, 
Muslims are brought up to understand that these rights are inviolable, and that compliance is 
of the utmost importance,102 since Muslims believe that Islamic law is living law. The failure 
to submit to it equates to contradicting God's law, thereby rendering a person a sinner. Muslims 
maintain that this concerns the whole of everyday life. 
  
2.2.3.2 Saudi Statutes  
Saudi adjudicators also rely on written statutes. They create standards that serve as a guide for 
parties, ensuring that their activities are legal, and for judiciary and executive branches to 
respectively decide disputes and enforce sanctions in response to non-compliance. It is 
interesting to note that the Saudi legislature uses the term, Nizam meaning ‘regulation’, to 
describe its legislative acts, as opposed to Qanun, meaning ‘law’ or ‘Act’. The rationale behind 
this wording is that only God can create laws and as such, the legislature or even the King 
should not attempt to refer to his enactments as ‘laws’.103 For the purposes of simplicity in 
concept and translation, the terms ‘law’ and ‘Act’ are interchangeable with the Saudi 
legislature’s term, Nizam in this thesis. What is important here is that the rule or regulation is 
recognised as having the force the law and may be enforced by the distribution of benefits and 
burdens, or by the imposition of penalties.104 
There are a number of legal instruments implemented in SA, including: 
Royal Decrees, regulations, executive regulations, lists, codes, rules, procedures, 
international treaties and agreements, ministerial resolutions, ministerial decisions, 
circular memoranda, explanatory memoranda, documents, and resolutions which have 
been designated by the government as the official sources of Saudi Arabian Law.105  
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In addition to these sources of law, the Saudi King has the legislative power to issue Royal 
Orders. One of the most important of these is the Basic Law of Governance. 
 
2.3.2.1 The Basic Law of Governance  
For nearly 60 years from the date of the KSA’s unification, the Saudi people lived according 
to Shariah law, without a written constitution.106 However, on March 1, 1992, King Fahad bin 
Abdul-Aziz enacted the Basic Law of Governance to delineate the constitutional framework in 
the KSA.107 He viewed this as a necessary step towards regulating State authorities, managing 
the transfer of power between heirs, and protecting fundamental human rights.108 Before its 
enactment, there was no centralised means of establishing government powers; rather, they 
were outlined in diverse instruments, strewn together piecemeal to empower the government 
to regulate society.109  
The Basic Law consists of 83 Articles, grouped into nine Chapters, which focus primarily on 
the system of governance, including its structure and powers. Article 1 provides that the KSA 
is an Islamic state, with its Constitution rooted in the Quran and Sunnah.110 Article 7 further 
affirms that the government is to be guided by Shariah principles, declaring that the 
government’s authority and the State’s administrative regulations are governed by the Quran 
and Sunnah.111 Furthermore, in Article 23, the Basic Law confirms that it is the State’s role to 
protect the principles of Islam and uphold Shariah law.112 
The contents of the Basic Law are quite similar to the constitutions of other nations, given that 
they establish the basic principles governing behaviour in society and the rights of the people. 
For example, Article 5 confirms that the KSA is a monarchy,113 while Article 8 provides that 
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Current Practices of Saudi Corporate Governance: A Case for Reform (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brunel 
University, 2013), 14-15. 
112 This is in line with the law’s demand for government in administrative jurisprudence. See E Barendt, 
‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’ (1995) Public Law 559, 559-619. See also P Hamburger, 
Is Administrative Law Lawful? (University of Chicago Press, 2014), 5-7, 12-13.   
113 See ‘Saudi Arabia: The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (1993) 8(3) Arab Law Quarterly 
258, 259. 
43 
 
the government must prioritise justice, consultation, and the equality of citizens under Shariah 
law. Article 9 emphasises the importance of maintaining Islamic values and of the basic 
structure of, and need for, unity within the Saudi family. Articles 37 and 40 recognise the right 
to privacy in one’s home and personal communications, and Article 18 protects private 
property. Article 23 outlines the KSA’s economic principles, including the rights and duties of 
transacting parties, stressing that it is the State’s responsibility to protect human rights in 
accordance with Shariah laws and principles. Finally, Article 16 highlights the sacrosanct 
nature of public funds, and tasks the Kingdom with safeguarding them.  
 
2.3 The Development of Saudi Insurance Law 
As the KSA developed and began to witness economic growth, insurance increasingly became 
important as insurers helped businesses mitigate risk and provided financial assistance to 
consumers in times of need.114 The concept of insurance is not new in the KSA, having its roots 
in early Arabic society.115 In fact, its origins lie in Aqilah, referring to a pool of risk and common 
resources,116 and Al-Dayyah, a substitute penalty.117 These concepts were originally founded on 
the Islamic principles of shared responsibility, social solidarity, and mutual cooperation. The 
goal of this mechanism was to provide mutual financial security to participants against pre-
defined risks.118 This concept of risk-sharing represents an intrinsic feature of all Islamic 
contracts and modes of financing. Islam favours contracts based on exchange and collective 
efforts towards the protection against measurable risks in order to mitigate or eliminate the 
threat they pose to the business enterprise. The entity providing the protection must be paid a 
charge against revenues. This enables all participants, investors and managers, to share in the 
cost. Hence, the measurable risk is shared, rather than transferred. On the other hand, the 
unmeasurable risk or uncertainty cannot be shared. Interest is banned because it enables the 
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investor to unfairly transfer such risks to the borrower. Islam therefore requires the manager to 
rely on Tawakal (what Allah may grant) beyond what can be protected against (measurable 
risk) at a fair cost.  
The Saudi insurance market has undergone significant changes and is witnessing extensive 
growth,119 becoming one of the leading insurance markets in the MENA region. It has in fact 
transitioned from dominance by a single, officially-sanctioned entity  to one in which licences 
can be issued to private insurers; giving rise to a competitive market with over 35 licenced 
providers.120 As a consequence of the liberalisation and privatisation of the sector, there have 
inevitably been attempts to regulate it. It has been shown that enhancing access to the market 
through privatisation or liberalisation does not in itself ensure fair competition; regulatory 
reform built on pro-competitive policies is also needed. Thus, liberalisation and privatisation 
only improve market performance and competition, if they are accompanied by effective 
regulation.121  
Nonetheless, historically, there has not been much in the way of insurance sector development 
and regulation in the KSA. Indeed, Saudi regulators have been under increasing pressure in 
recent decades to develop and implement managerial, financial and legal instruments, which 
can adapt to the changing insurance landscape. Regulation has been problematic, because 
although the Kingdom’s insurance sector continues to grow and evolve, many areas of 
insurance, especially commercial insurance, remain controversial from the Islamic 
perspective.122 
 
2.3.1 Basic Law of the Insurance Sector 
The basic law covering the insurance sector in the KSA is the Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Control Law (CICCL), which came into force on 20 November 2003. The 
Implementing Regulations were subsequently published on 23 April 2004.123 Prior to these 
reforms, however, the Saudi insurance sector was largely unregulated. In 2004, the Saudi 
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government formally ended its monopoly over the insurance industry by inviting companies to 
register and trade as publicly-listed companies on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).124 The 
Foreign Investment Act of 2002 allowed companies to have foreign majority ownership and in 
2003, insurance was removed from the list of sectors in which foreign entities were prohibited 
from investing.125 
CICCL requires that insurance products be purchased within the scope of Islamic finance and 
its implementing regulations. Thus, the integration of the cooperative insurance model into 
Saudi law has allowed the market to grow exponentially,126 while still maintaining the ethical 
principles mandated by Shariah law. The CICCL places an emphasis on cooperative insurance. 
This is a form of risk-sharing plan. Similar to takaful (Islamic insurance), it incorporates the 
concepts of mutuality (mutual help, mutual protection and shared responsibility for claims) 
between policyholders. With the CICCL coming into force, cooperative insurance has likewise 
been determined to be Shariah-compliant. Under this model, policyholders contribute 
premiums to a shared fund, and the money within that fund is used to cover the claims of any 
participants in that fund.127 This is similar to the cooperative and mutual insurance models used 
by conventional insurers in Western markets. Therefore, in essence, all Shariah-compliant 
insurance is cooperative, but not all cooperative insurance is takaful. The cooperative and 
mutual insurance models used by conventional insurers in Western markets are not takaful, 
because they involve charging interest and enforcing speculative contracts. 
In this regard, scholars have identified a number of ways in which Shariah-compliant 
cooperative insurance differs from takaful. First, some measure of capital is occasionally 
provided by an external shareholder in a cooperative model, as opposed to other members of 
the community. Second, to the extent that there is an underwriting surplus, it is shared by the 
shareholders and not returned to the policyholders.128 Third, governance of the insurance 
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company and its products remains with the shareholders.129 Finally, the governing regulations 
provide little insight into how the term ‘cooperative’ should be defined.130 The regulations 
mention the model of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance, but  do not give 
detailed guidance on how such a model is to be implemented in practice.131 
 
2.3.2 Obligations of the Parties 
The goal of insurance is to bring ‘the insured back to their financial condition prior to the 
loss.’132 Thus, insurance provides financial security against the risk of loss or damage.133 In 
doing so, it helps alleviate the stress associated with potential risks for individuals and 
businesses, and gives them some reassurance of safety and economic stability.134 This is 
accomplished by allocating duties and responsibilities to the various parties involved in the 
creation and regulation of insurance contracts. 
2.3.2.1 Policyholders 
The most important duty of a policyholder is the duty of good faith to the insurer.135 This means 
that the policyholder must fully disclose all known material facts and matters that could affect 
either party’s acceptance of the insurance contract, whether or not the insurer requests them.136 
This obligation exists prior to the signing of an insurance policy and for the duration of the 
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policy’s effectiveness.137 Should an insured party fail to notify the insurer of a material change 
in his or her circumstances, the policy will be affected, and the insured party will risk losing 
the protection of the insurance contract. Additionally, policyholders are under an obligation to 
pay premiums in a timely manner.138  
Furthermore, if a policyholder wishes to submit a claim, he or she must comply with all the 
formal requirements for submitting the application and the requested documentation.139 The 
time period for an insurer to settle a claim will not begin until the insurer has received all the 
required documentation.140 It is the insured party’s responsibility to demonstrate that the claim 
falls within the scope of the policy and that all contractual conditions have been met. If the 
insured party fails to comply with these procedural steps, he or she will risk the claim being 
denied. It is therefore in the best interests of both the insured and the insurer for there to be 
clear communication and cooperation. Although not specifically mentioned in the laws and 
regulations, the insured party may also have an implicit duty to mitigate damage and preserve 
subrogation rights.141 
 
2.3.2.2 Insurers 
Similar to policyholders, insurers have a duty of good faith to their customers. The Insurance 
Market Code of Conduct Regulation, enacted by Decision No. 103/429 dated 8 September 
2008 provides that ‘Companies must act in an honest, transparent and fair manner, and fulfil 
all of their obligations to customers, which they have under the laws, regulations, and SAMA 
guidelines.’142 The implementing guidelines further elaborate that ‘the founders of the 
Company, and owners of insurance professions shall be of good conduct and reputation with 
no convictions by court action affecting their honor and integrity.’143 Additionally, the 
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Implementing Regulations require that insurance companies ‘conduct their business according 
to professional and ethical standards.’144 To ensure that these professional and ethical standards 
are met, the company must qualify its employees to undertake duties related to insurance 
work.145 When selecting board members and managers, the company has a duty to only engage 
those who are trustworthy and experienced in financial and insurance business.146 Furthermore, 
a company board member is not permitted to sit on the board of another insurance company;147 
this prevents conflicts of interest from arising. Additionally, the company must draft internal 
policies and procedures to combat economic crime, such as money laundering.148 
In dealing with policyholders, the company is to apply ‘Know Your Customer’ standards.149 It 
also has an obligation to communicate all relevant information to a customer that will enable 
that customer to make an informed and timely decision.150 When pricing policies for 
policyholders, the company likewise has a duty to ensure that this pricing is fair, reasonable 
and adequate;151 aligning with the company’s underwriting guidelines and with appropriate 
consideration for the risks involved.152 Additionally, the company must be able to provide 
SAMA with the basis and justification of its pricing.153 
For the policies themselves, they need to be drafted so that they are clear and can be readily 
understood by the public at large.154At the very minimum, a policy must also provide the 
following information: the policy number; the policyholder’s name and mailing address; the 
period of cover; a description of the cover and limits; deductibles and retentions; endorsements, 
warranties and riders; conditions and exclusions; insurance rates and premium accounts, and 
the identification of the property or activities to be insured.155 The policyholder should also 
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have an opportunity to access and review the policy’s terms, conditions and exclusions, before 
it is issued by the insurance company.156 The company must then provide complete and accurate 
information to SAMA about its insurance products and services, receiving SAMA’s approval 
for all marketing activities.157 Moreover, when marketing its insurance policies, the advertising 
material cannot contain any false, deceptive or misleading representations, or any statements 
that will defame or cause prejudice to the interests, services or products of others.158 
Once a policy has been issued, it can only be amended at the written request of the 
policyholder.159 Furthermore, a company cannot cancel an otherwise valid insurance policy, 
except under the conditions stated in the policy’s cancellation clause.160 Cancellation terms 
must be fair and clearly stated in the policy agreement.161 If an insurance company cancels a 
policy, the policyholder will be entitled to a pro rata refund of the premiums paid, and at least 
30 days’ notice of the effective date of cancellation.162 However, a policyholder can cancel a 
policy at any time, so long as there are no unpaid or outstanding claims.163 
If an insurance policy is denied, cancelled or not renewed, the insurance company must provide 
a credible reason for its actions. Therefore, an insurance company may not discriminate or 
engage in the unfair treatment of policyholders, and cannot base its decisions on the decisions 
of other companies.164 In addition, when a policy is about to expire, the company must notify 
the customer in a timely manner, so that he or she can arrange for a renewal.165 
Once a policy comes into effect, the company has a duty to respond to customer inquiries in a 
timely manner.166 Additionally, the company must respond to and resolve claims promptly, 
notifying the claimant of any missing information within seven days of receiving the 
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application.167 Moreover, claims should be handled fairly, and the company must provide the 
policyholder with adequate guidance for filing a claim.168 
Where customers have complaints about a company, the company requires a fair, transparent 
and accessible complaints handling process.169 Upon receipt of a complaint, the company must 
acknowledge it, give an estimate of the amount of time needed to resolve it, provide the 
customer with a follow-up contact, keep the customer updated on the progress of the complaint, 
address the complaint promptly (within 10 working days), notify the customer as to whether 
the complaint was accepted or rejected, and explain to the customer the dispute resolution 
process available under the CICCL.170 
 
2.3.2.3 Insurance Brokers and Agents 
Insurance brokers and agents are required to provide sound advice to a potential insured 
party.171 They must also disclose all facts and risks associated with the proposed policy.172 
Moreover, in dealing with potential policyholders, there should be no inducement or deception 
on the part of the insurance agent or broker.173 To ensure that the policyholder is informed, the 
agent or broker must provide the potential insured party with the following: limits of the 
insurance cover; policy exclusions; premium amounts; policy start and end dates; policy 
conditions, and the name of the company issuing the insurance policy.174 Additionally, 
insurance brokers must refrain from engaging in any business that might create a conflict of 
interests to the detriment of the policyholder;175 instead, serving the insured’s interests by 
identifying the most appropriate cover and price available,176 disclosing the benefits and prices 
of comparable policies,177 and disclosing to the insured party any commission or fees earned.178  
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2.3.2.4 Regulators 
Not only does the law impose duties on insurers and policyholders, it also recognises that 
regulators, by nature of their function and authority, may come into contact with sensitive 
information. The law specifically addresses this by prohibiting anyone who obtains information 
related to his or her work in applying the law from disclosing that information or benefitting 
from it in any way.179 
 
2.4 Regulation of the Insurance Sector  
The regulation of the insurance sector is of the utmost importance in ensuring that it remains 
economically stable and efficient in serving policyholders.180 The International Cooperative 
and Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF) states in its manifesto for cooperative and mutual 
insurance that ‘[d]omestic legislation and regulation everywhere can and must be brought up 
to the highest standards that exist in some countries to ensure that the existing and potential 
mutual and cooperative insurance customers are not disadvantaged.’181 In response to insurance 
market growth in the KSA, the General Secretariat has noted that the ‘insurance services sector 
in the Kingdom has witnessed a remarkable boom in the regulatory and supervisory aspects 
and practice at both the individual and institutional levels.’182 
The Kingdom’s insurance market is broadly governed by CICCL, as mentioned above. In 
addition to the CICCL, the regulatory framework is composed of the Implementing 
Regulations, Code of Conduct Regulations, Risk Management Regulation (2008), Regulation 
of Reinsurance Activities (2010), Insurance Intermediaries Regulation (2011), Investment 
Regulations (2012), Outsourcing Regulation for Insurance and Reinsurance Companies and 
Insurance Service Providers (2012), Surplus Distribution Policy (2015), Insurance Corporate 
Governance Regulations (2015), Audit Committee Regulation in Insurance and/or Reinsurance 
Companies (2015), and Actuarial Work Regulation for Insurance and/or Reinsurance 
Companies (2016). In addition to these primary sources of regulation, SAMA publishes 
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circulars to clarify how the applicable insurance law and regulations function.183 This thesis 
focuses primarily on the CICCL, its Implementing Regulations, and the Working Rules of the 
IDCs. 
 
2.4.1 The Authority Responsible for Regulating and Supervising Insurance 
Activities  
The legislative framework for insurance has empowered SAMA to regulate the insurance 
sector and oversee the insurance dispute resolution process.184 SAMA was established in 1952 
as the Kingdom’s Central Bank; through legislative Decrees, it has been vested with powers to 
regulate a variety of financial sectors.185 In addition to insurance regulation, SAMA has the 
authority to supervise commercial banks, exchange dealers, finance companies, and credit 
information companies.186 In its regulatory capacity, it is empowered to issue implementing 
regulations for the laws or Decrees through which it is vested with powers. In the insurance 
context, SAMA is the party responsible for granting companies permission to operate as 
insurers within the State; approving the insurance products made available to consumers, and 
reviewing and approving consumer insurance contracts.187 Furthermore, SAMA has the ability 
to constitute dispute resolution mechanisms, to the extent that is contemplated by the 
empowering legislation. In the insurance context, this includes the creation of IDCs, pursuant 
to the CICCL.188 
Article 2 of the CICCL explicitly empowers SAMA to regulate the insurance industry.189 
SAMA therefore has the authority to review all applications to form insurance and reinsurance 
companies, and to ensure that they satisfy the applicable rules and conditions for operating in 
the Kingdom.190 Aside from this, SAMA has supervisory and technical control over all 
insurance activities within the Kingdom, and is vested with the following delineated powers: 
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184 CICCL, Articles 1 and 20.  
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186 Ibid. 
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regulating and approving rules for investing premiums; designing the formula for distributing 
surplus; determining the amount that must be deposited with a local bank by the insurance 
company; approving standard forms of policy; determining the necessary minimum amount of 
third party insurance coverage; creating rules and restrictions on methods of investing 
insurance company assets; setting general rules governing which assets must be kept in Saudi 
Arabia and which assets may be held outside; determining the minimum and maximum 
amounts of each type of insurance, along with conditions, the amounts payable as membership 
fees, and the insurance premium amounts against the company’s capital and reserves, and 
creating rules and regulations to protect beneficiaries and ensure that insurance companies 
satisfy their claims and obligations.191 
In carrying out its regulatory functions, SAMA has explicit authority to conduct an on-site 
inspection of an insurance company’s records and accounts.192 The company’s employees must 
consequently cooperate by disclosing any relevant information within the scope of their 
authority or possession.193 Additionally, SAMA has the power to request that an insurance 
company submit any information deemed by SAMA to be necessary for achieving the CICCL’s 
objectives.194 
To the extent that SAMA identifies any violations of the law or its regulations, it is empowered 
to perform a variety of actions.195 First, it may appoint one or more consultants to provide 
consultation to the company over the management of its activities in attempting to cure the 
issue.196 Second, SAMA may suspend any company board member or employee who is proven 
to be responsible for a violation.197 Third, SAMA can restrict or prevent a company from 
accepting new shareholders, investors, or members in any of its insurance activities.198 Fourth, 
SAMA has the broad authority to compel a company to take any other measures that it deems 
necessary for resolving a violation.199 Finally, if all the above measures fail to resolve a 
violation, or if a company continues to violate provisions of the law, SAMA may request that 
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the company be dissolved.200 In addition, SAMA has the authority to condemn violations of the 
law with a fine of up to one million Saudi riyals and a maximum of four years in prison.201 
Thus, SAMA may impose an imprisonment sentence as a last resort.  
 
2.4.2 Understanding the Insurance Claim Process 
It should be noted that insurance contracts, whether compliant or non-compliant with Shariah, 
are generally sequential and contingent. They are sequential because the third-party can claim 
compensation from the policyholder and the latter’s insurer. They are contingent because 
performance by one of the parties (in this case, the insurer) is based on specific events or 
conditions occurring. Hence, although the consumer performs on a regular basis by paying the 
required premiums, the insurer only performs by paying the consumer’s claim when a covered 
loss occurs. Previous studies have demonstrated that the weaker parties in sequential and 
contingent contracts, usually the policyholders, can best protect their interests by clearly 
specifying the conditions upon which the stronger parties’ performance is due.202 However, 
within the insurance context, the weaker or vulnerable parties can hardly depend on the contract 
for such protection, because insurers often include abstract or ambiguous language, leaving 
them with broad contractual discretion.203 Such contracts may give consumers the illusion of 
coverage or confer unconscionable advantages on the insurers. Hence, with significant 
discretion, insurers may readily engage in systematic efforts to wrongly deny consumers 
payment of their claims, in order to increase their profit margins. A good example is where a 
motor vehicle policy purchased by an elderly person contains an exclusion clause that removes 
coverage for injuries to members of the policyholder’s family. The exclusion clause makes 
coverage illusory if the elderly policyholder cannot drive and only his children and 
grandchildren drive the vehicle.204  
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The IDC may therefore be deemed to be a better dispute resolution forum than litigation, or 
other forms of ADR, where it is shown that they provide consumers with the most effective 
avenue for challenging such determinations by insurers. Nevertheless, to understand how 
disputes arise, and how the IDC resolves them, it is important to first understand the stages of 
the claim process. 
2.4.2.1 Pre-Contract Stage 
The pre-contract stage refers to all activities that occur prior to the signing of an insurance 
contract. The first step in the pre-contractual stage is the potential policyholder’s search for an 
appropriate insurance policy.205 A prospective subscriber may first learn of a type of policy 
through an insurer’s advertising, or through an insurance broker. The prospective subscriber 
will then need to identify what type of risk they wish to be insured against, and the required 
cover and potential obligations of the policy.206 Once the individual has selected an appropriate 
policy, he or she will be provided with the relevant policy information and the terms and 
conditions for review, prior to purchasing the cover.207 This is the individual’s opportunity to 
read and understand all the policy’s terms, conditions, cover and exclusions. The goal of this 
review is to bridge the gap between policyholder expectations and the realities of the contract, 
thus avoiding disputes further down the road.208 Finally, after thoroughly reviewing the policy, 
the subscriber must disclose any material facts to the insurer that could affect the policy, prior 
to signing the contract.209  
The Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulations (enacted by Decision No. 103/429 of 8 
September 2008) imposes the duty of disclosure on the insurance company and policyholder 
or insured party. As such, Article 3 of this Code sets a materiality test in the form of disclosing 
all information that ‘a reasonable person would regard [as] relevant.’ The failure of the 
insurance company to disclose all material information in the pre-contract stage will ensure 
that the consumer can successfully challenge the insurance company’s adverse determination 
in the claim and dispute stages of the process. 
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2.4.2.2 Post-Contract Stage 
Once the contract has been signed by the parties, it enters into full force. During this post-
contract stage, it is important that both parties comply with the terms and conditions of the 
policy.210 For the insured party, this means complying with all requirements and stipulations of 
the cover.211 The insurer must also uphold its obligations, such as processing claims in a timely 
manner and responding promptly to customer inquiries. Additionally, during the post-contract 
stage, it is essential that the insured party discloses any material changes in circumstances that 
could affect the cover.212 If the insured party fails to do so, the risk that a loss might not be 
covered by the insurer will increase. 
 
2.4.2.3 Claim Stage 
The claim stage refers to the point at which a policyholder files a claim with the insurer for 
cover under the insurance policy. Pursuant to the Implementing Regulations, an insurance 
company is required to set up a specific claims department to accept, evaluate and process 
claims.213 For a claim record to be created, the insurance company must compile the following 
information: an insurance adjuster’s report and any other documents relating to the claim, and 
the reason for the covered loss; information about any indemnity from another insurance 
policy; the actions taken by the company and the status of the claim; a power of attorney form, 
and a copy of the signed settlement agreement, once the claim is settled.214 The company has 
15 days to settle the claim, as from the date on which the individual policyholder files the claim 
with all the necessary documents. This timeframe is extended to 45 days for claims from 
commercial entities.215 
 
2.4.2.4 Dispute Stage 
Lastly, the dispute stage occurs when there is a disagreement between the insurer and an insured 
party over a policy and the insurer’s determination regarding the insured party’s claim.216 The 
most common type of dispute involves an insurer’s failure to cover a claim, which the insured 
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party believes should be paid out under the policy. To engage the dispute resolution process, 
the insured party must file all documents related to the claim and its denial, in order to initiate 
the IDC proceedings.217 
Given that the IDC represents an interest-based process,218 as shown above, it may be assumed 
that the CICCL, Implementing Regulations, and Insurance Market Code of Conduct 
Regulations seek to balance the interests of policyholders and insurers, or at least to redress the 
balance.219 Nonetheless, it could be argued that these instruments are weighted in favour of the 
policyholder rather than the insurer, because the policyholder’s economic, social and relational 
interests are taken into account, while less emphasis is placed on the insurer’s economic and 
relational interests. The policyholder is therefore only required to make a fair presentation of 
the material circumstances impacting on the judgement of a prudent insurer, in deciding 
whether to cover the risk and on what terms.220 The policyholder’s performance of the duty in 
good faith eliminates the incidence of insurance fraud.221 On the hand, the insurer has an 
obligation to communicate all relevant information to the potential policyholder, so as to enable 
him or her to make an informed and timely decision.  
In addition, the insurer must ensure that the policies are drafted clearly and can be readily 
understood by the public at large.222 Moreover, when marketing its insurance policies, the 
insurer must ensure that the advertising material does not contain any false, deceptive or 
misleading representations, or any statements that will defame or cause prejudice to the 
interests, services or products of others. Lastly, where policyholders have complaints about an 
insurer, the latter must conduct a fair, transparent and accessible process for handling 
complaints. 
                                                          
217 Ibid. 
218 See section 2.5.1.1 below for an explanation of the interest-based process. 
219 Balancing the interests of parties was one of the main aims of the reform in the UK, resulting in the enactment 
of the Insurance Act 2015. See this specific aim discussed in: Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business 
Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims, and Late Payment (Law Com No 353, HMSO 
2014), para 1.6. See also generally, AF Lowenfeld, ‘Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case’ (1995) 89(1) American Journal of 
International Law 42, 42-53. 
220 See Article 42 of the Code of Conduct. This is the duty to act in good faith, which, as noted above, is already 
imposed by the Shariah on all contractual parties. It has however been argued that the duty of fair presentation is 
separate from the duty of good faith. See R Merton, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 
2017) 6-006. 
221 Also, Article 13 of the Anti-Forgery Law imposes hefty sentences for insurance fraud. These include 
imprisonment from 1 to 5 years and a fine of 400,000 Saudi riyals. 
222 See Article 37 of the Code of Conduct. 
58 
 
As such, Saudi laws and regulations seem to be largely weighted in favour of the policyholder, 
for the purposes of protecting the public at large and ensuring that prejudice is not caused to 
public interests. Hence, they enable insurance to assist groups who are often unrepresented or 
marginalised in society, such as consumers or employees. It may then be contended that 
insurance law in the KSA is essentially public interest law.223 This justifies providing 
disputants with a single process (the IDC) rather than multiple process options, including other 
mechanisms that the insurer may use to undermine the interests of policyholders and the public. 
However, the contention that insurance law in the KSA is public interest law raises two 
concerns. The first of these concerns whether the State may be entitled to impose duties on 
insurers to ensure that private insurance coverage is always consistent with public interests. 
The second question enquires whether a law weighted in favour of consumers may be said to 
be a public interest law, where the interests of those consumers are represented and dictated by 
government policy.  
The answer to the first question requires determining whether the imposition of public interest 
duties on insurers (who are private parties) is a workable social arrangement in the KSA. To 
clarify this further, it must be demonstrated that this is the best way of helping consumers (or 
marginalised groups) to access justice. With regard to the second question, it is important to 
emphasise that consumers do not form a homogenous group with common interests, but usually 
have competing interests.224 Hence, insurance law is public interest law, if it focuses on 
marginalised consumer groups and enables them to access justice at little or no cost.225 In this 
light, the laws and regulations in the KSA have imposed on insurers an obligation to ensure 
fair process by providing policyholders with the right to challenge insurers’ adverse coverage 
determinations and by compelling both parties to use a specific dispute resolution forum, 
namely the IDC. This forum is briefly assessed below, in order to ascertain whether it is 
justified to compel its use. The forum is also critically examined in Chapters 3 and 4, in order 
to determine whether it is the best avenue for providing consumers with a fair process. The 
next section gives a brief overview of what it entails. 
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2.5 Dispute Resolution under the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law 
(CICCL) 
In addressing insurance disputes, Article 20 of the CICCL provides for the creation of 
administrative tribunals or committees to hear and decide disputes between insurers and their 
policyholders, or between insurers and other companies.226 Specifically, the law provides that: 
One or more committees shall be formed… composed of three specialized members, at 
least one of whom shall be a legal counsellor, to be entrusted with the settlement of 
disputes occurring between insurance companies and their clients, or between these 
companies and others that may substitute for the insured…227 
The establishment of these administrative tribunals or committees, and the rules governing 
their activities, are set out in the Approval of the Working Rules and Procedures of the 
Insurance Disputes and Violations Settlement Committees.228 These Committees are fully 
independent and do not fall under the jurisdiction of SAMA or any other authority.229 They 
include the Primary Committees in three major cities: Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah, and an 
Appeal Committee within SAMA. Compulsory mediation, which is required before disputes 
are submitted to the relevant Committee, is coordinated by the General Secretariat.230  
The Primary Committees are formed by Ministerial Resolution and have an initial tenure of 
three years, which can be renewed by the Minister.231 The authority of the Primary Committees 
is derived from Article 20 of the CICCL which provides for specialised committees to settle 
insurance disputes and violations of the provisions of the CICCL.232  
The SAMA Appeal Committee is also appointed for a period of three years, subject to renewal, 
but formed by Royal Order.233 It was set up under Article 22 of the CICCL and specialises in 
handling complaints filed by persons who are unhappy with the decisions of the Primary 
Committees and therefore seek to have them reversed.234 The Primary Committees and SAMA 
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Appeal Committee, formed under the authority of the CICCL, are excluded from section 3 of 
the Executive Work Mechanism Law of the Judiciary and Law of the Board of Grievances.235  
While the Committees are ultimately responsible for hearing and deciding insurance disputes, 
the General Secretariat also plays a supporting role by handling the administrative, regulatory 
and technical tasks associated with managing disputes and violations brought before the 
Committees.236 For example, the General Secretariat receives dispute and appeal requests to be 
considered by the Committees; ensures that all documents for registering a dispute are 
completed; communicates with the parties to ensure that the paperwork is completed and that 
the supporting documents are obtained; reviews the requests and defences contained in the 
proceedings, and prepares legal and technical opinions for the Committees; sets the schedules 
for hearings; performs secretarial functions for the Committees, and drafts and distributes 
decisions to the parties.237 
Several types of natural and artificial person can file an insurance dispute before a Primary 
Committee, assuming that they have the requisite capacity and interest in the case.238 These 
include insurance and reinsurance companies, policyholders (insured clients), insurance 
companies in the capacity of an insured party, insurance service providers, and any other 
relevant party that may be a beneficiary of the insurance cover with a legitimate interest in the 
case.239 It follows that the Committees were not created to cater specifically for consumers, but 
first and foremost, they are required to adjudicate and address specific issues to ease the burden 
on the courts, and also to help ensure that cases progress in a timely fashion, as well as dealing 
with certain issues that the Shariah courts or the Board of Grievances have been reluctant to 
adjudicate.240 However, there is no information on the issues that Shariah courts have been 
reluctant to adjudicate which are now within the IDC’s jurisdiction. Concerning the Board of 
Grievances, it is shown in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 that the Board was reluctant to recognise and 
enforce insurance contracts that did not comply with the Shariah in part or in whole. It is also 
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shown that the IDC committees exercise discretion in severing the Shariah-noncompliant 
clauses from contracts.  
By conferring the power to set up dispute resolution mechanisms on SAMA, the drafters of the 
CICCL contended that the use of litigation or courts as the main form of insurance dispute 
resolution would not only diminish but cease altogether. The historically narrow limitation to 
litigation, appeals, and rights-based processes within the judicial system was problematic, 
because, as mentioned above,  the Board of Grievances often declined to recognise and enforce 
conventional insurance contracts.241 Nonetheless, the CICCL did not simply create an 
alternative dispute resolution system to litigation; it replaced litigation as the official insurance 
dispute resolution system, compelling all parties to use this new system. Hence, all insurance-
related disputes must be submitted to an IDC. 
 
2.5.1 Assessing the Quality of the IDC 
2.5.1.1 Dispute System Design 
 
Towards the end of the last century, Ury et al. developed the concept of dispute system 
design;242 emphasising the importance of interests-based procedures for the resolution of 
disputes related to a specific industry. They noted that the system offered one or several formal 
processes, which may have been created over the course of the industry’s history or at a single 
point in time.243 However, disputes ought to be resolved according to the parties’ interests, 
rights, and power. Interests-based processes emphasise the parties’ economic, social and 
relational values, and involve direct negotiations by the parties, with the assistance of a third 
party. Ury et al. also state that these processes require a significant time investment, but often 
yield the highest satisfaction with outcomes.244 Pertinent examples would include the use of an 
ombudsman or mediation. It follows that the IDC may be described as an interest-based process 
option, given that it involves the use of mediation and an administrative adjudicating organ, 
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which is akin to an ombudsman. Hence, the Saudi legislator may have chosen this option, 
because it often produces the highest satisfaction with outcomes.245 
Conversely, rights-based processes require the parties to agree upon the procedural rules and 
use of a neutral third party, who will then enforce the rules and determine the prevailing party. 
The examples provided by Ury et al. include binding arbitration and litigation, based on an 
agreement between parties.246 The authors note that such processes provide limited remedies 
and will not address all the interests that are valued by parties.247 
Lastly, power-based processes involve the weighting of the outcome in favour of the party with 
the most resources, leverage or status. Ury et al. comment that these processes do not vindicate 
rights or address the wide array of parties’ interests. Moreover, they are often costly in terms 
of relationships. Examples of this include the management responding to a strike with a lockout 
or the use of coercion by the government to compel compliance with a law.248 
Subsequent researchers have identified more options for policy makers within the processes 
analysed by Ury et al. These options provide parties with varying levels of control over the 
process and outcome.249 Nonetheless, the objectives of these processes remains the same: 
minimise transaction costs, enhance relationships between parties, improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism, and increase satisfaction with the process 
and outcome.250 The above-mentioned researchers therefore claim that the best systems for 
achieving these objectives display the following characteristics: 
 Parties are provided with multiple process options, which include both interests-based 
and rights-based processes. 
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 Parties can ‘loop back’ and ‘loop forward’ between interests-based and rights-based 
processes. 
 All key players in the industry and wider community are involved in the system’s design. 
 Participation in the system is confidential and voluntary. 
 Impartial third-party neutrals serve as adjudicators. 
 All the stakeholders are educated in the use of the multiple process options. 
The above factors may be applied to assess the quality of the IDC, as well as the rationale for 
compelling disputants in the KSA to use this mechanism. This assessment takes place in the 
next section. 
2.5.1.2 The IDC Process 
The administrative tribunals or committees that comprise an IDC are competent to hear all 
disputes related to insurance policies; including disputes between insurers and policyholders, 
and between insurers and other companies; disputes between insurance and reinsurance 
companies; alleged violations of the supervisory and regulatory instructions for insurance and 
reinsurance companies; insurance service provider violations, and violations arising from the 
implementation of the CICCL, as well as any applicable fines.251 These disputes are best 
classified under two main categories: disputes arising directly from insurance policies, and 
insurance-related disputes and violations.252  
Disputes arising directly from insurance policies are those that result from the actual agreement 
signed by the contracting parties.253 If a dispute is filed against an insurance company, 
jurisdiction over the dispute is based on the complainant’s place of residence. Similarly, if an 
insurance company files a dispute, jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s place of residence.254 
Conversely, insurance-related disputes and violations are those arising between players in the 
insurance industry itself, such as insurance and reinsurance companies.255 These disputes are 
typically heard within the jurisdiction of the defendant’s residence or head office.256 For either 
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type of dispute, the General Secretariat will coordinate mediation and then refer the dispute to 
the nearest Committee for resolution, if mediation fails.257 
In terms of procedural governance, the Committees are guided by the Working Rules. Where 
the Working Rules do not contain an applicable provision, the Committees are guided by the 
Law of Procedure before the Shariah Courts, as well as its implementing regulations.258 
Additionally, the Committees are bound by the regulatory standards and controls of general 
litigation, which provide that they can only accept cases that fall within their jurisdiction and 
relate to a claim that they are competent to hear.259 
In hearing a dispute, the Committees are granted significantly more leeway than Shariah or 
civil courts. For example, they can accept all types of evidence related to a dispute, including 
electronic and computer data, telephone recordings, faxes, emails and SMS messages.260 The 
Committees are also able to conduct hearings that allow the parties to present their case and 
explain their arguments.261 Additionally, unlike civil cases, where there is very little in the way 
of applicable case precedent, the Committees are permitted to adopt an approach more akin to 
the common law. In deciding a dispute, the Working Rules provide as follows: 
[l]awsuits shall be considered in the light of presented written requests, defenses or 
whatever is raised during the proceedings. They shall be decided on in accordance with 
the laws and regulations regulating the nature of the dispute, the applicable rules and 
rulings reached at by the judiciary and the comparative jurisprudence for settling 
insurance disputes and violations.262  
This broadening of precedential scope allows the Committees to draw upon reasoning from 
domestic cases, as well as upon approaches to similar disputes in other jurisdictions.263 Finally, 
the Committees may also settle litigants’ claims for legal fees related to a lawsuit.264 
The Committees set a maximum time of five years from the due date of the claimed amount 
within which proceedings must be initiated.265 Assuming a timely dispute is brought before a 
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259 The Guidelines (n 78) 6. 
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Committee, while drawing their conclusion, the Committee will cast votes and the decision 
will be determined by the majority vote at both primary and appellate levels.266  
Decisions on cases brought before a Committee become final in three situations. First, a 
decision will be final if it is settled through conciliation by the parties. Conciliation can either 
take place before a Primary Committee or through mediation that is facilitated by the General 
Secretariat.267 Second, after a Primary Committee issues a decision, the parties have 30 days to 
lodge an appeal against it. If no appeal is made, the decision becomes final.268 The decision 
subsequently issued by the Appeal Committee is final and not subject to any grievances.269 
Turning to the issue of remedies, there are a number of remedies available to an insurer, if a 
policyholder breaches a policy. While these are not specifically enumerated in the law or 
regulations, practice has demonstrated that IDCs are likely to recognise the following: 
avoidance of the policy, if the policyholder has breached the duty of disclosure or made a 
misrepresentation; refusal to pay the claim, because the insured party has breached the warranty 
causing the loss; failure to give force to a policy, due to a policyholder’s breach of a condition 
precedent, and cancellation of the non-payment of a premium.270 With regard to the 
policyholder, he or she may bring a claim based on the insurer’s general duty to perform and 
the principles of good faith that are embodied in Shariah, but there is no independent cause of 
action based on bad faith.271 Particularly egregious conduct by the insurer can be brought to the 
attention of SAMA (or previously the Board of Grievances) for the application of sanctions.272 
A good example of this is Al-Ahlia Cooperative Insurance Company v The Committee for the 
Settlement of Insurance Dispute,273 where an insurer was held by the Board of Grievances to 
be in violation of the CICCL, because it distributed 90% of its profits to shareholders and only 
10% to policyholders. The Board held that such conduct was egregious, given that insurance 
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companies in the KSA are required to manage the insurance pool, rather than make abnormal 
profits for themselves and their shareholders.274 
Given that all parties are required to submit disputes to the IDC, it could infer that the Saudi 
legislator has offered a single, interest-based, formal process. This is because the process 
involves direct negotiation by the parties, with the assistance of a third-party neutral. The latter 
may be a mediator at the General Secretariat, or an IDC adjudicator in a Primary Committee. 
Moreover, disputes in the IDC are resolved according to the interests of the parties, with less 
emphasis on prescribed rights. As noted above, Ury et al. declare that examples of interest-
based processes include the use of mediation and an ombudsman. The IDC takes recourse in 
mediation at the General Secretariat and if mediation fails, the parties are required to submit 
the dispute to a Primary Committee. In addition, the adjudicator in the Primary Committee is 
akin to an ombudsman, because he is appointed by the government to investigate complaints 
made by individuals or insurance companies.  
Ury et al. also state, as cited earlier, that interest-based processes often yield the highest 
satisfaction with outcomes. This justifies the Saudi legislator’s choice of an interest-based 
process. However, it does not justify the requirement that parties use this process alone. Given 
that parties are required to use mediation, followed by the Primary Committee, they cannot 
‘loop back’ or ‘loop forward’ between the interests-based process and other rights-based 
processes, such as arbitration and litigation. Furthermore, participation in the process is neither 
voluntary nor confidential, and it is uncertain whether all key players in the Saudi insurance 
industry – as well as in the wider community – were originally involved in the system’s design. 
As such, it would have been more appropriate to provide the parties with multiple process 
options, including both interest-based and rights-based processes. 
 
2.5.2 Specific Challenges to Insurance Dispute Resolution 
Despite the great strides forward made by the KSA in streamlining its insurance dispute 
resolution, there are still a number of challenges faced by adjudicators or other independent 
persons selected by parties to settle disputes. It remains uncertain how the adjudicator or 
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tribunal should handle an insurance policy that purports to cover general liability, but contains 
an exclusion clause that arises out of, or is linked to, all the policyholder’s activities. To clarify 
further, this is where the exclusion clause identifies a category of claims that are not covered 
by the policy; a category that includes most of or even all possible events or risks associated 
with the policyholder’s activities. In such circumstances, it would be unfair to enforce the 
exclusion clause as written, given that the clause renders the coverage worthless. In 
jurisdictions such as the United States, the policyholder may ask the court or tribunal to assess 
the policy under the illusory coverage doctrine.275 This doctrine is generally invoked in cases 
where the policy’s language gives the policyholder the illusion that certain risks are covered, 
when in fact they are not. This is unfair to policyholders who have consistently paid premiums, 
unaware that the policy was drafted in such a way that there could never be any coverage of 
risks associated with those activities.  
Thus, given that the interpretation of a contract is geared towards determining the nature of the 
bargain that both parties seek to make, it is justified for courts to be suspicious of policies that 
contain illusory coverage.276 The court cannot assume that the policyholder intended to pay 
money under a worthless policy, leaving him or herself exposed to risks. The illusory coverage 
doctrine therefore enables the court to interpret the contract in light of the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations. However, although the CICCL provides parties with an interest-based 
process, the doctrine of illusory coverage has not been invoked in the KSA. Hence, it is 
uncertain how policyholders can challenge insurance companies that make adverse 
determinations based on policies containing illusory coverage. 
Moreover, it is also uncertain how the Saudi adjudicator or tribunal handles insurance policies 
that contain ambiguous terms, which are interpreted by insurance companies in a manner that 
unfairly prejudices the policyholder. Courts in the United States and to a limited extent, the 
United Kingdom, have been guided by Keeton’s doctrine of reasonable expectation.277 This 
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doctrine is to the effect that the court should deny the insurance company an unconscionable 
advantage in an insurance policy and honour the reasonable expectations of the policyholder 
and intended beneficiary.278 It was contended by Rahdert that the controlling code for 
determining parties’ rights and duties is that the policyholder’s reasonable expectation of 
coverage should be powerful enough to override the literal interpretation of the policy’s 
terms.279 
A related doctrine adopted by the courts of the United Kingdom and United States to deal with 
ambiguities in contracts is contra proferentem.280 This is to the effect that where a clause in an 
insurance contract is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it  
will be construed against the insurance company that drafted the contract.281 This doctrine has 
been described as ‘a first principle of insurance law’;282 it guides the court’s interpretation of 
the contract, allowing it to determine what an ambiguous provision means. Thus, courts use 
the doctrine as a policy tool to discourage ambiguity.283 
Illusory coverage, ambiguities in contracts, and unconscionable advantages gained by 
insurance companies, often result in adverse coverage determinations by insurance companies. 
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Policyholders in the KSA are confronted with similar problems. However, as noted above, it is 
uncertain how adjudicators and tribunals in the Kingdom interpret such contracts to ensure that 
parties are treated fairly. Equally, it is uncertain how the adjudicator or Primary Committee 
should handle conventional insurance contracts, containing elements such as riba and gharar, 
which violate the Shariah.   
 
Al-Shehry examined Keeton’s doctrine of reasonable expectation and considered how it could 
be applied in the Saudi insurance industry,284 submitting that the doctrine may help to design a 
new law that does not violate the Shariah. However, he did not examine the case law to 
determine how the Kingdom’s courts and tribunals prevent insurance companies from gaining 
an unconscionable advantage, discourage ambiguities in insurance contracts, and protect the 
non-drafting parties, namely the policyholders. Moreover, neither did he seek to establish a 
link between Keeton’s doctrine and the traditional Islamic philosophy of prioritising the 
parties’ legitimate expectations.285 It follows that the broad discretion given to IDC 
adjudicators in the interest-based process, as well as the traditional Islamic philosophy of 
prioritising the parties’ legitimate expectations, may lead to a high level of satisfaction with 
the process and outcome. Nonetheless, it does not justify compelling a form of adjudication, as 
opposed to providing disputants with multiple process options that include interest-based 
processes, such as mediation, and negotiation, with the use of an ombudsman, and rights-based 
processes, like arbitration and litigation. 
Aljallal argues that Article 42 of the Code of Conduct applies the reasonable expectation 
doctrine, because it requires the consumer to make full and honest disclosure of all relevant 
information required for underwriting risk, as would a reasonable person.286 He notes that in 
the same vein, Article 15 of the Code of Conduct requires insurance companies or their 
intermediaries to disclose all relevant information to the insured party, in writing and in a 
timely, clear and accurate manner. He then concludes that the disclosure requirement is a ‘clear 
inclination in the regulation to protect the assured as the weak party in the contract.’287 
However, it is unclear whether the Saudi legislator has sought to protect the policyholder, or 
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simply sought to ensure that both parties act in good faith through full and honest disclosure. 
This is because the insured party is also obligated to make a full and honest disclosure to the 
insurance company. In addition, the fact that both parties are assessed in light of the reasonable 
person standard does not imply that the Saudi legislator has adopted the reasonable expectation 
doctrine. This is because the insurance company may disclose information relating to the legal 
nature of the company,288 or of the product or policy being sold,289 along with all the fees and 
commissions,290  but the policy’s language will still be sufficiently ambiguous to give the 
policyholder the illusion that certain risks are covered, when in fact they are not. Thus, although 
the insurance company has made full and honest disclosure as a reasonable person would in 
the circumstances, the policyholder’s reasonable expectations have not been met. If IDC 
adjudicators had been required or empowered to take into account the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations, it may have justified compelling this form of adjudication, as opposed 
to providing policyholders with multiple process options, including rights-based processes 
such as binding arbitration and litigation. In Chapter 5, an attempt is made to develop the 
doctrines of illusory coverage and reasonable expectation in light of decided IDC cases. An 
attempt is made to demonstrate how the doctrines may be integrated with the working of the 
IDC committees in practice. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The Quran and Sunnah constitute the Kingdom’s Constitution, and the government’s authority 
is derived from these sources. Hence, the Saudi legal system is based on the principles of 
Shariah, which regulate all aspects of Muslim societies and states, including the methods by 
which legal rights are enforced. However, the Quran is not a code that exhaustively covers a 
system of laws, and the Sunnah is limited to the Holy Prophet’s interpretations of certain verses 
while acting as mediator and negotiator. Also, different schools of Islamic jurisprudence offer 
different interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah, as well as different theories to fill in the 
loopholes in the holy texts. The Saudi legal system has designated the conservative Hanbali 
School as the official school of Islamic jurisprudence. It provides guidance on how courts in 
the Kingdom should address legal questions. Nonetheless, the Hanbali texts also have 
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loopholes and it is argued here that judges are free to consult other schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, wherever an issue is not covered by the accepted Hanbali texts. Adjudicators in 
the Kingdom may equally rely on secondary sources that interpret the Quran and further 
interpret the Sunnah. These are referred to as fiqh. However, there are different types of fiqh, 
and there is no consensus on which one figh takes precedence over the others. 
 
The absence of a clear structure and hierarchy of laws may explain why, historically, there has 
not been much in the way of insurance sector regulation in the KSA. Also, regulation has been 
problematic because although the Kingdom’s insurance sector has continued to grow and 
evolve, many areas of insurance, especially commercial insurance, remain controversial from 
the Islamic perspective. Only cooperative and mutual insurance models that do not involve 
charging interest and enforcing speculative contracts were deemed to be Shariah-compliant. 
Thus, the integration of the cooperative insurance model into Saudi law via the CICCL has 
allowed the market to grow exponentially, while still maintaining the legal and ethical 
principles mandated by Shariah law.  
 
The goal of the Saudi model, like the models of other jurisdictions, is to provide financial 
security against the risk of loss or damage. This is accomplished by imposing duties and 
responsibilities on the various parties involved in the creation and regulation of insurance 
contracts. It is shown that the CICCL, Implementing Regulations, Working Rules, and Code 
of Conduct have also imposed a single, interest-based process option for dispute resolution in 
the form of the IDCs. This model is largely weighted in favour of the policyholder, in order to 
protect the public at large and to ensure that prejudice is not caused to the public interest.  
 
It is argued that the Saudi legislator is justified in compelling this single form of adjudication, 
because insurance law in the KSA is essentially public interest law, and the model is consistent 
with Shariah, which prioritises the promotion of public welfare. Hence, it may be assumed that 
the imposition of duties on insurers to ensure that private insurance coverage is always 
consistent with the public interest is a workable social arrangement in the above context. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this is the best model for the empowerment of 
consumers (or marginalised groups) seeking to challenge unfair adverse determinations by 
insurers.  
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The Primary Committee structure has more in common with an ad hoc administrative tribunal 
or ombudsman than with a functional branch of the judicial system. The Working Rules provide 
nothing in the way of guidance on how the Primary Committee should exercise discretion in 
practice. It is therefore uncertain whether the IDC administers justice in a manner that is fair to 
all consumers, especially low-income consumers who are in desperate need of money 
following a loss. The next Chapter is the first step towards determining whether the IDC is the 
best option for legislators seeking to enable consumers challenge unfair adverse determinations 
by insurers. In this light, it compares the IDC with the traditional, rights-based dispute 
resolution option, litigation. 
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Chapter 3: Comparing the Litigation and Administrative Tribunal Models 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter examines the role of dispute resolution in insurance law by comparing the 
litigation-based approach to the administrative tribunal model. It begins with a discussion of 
the importance of litigation in enabling policyholders to challenge insurers’ adverse 
determinations. It then discusses the shortcomings of the litigation model and considers the 
argument that the expense and unpredictability of litigation could be avoided or reduced by 
channelling disputes towards an administrative system. The concept and nature of the 
administrative tribunal are assessed, as well as the use of the model in Islamic systems. The 
goal is to conduct an analysis of the existing model in the KSA and determine whether it is 
preferable, given the flexibility it aspires through modified rules of evidence, measures to 
minimise legal technicalities, and the delegation of broad investigative powers to 
administrative committees.  
In light of the absence of a solidly grounded theoretical understanding of the model in the KSA, 
this Chapter maps the profile of the archetypal administrative tribunal. It then determines how 
the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC), with similar functions to an administrative tribunal, 
is specifically tasked with resolving insurance coverage disputes in KSA. It therefore looks at 
how the IDC compares to the archetypal or paradigm291 or quintessential administrative 
tribunal.292 It shows that the IDC does not have the fitting qualities of the archetypal tribunal, 
and from a theoretical perspective, it is not a better option than litigation for resolving disputes 
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over insurance cover, because of the lack of clarity in IDC procedures, and ambiguities within 
the empowering legislation. 
3.2 Insurance Dispute Resolution in the KSA 
3.2.1 The Use of Litigation 
Prior to the enactment of the CICCL, there were no specific forums for resolving insurance 
disputes, to the extent that they arose from the permissible takaful insurance products, or any 
products issued that were consistent with Cooperative Health Insurance Law.293 While the 
introduction of cooperative insurance as a regulated form of more traditional insurance in KSA 
did not occur until the CICCL was passed, insurance disputes existed prior to the law, 
specifically in relation to takaful insurance products and cooperative health insurance.294 Thus, 
prior to the establishment of IDCs under the CICCL, these disputes were either resolved by the 
Ministry of Commerce or the Board of Grievances.295 
The Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazalim) was the first form of administrative tribunal to 
be created in KSA.296 It was initially established in 1955 to hear cases involving complaints 
against government officials and instances of injustice arising from the Shariah courts.297 In 
1982, the passing of a new Board of Grievances law reformed the tribunal298 and over time, its 
jurisdiction expanded to cover most types of commercial cases and the enforcement of foreign 
judgments and awards. 
Litigation before the Board of Grievances consisted of a series of short hearings. Modelled on 
civil law tradition, it was not characterised by lengthy pre-trial procedures or pleadings.299 
Instead, after filing the initial complaint, the parties were summoned to a hearing, where they 
could file written submissions, present oral arguments, and produce evidence.300 It follows that 
the Board of Grievances ought to have been more efficient in settling disputes than the ordinary 
courts. However, there were often significant delays, lasting from weeks to months between 
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hearings, as the Board was not required to follow a strict timetable.301 Nonetheless, one of the 
main problems with the Board was the reluctance of its adjudicators to recognise and enforce 
conventional insurance contracts.302 
A series of reforms to the Board of Grievances began in 2000, whereby the 1982 Decree was 
abolished and eventually replaced with the Royal Decree of 2007.303 However, this Decree 
required the Board of Grievances to act as a traditional administrative tribunal, but transferred 
jurisdiction over commercial disputes to the new Commercial Division of the General Islamic 
Court.304 Within this period of reform, the CICCL was introduced and along with it came 
specialised forums for resolving insurance disputes, thus removing them from the Commercial 
Division’s jurisdiction. 
What is clear from the above is that although the KSA maintains its legal basis in Islamic and 
civil law, it also makes use of sector-specific administrative committees.305 The CICCL 
empowers the IDC to consider prior cases and comparative jurisprudence when resolving 
insurance disputes. This reflects the doctrine of precedent. This precedent serves as a means of 
filling in any gaps in the regulations and ensuring that the regulations are interpreted and 
applied consistently among cases. This is a significant departure from the previous stance on 
the role of precedent in the Shariah system, which the judges of Board of Grievances and all 
other Islamic courts readily adopted.306 It is therefore uncertain whether the CICCL seeks to 
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Cooperative Health Insurance Law provided for the creation of the ‘Committee for Violations of Cooperative 
Health Insurance Law’ by the Chairman of the Council. This Committee was tasked with reviewing violations of 
the provisions of the Law. Article 107 required insurance companies to establish units for reviewing and handing 
complaints of policyholders and beneficiaries, and it noted that where the insurance companies could not establish 
such units, the complaints had to be submitted to the Insurance Dispute and Violation Resolution Committee that 
was set up by Ministerial Decree No. 222 of 25/07/1429 H. 
306 Mikail and Arifin note that the doctrine of binding precedent does not have binding force in the Islamic judicial 
system because judges in Islamic courts are required to decide cases based on their own merits. However, they 
argue that the doctrine may have persuasive value because Shariah law does not expressly prohibit judges in 
Islamic courts from taking guidance from previous dicta. See SA Mikail and M Arifin, ‘Application of Judicial 
Precedent in Shariah Courts’ (2013) 2 Malaysian Court of Practice Bulletin 1, 1-6. See also Brand (n 4) 4, 13. 
(Precedent ‘is not a source of law in Islamic jurisprudence’ and ‘there is no formal role for precedent in the Shari’a 
system. A qadi is not bound by earlier decisions, including those of his court’); M Munir, ‘Precedent in Islamic 
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give precedent a bigger role than previously recognised in Islamic jurisprudence or the goal is 
that precedent would have only persuasive value. The observance of the doctrine will be 
enhanced by the fact that cases coming out of the IDC Committees are published, which may 
ensure predictability.307 This is something that has historically not been done in the Saudi 
judicial system308 where judges and lawyers are required to look to statutes and regulations to 
find solutions. The decisions of the Board of Grievances are generally not published. Article 
21 of the Law of the Board of Grievances of 1982 (Royal Decree No. M/51) provided that at 
the end of each year, the office for technical affairs comprising judges and researchers would 
classify judgements rendered by the Board and publish them in volumes. This was not done. 
The Royal Decree No. M/78 which abolished and replaced Royal Decree No. M/51 provides 
in Article 71(3) that the Research Centre at the Ministry of Justice shall publish select 
judgments of all courts (including the Board of Grievances) with the approval of the Supreme 
Judicial Council. However, the Research Centre at the Ministry of Justice has since published 
only a handful of the decisions of the Board of Grievances.309  
 
Since its creation, the KSA has grounded itself in civil law tradition to complement its Shariah 
law system by establishing written laws, which are accompanied by implementing regulations 
and working rules. This provided the public and the Board of Grievances with clear provisions 
on how to comply with the law and apply it in the event of a dispute.310 Nonetheless, the IDC 
model accommodates formal doctrinal precedent in ADR structures and requires the 
Committees to publish their decisions. 
In addition, the General Secretariat and panels of the IDC perform conciliatory functions that 
closely resemble those of an ombudsman. While the primary role of the General Secretariat is 
to provide administrative support to the Committees, it also vets cases for the possibility of 
early stage resolution through mediation. It is not empowered to make decisions. The panels, 
                                                          
Law with Special Reference to the Federal Shariah Court and the Legal System in Pakistan’ (2008) 47(4) Islamic 
Studies 445, 445-482. (Showing that there is no evidence about the role of binding precedent in Islamic law). 
307 The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 190 dated 9/5/1435H approved the rules and procedures of the IDC 
and Article 13 of the Resolution requires the General Secretariat to classify and publish IDC decisions. The 
motivation for requiring the publication of the decisions is not discussed. However, it may be assumed that the 
objective is to enhance transparency, accountability, and efficiency of the IDC since the publication of decisions 
increases access to information about outcomes and also enhances the predictability of the system. 
308 J Fedynskyj (J Dainow, ed) ‘The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions’ 
(1975) 50(3) Indiana Law Journal 638, 637. 
309 The decisions, many of which are cited in this thesis, are actually expedited opinions that are published in draft 
form reflecting the substance of the judges’ decisions.  
310 See Chapter 2. 
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on the other hand, are empowered to make decisions after investigating the complaints that 
have not been solved by mediation. It is noted in Chapter 2 that the Saudi legislator is justified 
in compelling this interest-based process that takes into account the interests of the parties and 
the public. It is uncertain whether it is more efficacious than litigation in the courts of the Board 
of Grievances.  
The use of alternative interest-based means of dispute resolution by a government agency is 
the core of the IDC process and the foundation on which it is built. It is essentially a quasi-
judicial approach to sector-specific dispute resolution. As will be shown below, when labelling 
this model, the administrative tribunal tag is most appropriate because the IDC Committees are 
constructed and operate consistently using this approach. By rooting the forum in an 
administrative tribunal process, it has provided sector-specific dispute resolution by experts 
who are familiar with the subject matter. Moreover, there are clear regulations to ensure 
Shariah compliance, while at the same time permitting the creation and use of precedent for 
the consistent interpretation and application of legal principles. The rights of consumers and 
the interests of the public have taken centre stage, as the General Secretariat has been accorded 
powers to safeguard the public interest and minimise the burden on the IDC. 
3.2.2 The Use of Administrative Tribunals  
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the Saudi legal system represents a fragmented amalgamation of 
various influences from other legal systems. When exploring its structures, one can identify 
elements of common law, civil law, and Islamic legal traditions.311 One of the most recent 
developments in the Saudi legal system over the past few decades has been the creation of the 
sector-specific administrative committee – a form of administrative tribunal – tasked with 
hearing disputes of a particular nature. Examples of these tribunals include the Commission for 
the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, the Commercial Paper Committee, the Agency 
Conciliation Committee, the Commission for Labour Disputes, and of course, the IDC.  
The KSA’s administrative tribunals are generally quasi-judicial forums, established by Royal 
Decree, which have jurisdiction over a specific topic and area of law and are generally subject 
                                                          
311 The influence of Continental European civil law tradition is stronger than that of the common law tradition. 
See A Husein and J Burns, ‘Choice of Forum in Contracts with Saudi Arabian Counterparties: An Analysis of the 
DIFC Common Law Courts from a Saudi Arabian Perspective’ (2015) 48(3) International Lawyer 179, 182-183. 
See also AD Marar, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the Challenge of Adapting Law to Market 
Economies’ (2004) 19(1/4) Arab Law Quarterly 91, 91-123. 
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to the principles of Shariah law. While the majority of these tribunals deal with issues involving 
the application of a statute or its implementing regulations, they have been vested with the 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes between two non-governmental parties within a specific sector. 
By allowing for the involvement of specialised tribunals and expert panellists, there is an 
increased likelihood that the decisions issued by the tribunals will be consistent with industry 
practices and equitable for the parties involved.312 In its current iteration, the Saudi 
administrative system has been criticised for failing to provide a ‘transparent, reliable, 
predictable or comprehensive legal framework for resolving commercial disputes’ due to 
structural defects and a lack of infrastructure to support the desired changes.313 Hence, for 
administrative committees to be effective in resolving disputes, the system must continue to 
evolve and become more refined.  
Administrative committees in the KSA exist in many sectors as shown above. Other 
committees include the Tax Committees,314 Committee for Penalizing Traffic Violations,315 the 
Mining Disputes Committee,316 the Fraud, Cheating and Speculation Committee,317 the 
Banking Disputes Settlement Committee,318 and the Copyright Committee.319 Although these 
committees are not recognised under the Basic Law of Governance as being part of the judicial 
authority, they exercise judicial powers to resolve disputes arising from the implementations 
of their subject matter laws.320 The Decree authorising the creation of such committees typically 
establishes their jurisdiction.   
                                                          
312 The debate about the loss of formal procedures and the increased use of informal dispute resolution forums has 
raged for a while now, with many arguing that there are not enough cases and decisions available to generate the 
requisite precedent in order to transparently establish reasoned doctrines and rules to govern society. See C 
Menkel-Meadow, ‘Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of America: From the Formal to the 
Informal to the “Semi-final”’ in F Steffek et al (eds), Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice 
at the Crossroads (Hart 2013) 419, 423-424. See also SN Subrin, ‘Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Reasonable Prospect of Trial’ (2011) 46 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 399; C Menkel-
Meadow, ‘Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases)’ 
(1995) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2663; O Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073. 
However, the argument about the lack of sufficient cases and decisions does not hold in the KSA given that the 
doctrine of binding precedent does not play any role in the Shariah system and the decisions of courts are generally 
not published. Nonetheless, this may become important with the recognition of the doctrine by the CICCL. 
313 R Al Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development (Routledge 2019) (noting that ‘[a] nation growing as rapidly 
as Saudi Arabia puts tremendous strain on its administrative apparatus’ and that one of the main objectives of 
reform and development is ‘improvement in the efficiency of the operation and management of the… 
government’s administrative system’). 
314 The Income Tax Law, Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/322 (21/1/1370H, Nov. 1, 1950). 
315 The Traffic Law, Royal Decree No. M/49 (6/11/1391H, Dec. 23, 1971). 
316 The Mining Law, Royal Decree No. M/21 (20/5/1392H, Jul. 1, 1972). 
317 The Council of Minister Decree No. 11 (6/12/1400H, Oct 14, 1980). 
318 The Prime Minister Decision No. 8/729 (10/7/1407H, Mar. 9, 1987). 
319 The Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. 1 (19/5/1410H, Dec. 18, 1989). 
320AF Ansary, ‘A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (Global Lex, 2008) 
<http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html#_ednref176> accessed 14 November 2019. 
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3.2.2.1 The Concept of the ‘Administrative Tribunal’ 
 
Administrative tribunals are used in many countries to resolve sector-specific disputes, which 
would otherwise place an excessive burden on the judicial system.321 Administrative tribunals 
differ from regular courts and are set up as necessary concomitants of the administrative state, 
with less technicality and better accessibility for the general public.322 In addition to the KSA, 
some of the notable countries that have implemented these administrative systems include the 
United States,323 United Kingdom,324 Canada,325 Malaysia,326 India,327 Australia,328 and New 
Zealand.329 In most of these countries, the administrative tribunal ‘may be referred to as a 
person or body of persons or an administrative agency not forming a part of the judiciary with 
limited statutory powers to determine disputes and pass binding decisions between individuals 
or individuals and officials in a government department.’330 
Since the mid-1900s, there has been a marked rise in the use of administrative tribunals 
worldwide.331 Researchers have identified various reasons for this rapid growth, primarily in 
North America, Europe, and Asia. First, the significant and continued expansion of 
governmental functions in the decades following the industrial revolution, coupled with the 
emergence of the concept of the welfare state, prompted countries to adopt the use of 
                                                          
321 R Thomas, ‘From “Adversarial v Inquisitorial” to “Active, Enabling, and Investigative”: Developments in UK 
Administrative Tribunals’ in L Jacobs and S Baglay, The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative 
Regimes (Routledge 2013) 51, 52-54; M Elliott and R Thomas, Public Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2011) 633-758; HH Bruff, ‘Specialized Courts in Administrative Law’ (1991) 43 Administrative Law Review 329, 
332-337; R Carnwath, ‘Tribunal Justice: A New Start’ (2009) Public Law 48, 48-69. 
322 KC Joshi, ‘Service Tribunals under Administrative Tribunals Act’ (1986) 28(2) Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute 207, 207-208. 
323 See HM Bowman, ‘American Administrative Tribunals’ (1906) 21(4) Political Science Quarterly 609 
(accounting for the origins of administrative tribunals in the US). 
324 See D Drewry, ‘The Judicialisation of ‘Administrative’ Tribunals in the UK: From Hewart to Leggatt’ (2009) 
28 Transylvanian Review of Administrative Science 45.  
325 See Government of Canada, ‘Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada’ (2017) 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/administrative-tribunals-support-service.html> accessed 14 November 2019 
(detailing the various sector-specific tribunals). 
326 See Oxford Business Group, The Report: Malaysia 2014 (Oxford Business Group, 2015). 
327 See A Jha, Administrative Tribunals of India: A Study in the Light of Decided Cases (Working Paper, 2015) 
17. 
328 Australia Government, State Administrative Tribunal (SAT, 2017) <http://www.sat.justice.wa.gov.au/> 
accessed 14 November 2019. 
329 See AH McLintock, ‘Administrative Tribunals’, An Encyclopedia of New Zealand (1966); Law Commission, 
Tribunals in New Zealand (Wellington 2008) 
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFormats/NZLC%20IP6.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019. 
330 H Genn, ‘Tribunals and Informal Justice’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 393, 393. See also P Johnson, 
‘Tribunal Administration’ (2012) <http://www.peterdjohnson.net/tribunaladmin.htm>, accessed 14 November 
2019. 
331 Johnson, ibid. 
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administrative tribunals as a means of promoting and protecting the economic and social 
interests of their citizens.332 Second, it has been recognised that society requires a form of 
flexible adjudication, suited to changing social requirements and industry needs, and this 
outweighs the need for formal and rigid procedures, which are ingrained in the operations of 
ordinary courts of law.333 
Third, the rapid growth of economies, and the expansion of industry sectors and commerce 
have given rise to an increase in the number of disputes that need to be resolved 
expeditiously.334 The ordinary court structure, already burdened with heavy dockets, has not 
been placed in a position to be able to take on this ever-increasing case load.335 As a result, 
when using the ordinary courts, litigants face systemic inefficiency and extensive delays, 
leading to increased costs and potentially, further damages.336 Sector-specific administrative 
tribunals, with limited jurisdiction over disputes in specific industries and their own sets of 
laws and regulations, have arisen as a viable alternative to the court structure.337 Hence, 
administrative tribunals were designed to overcome the shortcomings of existing litigation 
systems. As a result of their reduced scope and specialised nature, these tribunals are able to 
accelerate the process and render it more efficient, moreover, at a more affordable price for the 
parties, compared to the realities of traditional litigation.338 
Finally, when technical matters, or in particular, industry-specific disputes arise, there is 
generally some concern that the ordinary courts may be unable to deliver justice in an 
expeditious manner to the parties involved.339 This concern stems from the reliance of ordinary 
courts on formalistic procedures, including rules on evidence, hearings, and witnesses, and an 
overly legalistic attitude, which places form over legislative function.340 The judges in ordinary 
judicial structures are trained in the classic traditions of law and jurisprudence and are often 
                                                          
332 P Leelakrishnan, ‘Reviewing Decisions of Administrative Tribunal: Paternalistic Approach of the Indian 
Supreme Court and Need for Institutional Reforms’ (2012) 54(1) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 1, 1-2; 
Drewry (n 31) 47-48. For a detailed analysis of the historical development of administrative tribunals, see RE 
Wraith and PG Hutchesson, Administrative Tribunals (George Allen and Unwin 1973); C Stebbings, Legal 
Foundations of Tribunals in Nineteenth Century England (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
333 L Sossin, ‘Designing Administrative Justice’ (2017) 34(1) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 87, 88-89;  
334 J MacFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Law (UBC Press 2008) 9. 
335 SH Rifkind, ‘Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?’ (1976) 70 Federal Rules Decisions 96, 99-100. 
336 AB Overby, ‘An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
1219, 1277. 
337Johnson (n 40). 
338 JTA Gabel, ‘Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is Federal Reform the Answer?’ 
(1999) 34 Wake Forest Law Review 1083, 1089. 
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incapable of comprehending the impact of minutiae in technical cases.341 As cases become more 
complex, with the advances made by modern society, the need for individuals to possess expert 
knowledge or have access to experts in order to preside over these disputes has become even 
more pressing.342 With regard to disputes concerning insurance cover, it is noted above that 
most insurance policies are based on sequential and contingent contracts, which do not clearly 
specify the parties’ rights and obligations in the event of risk. Thus, expert knowledge and 
experience are often required to assess the coverage determined by insurers, who may rely on 
technical and complex language to wrongly cut payment claims and increase their revenue. 
Many states such as the KSA have therefore created sector-specific administrative tribunal 
regimes to fulfil the above-mentioned needs and allow for the expeditious and judicious 
resolution of such matters.343 
 
3.2.2.2 The Nature of the Tribunal 
 
The administrative tribunal system runs parallel to the court system, in a space situated 
somewhere between the executive and judiciary bodies.344 This explains why tribunals may 
conveniently be used as a legal control mechanism for decision-making in the 
administration.345 While they have many similarities to the courts under the judicial system, 
they are distinct in a number of key ways.  
First, administrative tribunals occupy a unique space within the administrative structure of the 
government’s executive arm, unlike the ordinary courts, which fall squarely within the 
judiciary branch. The administrative tribunal is neither an executive body nor a court, but is 
rather a hybrid, combining elements of both.346 In fact, some jurisdictions that utilise 
                                                          
341 AK Agnihotri, ‘Tribunalisation of Justice’ (The RTT, 2017) <http://thertt.com/Articles/daf780fe-3dd7-46ab-
83cf-5b7b99c15ded.html> accessed 14 November 2019. 
342 Ibid; Johnson (n 40). 
343 CN Pickerill, ‘Specialized Adjudication in an Administrative Forum: Bridging the Gap Between Public and 
Private Law’ (2007) 82(4) Notre Dame Law Review 1605, 1610. 
344 Different countries place administrative tribunals under different branches of the government. In the UK, for 
example, adjudicative tribunals are supervised by the judiciary, whereas in Canada, these tribunals form part of 
the executive branch. See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and 
Licensing Branch) 2001 SCC 52 (Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)). 
345 KI Vibhute, ‘Administrative Tribunals and the High Courts: A Plea for Judicial Review’ (1987) 29(4) Journal 
of the Indian Law Institute 524, 524-525; R Creyke, ‘Administrative Justice: Towards Integrity in Government’ 
(2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 705, 722-731. 
346 Administrative tribunals are judicial, insofar as they engage in fact-finding to impartially resolve a dispute 
brought before them, in light of the existing law and without regard for executive policy. Additionally, the courts 
are administrative to the extent that the preferential reasons for utilising tribunals, as opposed to the ordinary 
courts, stem from a need for efficiency from the administrative agency. 
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administrative tribunals expressly declare that they are public bodies, which exist and operate 
outside of the court system.347 Thus, these tribunals are more likely to be appropriate quasi-
judicial bodies, created by specific legislative or agency actions, for the purposes of 
adjudicating disputes arising from a particular law or set of rules and regulations. As a result, 
administrative tribunals are not generally required to observe the rules and formalities of the 
ordinary courts when adjudicating disputes.348 Typically, they have broader rules of evidence 
and more flexible procedures for engaging in fact-finding than ordinary courts.349 
Furthermore, unlike ordinary courts, which have typically had broad jurisdiction and held 
unlimited powers to hear the cases brought before them, administrative tribunals have limited 
adjudicative powers.350 Therefore, the tribunals are restricted to hearing cases involving the 
legal subject matter for which they are empowered by the instituting legislation or order.351 
When handling the disputes that come before them, administrative tribunals may exercise broad 
discretion and deal with them subjectively, in contrast to the ordinary courts, which are required 
to handle disputes objectively.352 
In terms of those presiding over cases, administrative tribunals are composed of administrative 
officials, some of whom may be required to have a legal background, and other technical 
experts in the subject field,353 whereas ordinary courts of law are presided over by classically 
trained judges. Moreover, in applying the law, judges have broad powers to opine on the 
constitutionality or inherent fairness of a law that is implicated in a dispute, but tribunals are 
not afforded the same powers.354 Instead, they are required to interpret and apply the law that 
is relevant to the dispute and adjudicate cases in light of that law, even though they cannot 
strike down the law itself.355 
                                                          
347 Cane (n 1) 23-68; A Yohannes and DG Michael, ‘The Advantages and Disadvantages of Administrative 
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In performing their duties, administrative tribunals should be free of any interference from the 
government or from other administrative agencies,356 although this may not always be the case, 
given that the adjudicators are actually appointed by government agencies. The statutes that 
establish these tribunals typically contain provisions on their composition, powers, and 
functions. Beyond this, however, the government agencies concerned are generally not 
empowered to become involved with the tribunals’ operations.357 Finally, once an 
administrative tribunal issues a decision, the decision will be subject to judicial review only in 
a limited number of circumstances.358 
 
3.2.2.3 The Use of Administrative Tribunals in Islamic Countries 
 
As explained in greater detail below, the administrative tribunal model has been adopted in 
KSA to resolve insurance-related disputes. The assessment of this model in KSA is the main 
thrust of this chapter. Administrative tribunals created within the Saudi insurance sector to hear 
a clearly defined set of disputes are quasi-judicial bodies, which perform functions similar to 
those of the courts, but remain independent of the judicial system. As noted above, this 
approach has been widely adopted in various sectors across the globe,359 including in some 
neighbouring Muslim-majority countries. However, many Muslim-majority countries still 
prefer litigation. The next section briefly compares two cases, Pakistan and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). In Pakistan, insurance disputes are adjudicated by a specialised body, while 
in the UAE, they are settled by the ordinary courts of law. 
 
Article 121 of the Insurance Ordinance of 2000 empowered the Federal Government of 
Pakistan to create tribunals with jurisdiction over insurance matters.360 The tribunals 
established under this Ordinance are referred to as Insurance Appellate Tribunals (IAT) and 
each consists of at least three members: a chairperson who may be a serving or retired judge, 
and at least two additional members with knowledge of the insurance industry.361 Notably, the 
law is silent on the issue of the independence of these tribunal members, but provides that ‘no 
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act or proceeding of a Tribunal shall be invalid by reason only of… [a] defect in the constitution 
of the Tribunal.’362 Hence, an award granted by just one or two members of the panel may be 
enforceable in Pakistan. 
In terms of the tribunal’s powers and the scope of their jurisdiction, the IAT is vested with all 
the powers accorded to traditional courts for trying claims filed by a policyholder against an 
insurer.363 Furthermore, the tribunals may exercise any additional powers assigned to them 
under the Ordinance.364 Similar to the Saudi approach, the IAT has exclusive jurisdiction over 
insurance disputes, despite operating outside the traditional court structure.365 
The procedures for IAT hearing insurance cases are the same as those applied in the civil 
courts.366 They are therefore governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.367 The IAT may demand 
the attendance of anyone with knowledge that is relevant to the case and take witness testimony. 
It may also compel the parties to produce documents.368 When rendering a decision, in the event 
that the decision is not unanimous, the majority opinion of the tribunal members will prevail.369 
However, the law is silent on the process of deliberation to be adopted, and on the rationales 
or support on which the decision should be based, if applicable, beyond the stipulation for the 
decision to be in writing.370 Furthermore, unlike the Saudi approach, the law does not permit 
tribunals to consult an expanded scope of comparative jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the 
decisions of the IAT are final and may not be challenged in any court or before any authority,371 
although there is a limited exception for claims that exceed 100,000 rupees, which may be 
appealed to the High Court within 30 days of the date of the decision.372  
Although research undertaken in this thesis revealed that there is no evidence of the influence 
of the Pakistani model in the KSA, it may be contended that the Pakistani model provides the 
foundation upon which the administrative tribunal system in an Islamic society may be built. 
This explains why there are many similarities between the Pakistani model and the subsequent 
approach adopted in the KSA. There are also significant cultural and regional similarities 
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365 Ibid. 
366 Ibid § 123. 
367 Code of Civil Procedure 1908. 
368 Insurance Ordinance, § 122. 
369 Insurance Ordinance § 123. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid § 124. 
372 Ibid. 
85 
 
between the two countries. However, the IAT in Pakistan is part of the judicial branch. It 
interprets and applies the law as a judicial body. The Saudi government has attempted to further 
develop its quasi-judicial model and, as it continues to implement reform, the Saudi model may 
serve as a better template for handling insurance coverage disputes in Islamic societies. 
Another Muslim-majority country with established administrative bodies for settling civil and 
commercial disputes is the UAE. This country is unique, because it consists of two separate 
insurance jurisdictions. The first regulates ‘onshore’ UAE disputes, which comprises disputes 
from a federation of seven separate emirates,373 and the other regulates disputes in the free 
zones, including the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). For the purposes of this 
analysis, the ‘onshore’ federation of the UAE will be examined, as opposed to the DIFC, which 
is a distinct jurisdiction. 
Insurance in the UAE is governed by the 2007 Insurance Law, which applies to all companies 
seeking to register and obtain licenses to provide insurance products within the UAE, aside 
from in its free zones.374 In addition to the 2007 Insurance Law, a number of ancillary laws, 
resolutions, regulations, and Insurance Authority decisions work to regulate the UAE’s 
insurance sector.375 
Despite the existence of administrative bodies for settling commercial disputes as a whole, 
when a dispute arises between a policyholder and an insurance company, a complaint must be 
submitted to the UAE courts.376 Thus, although there are ADR centres designed to handle 
labour, civil and personal disputes, the UAE does not have any specialised forums or 
procedures for handling insurance disputes specifically.377 Prior to initiating litigation, a client 
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can file a grievance against an insurance company with the UAE Insurance Authority.378 
However, if the Insurance Authority is unable to resolve the dispute to the complainant’s 
satisfaction, the only remaining recourse is to litigate before the UAE court system.379  Unlike 
many other jurisdictions, however, the UAE courts often fail to recognise contractual clauses 
that specify a choice of forum.380 Moreover, attempts to invoke a choice of foreign law in UAE 
court proceedings are likely to create procedural impracticalities, because the foreign law may 
be deemed unacceptable by the UAE courts.381 
If a party proceeds to take an insurance claim to trial, it will be brought before the Court of 
First Instance.382 The appropriate first instance court is determined by the location where the 
damage or loss occurred, or where the defendant is domiciled.383 Finally, civil insurance 
disputes are only heard by judges; there are no juries available for insurance trials.384 Once a 
claim has been filed with the court, the defendant is served and a hearing is scheduled for a few 
weeks’ time, at which the defendant will submit a response to the claim.385 The exchange of 
statements and documents continues in a series of short hearings for as long as the judge deems 
it necessary.386 Regarding the pre-trial discovery, the UAE Law of Evidence imposes specific 
rules, which oblige the parties to provide certain documents in their possession to the counter-
party.387 Furthermore, witness evidence and testimony tends to be rather limited.388 
In rendering a decision, the judge considers the evidence presented before the court in light of 
the governing statutory provisions, without regard to previous decisions.389 The decisions of 
the Court of First Instance are subject to an automatic right of appeal within 30 days, regarding 
issues of law or fact, and such appeals are heard by the Court of Appeal.390 The UAE approach 
fails to provide the consistency and predictability in resolving insurance disputes. This is 
because it is difficult to predict an outcome without clear rules on the substantive rights of 
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parties. Consistency and predictability can be reinforced by adherence to precedent.391 In the 
absence of the doctrine of precedent, it may be suggested that the UAE follows suit with 
Pakistan by establishing specialised tribunals for the purpose of hearing these disputes. ADR 
centres in the UAE such as the Reconciliation and Settlement Committees, and the Family 
Guidance Section, generally attempt to settle disputes amicably between parties but their 
adjudicative function is not well-defined.  
3.2.2.4 Advantages and Shortcomings of the Administrative Tribunal Model 
 
3.2.2.4.1 Advantages 
 
In light of the above, it may be contended that there are many advantages of using various 
forms of administrative tribunal to resolve sector-specific disputes, which fall within the 
purview of a particular agency or set of laws and regulations. 
First, administrative tribunals provide faster and more cost-effective resolutions of disputes, 
compared to the ordinary court structure.392 For instance, they help ensure that the parties 
engaged in a dispute within a particular sector are afforded an inexpensive and efficient option 
to achieve justice.393 In traditional litigation, the timeline for a case is often lengthy and the 
accumulation of fees along the way is significant.394 These factors are often exacerbated by the 
procedural formalities required when pursuing a case in the ordinary courts. In contrast, 
administrative tribunals are more flexible and informal.395 Theoretically, a party may therefore 
pursue a claim before an administrative tribunal, either with or without counsel, and the lesser 
procedural burden often results in time and cost savings. 
Aside from the above, the individuals selected to serve as members of an administrative 
tribunal will possess greater technical knowledge and expertise than ordinary judges in the 
subject matter of the dispute.396 Unlike ordinary judges in the general courts, who preside over 
a varied docket of claims, specialised tribunals can effectively deal with the technical nuances, 
socio-economic considerations, and policy issues arising from administrative actions.397 
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Furthermore, as mentioned previously, administrative tribunals possess a significant degree of 
flexibility, allowing them to decide cases according to the different circumstances presented 
and the legal requirements involved.398 In many situations, these tribunals are not bound or 
restricted by judicial precedent when deciding cases;399 they are vested with the authority to 
consider all relevant jurisprudence, including what would otherwise be classified as binding or 
persuasive authority. Moreover, they can render a decision that will go against existing 
precedent, if the circumstances so warrant.400 
In addition, administrative tribunals increase overall efficiency within both the executive and 
judicial sectors; in the executive domain, they help ensure the ‘efficient conduct of public 
administration and promote a policy of social development,’401 whereas in the judicial sector, 
they help relieve the pressure and workload faced by the courts as a result of overburdened 
dockets and a backlog of pending cases.402 Yohannes and Michael therefore note as follows: 
[Administrative tribunals] could offer speedier, cheaper and more accessible 
justice, essential for the administration of welfare schemes involving [a] large 
number of small claims… The process of courts of law is elaborate, slow and 
costly… [the court process] is to provide the highest standard of justice; generally 
speaking, the public wants the best possible article and is prepared to pay for it… 
In administering social justice […] the objective is not the best article at any price 
but the best article that is consistent with the efficient administration. Dispute must 
be disposed of quickly and cheaply for the benefit of the public purse as well as for 
that of the claimant.403 
Finally, most administrative tribunals are created to serve particular regions or localities.404 As 
such, the tribunals become familiar with the nuances of the region, insofar as the economy or 
business customs are concerned.405 A working knowledge of the daily realities of the parties 
appearing before them can be instrumental in applying the law and rendering decisions.406 This 
implies that administrative tribunals are best placed to appreciate the values and interests of the 
local community. 
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Together, these advantages work to protect party rights by creating a forum that enhances 
accessibility and participation for parties and ensures that an expedited form of justice can be 
achieved in a fair and efficient manner by a competent adjudicator. 
3.2.2.4.2 Shortcomings 
 
Despite the many advantages of the administrative tribunal structure, it would be remiss of any 
study not to mention some of the model’s disadvantages that have been highlighted by 
commentators. Awareness of these disadvantages will help to give necessary insights into the 
debate surrounding the use of administrative tribunals and the challenges to be overcome, if 
the administrative model is to be presented as a more effective dispute resolution option than 
litigation or other ADR mechanisms, with regard to disputes over insurance cover. 
First, it has been argued that the concept of the ‘administrative tribunal’ falls foul of the 
principles of the rule of law and natural justice.407 This argument stems from the fact that 
administrative tribunals are often the creation of the same laws that they are tasked to enforce, 
and the proponents of their own substantive jurisdiction and procedures.408 In theory, this could 
jeopardise the supremacy of ordinary courts of law in adjudicating on disputes and limit the 
equality of parties under the law, when they appear before administrative tribunals.409 In a 
similar vein, some commentators have pointed out that the quasi-judicial status of 
administrative tribunals violates the principle of the separation of powers, because these 
tribunals can perform both administrative and adjudicative functions.410 In fact, administrative 
tribunals are basically government agencies that take the place of the judiciary by performing 
judicial functions. Hence, they are more suited to societies where the separation of powers is 
less established. Nonetheless, this argument was countered in New York v Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, where it was held that an administrative tribunal or agency has ‘no 
power to act… unless and until Congress confers power upon it.’411 Hence, the tribunal simply 
administers a programme created by parliament.412 That said, it does not explain the tribunal’s 
powers to formulate policies and rules, in order to fill in the loopholes in acts of parliament. 
                                                          
407 Jha (n 37) 18. 
408 Ibid; Johnson (n 40). 
409 Ibid. 
410 See EH Slattery, ‘Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Administrative Agencies, the Separation of Powers, and 
Chevron Deference’ (2015) 153 Legal Memorandum 1, 3-4. 
411 535 US 1, 18 (2002). 
412 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
90 
 
Sales and Adler therefore remark that ‘allowing agencies to police the limits of their regulatory 
authority is like letting foxes… guard henhouses.’413 
Secondly, there is concern that those serving on administrative tribunals may not possess 
sufficient training or experience to properly render legal decisions.414 This belief stems from 
the fact that members of administrative tribunals might not have undergone the same training 
or possess the same judicial spirit as judges of ordinary law courts and, in the case of expert 
tribunal members, may not have a legal background at all.415 There is also the question whether 
those serving on tribunals possess the necessary independence to perform essentially judicial 
functions. In some instances, tribunal members may have previously served as administrators 
within the agency.416 Furthermore, despite the tribunal’s independence, its members may be 
more susceptible to political interference and might not maintain the same respect for an 
independent outlook as ordinary judges.417 This is especially problematic in the United States, 
whereby, as noted above, the United Supreme Court recently held that administrative law 
judges who are appointed by government agency staff do not have the same status as Federal 
or State court judges. 
Finally, the way in which the proceedings of administrative tribunals are conducted presents 
cause for concern. For example, these tribunals are not subject to the same set of uniform 
procedures and precedents as the ordinary courts, which could potentially lead to arbitrary and 
inconsistent decisions from tribunals in different regions or areas of law.418 Furthermore, some 
tribunals are permitted to meet in private,419 engendering concerns over the transparency of 
their activities and possibly calling into question the fairness of their process, as well as the 
final award.420 Moreover, when allowing parties to present their case and undertaking a fact-
finding investigation, administrative tribunals are not subject to strict rules of evidence, which 
affords them significant discretion to accept or refuse to consider evidence that would 
otherwise be clearly addressed by the evidentiary rules of ordinary courts.421 Also, when 
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rendering decisions, not all tribunals are required to rely on precedent422 or provide reasons or 
a rationale for their decisions.423 This makes it difficult for an aggrieved party to challenge the 
decision of an administrative tribunal on appeal, insofar as such an appeal is permissible. 
Despite the above, it must be noted that shortcomings relating to the rightness or wrongness of 
the actions of administrative tribunals, rather than the consequences of their actions, are not 
substantive in this context. This is because the predefined sets of rules and polices that govern 
the way in which Western states function often differs from those that govern the functioning 
of Islamic states. Hence, the separation of powers model may be suited to the governance of 
Western states, but not necessarily relevant in Islamic states such as the KSA. The fact that the 
quasi-judicial status of administrative tribunals violates the separation of powers principle is 
therefore not as important as the tribunals’ potential to offer faster, less expensive, and more 
accessible justice.  
3.3 The Profile of the Archetypal Administrative Tribunal  
 
The primary goal of embracing the use of administrative tribunals is to improve the parties’ 
access to justice via a competent adjudicative authority within a given sector.424 This means 
that the archetypal tribunal must ensure the following: justice is achieved through its 
proceedings; the tribunal system is accessible and fair; the tribunal proceedings are efficient 
and expedient; the rules governing tribunal proceedings are simple and easily understood by 
the disputing parties, and the tribunal serves its function to increase efficiency in the 
administration of justice and application of the governing legislation.425 
In measuring the effectiveness of an administrative tribunal system, scholars have delineated a 
number of elements that need to be aligned, in order for the overall system to be just.426  The 
next subsection outlines the most relevant of these elements and the benchmark standards 
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within each element, gleaned from established trends in administrative tribunal systems around 
the globe.427 
3.3.1 Creation of the Tribunal 
 
Administrative tribunals are a creation of ‘empowering legislation’.428 Empowering legislation 
can be general and broad, such as a country’s constitution,429 or a broad administrative tribunal 
act.430 The tribunals make decisions on behalf of national and local government agencies and 
departments, based on the legislation.431 However, the tribunals generally enjoy a high degree 
of independence and retain overall responsibility for adjudicating matters in the policy area in 
which they operate.432 They may therefore be considered an extension of specialised 
government agencies, tasked with implementing and enforcing legislative policy to resolve 
disputes.433  
Despite their role in supporting and enforcing the existing legislation, these tribunals typically 
have an arm’s length relationship with governmental agencies and exercise their authority in a 
non-partisan manner.434 Their jurisdiction is limited to the extent of the empowering 
legislation,435 and the scope of their authority is to interpret and apply the legislative mandates 
of the relevant legislation.436  
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3.3.2 Composition of the Tribunal 
 
Tribunals may be composed of a single member, but are often presided over by three 
members.437 In the event that a tribunal is composed of a single member, that member will 
typically have a legal background.438 Where there are three tribunal members,439 the member 
with a legal background will serve as the tribunal chair. Nonetheless, what sets tribunal 
members apart from ordinary judges is their expertise in the given field. Pickerill asks the 
following question: ‘[w]hat if antitrust litigants [in the U.S.] could, instead of litigating their 
cases before federal courts of limited expertise, litigate them before a hall-of-fame antitrust 
panel composed of Richard Posner, Robert Pitovsky, and Herbert Hovenkamp?’440 
Recourse to administrative tribunals therefore moves away from the deployment of legal 
generalists, presiding over disputes, and into a system where subject matter experts can preside 
over hearings. However, all tribunal members must be appointed, just like trial judges. 
Established jurisdictions have clear procedures and processes for appointing members of 
administrative tribunals, which often closely mirror those for appointing judges.441   
Nonetheless, non-lawyer experts have been embraced for the unique contribution that their 
skills and experience make to a tribunal. Mixed tribunals at state and local levels allow tribunal 
members with no legal training to bring their expertise and societal experiences to the table 
when making decisions that will affect parties’ legal rights and claims.442 The fact that a tribunal 
is not a court allows those with appropriate non-legal skills to participate directly in the 
decision-making process, as members of the tribunal rather than simply as expert consultants 
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or witnesses.443 This renders the tribunal more accessible to the parties, by reducing the need 
to rely on expert witnesses to make out their case.444 As one judge aptly notes: 
One of the strengths of the tribunal system as it has been developed… is the breadth 
of relevant experience that can be built into it by the use of lay members to sit with 
members who are legally qualified… its integrity is not compromised by the use of 
specialist knowledge or experience when the judge or tribunal member is examining 
the evidence.445 
When determining whether a potential tribunal member is suitable for appointment, there are 
a number of core skills that are considered. These core competencies fall into several broad 
categories, such as law and procedure, equal treatment, communication, conduct of hearing, 
evidence, and decision-making.446 The tribunal member should therefore have a comprehensive 
understanding of the merits review and adjudicative process, and its place in the public 
administration of sector-specific legislation.447 In addition, the member must have an 
understanding of the role of the administrative process, a clear conception of procedural 
fairness, a working knowledge of the rules of evidence, and the ability to judiciously exercise 
discretion in presiding over a case.448 Also, the tribunal member must possess the ability to 
interpret the empowering legislation, apply the relevant laws and administrative principles, 
make reasoned decisions, and evaluate the evidence.449 
Besides the set of basic skills required of tribunal members on appointment, many regimes also 
endeavour to provide them with ongoing professional development and training, so that they 
continue to refine and develop their skills.450 As recommended by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission: 
Every… review tribunal should have an effective professional development 
program with stated goals and objectives. This should include access to induction 
and orientation programs, mentoring programs, and continuing education and 
training programs. In particular, training in administrative law principles relevant 
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to decision making should be made available to members of tribunals who do not 
have legal qualifications.451 
Such training would ideally include effective strategies for managing and monitoring training 
programmes and tailored programmes for the induction of new tribunal chairs and members.452 
3.3.3 Procedural Rules of the Tribunal 
 
There is great variability among the procedures that are prescribed and adopted for use by 
administrative tribunals.453 In part, this stems from the fact that not all tribunals are the same 
and as such, they may have different requirements.454 Administrative tribunals borrow many of 
their procedural rules from ordinary courts of law,455 or may have a specific governing 
legislation.456 This means that in numerous jurisdictions, these tribunals are vested with the 
same authority as the courts; requiring parties to attempt to settle their disputes, prior to 
engaging in lengthy hearings.457 The emerging trend in governing the procedures of 
administrative tribunals is to enact a governing act that sets forth a common and uniform set of 
rules to be followed.458  
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that tribunals are not courts.459 In fact, tribunals were 
specifically created as an alternative to the courts and to keep matters within a specific sector 
outside the ordinary judicial structure.460 Thus, when it comes to developing procedural rules 
for tribunals or transposing the rules of the courts onto them, it is important that some degree 
of flexibility is preserved.461 However, this flexibility must not obstruct the tribunal from 
complying with the principles of administrative and natural law.462 Each party, whether 
bringing their case before a court or a tribunal, ‘has the right to the observance of the principles 
                                                          
451 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (ALRC 
Report No 89, Canberra, 2000) R 9. 
452 Judicial Studies Board (n 156). 
453 Law Commission (n 149). 
454 Ibid. 
455 Ibid. 
456 For example, The United Kingdom’s Tribunals, Courts & Enforcement Act of 2007. 
457 Endicott (n 136) 463. 
458 For example, this has been the case with the issuance of the United States Administrate Procedure Act and the 
United Kingdom’s Tribunals, Courts & Enforcement Act. 
459 Law Commission (n 149). 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid (noting that tribunals ‘should only be as formal and complex as is necessary to ensure that rights, interests, 
or legitimate expectations are fairly determined’). 
462 Ibid. 
96 
 
of natural justice by any tribunal… which has the power to make a determination in respect of 
that person’s rights, obligations, or interests, protected or recognised by law.’463 
Generally speaking, the flexibility and informality of the administrative tribunal process can 
be addressed through the empowering legislation and its accompanying rules. They may 
contain flexible hearing provisions, measures that minimise legal technicalities, and the 
tribunals’ broad investigative powers.464 Additionally, it is common for the empowering 
legislation to confer the power to determine the tribunal procedures onto the tribunals 
themselves.465 
When considering the areas to be addressed by procedural rules, the following constitute 
necessary provisions: the conduct of hearings, adequate notice, disclosure, the opportunity to 
make representations, and the calling and examining of witnesses.466 With regard to hearings, 
the rules must provide for what constitutes an adequate hearing. However, most systems simply 
provide that ‘the principles of natural justice’ must be observed; leaving tribunals to determine 
on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which hearings must be conducted to ensure that the 
parties’ rights to justice are preserved.467 
As for the initiation of proceedings, the tribunals must also have rules that provide any party 
whose rights or interests are likely to be affected with adequate notice of the pending case; 
thereby affording them adequate time to prepare and present their case.468 Once the case has 
been initiated and pleadings and supporting evidence have been exchanged, the parties must 
then be afforded the opportunity to make representations before the tribunal. Such 
representations may take the form of written motions or bench memoranda, or oral hearings, at 
which the parties may present oral arguments or a witness testimony.469 Each party must also 
be given a fair opportunity to respond to the introduction of any adverse arguments or 
materials.470 
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3.3.4 Decision-Making by the Tribunal 
 
When it comes to decision-making, the tribunal is autonomous and immune from direction by 
the agency that created it or from the agency chair, concerning the way in which it should 
decide a particular case.471 Tribunals require some procedural governance regarding the 
grounds on which their decisions are based and must present the underlying reasons for their 
decisions. 
3.3.4.1 Evidence 
 
Tribunals have broader discretion than the courts over the evidence that they may accept in 
deciding a dispute,472 because they are generally not confined by the laws of evidence that apply 
to the ordinary courts.473 These modified rules allow administrative tribunals to accept evidence 
that would otherwise not be admissible in an ordinary court.474 For example, under one 
legislative provision, a tribunal has the power to ‘receive as evidence any statement, document, 
information, or matter that in its opinion may assist it to deal effectively’ with the case at hand, 
‘whether or not it would be admissible in a court of law.’475 In some instances, tribunals may 
be governed by multiple statutes or rules of procedure and these rules must be reconciled.476 
However, tribunals maintain the hallmark rule of evidence that for particular material or 
testimony to be considered in resolving a dispute, it must be of logical probative value to the 
case.477  
If a tribunal makes adjudicative decisions based on testimony and evidence, like a normal court, 
it will tend to function more like a court. This may then beg the question of why a tribunal 
should be created, rather than merely appointing more judges. As previously noted, procedures 
before a tribunal are generally less formal than those that take place before a court. Nonetheless, 
the subsequent decisions must ultimately be based solely upon cogent and probative evidence. 
                                                          
471 Evans (n 142). 
472 Jacobs (n 135) 8. 
473 Endicott (n 136) 462; Metropolitan Properties Ltd v. Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577, 603 (‘members [of tribunals] 
are not restricted to the evidence adduced before them, they are free to draw upon their cumulative knowledge 
and experience of the matter in hand’); Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand, AID 1963 SC 677, 678 (India). 
474 Law Commission (n 149). 
475 Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, section 4B(1) (New Zealand).  
476 For example, the Ontario Child and Family Services Review Board gets its powers from the Child and Family 
Services Act (1990), the Intercountry Adoption Act (1998) and the Education Act (1990), while the Conservation 
Review Board is empowered only by the Ontario Heritage Act (1990). 
477 Law Commission (n 149). 
98 
 
This is because the decisions of administrative tribunals can be final and not subject to appeal, 
unlike those of courts. 
 
3.3.4.2 Precedent  
 
Tribunals have the capacity to both rely on and create precedential decisions, which will further 
the development of public law and assist future parties with protecting or asserting their 
rights.478 For administrative tribunals to be predictable and consistent as an adjudicatory 
system, it is essential that they incorporate both precedent and institutional legitimacy into their 
decision-making process.479 
By publishing their opinions, even where these are anonymised to protect the identities of the 
parties involved, the public is enlightened on what the law consists of and its application in 
practice,480 thereby enhancing predictability. Over time, these published decisions create a 
consensus on how the law is applied; for instance, when interpreting a particular contractual 
provision or hearing a party’s defence.481 This consensus can help deter parties from bringing 
frivolous or baseless suits and help meritorious claims build their cases.482 
Furthermore, by publishing opinions that contain tribunals’ reasoning and interpretation of the 
law, the corresponding legal system will be afforded the ability to identify changes in the 
perceptions of legal norms over time and the flexibility to respond.483 In addition to allowing 
the legal system itself to adapt to changing norms, the publication of opinions brings the 
attention of the public and legislature to  the tribunals’ position on current laws.484 Should the 
public or agency involved disagree with the interpretations of these tribunals, or feel that the 
legislation is not achieving its intended purpose, the legislature will subsequently be able to 
revisit the law and make amendments through the legislative process.485 
                                                          
478 Pickerill (n 53) 1619. 
479 Ibid, 1620.  
480 Ibid; DM Engel, ‘Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court’ (1980) 
1980 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 425, 435-36; WB Weinstein, ‘Some Benefits and Risks of 
Privatization of Justice through ADR’ (1996) 11 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 241, 249 (‘For law to 
serve its function as giving expression to enforceable behavioural norms, it must be made publicly for all to see… 
Members of the public must know what the law is…’). 
481 Pickerill (n 53) 1620.  
482 Administrative Review Council (n 157) 106.  
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why that precedent should no longer apply. This chronicled development of legal norms assists tribunals by 
providing them with current interpretations for comparison, on which to base their instant opinions. 
484 Law Commission (n 149). 
485 Pickerill (53) 1621. 
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3.3.4.3 Decision Rationales 
 
Jurisdictions differ over whether an administrative tribunal is required to present reasons to 
support its decisions.486 However, there is a growing trend towards requiring tribunals to 
provide the rationale for their decisions.487 Various legislatures recognise that a failure to 
impose this requirement would result in administrative tribunals being able to circumvent 
effective judicial review488 and would inhibit the transparency of tribunal proceedings.489 
Furthermore, the requirement for tribunals to give the reasons underpinning their decisions 
coincides with the policy reasons for making tribunal decisions public and assists with the 
development of precedent.490  
In terms of what must be included to support a judicial decision, the consensus is that the 
reasoning must be intelligible and should address the substantial points that have been made.491 
Particularly where non-legal tribunal members are involved, it is important to understand how 
they view the law’s applicability in a given case and their role as adjudicators in the legal 
system. However, in practice, few members of administrative tribunals write individual 
opinions containing their deliberations as decision-makers; instead, this task is often delegated 
to the chairman of the tribunal, who generally has a legal background.492  
 
3.3.4.4 Appeals and Judicial Review  
 
The possibility to appeal tribunal decisions and obtain judicial review is also an important 
aspect of the administrative tribunal system. While generally speaking, the decisions of 
tribunals are final, the empowering legislation may enable parties to challenge these decisions 
on appeal.493 In some jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, tribunal decisions may 
be appealed, although they narrowly limit the grounds of appeal.494 Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
486 Wade and Forsyth (n 180) 522.  
487 Ibid. 
488 Endicott (n 136) 463-64. 
489 Law Commission (n 149). 
490 Endicott (n 136) 463-64. 
491 See In Re Pyser and Mills’ Arbitration [1964] 2 QB 467, 478. 
492 KK Latta, ‘The Role of Non-Lawyers on Administrative Tribunals: What Lay Members Think about Law, 
Lawyers, and Their Own Participation in Alaska’s Mixed Administrative Tribunals’ (2014) 31(1) Alaska Law 
Review 37, 38.  
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importance of appeals should not be ignored. Appeals serve to correct errors, and to assess and 
improve the decisions of tribunals and other decision-makers.495 
3.3.4.5 Enforceability of Tribunal Decisions 
 
When it comes to the enforceability of administrative tribunal decisions, they are routinely 
accorded the same weight as decisions issued by ordinary courts. The only difference is that 
tribunals lack direct powers of enforcement and, in the cases where this is needed, their 
decisions are enforced in the ordinary courts.496 However, the enforcement of tribunal decisions 
varies, depending on the administrative regime. In some systems, administrative tribunals are 
empowered to enforce their own decisions, either by acting as adjudicative bodies, or through 
the regulatory and licensing bodies of the agency or department with which they are 
connected.497 A good example is the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which regulates 
the insurance industry (except the health insurance sector), receives appeals from the IDCs, 
and then issues and enforces its decisions.  
As noted above, SAMA uses a range of sanctions that are tailored to the misconduct of the 
insurer. It may appoint consultants to provide consultation to the company over the 
management of its activities in attempting to cure the issue. It may suspend any company board 
member or employee who is proven to be responsible for a violation. It may restrict or prevent 
the company from accepting new shareholders, investors, or members in any of its insurance 
activities. It may compel the company to take any other measure that it deems necessary for 
resolving a violation. It may request that the company be dissolved, impose a fine of up to one 
million Saudi riyals and an imprisonment sentence of up to four years. Thus, SAMA may 
impose an imprisonment sentence as a last resort. 
 
3.3.5 How the IDC Compares to the Archetypal Administrative Tribunal 
 
The IDC system in the KSA represents a hybrid dispute resolution structure. The procedures 
and structures of the model stem from principles of administrative law. However, instead of 
                                                          
495 Law Commission (n 149) 117 (internal citations omitted). 
496 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Saleem [2001] WLR 443, 457. 
497 Kuttner (n 138). 
101 
 
resolving issues between parties and the State, IDC Committees resolve disputes between 
private parties, viz., the individual policyholder and the insured.  
The IDC is a forum that was specifically created by SAMA to resolve insurance disputes. It is 
a quasi-judicial body, in that it exists outside the Saudi court structure, but serves an 
adjudicatory purpose. Proceedings before the IDC are more formal than other types of ADR. 
However, they are arguably less formal than traditional litigation before the Saudi courts. In 
the KSA, if a party wishes to resolve an insurance dispute in a ‘litigation’ forum, the dispute 
must be submitted to an IDC. This committee has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims and 
participation is not voluntary. This section compares the IDC to the profile of the efficient 
administrative tribunal mapped out above. 
3.3.5.1 Creation by the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA) 
 
The creation of the IDC by SAMA marks the establishment of an essentially ad hoc tribunal 
system within the KSA’s overall adjudicatory regime. Article 20 of the CICCL provides that: 
One committee or more shall be formed by an Edict of the Council of Ministers on 
a recommendation of the Minister of Finance. Such committee or committees shall 
consist of three specialized members, one of whom, at least, must be a legal 
consultant. The committee shall undertake to resolve the disputes arising between 
insurance companies and their customers…498  
 
There are a few important items to be gleaned from Article 20. First, the empowering 
legislation is the CICCL. This is a sector-specific statute with a scope that is limited to the 
insurance industry. There is no overarching tribunal law to which this sector-specific agency 
is subject. Second, the IDC is vested with both ‘party-and-party’ and ‘party-and-State’ 
authority. This reinforces the IDC’s quasi-judicial nature, in the sense that it adjudicates 
disputes, but also highlights the IDC’s administrative nature with regard to its role in 
enforcement. Finally, the law provides for the creation of ‘one or more’ Committees. In 
practice, these have been regionally established, with three Primary Committees assuming 
jurisdiction over different territories of the Kingdom. However, should the need arise, there is 
the option of creating additional committees. 
 
3.3.5.2 Composition of the Committee 
 
                                                          
498 CICCL, Article 20. 
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When determining the composition of the IDC Committees, Article 20 of the CICCL again 
provides preliminary guidance: Each Committee will be composed of three members and one 
of these must be a legal consultant. It should be noted here that the language used is ‘legal 
consultant’, as opposed to an attorney or judge.499 Meanwhile, the only guidance provided with 
regard to the other two members is that they should be ‘specialised’ members. It is uncertain 
whether this means that they should have a background in insurance, given that the rules are 
silent on the credentials and expertise that they should possess, in order to qualify as 
‘specialised’ members.  
Similar to other administrative tribunal systems, Committee members are appointed for terms 
of three years. There is no guidance provided on the vetting and appointment process that is 
undertaken by SAMA; thereby raising questions about the independence of the Committee. 
The appointment of Committee members by the administrative agency may easily be viewed 
as the exercise of political influence. It also raises the question of whether specialised 
Committee members share the same status as ordinary court judges, or whether they may 
simply be considered as SAMA employees or independent contractors, engaged by the agency. 
It is striking that there are no provisions to address the impartiality and competence of 
Committee members. Unlike trial judges, who are subject to strict rules on conflicts and 
recusal, there are no comparable provisions governing Committee members. Given that the 
disputes are primarily between insurance companies and their policyholders and concern 
isolated events, the potential for bias may be modest. However, over time, in dealing with the 
same insurance companies repeatedly, such positions may develop, leading to the problem of 
‘repeat-player effect’.500  
Despite the lack of provisions for this issue in the Working Rules, the Law of Procedure of 
Shariah Courts may arguably be applied, specifically its disqualification and recusal rules.501 
This argument is premised on the assumption that in the eyes of the law, Committee members 
are comparable to judges, although there is nothing to affirmatively support this. As a result, it 
is essential that the KSA either incorporates references to its provisions governing the conduct 
                                                          
499 However, the researcher was unable to find any member of an IDC Committee with a legal background who 
was not a judge. Thus, all members surveyed in this study (results are discussed in Chapter 6) are judges. 
500 For an analysis of the problem, see AJS Colvin, ‘An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes’ (2011) 8(1) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1, 1-23; L Bingham, ‘Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect’ (1997) 1 Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal 189, 189-220. 
501 Law of Procedure of Shariah Courts issued by Royal Decree No. M/21 of 20 Jumada I, 1421 (19 August 2000), 
Articles 90 to 96. 
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of judges or formulates additional guidance on the role of Committee members in presiding 
over disputes. 
In addition to the need to develop guidance on how Committee members should operate once 
appointed, there is also a noticeable lack of guidance on who may be eligible for appointment 
to a Committee. Unlike judges, who must meet a set of eligibility criteria, the only guidance 
provided with regard to Committee members is that they are to be specialised, and at least one 
must be a legal consultant, rather than a judge or lawyer. In practice, this becomes problematic. 
For instance, it is uncertain whether there is an objective level of experience or education that 
must be attained, prior to becoming eligible for appointment, such as a university degree or a 
specific minimum number of years of industry experience. Additionally, it is uncertain whether 
consideration is given to socio-economic factors, such as gender, criminal history, or any 
vested financial interests in the insurance sector. These uncertainties still exist, because there 
have been no public statements about the core competencies required for tribunal members. It 
is therefore important to promulgate regulations or guidance on the basic prerequisites for 
consideration in the appointment of IDC members. 
By creating appointment standards, the parties will be assured that their Committee is 
competent to hear their case; thereby promoting their confidence in the process and 
discouraging them from opting out in favour of other forms of ADR, such as mediation or 
arbitration. Furthermore, in the event that tribunal members are able to make a career out of 
their appointment – assuming that appointments are not limited to a single three-year term but 
are subject to renewal – consideration should be given to ongoing training for professional 
development and support for Committee members. Such training should address developments 
within the sector, legislative changes that affect parties’ rights or that bear upon the subject 
matter of disputes, and advancements in the overall regime of the administrative agency. 
 
3.3.5.3 Procedural Rules of the IDC 
 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Working Rules establish the jurisdiction and procedural rules of the 
IDC. Under Article 2, the Primary Committees have jurisdiction over all insurance disputes 
and complaints brought by a complainant with a capacity or interest in the outcome of the 
proceeding. Thus, the jurisdiction of the IDC is limited to hearing insurance disputes and does 
not extend to outside contractual or collection matters. Article 6 further provides that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over insurance disputes is divided according to territory. The complaint 
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must be brought before the appropriate Primary Committee within the claimant or defendant’s 
territorial jurisdiction, depending on the circumstances of the dispute. Article 3 sets forth the 
form and process through which the proceedings may be commenced, including all of the 
required pleading details. It fulfils the notice and disclosure requirements of the tribunal’s 
empowering legislation. 
In terms of the transparency of proceedings, the Committees are required to hold hearings in 
the presence of the Committee members and parties.502 However, the rules do not indicate 
whether the hearings are otherwise open to the public. For situations on which the Working 
Rules are silent, Article 12 provides that ‘the provisions of the Law of Procedure of Shariah 
Courts and the Criminal Procedures Law, as the case may be, shall be applied…’503 
3.3.5.4 Decision-Making by the IDC 
 
As noted above, there are three areas of concern relating to Committee decision-making. These 
include the consideration of evidence, the consideration of precedent, and the content of the 
Committee’s opinion. Each of these areas is explained in more detail below. 
3.3.5.4.1 Evidence 
 
Like many other administrative tribunal systems, the Working Rules provide the IDC with 
broader flexibility in considering evidence. Notably, Article 7 of the Working Rules provides 
that ‘[a]ll types of evidence may be used before the Committees, including electronic and 
computer data, telephone recordings, fax correspondence, emails or SMS messages.’ This 
provision of the Working Rules trumps the traditional, more formal rules of evidence that apply 
to the ordinary courts, as embodied in the Law of Procedure. However, the Working Rules 
could be further improved by adding the qualifier that all evidence considered must be reliable, 
cogent, and have probative value to the matter at hand. 
3.3.5.4.2 Precedent 
 
Under Article 9 of the Working Rules, the IDC is instructed to decide cases ‘in accordance 
with the laws and regulations regulating the nature of the dispute, the applicable rules and 
rulings reached at by the judiciary and the comparative jurisprudence for settling insurance 
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disputes and violations.’ While it is laudable that the IDC regime embraces the doctrine of 
precedent to achieve efficient justice and protect party rights, the provision on the use of 
precedent is in fact quite vague. It essentially states that members of the Committee may 
consider all sources of law that are applicable to the dispute, both domestic and comparative. 
However, it does not provide for any hierarchy or priority of these sources. Some delineation 
of binding or mandatory versus persuasive authority, along with an established order of 
authority, will therefore be necessary for the system to generate predictable and consistent 
decisions. Without such guidance, each dispute brought before the Committee will essentially 
be resolved in an ad hoc manner. 
3.3.5.4.3 Decision Rationale 
 
The Working Rules provide little guidance to the Committees on the content that is required 
for their decisions. Again, in turning to the Law of Procedure, there is little to be found on what 
the final decision should contain. Nevertheless, it may be argued that a decision should lay out 
the issues considered by the tribunal, along with a well-reasoned explanation of the law applied 
and the route taken by the tribunal to reach its conclusions. Article 170 of the Law of Procedure 
provides that ‘[i]f the wording of the judgment is vague or confusing, the litigants may request 
an interpretation from the court that rendered the judgment.’504 However, this does not shed 
light on what should be routinely included in a decision.505 The Working Rules therefore need 
to be revised to include the basic elements that all committee decisions should contain. 
3.3.5.4.4 Appeal and Judicial Review  
 
The Working Rules permit the appeal of Primary Committee decisions. The CICCL and its 
implementing regulations provide for the creation of an Appeals Committee, in addition to the 
Primary Committee of the IDC within this dispute resolution system.506 Article 8 of the 
Working Rules provides that ‘[t]he Appeal Committee shall have the jurisdiction to settle 
litigants’ grievances submitted by the persons concerned against the decisions issued by the 
Primary Committees.’ Prior to the issuance of these Working Rules, appeals against IDC 
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505 102 decisions of the IDC Committees were analysed by the researcher. See Appendix I. The Committees do 
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decisions were brought before the Board of Grievances. However, under the current regime, 
the Appeal Committee has exclusive jurisdiction over these appeals.  
Nonetheless, it is noted in Chapter 2 that Article 13(b) of the Law of the Judiciary, 2007 
provides that the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over the decisions of all quasi-judicial 
committees, except the Committee for the Resolution of Security Disputes, the Banking 
Dispute Settlement Committee, and the Tariff Committees; Article 20 of the CICCL provides 
that IDC decisions may be appealed before the Board of Grievances; and Article 8 of the 
Working Rules limits the jurisdiction of the Appeal Committee to examining decisions in 
lawsuits where the amount decided is less than 50,000 Saudi riyals.  
Procedurally, any grievance against a decision of the Primary Committee must be submitted to 
the Appeal Committee for consideration, within 30 days of delivering the decision.507 However, 
the Working Rules are silent on the available grounds for appeal. Assuming that the Law of 
Procedure applies in this instance, Article 179 provides that ‘[a]ll judgments are appealable.’508 
This then essentially creates an automatic right of appeal for the losing party in any insurance 
dispute. However, such an appeal is not a de novo review of the case on its merits. Article 180 
of the Law of Procedure requires the objection brief (application for appeal) to contain ‘the 
grounds for the objection, the requests of the objector, and the reasons in support of the 
objection.’509 Under these circumstances, the appellant must specifically plead the reason why 
they believe the Primary Committee erred in rendering its judgment. What is noticeably absent 
from the Law of Procedure is any clear delineation of the grounds for objection and appeal. 
For the appeal system to be successful in the insurance dispute sector, it is important that the 
parties are clearly informed of the grounds on which they can appeal a decision, as well as the 
scope of the review upon appeal.510 
On the matter of judicial review, the Working Rules are silent, and one must again consult the 
Law of Procedure of the Shariah Courts. Article 3 states: ‘[a]ny procedure in a proceeding 
validly applied under laws in force shall remain valid.’511 Thus, if a Primary Committee validly 
applies the law to resolve a dispute brought before it, the proceedings will be upheld by the 
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courts and the decision will remain valid. However, Article 6 of the Law of Procedure also 
provides as follows: 
[a]n action shall be invalid if declared null and void by a provision hereunder or is 
so flawed that the purpose thereof is not served. Nonetheless, it shall not be 
adjudged invalid, notwithstanding such a provision, if it is proven that the purpose 
of the action is definitely achieved.512 
 
3.3.5.4.5 Enforceability of IDC Decisions 
 
The Working Rules are silent on the issue of enforcement. This is problematic because, while 
the decisions issued by courts and arbitrators are subject to enforcement under Enforcement 
Law, Article 2 of this Law expressly excepts decisions rendered over administrative matters.513 
This begs the question of whether committee decisions are in fact administrative decisions. If 
the Enforcement Law does not apply, then, the provision on the attachment and execution of 
the Law of Procedure may allow a party to fulfil a judgment, insofar as it can provide a 
remedy.514 For parties to enforce decisions effectively, it is essential that they are clear on the 
procedures that are available to them, in order to compel the compliance of adverse parties. 
 
However, it may be contended that SAMA enforces IDC decisions because SAMA has 
supervisory and technical control over all insurance activities within the Kingdom, sanctions 
insurance companies that violate provisions of the law, and hears appeals against the decisions 
of the Primary Committees. 
 
3.4 Is the Administrative Model More Effective than Litigation? 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the analysis of insurance law in this thesis focuses on the compensation 
of consumers who are confronted with an adverse determination of their insurance cover. In 
general, consumers, and other policyholders, have few means of challenging an insurer’s 
adverse determination.515 This is compounded by the fact that insurance policies are purchased 
by consumers to protect themselves against significant risks, and when such risks arise, 
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consumers usually lack the financial resources to challenge insurers.516 Conversely, denying 
policyholders’ claims increases the revenue of insurers. Although this may be detrimental to 
an insurer’s reputation,517 there are equally numerous factors that could prevent such an 
outcome; namely, the malleability of the language used in insurance contracts, the lack of 
comprehensive information to consumers, and poor handling of insurance claims.518 Where the 
underlying contract is not balanced, it is important for the consumer to be able to credibly 
threaten insurers with a form of legal recourse.519  
Litigation has historically been a form of legal recourse, which readily provides a 
comprehensive set of potential remedies to policyholders. These include punitive damages, 
attorneys’ fees and expenses, and damages for emotional stress.520 Liability or third-party 
insurance has historically been linked with litigation, because the former seeks to protect the 
policyholder from the risk of liabilities imposed by the latter.521 In short, it protects the 
policyholder in the event of litigation, according to the cover offered by the insurance policy. 
Hence, the insurer is required to defend the policyholder if a claim is made against the latter, 
with the legal costs of the defence being borne by the insurer and no effect on the limits of the 
policy, unless the insurance contract specifies otherwise. It follows that without liability 
insurance and litigation, many innocent victims of tort or negligence would not be 
compensated.522 The decision to litigate is not only motivated by the need to establish fault or 
negligence, but also to compel the insurer to pay.523  
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Litigation is therefore important, because although it is a rights-based process option, it serves 
the public good and furthers the interests of the general public by ensuring that policyholders 
who have suffered a loss that is covered have a means of seeking relief from an insurer. 
Nonetheless, due to the shortcomings of litigation, it has been argued that expenses and 
unpredictability may be avoided or reduced by channelling disputes into an administrative 
system.524 In light of this argument, the present chapter critically examines the administrative 
tribunal model and determines whether it is a more effective avenue than the litigation-based 
model for resolving disputes over insurance cover. It uses five criteria, namely cost and 
duration, Shariah-compliance, impartiality, flexibility and predictability. 
3.4.1 Cost and Duration 
 
Schwarcz argues that although litigation provides a comprehensive set of potential remedies, 
in reality, it offers little compensation to aggrieved policyholders.525 Hence, the problem with 
litigation lies not with the remedies that it affords, but with the path to obtaining those remedies, 
or the ‘process of litigation’.526 Also, Sykes concluded his study with the contention that 
litigation is inefficient and works purely in favour of the insurer, because it is slow and 
unpredictable, which does not favour aggrieved policyholders, who may be in desperate need 
of financial compensation.527  
Abraham on his part notes that most insurance policies are based on sequential and contingent 
contracts, which do not clearly specify the parties’ rights or obligations when a risk arises.528 
This explains why insurers with sufficient resources may wrongly but systematically cut claims 
payments.529 In contrast, consumers seldom have sufficient resources to challenge insurers’ 
adverse determinations.530 Hence, it has been contended that insurance disputes generally do 
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not merit the expense, delays, or effort required for litigation, unless the objective is to obtain 
punitive damages, or the claimant is filing on behalf of a large group.531 
Given the absence of data on insurance coverage litigation in the KSA,532 it may be assumed 
that the litigation-based model has the same benefits and shortcomings in Saudi society. The 
consumers are likely to face the expenses, delays, and effort required to litigate in Shariah 
courts. Nonetheless, under the IDC regime, only three Primary Committees assume jurisdiction 
over the entire Kingdom. Hence, parties who do not live in the three cities in which the 
Committees hold sessions have to travel to these cities. This engenders important costs that 
make the IDC less accessible.  
3.4.2 Shariah-Compliance 
 
The imbalance of power between insurers and consumers highlights the difficulty of consumers 
to compel insurers to pay and reinforces the contention that conventional insurance contracts 
are contrary to Shariah law.533 It is shown above that the Board of Grievances consistently 
refused to recognise or enforce contracts that allowed the insurer to use riba (interest) and 
gharar (speculation). It is also noted that even in Appeal No. 3/T/141 Year 1407H, the Board 
of Grievances refused to enforce an insurance contract because it was not Shariah-compliant, 
despite the intervention of the Governor. 
On the other hand, the IDC Committees consistently recognise conventional insurance 
contracts and do not adhere to the contention that insurance that is not cooperative insurance 
or takaful is prohibited by the Shariah. Also, the Committees are required to apply precedent, 
despite the fact that the doctrine of binding precedent does not have binding force in the Islamic 
judicial system, and judges in Islamic courts are required to decide cases based on their own 
merits. Thus, it is uncertain whether the doctrine has persuasive value only since Shariah law 
does not expressly prohibit judges in Islamic courts from taking guidance from previous dicta. 
Nonetheless, it is also noted above that the researcher analysed 102 decisions of the IDC 
Committees and was unable to identify a single decision that cited and relied on precedent. 
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risks and responsibilities through a common fund, based on the understanding that each party experiencing loss 
will be compensated. Thus, an adverse determination would be contrary to Shariah. 
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3.4.3 Impartiality and Flexibility 
 
Given that the hearing in court is open and accessible to the general public, insurers are likely 
to be influenced by the adverse publicity generated by litigation.534 On the other hand, it is 
shown above that the IDC is a creation of an empowering legislation, which is specific to the 
insurance industry. It enjoys a significant degree of independence and retains overall 
responsibility for adjudicating matters in the industry. What sets panel members apart from 
ordinary judges is their expertise in insurance dispute resolution. Also, it is shown in Chapter 
5 that, in practice, IDC adjudicators prefer interpretations of ambiguous provisions that protect 
the weaker or non-drafting parties. Thus, the shortcomings from a theoretical perspective may 
not necessarily translate into impediments in practice. 
Nonetheless, it is noted that there is concern that those serving on administrative tribunals may 
not possess sufficient training or experience to properly render legal decisions. Hence, 
members of the IDC Committees might not have undergone the same training or possess the 
same judicial spirit as judges of ordinary law courts and, in the case of expert panel members, 
may not have a legal background at all. There is also the question whether those serving on the 
Committees possess the necessary independence to perform essentially judicial functions.  
However, it is noted in Chapter 6 that all the Committee members contacted by the researcher 
have previously served as judges rather than administrators within SAMA. Notwithstanding, 
although on paper, the IDC is an interest-based option that enjoys a high level of independence 
and is governed by rules that afford parties sufficient time to prepare and present their cases,  
its members may be more susceptible to political interference and might not maintain the same 
respect for an independent outlook as ordinary judges. There is no guidance provided on the 
vetting and appointment process that is undertaken by SAMA. The appointment of Committee 
members by SAMA may easily be viewed as the exercise of political influence 
3.4.4 Predictability 
 
                                                          
534 This is related to the ‘mass litigation’ problem faced by manufacturers of drugs and medical devices. Hence, 
once their products are associated with consumer injuries, the healthy profits they make becomes a hedge against 
the loss of revenue due to the adverse publicity generated by litigation as well as the costs of litigation. See 
Mullady RG, ‘Considerations in the Management and Defence of Pharmaceutical Litigation in the United States’ 
in Howells GG (ed), Product Liability, Insurance and the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Anglo-American 
Comparison (Manchester University Press 1991) 122. 
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It has been demonstrated that insurers are wary of litigation due to unpredictable verdicts and 
huge legal fees and expenses.535 Moreover, a study conducted by Friedman and Ladinsky 
showed that the US workers’ compensation scheme is only effective due to, inter alia, the 
shortcomings of litigation unless it imposes a strict or absolute liability on employers to ensure 
that they subscribe to employee cover.536 Thus, litigation can be very effective, if it is 
accompanied by strict duties. 
With regard to the IDC, until the procedures utilised by the Committees and the ambiguities 
within the empowering legislation are clarified, the present status of the Committees and their 
freedom to interpret the principles of justice continue to pose a direct threat to the fair and 
efficient resolution of insurance disputes. Although it would seem as if the IDC regime 
embraces the doctrine of precedent to achieve efficient justice and protect parties’ rights, the 
provision on the use of precedent is quite vague and none of 102 Committee decisions analysed 
by the researcher cited and relied on precedent. Also, there is no hierarchy or priority stated for 
the sources to be availed of by the Committees. The Working Rules do not delineate which 
decisions constitute binding or mandatory authority and which constitute persuasive authority. 
From a theoretical perspective, this is quite problematic because ambiguity creates a substantial 
risk of bias towards the policy preferences of adjudicators and possibly, miscarriage of 
justice.537 
The Working Rules are also silent on the issue of enforcement. It is noted in Chapter 2 that the 
influence of the Continental European civil law tradition is strong in the KSA. The hallmark 
of the civil law system is the comprehensive codification of its law into frequently updated 
legal codes. These codes provide specifically for all aspects of a matter being tried and it is 
ventured here that codification would rectify the shortcomings indicated above. In this vein, 
Al-Obeikan clarifies: 
The human mind is limited, which may cause conflict between opinions. It is for 
this reason codification is necessary. It would contribute to establishing justice. It 
will facilitate a judge’s work and relieve him of conducting difficult research in the 
books of jurisprudence. We are living in times that require rapid verdicts in 
accumulating cases. This process will be speeded up by codification. Codification 
would also be useful to end the serious matter of conflicting judgments that 
                                                          
535 See OT Beatty, ‘Workers’ Compensation and Hoffman Plastic: Pandora’s Undocumented Box’ (2011) 55 St 
Louis University Law Journal 1211, 1221-1222 (discussing the problems encountered by workers, employers and 
insurance companies in the civil justice system). 
536 Friedman and Ladinsky (n 240) 70-71. 
537 W Fansworth et al, ‘Ambiguity about Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation’ (2010) 2(1) 
Journal of Legal Analysis 257, 271. 
113 
 
sometimes occur within the same case and in the same city, perhaps even in the 
same court or that are passed by the same judge.538 
The KSA’s insurance sector is currently facing an issue that was previously acknowledged by 
the Commissioner of Australia in 2005: 
[A] large number of Tribunals have been created, with a wide variety of powers. 
Many of these Tribunals were set up in response to specific needs, and lack any 
coherent framework or settled pattern. Reaction to a new statutory scheme, or the 
emergence of a particular kind of dispute, has often been the establishment of a new 
Tribunal.539 
Codification, or at the very least, express acknowledgement in the Working Rules and related 
regulations, will mean that the IDC Committees and parties will be clear on the scope of 
authority, jurisdiction, power, and enforcement. Such clarity will certainly enhance the 
effectiveness of the system. The above shortcomings show that the proceedings of the IDC are 
not sufficiently streamlined to support the contention that the KSA’s administrative tribunal 
model is a superior alternative to litigation, given that the tribunal functions like a court and 
does not provide a shorter and more cost-effective path towards making a comprehensive set 
of remedies available to policyholders. However, as noted above, a practical inquiry may 
provide different findings to the theoretical and doctrinal analysis conducted above. Hence, it 
may be difficult to argue that the IDC is not a more efficient and effective dispute resolution 
option when compared to litigation without examining actual decisions of the IDC. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The premise of this Chapter is that the consumer should be able to credibly threaten a form of 
legal recourse against insurers who wrongly cut payment claims. It has been argued that 
litigation has historically been a form of legal recourse which readily provides a comprehensive 
set of potential remedies for consumers. These remedies include, inter alia, punitive damages, 
attorneys’ fees and expenses, and emotional stress damages. This Chapter has shown that there 
are shortcomings in the litigation model. In particular, the limitations in the available remedies, 
access to the courts, and the litigation process. The legal process is inefficient and works in 
favour of the insurers; it is slow, costly, and unpredictable. In this light, this Chapter considered 
                                                          
538 AM Al-Obeikan, The Codification of Islamic Shariʿah (Asharq al-ʾAwsat 2006) 36. 
539 M Barker, ‘The Emergence of the Generalist Administrative Tribunal in Australia and New Zealand’ (8th 
Annual AIJA Tribunal’s Conference, 9 June 2005) 
<http://www.sat.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/JBspeechGeneralistAdministrativeTribunal.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019. 
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the argument that the expenses and unpredictability of litigation could be avoided or reduced 
by channelling disputes into an administrative system. 
What has commonly been shown is that in most societies, including the KSA, there is a need 
for a form of flexible adjudication, which is suited to changing social requirements and industry 
needs, as opposed to the rigid formal procedures that are ingrained in the operations of ordinary 
courts of law. The administrative tribunal model seeks to achieve this objective, because it 
consists of an agency that is not part of the judiciary but is tasked with determining disputes 
and passing binding decisions. It is essentially designed to overcome the shortcomings of the 
litigation system. As a result of the tribunal’s reduced scope and specialised nature, it is able 
to offer increased speed and efficiency at a more affordable cost for the parties involved, in 
comparison with the realities of traditional litigation.  
It is also shown that the administrative tribunal in the KSA tasked with settling insurance 
disputes, the IDC, is an interest-based option that enjoys a high level of independence and is 
governed by rules that afford parties sufficient time to prepare and present their cases. 
Nevertheless, the IDC Committees have tribunals in only three cities, implying that parties who 
do not live in these cities have to able to meet the additional costs of travel and accommodation. 
Also, there is no conclusive evidence that IDC Committees constitute a better dispute 
resolution option than litigation; at least, from a theoretical perspective. The provision on the 
exercise of precedent is somewhat ill-defined, and the researcher was unable to identify any 
Committee decision that cited and relied on precedent; the Working Rules do not mention what 
constitutes binding, mandatory or persuasive authority; neither do they clarify the basic 
elements that all Committee decisions should contain, how decisions should be enforced, and 
the grounds for objection and appeal. These shortcomings may be overcome by enacting new 
codes or rules to clarify the enabling legislation. In the meantime, the next Chapter seeks to 
determine whether opting for other forms of ADR (negotiation, mediation and arbitration) may 
be preferable to the administrative tribunal model, given the flexibility provided by these forms 
of ADR over the choice of forum, and substantive and procedural law. 
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Chapter 4: Comparing the Administrative Tribunal Model and Other 
Forms of ADR 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 2, since 1928, courts in the KSA generally defer to the interpretations or 
fatwa of the Hanbali Sunni School following a resolution issued by the Saudi Judicial Board. 
Also, in Chapter 3, it was noted that courts in the KSA apply the Shariah in most civil and 
criminal cases. Thus, although administrative rules, regulations and implementing regulations 
issued by government ministers and the Saudi Council of Ministers govern some commercial 
activities, they simply supplement the Shariah as interpreted by the Hanbali School. Also, it 
was noted that although litigation has historically been a form of legal recourse that readily 
provides a comprehensive set of potential remedies to policyholders, courts in the KSA do not 
hear insurance-related disputes. The adjudication of these disputes has been delegated to an 
administrative tribunal or specialised committee called the Committee for the Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes and the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC). It was then shown that this 
sector-specific administrative committee or tribunal does not provide an interest-based dispute 
resolution option that is without serious flaws.  
This Chapter is the third step towards answering the research question of the rationale for 
compelling IDC adjudication. It answers this question by examining other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) available in the KSA and determining whether they are more 
effective than the IDC adjudication. Emphasis is placed on negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration.  
This Chapter begins with a brief discussion of the shortcomings of the administrative tribunal 
model (IDC adjudication) identified in Chapter 3. It then seeks to determine whether each of 
the three forms of ADR may help overcome these shortcomings. It is shown that although 
negotiation and mediation may not be slow, laden with rules, and costly, they are less appealing 
to policyholders than administrative tribunals because, unlike third parties who facilitate 
negotiations or mediate, the IDC adjudicators can enforce their decisions or have them 
enforced. It is also shown that arbitration is effective but does not confer any unique advantage 
regarding fairness, privacy, and timely determinations. The parties to the arbitration are 
essentially provided the same protection as disputants in the IDC. 
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4.2 The Shortcomings of the Administrative Tribunal Model 
It is shown in Chapter 3 that litigation is inefficient and works in favour of the insurers. It is 
slow, laden with rules, costly and unpredictable. It also shown that the IDC is not a better option 
than litigation for resolving insurance-related disputes. The provision on the use of precedent 
by the IDC is quite vague and the Working Rules are silent on what constitutes binding or 
mandatory authority and persuasive authority. Also, there is no delineation of the grounds for 
objection and appeal.  
An important factor that is common to both courts and sector-specific administrative 
committees or tribunals is that they apply Saudi law under all circumstances. Hence, where the 
parties are unable to amicably resolve a dispute, Saudi law (Shariah) is applied by the court or 
administrative tribunal to settle the dispute. The only conflict of laws recognised by tribunal is 
the conflict among the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence.1 Where a dispute implicates 
the substantive laws of more than one country, the tribunals applies Saudi law as the most 
appropriate law to resolve the dispute. For example, Article 11 of the Service Agency 
Regulation2 stated that all disputes involving foreign contractors and Saudi service agents 
should be submitted to the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, which 
applied only Saudi law. Saudi courts have even assumed jurisdiction where contracts provided 
that disputes arising from the contracts should be submitted to non-Saudi courts.3 As such, a 
foreign party with little or no grasp of the Shariah as it is applied in the KSA is more likely to 
avoid the courts and administrative tribunals in the KSA. 
Nonetheless, in 1979, the Companies Department of the Ministry of Commerce issued Circular 
No. 3/13/1399 H of October 10, 1979 providing that disputes that involve the Government may 
be submitted to arbitration rather than the Board of Grievances if the parties obtain prior 
approval of the Council of Ministers. Hence, the Ministry of Commerce required parties to 
register their agreement and inform the Council of Ministers in order to access arbitration 
within or outside of the KSA. However, it was uncertain whether the Ministry of Commerce 
expected the arbitral tribunal outside of the KSA to apply Saudi law as the lex causae or the 
                                                          
1 A Husen and J Burns, ‘Choice of Forum in Contracts with Saudi Arabian Counterparties: An Analysis of the 
DIFC Common Law Courts from a Saudi Arabian Perspective’ (2015) 48(3) The International Lawyer 179, 181; 
JL Brand, ‘Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice’ (1986) 9(1) Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 1, 29; A Khan, ‘The Interaction between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration’ 
(2006) 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 791, 797-798. 
2 Enacted by Royal Decree M/2 of December 31, 1977. 
3 AY Baamir, Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and Banking Arbitration (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, Brunel University 2008) 191. 
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law that was chosen by the forum tribunal from the relevant legal systems. This is important 
because the outcome of legal actions is more likely to differ where the Hanbali version of the 
Shariah is applied, given the uniqueness of this system. For example, an insurance policy is 
only accepted under the Shariah where all the parties share the risks and responsibilities 
through a common fund and based on the understanding that each party who experiences loss 
will be compensated. This may be problematic where the insurance policy is recognised by the 
laws of other jurisdictions in which the foreign party is established. The question that then 
follows is whether courts in the KSA will recognise an award granted by non-Saudi arbitral 
tribunal or mediator that applied legal principles or doctrines that are contrary to the Hanbali 
version of the Shariah. As such, the enforceability of the award or decision of the arbitrator or 
mediator is important in determining whether the expenses and unpredictability of litigation 
and administrative tribunals could be avoided or reduced by channelling disputes to the ADR 
systems. Notwithstanding, the next section discusses the framework for ADR procedures in the 
KSA and determines whether they provide better options than the IDC’s administrative model. 
4.3 The Effectiveness for Other ADR Options 
The alternatives to litigation and administrative tribunals in the KSA are limited. They include 
direct negotiation between the parties, mediation (insurance coverage disputes, labour disputes, 
family disputes, and disputes between distributors and principals), and arbitration.4 This section 
examines the effectiveness of these conciliatory means for the settlement of insurance disputes 
in the KSA. 
4.3.1 Negotiation 
Traditionally, the preferred method for settling disputes has been the Sulh, which means 
resolution or fixing, and emphasises the importance of religion.5 Thus, disputants in the Middle 
East have traditionally preferred building personal relations by socialising and settling disputes 
through continued negotiation.6 This reflects the larger cultural perception of conflict as a 
disruptive agent in society which members must collectively avoid.7 It follows that dispute 
                                                          
4 For a comprehensive analysis of this framework, see M Al-Ghamdi and PJ Neufeld, ‘Saudi Arabia’ (2018) 10 
The Dispute Resolution Review < https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-dispute-resolution-review-edition-
10/1166494/saudi-arabia> accessed 14 November 2019. 
5 W Iqbal, ‘Courts, Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses into the Islamic Tradition’ (2008) 28 Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 1035, 1037-1038. See also GE Irani, ‘Apologies and Reconciliation: Middle Eastern Rituals’ in E Barkan 
and A Karn (eds), Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation (Stanford University Press 2006). 
6 RMG Tirados, ‘Negotiation’ (2010) 48 Management 849, 1023-1027. 
7 M Abu-Nimber, ‘Conflict Resolution Approaches: Western and Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities’ 
(1996) 55 American Journal of Economics and Sociology 35, 36. 
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resolution systems that require the parties to act as adversaries are shunned in this society.8 
Negotiation is an interest-based approach that provides advantages to parties seeking to resolve 
insurance disputes by concerting their interests rather than acting as adversaries. However, 
despite the traditional role of negotiation in Saudi society, it is surprising that at the beginning 
of this century, the Sulh was only invoked in rural areas that had few courts and government 
officials.9 Hence, this dispute resolution option also has serious shortcomings. The advantages 
and shortcomings are discussed here under five criteria for judging the quality of a dispute 
resolution option. 
4.3.1.1 Cost and Duration 
 
This form of ADR was preferred to litigation in the KSA because it avoided a cycle of revenge 
and affirmed the bonds between groups.10 It is also a cost-effective and swifter process for 
settling disputes than litigation in courts and administrative tribunals. The parties agree on a 
form of joint action which they both undertake to manage and resolve the dispute. This 
demonstrates that negotiation is the best option when it becomes clear to the parties that 
unilateral action through the courts or tribunals would impose a heavy toll on both sides. With 
negotiation, the working relationship is preserved, and the medium-based commercial benefits 
of each party is taken into account when solutions are considered.11  
The parties are not required to involve an outside party thereby saving the cost of hiring the 
services of the third-party neutral. This also implies that delays caused by the dispute are 
reduced, thereby making this resolution option less expensive. It must however be noted that a 
party may use negotiation as a stalling tactic in order to prevent the other party from enforcing 
their contractual rights through rights-based options such as arbitration or litigation. This may 
turn out to be more expensive for the party that eventually asserts its rights through arbitration 
or litigation. 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 See M Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (Oxford University 
Press 2002). The Holy Prophet noted that Sulh is allowed except in cases where it enables a party to make ill-
gotten gains. (4: 128). In the KSA, some agreements between defendants and plaintiffs have been enforced as 
Sulh contracts such as where the defendant admits the plaintiff’s claim and agrees to pay a specified amount of 
money to settle a debt or end the conflict. See EA Alsheikh, ‘Distinction between the Concepts Mediation, 
Conciliation, Sulh and Arbitration in Shari’ah Law’ (2011) 25 Arab Law Quarterly 367, 372-373. 
10 Iqbal (n 5) 1037-1038. 
11 SB Goldberg et al, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes (Aspen Publishers 1999) 
22. 
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4.3.1.2 Shariah Compliance 
 
As noted above, disputants in the Middle East have traditionally preferred building personal 
relations by socialising and settling disputes through continued negotiation. As will be shown 
below, the Prophet and early Muslims promoted dispute resolution outside of the public court 
system. Hence, the outcome of negotiation is likely to be Shariah-compliant where the parties 
are Muslims and associated with one another in a common endeavour. They work together 
towards settling differences in a manner that complies with the Shariah. Although they may or 
may not agree to select a revered or respected individual in society to help them negotiate, 
where they select such an individual, he or she is likely to be devoured Muslim. The individual 
focuses on enhancing the relationship between the parties and declares a hudna or truce and 
seeks an outcome that maintains the integrity, status and honour of both parties.12 The neutral 
party is able to achieve this outcome because he is highly respected, and people often hearken 
to his or her words.  
Thus, the objective of negotiation is to achieve an outcome that may not otherwise be achieved 
by unilateral action.13 The outcome is likely to more Shariah-compliant than the decisions of 
arbitrators who may be based outside of the KSA. It must nonetheless be noted that the parties 
are not required to choose a devoured Muslim as negotiator. Also, the parties are free to enforce 
contracts that are not Shariah-compliant. Hence, negotiation does not compel the parties to 
comply with the Shariah. 
4.3.1.3 Impartiality 
 
No party may be expected to use negotiation to obtain an unfair advantage. This is because this 
dispute resolution option is voluntary. The parties cannot be compelled to participate in a 
negotiation by the contract or legislation. A party’s participation may therefore be contingent 
on the existence of adequate safeguards against inequities in the process. Also, the parties may 
accept or reject the outcome or simply withdraw from the process at any time if they believe 
their interests are being undermined. As noted above, the outcome may be reached with the 
help of a third-party neutral. However, there is no guidance on the eligibility, competence and 
impartiality of the third-party neutral who is chosen to act as negotiator. Pretorius argues that 
                                                          
12 See N Yassine-Hamdan and FS Pearson, Arab Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Mediation, Negotiation and 
Settlement of Political Disputes (Routledge 2014) 45, 270. See also D MacEoin, ‘Tactical Hudna and Islamist 
Intolerance’ (2008) Middle East Quarterly 39, 39-40. 
13 MZM Nor, ‘Settling Islamic Finance Disputes: The Case of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia’ in A Koppel, Matter 
M and Palmer V (eds), Mixed Legal Systems, East and West (Ashgate 2015) 267, 270. 
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this form of ADR has not been very successful because parties are often too partial and 
emotionally invested to make rational and objective decisions.14 Also, the effectiveness of 
negotiation largely depends on the cultural background of the parties.15 It is more likely to be 
effective where the parties are locals or resident in the KSA. They may easily deal with each 
other directly or through respectable advisors in the local community. Where foreign parties 
are involved, the process of negotiation may be less effective, especially where the dispute 
involves more than just a misunderstanding. 
4.3.1.4 Flexibility 
 
It may be argued that this is the most flexible dispute resolution option. This is because there 
are no prescribed rules and the parties are free to adopt any rules to guide the process. Also, 
since only the parties and their representatives may be involved, the negotiation may be shaped 
in accordance with the parties’ interests. The parties are also free to determine the subject 
matter, location of the negotiation, and set a timetable for reaching an outcome that is 
acceptable to both parties. Thus, where the parties negotiate in good faith, they may design the 
process and determine an outcome that reflects their interests and needs. For example, where 
the dispute is highly sensitive in nature, the parties may exclude all persons with no interests 
in the matter thereby preserving the confidentiality of the process. 
It must however be noted that there is no guarantee of the good faith of any of the parties. Thus, 
since there are no guidelines on procedures, the weaker party may be at a disadvantage. This 
may make the outcome subject to future challenge through a rights-based option where the 
weaker party may seek to assert his or her rights. 
4.3.1.5 Predictability 
 
Given that negotiation is an interest-based option, the likelihood of a successful outcome for 
both parties is high. This is because the parties are free to shape the process in accordance with 
the interests and needs. However, there is no timeframe within which negotiation must be 
concluded. Also, a party cannot be compelled to continue negotiating or to accept the outcome. 
Hence, there is much uncertainty created by the fact that any party may terminate the 
negotiation at any time, regardless of the time and money invested by the other party. It is 
                                                          
14 P Pretorius, ‘ADR: A Challenge to the Bar for the 1990s’ (1990) 1 Consultus 38, 38. 
15 See CH Tinsey et al, ‘The Interplay between Culturally-and Structurally-based Mental Methods of Intercultural 
Dispute Resolution: West Meets Middle East’ (2011) 16(3) International Negotiation 481, 481-510. 
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therefore not surprising that despite the advantages of negotiation and its traditional role in 
Saudi society, at the beginning of this century, the Sulh was only invoked in rural areas that 
had few courts and government officials.16 The absence of any official guidelines makes it 
difficult a foreign party to previse the dispute resolution process. There is no requirement or 
even expectation of predictability and consistency in the way in which negotiation should be 
conducted. Hence, it is less appealing to a policyholder seeking to compel an insurance 
company with stronger bargaining power to pay. 
4.3.2 Mediation 
Parties in the KSA may also consider mediation. The General Secretariat of the Committees 
for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violation (‘General Secretariat’) states that parties 
to insurance disputes must seek mediation before submitting the disputes to the relevant 
Primary Committee; and this resulted in an increase in the number of cases resolved amicably 
by 56.08 per cent between 2014 and 2015.17 However, the statistics published by the General 
Secretariat reveal that the majority of insurance-related disputes in the KSA are not settled via 
mediation.18 Thus, mediation is not effective in practice. Nonetheless, it is assessed from a 
theoretical perspective in this section. 
4.3.2.1 Cost and Duration 
 
Chong and Zin noted that ADR methods such as negotiation and mediation have become more 
popular around the world due to the search for quicker and more cost-effective alternatives to 
litigation.19 They argue that the advantages of these forms of ADR include their use as 
mechanisms for preventing fully fledged disputes, the flexibility of the process, and the 
achievement of outcomes deemed fair by both parties.20 Hence, since mediation is required at 
an early stage in the KSA (before the dispute is referred to the Primary Committee), it may be 
argued that mediation allows the parties to avoid the ‘sunk cost’ of litigation21 or IDC 
                                                          
16 See M Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (Oxford University 
Press 2002). 
17 See General Secretariat, The 11th Annual Report for 2015 (General Secretariat 2015) 22. This report is analysed 
in Chapter 5. 
18 This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
19 H Chong and RM Zin, ‘Selection of Dispute Resolution Methods: Factor Analysis Approach’ (2012) 19(4) 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 428, 430-433. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See RJA Rhee, ‘A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation 
under Uncertainty’ (2006) 56 Emory Law Journal 619, 622. However, see RA Brealey et al, Principles of 
Corporate Finance (8th edn, S&P Global 2006) 116 (arguing that ‘sunk costs are like spilled milk: They are past 
122 
 
adjudication. Hence, by achieving an acceptable outcome via mediation, the parties would not 
feel obligated to pursue the litigation or IDC adjudication to the end because of the time, effort 
and money invested in the dispute resolution process.  
4.3.2.2 Shariah Compliance 
 
The culture of mediation was adopted and promoted by the Holy Prophet, and subsequently, 
the successors of the Holy Prophet, Khalifahs, were considered mediators.22 The influence of 
this method in Muslim-majority countries may explain why it was adopted by Article 1850 of 
the Civil Code of the Ottoman Empire (Majalla). The method therefore promotes solidarity 
between Muslims who must come together as members of the community and settle their 
disputes in a manner that ensures peace. It follows that the outcome of mediation is more likely 
to Shariah-compliant than that of any of dispute resolution option. Also, all insurance-related 
disputes in the KSA must be submitted to the IDC; mediation through the General Secretariat 
is the first step of the process; and the mediation must comply with the Shariah.  
4.3.2.3 Impartiality 
 
As in non-Islamic jurisdictions, the success of the method is also linked to the impartiality of 
the mediator and confidentiality of the process.23 The mediator is able to persuade the 
disputants to make concessions because the mediator is impartial, independent and objective. 
On the basis of experience and fairness, the mediator devises a compromise that is acceptable 
to both parties. Given that mediation is by definition private, it is easier for the parties to ensure 
the confidentiality of the process and even the dispute, unlike litigation, public tribunal 
adjudication or even arbitration.24  
 
However, the question about mediator neutrality is also problematic. Cobb and Rifkin noted 
that neutrality in mediation may be described in three ways.25 First, neutrality must be 
impartial, which means mediators must either ‘dismiss their opinions, values, feelings, and 
                                                          
and irreversible outflows. Because sunk costs are bygones, they cannot be affected by the decision to accept or 
reject the project, and so they should be ignored’). 
22 SA Saleh, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Arab World: Arbitration and Other Methods’ (1986) 4 
International Tax and Business Lawyer 280, 281. 
23 KK Kovach, Mediation: Principles and Practice (3rd edn, Thomson West 2004) 13. 
24 D Ciraco, ‘Forget the Mechanics and Bring in the Gardeners’ (2000) 9 University of Baltimore Intellectual 
Property Law Journal 47, 76. 
25 S Cobb and J Rifkin, ‘Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation’ (1991) 16 Law and Society 
Inquiry 35, 41-62. 
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agendas’ or ‘separate them from the mediation process’ in order to avoid imposing his or her 
values, which may align with those of one party and not the other.26 Second, neutrality must be 
equidistant, which means that mediators must keep the relationship between the parties equal, 
even where the mediators’ decisions favour one side over the other.27 Third, neutrality must 
involve ‘practice in discourse’ which means that mediators must shape problems in such 
manner as to provide all speakers the opportunity to be heard, thereby minimising the chances 
of delegitimising or marginalising one party.28 
 
Following Cobb and Rifkin’s recommendations, it may be argued that weaker parties or 
foreigners may be less keen on selecting mediation given the difficulty of finding a mediator 
that is impartial, equidistant and regulates discourse in a manner considered fair by both parties. 
Given the absence of official guidelines on qualifications, it is more likely that the mediator 
would be guided by opinions, values, feelings and agendas in the mediation process and would 
impose his or her values upon the parties. What is pertinent here is that there is no clearly 
defined mechanism by which mediators in the KSA may maintain neutrality. On the other hand, 
litigation and the administrative tribunal model do not require such a mechanism since the 
judiciary and administration are generally established on the promise of neutrality. The 
principles of adjudication are impersonal and developed to ensure the neutrality of the judicial 
or quasi-judicial process; and judges are trained to separate their opinions, values and feelings 
from the process and decide cases in accordance with the law. As Wechsler famously argued, 
the ‘virtue or demerit of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely on the reasons that support it and 
their adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees.’29  
 
However, this does not imply that legislators who draft and enact laws and judges who interpret 
them are not sometimes partisans of specific sets of ethical or social opinions.30 In all 
jurisdictions, including the KSA, some decisions of courts and tribunals are violative of 
neutrality, and adjudicators sometimes dispense with justice according to considerations of 
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personal expediency.31 Even where they rely strictly on the law, the fact that the law is based 
on a societal vision or consensus of acceptable values may be problematic where one party 
does not share the same vision or values as the rest of the society. With both litigation and the 
administrative tribunal model, the values of society will be imposed on the party. With 
negotiation and mediation, the party will be unable to compel the other party to look beyond 
the societal vision or values 
4.3.2.4 Flexibility 
 
Mediation is a flexible process that allows for the intervention of a neutral third party in order 
to resolve disputes that arise from a contract.32 The objectives are similar to those of 
negotiation, viz., achieve an outcome that is beneficial to both parties and preserve the ongoing 
project.33 Thus, mediation has been defined as ‘an assisted and facilitated negotiation carried 
out by a third party.’34 Although parties in the IDC cannot select a mediator, the General 
Secretariat’s choice enjoys flexibility in crafting remedies that judges cannot afford. Together 
with the parties, he may customise the process, expand the range of interests that should be 
considered, reach creative solutions that may not be available in court, and protect the 
confidentiality of the parties and dispute. 
 
It must however be noted that there are no guidelines on the procedures. Thus, the party who 
is unsatisfied with the outcome is less likely to be satisfied with the procedure adopted by the 
mediator, as well as the latter’s choice of remedies. This may make the outcome subject to 
future challenge through a rights-based option such as arbitration or litigation. 
4.3.2.5 Predictability  
 
Cheung, Suen and Lam have demonstrated that the selection and performance of ADR methods 
are influenced by the preservation of the relationship and enforceability of the final decision.35 
                                                          
31 See Pollak’s criticism of Wechsler’s conception of judicial neutrality in LH Pollak, ‘Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler’ (1959) 108 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 5, 34. 
32 SO Cheung and YW Yeung, ‘The Effectiveness of the Dispute Resolution Advisor System: A Critical 
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34 SB Goldberg et al, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes (Little Brown & Co 1992) 
103. 
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As noted above, enforceability is an important factor even in countries such as the KSA where 
the culture of mediation has been promoted for several centuries, but where decisions that do 
not comply with the Shariah are unenforceable. This therefore is a serious impediment for 
mediation given that the parties must agree on the mediator and forum in order to use the ADR 
method. If a party is not willing to assist in reaching an amicable settlement, the mediator 
cannot intervene. Also, if a party refuses to sign the mediator’s decision, it does not become 
legally binding on both parties.36 It follows that it is uncertain whether a party would agree on 
the mediator and forum, as well as sign the mediator’s decision. 
 
In the KSA, the uncertainty is limited to whether a party will accept to sign the mediator’s 
decision in order for it to become binding. This is because parties are required to submit 
disputes to mediation at the General Secretariat. Hence, the mediator and forum are chosen by 
the General Secretariat. Nonetheless, there is no timeframe within which the mediation must 
be concluded, and the mediator’s decision lacks finality since it may be challenged in a Primary 
Committee. The fact that the parties can reject the settlement agreement recorded by the 
mediator is good enough reason to compel a weaker party to seek an alternative that binds the 
stronger party regardless of the latter’s consent. As Kaufman and Duncan pointed out, the 
mediator is without authority to impose a settlement.37  
4.3.3 Arbitration 
Arbitration can best be described as a ‘process by which parties consensually submit a dispute 
to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties, to render a binding 
decision resolving a dispute in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording each 
party an opportunity to present its case.’38 In other words, it is a voluntary process that ends 
with a final resolution of the disputes between the parties outside of the court system.39 The 
dispute submitted to the arbitral tribunal results from an agreement between the parties and a 
defined legal relationship, which may be contractual or otherwise.40 The arbitration agreement 
creates a framework for a dispute resolution system for the parties which lies outside the 
                                                          
36 See E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fourchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 
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purview of courts of law.41 The arbitral tribunal derives its power from the arbitration 
agreement and it only has jurisdiction where a dispute exists at the time one party made the 
request for arbitration.42 
 
Like negotiation and mediation, the culture of arbitration was adopted and promoted by early 
Muslims.43 However, while it is certain that the Prophet and early Muslims promoted dispute 
resolution outside of the public court system, it is uncertain whether the form of ADR adopted 
and promoted was negotiation, mediation or arbitration. There is a strong case for arguing that 
it was arbitration given that the Shariah allows the Dhimmiyin or Jews and Christians who are 
resident in Muslim countries to create a framework for settling their disputes. Thus, they are 
entitled to submit disputes to arbitrators of their choice. However, where one of the parties is 
Muslim, the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools require a Muslim adjudicator to settle the 
dispute, although they also recognise non-Muslim arbitrators where both parties consent.44 This 
is based on the Surah V, verse 42 which provides that: ‘If they come to thee, either judge 
between them or decline to interfere. If thou decline, they cannot hurt thee in the least.’45 
However, this may be said to conflict with another verse, Surah V, verse 49 that provides that 
‘Judge thou between them by what Allah hath revealed and follow not their vain desires.’ The 
Hanafi School follows the latter verse and holds that it obliges Islamic courts to always apply 
the Shariah regardless of whether non-Muslims are involved in the dispute. Nonetheless, as 
noted in chapter 2, Saudi courts defer to the interpretations of the Hanbali School, not the 
Hanafi School. Thus, it may be contended that Surah V, verse 49 only applies where the judge 
or kadi (arbitrator) has accepted to settle a dispute involving a Dhimmiyin. 
 
What is important to note is that the Quran specifically recommends ADR methods, which may 
be interpreted as a recommendation of arbitration. It provides as follows: 
 
If you fear a breach between them (the man and his wife), appoint (two) Hakams 
[arbitrators or mediators], one from his family and other from her family; if they 
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both wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation. Indeed, Allah is ever 
all-knower, well acquainted with all things.46 
 
It may therefore be stated that the contention that Muslim residents in the Middle East are 
generally hostile to the idea of international arbitration47 is misguided. Saleh argued that 
international arbitration is viewed as a concession to the foreign party and a way of depriving 
the Muslim of the right to be heard by a Muslim judge.48 This may only be true of Muslims 
who defer to the interpretations of the Hanafi School. Regarding the other Schools, arbitration 
is regarded as a framework created by the parties, Muslim and/or non-Muslim, outside of the 
Shariah court system. The arbitral tribunal may apply the laws of a foreign, non-Muslim 
country, although it is expected to take the Shariah into account where enforcement is 
anticipated to take place in an Islamic country. Hence, the award should not include the 
payment of interest or performance of activities considered Gharar such as gambling and 
prostitution.49  
 
There are many advantages to arbitration that make it a desirable option in Islamic countries 
such as the KSA. In order to protect parties that choose this ADR option, different regulations 
and implementation rules have been enacted in the KSA over the past four decades. The next 
section discusses these regulations and rules and determines whether they make arbitration 
more cost-effective and expeditious than the litigation and administrative tribunal models. 
 
4.3.3.1 The Old Regime  
 
On April 25, 1983, the KSA enacted a separate arbitration legislation (Regulation) through 
Royal Decree M/46. The Regulation superseded the arbitration provisions of the Commercial 
Court Code that was issued in 1931. On May 25, 1985, the Implementation Rules to the 
Regulation were enacted by the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7/2021/M. The 
Regulations describe the substantive rights while the Rules outline the procedure for initiating 
and conducting arbitration. The latter includes rules governing the issue of summons, opinion 
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evidence, and nonappearances. However, the Rules were silent on the seat of the arbitral 
tribunal, communication between the parties, communication between the tribunal and third 
parties, and the way in which arbitral awards had to be delivered.50 These loopholes may be 
explained by the fact that the Regulation was deemed to be a codification of the Hanbali 
teachings on arbitration.51  
 
In light of the recognition of arbitration as the creation of a separate framework for dispute 
resolution, Article 1 of the Regulation required arbitration to be voluntary unless a party was 
compelled by the regulator to adopt that route as a preliminary step towards litigation. This 
effectively restricted the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts given that parties were entitled to 
create a framework for the resolution of their disputes outside of the Shariah courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
 
The above notwithstanding, other provisions of the Rules made the arbitral tribunal an 
extension or annex to the Shariah court. Article 36 for example required the arbitral tribunal to 
apply the rules of procedure of Shariah courts. The arbitral tribunals in the KSA therefore used 
the same rules of procedure as Shariah courts until the enactment of the Law of Procedure in 
2000. Also, Article 39 of the Implementing Rules provided that the arbitral tribunal should 
abide by the principles of the Shariah, including the Shariah rules of evidence. Article 1 of the 
Rules forbade the tribunal from receiving complaints regarding matters that fell in the category 
of crime called Hudud. These include adultery between spouses, fornication, sodomy, public 
apostasy, armed robbery and matters concerning public order.52 Article 3 of the Rules provided 
that the arbitrator should be a Muslim male or male public official approved by the department 
to which he belonged. Article 5 of the Regulation required the parties to send the arbitration 
agreement to the Board of Grievances or Ministry of Commerce and Industry for approval 
before the arbitral tribunal could receive and settle the dispute. 
 
Although the Regulation and Rules allowed government agencies to enter into arbitration 
agreements with private parties (this was initially prohibited by Article 2 of the Ministerial 
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Resolution No. 58 of June 25, 1963), the restrictions placed on the process regarding the scope 
of arbitration, gender of the arbitrator, rules of procedure and evidence, and prior approval of 
the arbitration agreement, made arbitration a far less attractive option than negotiation and 
mediation. In fact, it was simply a slower and more expensive form of litigation, taking into 
account the requirement to submit arbitration agreements to the Board of Grievances or 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the costs of finding and hiring a competent arbitrator or 
panel, secretary, reporter, translator (where foreign parties are involved); and the rental fee for 
the chamber in which the proceedings took place.  
 
Also, the Board of Grievances was the competent body regarding the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards granted in countries that had ratified the Convention of the Arab League on the 
Enforcement of Judgments of September 15, 1952.53 Hence awards issued by tribunals in 
countries that had not ratified this Convention were not enforced in the KSA without a new 
hearing in a Shariah court. Equally, the Shariah courts were the competent bodies for enforcing 
arbitral awards granted in the KSA. Article 44 of the Rules provided for the issuance of an 
enforcement order requesting all government agencies to execute the award attached to the 
order. However, awards that were not consistent with the Shariah were not enforced. The Saudi 
court reviewed decisions of arbitral tribunals and issued new decisions on the merits. In 
Jadawel International (Saudi Arabia) v Emaar Property PJSC (UAE) for example, the 
international chamber of commerce issued a final award dismissing Jadawel’s claims. The 
latter challenged the decision before the Board of Grievances. The Board reviewed the merits, 
reversed the award and ordered Emaar to make reparations to Jadawel.54 
 
The old regime was therefore problematic because it simply made the arbitral tribunal an 
extension or annex to the Shariah court, gave the latter extensive powers of intervention and 
ensured that the Shariah was applied in almost all circumstances. It therefore failed to create a 
neutral setting for dispute settlement and protect parties from local prejudice, which is said to 
be arbitration’s most significant advantage over litigation.55 This begs the question of why the 
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government did not simply train and appoint more trial judges rather than reform the law 
governing arbitral tribunals. 
4.3.3.2 The New Regime 
A new Arbitration Regulation was enacted on June 8, 2012 through Royal Decree No. M/34. 
It became effective on July 8, 2012 and replaced the Regulation of 1983. It is largely modelled 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006 version) and 
seeks to align the law of the KSA with international arbitration norms.56 In May 2017, the 
Council of Ministers enacted the Implementing Regulations of the Arbitration Regulation. 
Article 8 of the Implementing Regulations provides that where the parties fail to agree on the 
rules of procedure to be followed by the tribunal, it may choose to follow specific rules. Article 
11 of the Arbitration Regulation require courts of the KSA to decline jurisdiction where there 
is a valid arbitration agreement and a party requests referral of the dispute to arbitration. The 
parties are allowed the freedom to choose the rules of procedure that the arbitral tribunal will 
apply, including the choice of law rules, venue of the arbitration, and the language in which 
the proceedings will be conducted. They are also free to appoint the arbitrators. The arbitral 
tribunal may issue an award within twelve months from the commencement date of the 
proceedings, and this period may be extended by six months if the parties agree. An award duly 
granted has res judicate status and may be enforced within sixty days of the issuance under 
Article 52 of the Arbitration Regulation.  
 
In 2014, the Council of Ministers established the Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration 
(SCCA) to facilitate arbitration in the KSA. The SCCA’s Arbitration Rules were issued in 
2016. Despite the above changes, it is uncertain whether the Arbitration Regulation of 2012 
may be said to have given a new lease of life to the argument that arbitration is a better option 
than litigation, the administrative tribunal model and other forms of ADR. The next section 
considers this argument regarding the resolution of insurance-related disputes in the KSA. 
4.3.3.3. Insurance Dispute Resolution under the New Regime 
 
As noted above, the Arbitration Regulation of 2012 was largely modelled on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2006 version) in order to align the law 
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of the KSA with international arbitration norms. The Regulation therefore removed a 
significant number of barriers that businesses and foreign parties previously faced when 
attempting to resolve disputes through arbitration having the KSA as the seat of the proceedings 
or Saudi law as the applicable law.57 There were cases of Shariah courts in the KSA 
adjudicating disputes despite the existence of arbitration agreements or clauses in courts that 
designated another jurisdiction as the seat and the laws of another country as the applicable 
law.58 Many foreign investors lacked sufficient knowledge of Saudi rules of procedure and 
evidence that arbitral tribunals in the KSA applied.59 Without fixed codes, the KSA was an 
unfamiliar forum to these foreign investors.60 
 
When enacted, the goal of the Regulation of 1983 was to provide an effective means of dispute 
resolution for both international and local businesses trading within the KSA.61 However, 
initially the insurance sector was largely resistant to the use of arbitration to settle disputes.62 
The willingness to honour and enforce arbitration agreements in contracts may be attributed to 
the reform that culminated in 2016 with the establishment of the SCCA. Also important are the 
international conventions ratified by the KSA prior to the enactment of the Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Control Law of 2003 (CICCL), including the Riyadh Convention for 
Judicial Cooperation of 1983 and the New York Convention for the Enforcement and 
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (‘New York Convention’).63 However, there 
were no specific forums for resolving insurance disputes that arose from the permissible takaful 
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insurance products or any products issued consistent with the Cooperative Health Insurance 
Law.64 Also, prior to the enactment of the CICCL and the establishment of Insurance Dispute 
Committees (IDCs), insurance disputes were resolved either by the Ministry of Commerce or 
the Board of Grievances.65 Thus, the CICCL solidified the shift towards alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. ADR forms such as arbitration have since become more acceptable as 
a viable form of dispute resolution.  
 
The first important factor in gaining acceptance was the Arbitration Regulation’s provision that 
an arbitration clause must simply be in writing and signed by parties with competent authority 
to enter in the agreement.66 In contrast, under the old regime, an arbitration clause had to be 
drafted in Arabic and pre-approved by Ministry of Commerce and Industry. If a clause did not 
meet these requirements, it was open to challenge and resulted in a Shariah court assuming 
jurisdiction of the dispute. As such, arbitration under the new regime does not function as part 
of the judicial system given that courts are no more instrumental before the rendering of an 
arbitral award. Following the shift initiated by the CICCL and Arbitration Regulation, courts 
and administrative tribunals in the KSA uphold arbitration clauses contained in insurance 
policies. The Arbitration Regulation reiterated the commitment of the KSA under the New 
York Convention to recognise and enforce international arbitration agreements and awards. 
However, unlike the New York Convention, the Regulation compels Saudi courts and 
government agencies to recognise all agreements and awards of other signatory states. Article 
3 of the Regulation provides that arbitration is deemed to be international arbitration ‘if the 
subject matter thereof relates to international trading’ where the head offices of each of the 
parties are, at the time of signing the arbitration agreement, located in more than one country 
or the place for conducting the arbitration as designated in the agreement or where the place of 
execution of a substantial part of the parties’ obligations is outside of the KSA. Article 3 also 
recognises arbitration as international arbitration where the place most closely related to the 
subject matter of the dispute is another country. 
 
As such, the Arbitration Regulation effectively recognises arbitration as an ADR form rather 
than an extension or another form of litigation. However, this does not imply that arbitration is 
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necessarily more effective than the administrative tribunal model, given that the IDC also 
operates outside of the formal court system. It is true that unlike negotiation and mediation, 
there are specific rules and guidelines that govern the way arbitration is conducted. However, 
the parties do not have complete freedom to agree on all aspects of arbitration. This is shown 
in the examination of the rules and guidelines below. 
 4.3.3.3.1 The Decision to Arbitrate  
 
As with any form of ADR, the agreement to arbitrate must be made mutually among the parties. 
They have the autonomy to decide where, how, and by whom a dispute will be decided. Article 
11 of the Arbitration Regulation requires the court to decline jurisdiction where there is an 
arbitration agreement and one party has sought referral of the dispute to arbitration before 
making a claim or defence in court.67 Also, Article 20 of the Regulation provides that the 
arbitral tribunal may settle pleas of non-jurisdiction and those related to alleged ambiguities or 
defects in the arbitration agreement. Hence, the Regulation adopts the principle of competence-
competence whereby the arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide its own jurisdiction or 
competence.68 As noted above, in order for the agreement to arbitrate to be enforceable, the 
arbitration agreement must be in writing.69 While traditionally most arbitration agreements are 
entered into at the time of the contract and prior to the occurrence of a dispute, under the 
Arbitration Regulation, an arbitration agreement can be concluded either prior to the dispute or 
after the occurrence of the dispute.70 Regardless of when the arbitration agreement is entered 
into, it must include the matters to be arbitrated.71  
 
The above notwithstanding, there is insufficient guidance regarding the assessment of the 
arbitrability of claims under the Regulation. Apart from the fact that a clause or agreement that 
violates the Shariah or deals with ‘personal affairs’ would be unenforceable,72 it is uncertain 
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what jurisdictional limitations arbitral tribunals face when dealing with claims. Carbonneau 
notes that the ‘public dimension of the issues raised by commercial conduct can sometimes 
warrant exclusive judicial jurisdiction.’73 However, in many Western states, there has been as 
shift of policy regarding the potential non-arbitration of statutory claims. Arbitral tribunals are 
increasingly competent to decide disputes that involve public law claims or reflect national 
public policies.74 In the KSA, it is still uncertain whether arbitral tribunals can decide disputes 
involving public law claims. Thus, it may be safer for parties to refer disputes that are related 
to public claims to the IDC. 
4.3.3.3.2 Initiation of Arbitral Proceedings 
 
Arbitration proceedings can be initiated by the parties either by directly invoking the arbitration 
clause and engaging the arbitral process or in the event that either party files a suit with the 
court and raises the issue of the arbitration agreement.75 In the latter case, the court or IDC 
must decline jurisdiction and refer the dispute to arbitration. Additionally, at any point during 
court or IDC proceedings, the parties may agree to transfer the dispute to arbitration.76 The 
arbitration proceedings formally commence on the date that the request for arbitration by one 
party is received by the other party.77 Where many parties are involved, Article 11 of the 
Implementing Regulations provides that the proceedings commence on the date that the last 
party receives the request for arbitration. Article 9 of the Implementing Regulations also sets 
out matters that must be included in the request for arbitration. It is nonetheless uncertain 
whether the proceedings may be deemed to have commenced where the party requesting 
arbitration does not fully comply with Article 9 of the Implementing Regulations. Also, no 
distinction is made between natural and artificial persons or corporate bodies. This is important 
because although Article 10 of the Arbitration Regulation allows corporate persons to enter 
into arbitration agreements, it is uncertain whether an insurance company would be bound by 
the agreement entered into by mid-level managers regarding for example the seat of arbitration 
or the applicable law.78 It follows that it may be safer for the parties to submit the dispute to 
                                                          
Neufeld, ‘Saudi Arabia’ in D Taylor (ed), Dispute Resolution Review (9th edn, Law Business Research 2017) 
chapter 32. 
73 TE Carbonneau, Cases and Materials: Arbitration Law and Practice (6th edn, West 2007) 1. See also, TE 
Carbonneau, ‘The Revolution in Law through Arbitration’ (2008) 56 Cleveland State Law Review 233, 235. 
74 See TE Carbonneau, The Law and Practice of Arbitration (6th edn, Juris 2018) xiii, 28. 
75 Arbitration Regulation, Article 11. 
76 Ibid, Article 12. 
77 Ibid, Article 27. 
78 Article 10(2) provides that government bodies may not enter into arbitration agreements unless allowed by a 
special provision of a regulation or upon approval by the competent minister. 
135 
 
the IDC, given that its jurisdiction does not depend on a clause in the contract or agreement 
between the parties. 
4.3.3.3.3 Composition of the Tribunal 
 
The arbitral tribunal refers to a panel of one or more arbitrators that will preside over the 
arbitration proceedings.79 Article 27 of the Arbitration Regulation provides that an arbitral 
tribunal may consist of a single arbitrator or many arbitrators, and in the event that there are 
multiple arbitrators, the total number of arbitrators must be an odd number. Article 13 provides 
that where the total number of arbitrators is not an odd number, the arbitration is void. This 
shows limitations placed on the freedom of the parties to select the arbitrators. Also, where the 
parties choose Saudi law as the governing law, their discretion in selecting arbitrators is further 
limited given that they are required to comply with Article 14 of the Arbitration Regulation 
that lists conditions that each arbitrator must fulfil. These conditions include ‘holder of at least 
a university degree in Shariah or law.’ 
 
When it comes to selecting the arbitrators, the parties to the arbitration must agree on the 
appointment of the arbitral tribunal.80 In the event that the parties cannot agree, the process for 
selecting arbitrators depends on the number of arbitrators designated to serve on the tribunal in 
the arbitration agreement. If the arbitral tribunal is to be composed of one arbitrator, the 
competent court, the Court of Appeal, appoints the arbitrator.81 If the agreement provides for 
multiple arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator and the two arbitrators appoint the third 
arbitrator.82 
 
To be eligible to serve as an arbitrator, where the parties have chosen Saudi law as the 
governing law, an individual must be of full legal capacity and be of good conduct and 
reputation.83 Further, if the arbitral tribunal is composed of a single arbitrator, that individual 
must hold a university degree in Shariah or law.84 If the tribunal is composed of multiple 
arbitrators, only the chairman of the tribunal must meet the education requirement.85 This is a 
                                                          
79 See JB Simmons, ‘Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science’ (2012) 30 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 196, 196-197. 
80 Arbitration Regulation, Article 15. 
81 Ibid, Article 15(1)(a). 
82 Ibid, Article 15(1)(b). 
83 Ibid, Article 14(1)-(2). 
84 Ibid, Article 14(3). 
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marked improvement from the old regime given that there are no requirements regarding 
gender or nationality. Nonetheless, since emphasis is placed on the arbitrator’s grasp of the 
Shariah, there is the risk that the parties may appoint an arbitrator who fulfils the conditions 
set out in Article 14 but is not technically competent. 
 
The above notwithstanding, the most important quality of the arbitrator is the ability to serve 
as an independent and neutral third party. Article 16(1) of the Arbitration Regulation provides 
that the arbitrators must have no vested interest in the dispute. Additionally, from the time of 
appointment and for the duration of the proceedings, the arbitrators are required to disclose in 
writing any circumstances that could give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or 
independence. Article 16(2) also bars an arbitrator from presiding over any case for which a 
judge would be barred and must recuse himself from the proceedings, even if neither party 
requests this recusal. This follows from the traditional conception of the role of arbitrator as 
akin to that of a trial judge who has a reputation for impartiality and fairness. The first Caliph 
of the Ummayad dynasty, Mu’awiya, set up a judicial system that comprised trial judges and 
arbitrators with the authority to hear disputes and render and execute their decisions.86 
However, in the present day, trial judges and other state-appointed tribunal members are 
connected to the government, while arbitrators are private actors in the dispute resolution 
context who must be paid for their services directly by the parties.87 If the parties and arbitrators 
cannot come to an agreement on fees, the competent court will decide the fees in a non-
appealable decision.88 The fact that arbitrators are private actors largely limits their ability to 
determine the arbitrability of statutory claims. This is another major shortcoming of arbitration 
in the KSA. 
4.3.3.3.4 Conducting the Proceedings 
 
The parties are accorded significant autonomy to decide where the proceedings will take place 
and the procedures to be followed.89 The parties may for example agree on any venue for the 
arbitration, whether within the Kingdom or in another country.90  If the parties fail to agree on 
                                                          
86 See M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (The Lawbook Exchange 1995) 231-238, 242 (provides 
a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of arbitration in Islamic countries). See also J Schacht, An 
Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press 1964) 188-191. 
87 Arbitration Regulation, Article 24. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, Articles 4 and 25. 
90 Ibid, Article 28. 
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a venue, the arbitral tribunal will choose the venue taking into consideration the circumstances 
of the case and the convenience of the venue to both parties.91  
 
Among the parties’ choices for procedures are the procedural rules of any organisation, agency 
or arbitration centre within the Kingdom or in another country.92 The government established 
the SCCA with the expectation that many parties will nominate this organisation in their 
arbitration agreements. However, the freedom to select the rules to govern the arbitration or 
enforcement taking place within the Kingdom is also limited. This is because the rules cannot 
conflict with the principles of the Shariah.93 Thus, if the parties fail to determine the procedures 
for the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may decide the procedures as it deems fit, again subject 
to the principles of the Shariah and the Arbitration Regulation.94 It should be noted that the 
KSA adopted a generally accepted principle of arbitral proceedings which is to the effect that 
parties are guaranteed all of the same rights of fairness that would have been accorded to them 
had they pursued the dispute through litigation.95 Thus, arbitration does not necessarily provide 
any advantage to the parties as regards the freedom to choose the procedural rules and venue. 
 
The proceedings themselves are to be conducted in Arabic unless the tribunal or the parties 
agree on another language for the arbitration.96 Once the tribunal has been assembled, a time 
period will be set either by the parties or the tribunal for the plaintiff to send to the defendant 
a written statement of his claim that includes the full facts of his claim, any demands, and 
evidence to support his claim.97 The defendant will then have a reasonable period of time in 
which to send his response that includes any demands connected to the subject-matter of the 
dispute and the assertions of any rights or defences.98 In addition to evidence initially submitted 
by the parties with their pleadings, the arbitrators may request supplementary evidence to be 
submitted at any time throughout the proceedings.99 If the plaintiff fails to submit his written 
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92 Ibid, Article 25. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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claim, the proceedings will terminate.100 If the defendant fails to submit his written response, 
the proceedings shall continue on the basis of the plaintiff’s filings.101 If at any point either 
party fails to appear for a hearing or respond to a discovery request, the proceedings will 
continue and the tribunal will render a decision based on the information presented before it.102 
 
Once initial filings have been completed, the tribunal will hold hearings at which the parties 
may present their cases and submit their arguments for review.103 An underpinning principle 
in the Arbitration Regulation is that the parties must be treated equally and each party must be 
given a full and equal opportunity to present his case or defences.104 When it comes to the 
substantive matters of the case, the governing law for the dispute is again determined by the 
parties, typically in the arbitration agreement.105 Also, elements of the law must not conflict 
with the principles of the Shariah. 
 
The above guidelines clearly enable the parties to estimate what will happen if they submit 
their disputes to arbitration. This is no doubt an important advantage over other forms of ADR 
such as negotiation and mediation. However, the Arbitration Regulation does not nearly 
provide the complete picture of what is to be expected. It is for example silent on the specific 
documents that should be submitted during disclosure. Article 30 simply contemplates that all 
supporting documents that support the parties’ claims or defences will be submitted. Given that 
there are equally no rules governing the mandatory disclosure of evidence during litigation106 
or proceedings in the IDC, it may be contended that Saudi legislators assumed that disclosure 
under the Arbitration Regulation is based on the principles of the Shariah. These principles 
require litigants to submit all the evidence upon which they rely as well as any relevant 
evidence, whether unfavourable or not to their case. The courts and Committees of the IDC 
like the arbitral tribunal, are also empowered to compel disclosure of any document or evidence 
in a party’s possession. However, unlike the IDC, the court still retains certain powers of 
intervention in the arbitral process. Article 22(3) of the Arbitration Regulation provides that 
the arbitral tribunal may, if it deems appropriate, seek the court’s assistance regarding the 
                                                          
100 Ibid, Article 34. 
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103 Ibid, Article 33. 
104 Ibid, Article 27. 
105 Ibid, Article 38(1)(a). 
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proper conduct of the arbitral proceedings in relation to matters such as ordering disclosure and 
summoning witnesses. Other provisions that give the Court of Appeal powers of intervention 
include Article 15 which provides that it is the appointing body for the arbitral tribunal where 
the parties fail to agree on persons to be selected as arbitrators; and Article 22(1) which 
provides that the Court of Appeal may order precautionary measures following a pre-arbitration 
request by a party or a request by the arbitral tribunal during the arbitration. Thus, given the 
absence of clear guidelines regarding disclosure, it is highly probable that the arbitral tribunal 
would seek the court’s assistance in order to prevent a subsequent invalidation of the award by 
the Court of Appeal. 
4.3.3.3.5 Rendering Decisions 
 
Once the arbitrators have heard the arguments of both sides and received sufficient evidence 
and expert testimony, they make a final decision. The tribunal’s decision-making process is 
subject to the principles of the Shariah and public policy within the Kingdom,107 and arbitrators 
must consider the following when rendering a final decision: the applicable statutory 
substantive rules agreed upon by the parties; the terms of the contract that is the subject of the 
dispute; any prevailing customs and practices related to the contract; and the parties’ prior 
course of dealing.108 The question of the applicable statutory substantive rules is important 
because it may determine whether the claim can be arbitrated. This is a major shortcoming of 
arbitration in the KSA because although the arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on its own 
jurisdiction (competence-competence principle), it may not rule on statutory provisions related 
to public interest. However, the IDC, an administrative body, may rule on provisions related to 
public interest. 
 
If the arbitration is presided over by a single member, the arbitrator will render a decision. If 
the arbitral tribunal is composed of three or more members, the latter will deliberate in camera 
and come to a final decision based on majority votes.109 As noted above, the tribunal must issue 
the arbitral award within twelve months from the date of the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings. If an award is not issued within this timeframe, a party may appeal to the Court 
of Appeal to issue an order to terminate the proceedings. 
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Also, as noted above, once an arbitral award is issued, the award acquires the force of res 
judicata and is enforceable to the same extent as the order of any domestic court or 
administrative tribunal within the Kingdom. Unlike judicial proceedings, arbitral awards are 
final and binding and are not subject to appeal.110 The only process for challenging an award 
is through invalidation or annulment. Once an award is issued, the parties have sixty days in 
which they can argue that the award should be invalidated.  
 
The limited grounds for invalidation of the award include: the lack of a valid arbitration 
agreement; the lack of capacity of either party to enter into the arbitration agreement; failure to 
notify parties of the appointment of arbitrators or initiation of proceedings; the tribunal’s failure 
to apply the rules chosen by the parties; the tribunal’s composition or appointments violate the 
Arbitration Regulation or the agreement of the parties; the award exceeds the scope of the 
issues submitted to arbitration; and the tribunal failed to observe conditions required for the 
award in a manner that affects its substance.111 Additionally, the Court of Appeal, upon its own 
initiative, can invalidate the award if it violates principles of the Shariah or the Kingdom’s 
public policy; the parties are not in a position to raise this issue.112 The Court of Appeal’s 
review of the arbitral award is limited to the grounds for invalidation, and theoretically, it may 
not review or decide on the underlying facts or subject matter of the dispute.113 
 
The fact the Court of Appeal may sua sponte consider the arbitral award’s conformity to the 
principles of the Shariah and invalidate the award if the Court determines that it violates these 
principles implies that the Court of Appeal can independently analyse the case and issue its 
own decision. Thus, the provision that the Court of Appeal does not review or decide on the 
underlying facts or subject matter of the dispute is moot. If it can assess the Shariah-
compatibility of the award, it must invariably go beyond the facts stated in the award. It follows 
that the parties’ choice of arbitrator should be limited to persons who have a large fund of 
information concerning what is allowed or prohibited under the Shariah as it applies in the 
KSA. Hence, the arbitrator must be as knowledgeable as a trial judge and member of the IDC. 
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4.3.3.4 The Choice of Arbitration 
 
Any time an industry witnesses significant and continuous growth, particularly in the attraction 
of international investors, such growth is often coupled with an increase in claims and 
disputes.114 The timeous and effective resolution of these disputes plays a significant role in 
furthering the development and success of the industry.115 In the face of slow-paced and rules-
laden litigation procedures and the need for some level of confidence in pursuing dispute 
resolution, arbitration has no doubt risen as a viable non-court alternative. However, the 
question here is not whether it is better than litigation but whether it is also better than the 
administrative tribunal model that has been adopted by the government of the KSA to deal with 
insurance disputes. Following the analysis of the arbitration regime in the KSA, it may be said 
that there are important advantages and disadvantages for policyholders who choose this form 
of ADR for the resolution adverse insurance coverage disputes. This section discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
It is noted above that, historically, the KSA was slow in keeping up with the global trends in 
commercial arbitration. In fact, prior to enactment of the Arbitration Regulation in 2012 and 
the Implementing Regulations in 2016, the last time the KSA updated its arbitration regime 
was when the Regulation of 1983 was enacted. While under the old regime, arbitration 
proceedings were not viewed as an effective means for the resolution of many disputes, the 
Arbitration Regulation of 2012 has enabled the KSA to align its law with the prevailing 
arbitration provisions of many nations. By modelling the Regulation on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, the KSA aligned itself with international standards by affording greater independence to 
the arbitral process and its participants, enhancing the procedural powers of the arbitral 
tribunal, and clarifying and strengthening its position on the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and awards.116 The Saudi government itself had recognised the need for arbitration 
to resolve many commercial disputes, particularly within the area of international trade.117 This 
was a reflection of the rise in the use of arbitration proceedings within the commercial sphere 
around the globe. However, this does not imply that arbitration is the best forum for all types 
                                                          
114 See R Awwad et al, ‘Understanding Dispute Resolution in the Middle East Region from Perspectives of 
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of commercial disputes. Hence, the KSA is faced with the challenge of frustrating a number of 
businessmen and investors (mostly foreign or non-Muslim) who may run away from an 
unfamiliar forum (Saudi courts) to one that meets the structural needs of the industry but does 
not necessarily guarantee enforceability in the Kingdom. Thus, in order for arbitration to be 
considered a better forum for insurance dispute resolution, it must be shown to provide a 
comprehensive set of potential remedies to policyholders such as the administrative tribunal 
model, and it must also be shown that it enables parties to avoid or reduce the expenses, delay 
and unpredictability of litigation. Also, it must be shown to be more flexible regarding the 
application of Saudi law, especially where the place of execution of a substantial part of the 
parties’ obligations is outside of the KSA or where another country is more closely related to 
the subject matter of the dispute. 
 
The changes enacted by the Arbitration Regulation of 2012 provide numerous advantages to 
those seeking to resolve insurance disputes within the Kingdom, specifically when 
international elements are involved. These advantages are applicable in both the domestic and 
international contexts. In this section, the advantages and disadvantages are discussed under 
the five criteria for judging the quality of a dispute resolution option 
4.3.3.4.1 Cost and Duration 
 
An important advantage of arbitration with regard to insurance dispute resolution is the ability 
to achieve an expedited resolution. In the insurance sector, it is important to resolve disputes 
quickly because by nature of the claim giving rise to the dispute; a party is facing the occurrence 
of a detrimental event.118 Article 40 of the Arbitration Regulation requires arbitrators to render 
their decision within twelve months of the initiation of arbitration proceedings. In comparison, 
a study on the duration of litigation involving physicians in the KSA revealed that seventy per 
cent of cases lasted for two years or more.119 This is similar to the findings of another study 
that eighty per cent of litigations in the KSA lasted for more than two years.120  
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Alkhenizan and Shafiq contend that the protracted duration of litigation involving medical 
professionals in the KSA is due to the fact that they were carried out through the Shariah 
Medical Panels which is a judicial committee and not a traditional court.121 Hence, litigation 
through traditional courts ensures expedited processing and timely determinations when 
compared to administrative tribunals. However, the data collected by the General Secretariat 
which shows that a case brought for resolution before the IDC can take up to six months at the 
initial stage and another six months or longer if appealed.122 Nonetheless, the IDC rules do not 
provide any guidance on a timeframe within which a case must be concluded, leaving the 
parties with significant uncertainty as to how long their case will continue.123 As such, 
arbitration has an advantage over litigation and the administrative tribunal model regarding 
timely determinations. 
 
Given the expediency with which a dispute is resolved through arbitration, the parties may 
sometimes benefit from cost savings.124 Although they are required to pay the arbitrators (they 
would not have to pay IDC members and trial judges), the speed with which the case is resolved 
can avoid sunk costs and significantly reduce the legal fees associated with bringing or 
defending a claim. However, where the arbitral award was issued in another country or in a 
language other than Arabic, the enforcing court in the KSA may require the arbitration 
agreement and arbitral award to be translated accurately, as well as a written verification from 
the arbitral tribunal and a translated transcript of the arbitration proceedings. These may then 
add layers of formality, time and cost.125 
4.3.3.4.2 Shariah Compliance 
 
The Arbitration Regulation and New York Convention do not provide narrow grounds for 
annulling arbitral awards or refusing to enforce them. As noted above, the Court of Appeal, 
upon its own initiative, can invalidate an arbitral award if it violates principles of the Shariah 
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or the Kingdom’s public policy. Thus, the Court of Appeal independently analyses the case 
and issues its own decision regarding the Shariah-compliance of the procedure and award. 
Also, Article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention allows signatory states to refuse to enforce 
non-domestic awards that are contrary to their public policy. This provides a safe harbour 
wherein the KSA may align its laws to international norms without undermining its public 
policy, history and religion.  
 
Roy argues that Article V (2) (b) of the Convention enables the KSA to enforce non-domestic 
arbitral awards in the same way as it did prior to its accession to the New York Convention.126 
It suffices that the Board of Grievances determines that the non-domestic award is contrary to 
the Kingdom’s public policy. This is the same discretion given to the Court of Appeal to 
invalidate arbitral awards in the KSA that violate the Shariah. As such, the arbitrator must 
ensure that the outcome is Shariah-compliant, else the entire process would serve no purpose. 
4.3.3.4.3 Flexibility 
 
Another primary draw of the arbitration process is its overall flexibility and accordance of party 
autonomy in resolving disputes.127 Instead of being bound to particular procedural or 
substantive codes, the parties have the ability to agree on the arbitration rules that will serve as 
the procedural framework for the proceedings, as well as the substantive law that will govern 
the dispute.128 The parties also have the freedom to decide where an arbitration will be seated 
or take place as opposed to litigation and IDC proceedings where the competent jurisdiction 
and venue are decided on a territorial basis. As such, arbitration basically empowers parties to 
create a framework outside of the court system for the resolution of their disputes. 
 
Further, the parties have the ability to choose the law governing the dispute. For domestic 
arbitrations, the choice of law must be compliant with Shariah principles. The decision of the 
applicable law therefore enables the parties to opt-out of disfavoured legal systems and avail 
themselves of the provisions of other insurance regimes. 
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Once the procedural and substantive provisions have been established, the parties also have the 
ability to determine who will hear their dispute. Parties can choose arbitrators either at the time 
of signing an arbitration agreement or they can agree to a provision on how arbitrators will be 
selected in the event a dispute arises. The choice of arbitrators is a key benefit to the use of 
arbitration over litigation proceedings where trial judges are imposed on the parties.  
 
Another area of flexibility regarding the Arbitration Regulation in the KSA is the option to 
conduct proceedings in languages other than Arabic. Under the IDC Working Rules, all 
pleadings and hearings are to be submitted and conducted in Arabic. However, under the 
Arbitration Regulation, the parties may choose the language in which to conduct proceedings. 
This is important for the resolution of insurance disputes as there are often foreign investors 
involved that speak different languages and have different customs.129 Thus, the flexibility and 
party autonomy provided for by the Arbitration Regulation underscore the consensual nature 
of arbitration proceedings. These provisions allow parties to have confidence in the dispute 
resolution process because they exercise a significant degree of control over how the arbitration 
will proceed. 
 
However, flexibility of the process is very limited because of restrictions placed on the freedom 
of the parties to select the rules to govern the arbitration or enforcement taking place within the 
Kingdom. The procedural and substantive rules cannot conflict with the principles of the 
Shariah. Hence, the parties to the arbitration are simply guaranteed all of the same rights of 
fairness that would have been accorded to them had they pursued the dispute through the IDC. 
It follows that arbitration is very similar to the administrative tribunal model and does not 
confer any unique advantage. Also, the emphasis on the arbitrator’s grasp of the Shariah creates 
a high risk of the parties appointing an arbitrator who fulfils the conditions set out in Article 
14 of the Arbitration Regulation but who is not technically competent. Then the absence of 
clear guidelines regarding disclosure makes it highly probable that the arbitral tribunal would 
seek the court’s assistance in ordering disclosure and summoning witnesses in order to prevent 
a subsequent invalidation of the award by the Court of Appeal. 
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4.3.3.4.4 Impartiality 
 
The impartiality of the arbitrators is key to ensuring the independence of the arbitral tribunal 
and that the resulting award is not tainted by bias.130 Allowing the parties to choose the 
arbitrators gives them the control to choose individuals whom they know are independent and 
impartial with regard to the case at hand.131 However, in reality, parties sometimes prefer an 
arbitrator whom they believe will find their position persuasive.132 While each party may 
choose one arbitrator, the parties must either agree on the third arbitrator or allow their chosen 
arbitrators to appoint the third arbitrator. This safeguard ensures that the parties receive fair 
consideration of their dispute.133 This is especially important regarding insurance disputes 
because insurance companies are in a better position to choose from a pool of arbitrators who 
understand how policies are drafted and coverage determinations made and may have arbitrated 
in other disputes involving the same insurance companies. Policyholders on the other hand are 
less likely to know such arbitrators because they often deal with arbitrators just once.134  
 
However, when an arbitrator is requested to serve on an arbitral tribunal, the arbitrator has a 
duty to notify the parties of any facts or circumstances that would call into question the 
arbitrator’s impartiality.135 Article 16 of the Arbitration Regulation preserves this impartiality 
by requiring that an arbitrator have no vested interest in the dispute.136 Nonetheless, it is noted 
above that an insurance company may defeat this provision by naming friendly arbitrators in 
contracts of adhesion whereby the policyholder is not empowered to negotiate or counter the 
company’s offer. This may not happen in the IDC given that the parties cannot select the 
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members of the Committee. Hence, there is a risk that the neutrality provisions of the 
Arbitration Regulation may be abused, making arbitration less attractive than the 
administrative tribunal model for the parties with weaker bargaining power such as 
policyholders. 
 
One of the most often cited benefits of arbitration related to impartiality and neutrality is the 
privacy accorded to the parties during arbitration proceedings.137 Unlike suits brought before 
trial judges or quasi-judicial authorities that are public in nature, arbitration provides a private 
and confidential means for settling disputes. Article 43(2) of the Arbitration Regulation 
provides that the decision of the arbitral tribunal may only be released and published if the 
parties so agree. This is often attractive to policyholders who would prefer to keep their matters 
private, as well as to insurance companies which do not want proceedings or decisions to 
establish a negative precedent upon which future policyholders can rely.138 During the 
proceedings, insurance companies may make claims or adopt inconsistent positions knowing 
that their arguments will remain confidential and no other form of recourse is available to the 
policyholders.  
 
However, the Arbitration Regulation is silent on the issue of confidentiality, specifically. Also, 
there are no privacy laws in the KSA that protect the confidentiality of such processes.139 
Reuben noted that many commentators mistakenly conflate ‘privacy’ and ‘confidentiality’ or 
use them as synonyms when discussing arbitral proceedings.140 Schmitz equally noted that 
‘arbitration is private but not confidential … Arbitration is private in that it is a closed process, 
but it is not confidential because information revealed during the process may become 
public.’141 As such, Article 43(2) of the Arbitration Regulation guarantees privacy because it 
excludes non-parties from the hearing, precludes the arbitrator from disclosing information 
about the proceedings, and provides that the arbitral proceedings or award cannot be published 
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139 Article 40 of the Basic Law (Royal Decree No. A/90 Shaban 1412 H, March 1, 1992) simply safeguards private 
communications from confiscation, listening or reading except where required by statute. 
140 RC Reuben, ‘Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth’ (2006) 54 University of Kansas Law Review 
1255, 1260. 
141 AJ Schmitz, ‘Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration’ (2006) 54 University of Kansas Law Review 1211, 
1211. 
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in part or whole without the written consent of the parties to the arbitration. However, this does 
not extend to forbidding the parties from disclosing the existence of the arbitration or its 
outcome. Hence, the parties to the arbitration are essentially provided the same protection as 
disputants in the IDC as regards privacy. This is because although some of the decisions of the 
Primary Committees are published on the General Secretariat’s website, the names of the 
parties are not included. It follows that arbitration does not provide a unique benefit of privacy 
in the KSA.  
4.3.3.4.5 Predictability 
 
Another advantage of arbitral proceedings is that the process is typically the same among 
varying arbitral institutions, seats, and ad hoc models. Given that most countries now base their 
arbitration laws on the UNCITRAL Model Law, there are significant similarities between their 
arbitration regimes.142 Thus, parties that are familiar with arbitration in one country will be 
generally prepared to engage in arbitration even if in a new country or seat. This is in contrast 
to litigation proceedings that vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even 
among courts and tribunals for different subject matters within the same jurisdiction. A party 
may for example be unfamiliar with the IDC process for resolving an insurance dispute but 
may be quite familiar with the arbitration of insurance disputes and opt for the latter method as 
a result. 
 
One of the reasons why the outcome of arbitration is more predictable than the other forms of 
dispute resolution is the finality of arbitral awards.143 In the arbitral context, finality means the 
tribunal’s final decision and award are not subject to extensive judicial review or appeal. Court 
judgements and IDC decisions generally lack such finality because the parties are generally 
entitled to appeal the judgments or decisions to higher courts, unlike arbitral awards. The 
benefits of the limited appellate review for parties include expedited proceedings, timely 
determinations, reduction in costs, and increased confidence in the reliability of the outcome.144 
                                                          
142 See ‘Aiming for Consistency in Arbitration’ (LexisNexis, 9 October 2013) 
<https://www.cov.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Aiming_for_Consistency_in_Arbitration.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019 (discussing how the IBA is seeking to create greater consistency among arbitration guidelines 
globally). 
143 This principle of finality is embodied in most institutional arbitration rules worldwide, including those of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, London 
Court of International Arbitration, and the American Arbitration Association. See AM Saleem, Finality of 
Awards: Is It the Key Feature of the New Saudi Arbitration Law that Will Put the Country in the Global Map of 
Arbitration? (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Glasgow University 2013) 1. 
144 Ibid. 
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As such, parties generally include arbitration clauses in international agreements because they 
know that arbitral awards would be enforceable in countries that have ratified conventions such 
as the New York Convention.145 
 
In addition to being final, arbitral awards are also easier to enforce against foreign parties than 
foreign court judgments or administrative decisions.146 Given the number of foreign companies 
investing in the Saudi insurance market, there is a strong likelihood that awards granted by 
tribunals outside of the KSA may need to be enforced against a foreign parent company if the 
Saudi branch or subsidiary has insufficient domestic assets. The enforceability stems from the 
voluntary subjecting of the KSA to the New York Convention. The Convention provides for 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by all contracting states and narrowly limits 
the grounds on which a state can oppose the enforcement of an award.147 As noted above, the 
KSA became a party to the Convention in 1994. The majority of developed nations, in which 
most multinational companies are headquartered, have also subscribed.148 
4.4 Conclusion 
Litigation is inefficient and works in favour of the insurers because it is slow, laden with rules, 
costly, and unpredictable. IDC adjudication is not without flaws because the official guidelines 
are vague making the proceedings and outcome unpredictable. Also, compelling IDC 
adjudication cannot be justified if the available forms of ADR in the KSA provide consumers 
or policyholders with a better opportunity for challenging adverse coverage determinations by 
insurers. 
Although negotiation is traditionally the preferred method for settling disputes, it has not been 
very successful because parties are often too partial and emotionally invested to make rational 
and objective decisions. Also, there is no requirement or even expectation of consistency in the 
way in which negotiation should be conducted. Thus, it is less appealing to a policyholder 
seeking to challenge an insurance company with stronger bargaining power. 
All insurance-related disputes in the KSA are required to seek mediation before submitting a 
claim to the IDC’s Primary Committee. However, it is shown in Chapter 5 that the vast majority 
                                                          
145 See Moses (n 41) 211. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Roy (n 125) 924-928. 
148 ‘Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards’ (New York, 1958) (UNCITRAL, 
2017) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> accessed 14 
November 2019. There are currently 157 contracting states to the Convention. ibid. 
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of disputes are not resolved through mediation. Also, the mediator is without authority to 
impose a settlement, and a party cannot ensure that the mediator would not be guided by 
personal opinions, values, and feelings.  
Arbitration on the other hand is very appealing because of expedited proceedings, timely 
determinations, reduction in costs, and increased confidence in the reliability of the outcome. 
The parties exercise a significant degree of control over who arbitrates and how the arbitration 
will proceed. The Arbitration Regulation and Implementing Regulations empower parties to 
create a framework outside of the court system for the resolution of their disputes. This is no 
doubt an important advantage over other forms of ADR such as negotiation and mediation. 
However, the Arbitration Regulation and Implementing Regulations do not nearly provide the 
complete picture of what is to be expected. They are for example silent on the specific 
documents that should be submitted during disclosure. They are not clear on whether the 
proceedings may be deemed to have commenced where the party requesting arbitration does 
not fully comply with Article 9 of the Implementing Regulations. Emphasis is placed on the 
arbitrator’s grasp of the Shariah for tribunals in the KSA creating a high risk that the parties 
may appoint an arbitrator who fulfils the conditions set out in Article 14 but is not technically 
competent. Also, arbitrators as private actors cannot determine the potential arbitration of 
statutory claims, and the Court of Appeal may sua sponte invalidate an arbitral award because 
it violates the principles of the Shariah as interpreted by the Court. 
 
It follows that arbitration is very similar to the administrative tribunal model and does not 
confer any unique advantage. The parties to the arbitration are essentially provided the same 
protection as disputants in the IDC as regards fairness and privacy. The flexibility of the process 
is limited because of restrictions placed on the freedom of the parties to select procedural and 
substantive rules that do not conflict with the principles of the Shariah. However, arbitration 
has an advantage over the administrative tribunal model regarding timely determinations. 
Notwithstanding, where the arbitral award was issued in another country or in a language other 
than Arabic, the enforcing court in the KSA may require the agreement, transcript of the 
proceedings, and award to be translated accurately, as well as a written verification from the 
arbitral tribunal. These may then add layers of formality, time, and cost.  
 
It may then be contended that where the underlying contract is not balanced, there is no option 
that consistently provides policyholders with a credible opportunity to compel insurers to pay 
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claims following unfair coverage determinations. However, it is uncertain whether in practice 
policyholders do not consistently and successfully challenge adverse determinations by 
insurance companies in the IDC. This is because the analysis in this Chapter has been doctrinal 
and theoretical, but models and theories do not provide completely accurate representations of 
reality.149 Tribunals, like courts, are not limited in practice to the terms prescribed in the 
relevant statute or regulation.150 They also rely on scientific reasoning and creative activity to 
bring the statutes and regulations into a logical whole. The next Chapter therefore conducts a 
practical inquiry to determine whether the shortcomings of the administrative model identified 
in Chapter 3 and above adversely affect the IDC’s efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
149 See P Nilson, ‘Making Sense of Implementation Theories, Models and Frameworks’ (2015) 10 
Implementation Science 53, 56. 
150 NM Korkunov, General Theory of Law (MG Hastings, Tr, 2nd edn, Macmillan 1922) 421-424. 
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Chapter 5: Determining the Effectiveness of the IDC on the Basis of a 
Practical Inquiry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The adjudication of insurance coverage disputes has been delegated to administrative tribunals 
or specialised committees known as the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC). Thus, despite the 
shortcomings identified in Chapters 3 and 4, the IDC remains the official dispute resolution 
forum for policyholder’s claims in KSA. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis seeks to 
determine whether the choice of dispute resolution option made by the Saudi legislator is 
justified. Following the doctrinal legal inquiry in the previous chapters, this Chapter adopts a 
practical reason approach. This approach emphasises decisional methodology: how parties 
perceive the process and outcome and how IDC adjudicators decide cases.1 It follows from 
Bingham’s contention that ‘judicial generalizations are of questionable accuracy and utility.’2 
Thus, it shifts the emphasis from the doctrinal analysis of the rules governing the IDC to 
assessing the practical effects of the use of the IDC option. It stresses the importance of an 
objective and external observation of this dispute resolution option so as to determine whether, 
despite the shortcomings of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law of 2003 
(CICCL) and Working Rules, the IDC has practical and functional utility justifying the Saudi 
legislator’s preference for this option. 
The Chapter begins with a brief discussion of the main thrust of the practical inquiry. It explains 
how the findings of surveys conducted by the General Secretariat of the Committees for the 
Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations (‘General Secretariat’) and decisions of the 
IDC Committees are used to determine whether the IDC serves a predetermined purpose of 
efficiency. Satisfaction is used by the General Secretariat as the sole measure of efficiency and 
                                                          
1 JM Feinman, ‘Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies’ (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 724, 724, 
728-731 (contrasting critical legal studies and practical legal studies). 
2 JW Bingham, ‘What is the Law?’ (1912) 11 Michigan Law Review 1, 9, 15-16 (‘The lawyer, as does the scientist, 
studies sequences of external phenomena and he studies them with a similar purpose-to determine their causes 
and effects and to acquire an ability to forecast sequences of the same sort’). See also VA Wellman, ‘Practical 
Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory’ (1985) 57 Colorado Law Review 45, 46, 90-
92 (discussing the use of case studies to support the contention that the practical application of theory is viable); 
DA Farber and PP Frickey, ‘Practical Reason and the First Amendment’ (1987) 34 UCLA Law Review 1615 
(proposing the practical reason approach and criticising the assessment of the first amendment law based on 
abstract theories). 
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effectiveness.3 This is followed by an analysis of the eight-dimensional service quality 
instrument used by General Secretariat to ascertain the level of satisfaction of the parties who 
submit claims to the IDCs. In order to determine whether the drive for efficiency has not 
jeopardised the fairness and effectiveness of the system, some important decisions of Primary 
Committees and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) Appeal Committee are 
assessed. This also enables the researcher to ascertain whether the level of satisfaction of the 
users of the IDC may be correlated with the fairness of the decisions of the Committees. An 
attempt is also made to determine whether the level of satisfaction of the users of the IDC may 
be explained by the fact that the users believe the IDC is better than other dispute resolution 
options., It is shown that despite the shortcomings identified by the doctrinal legal inquiry in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the IDC is an effective dispute resolution option in practice. It is however 
noted that it is difficult to explain the disconnect between the results of the theoretical and 
doctrinal analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, and the results of the practical inquiry. This chapter 
seeks to answer the research questions about whether IDC adjudicators adopted any specific 
measures to protect consumers, and whether consumers are satisfied with the IDC. 
5.2 The Main Thrust of the Practical Inquiry 
In Chapter 3, it was noted that litigation is ineffective and works in favour of the insurer because 
it is slow, laden with rules, costly and unpredictable. One of the objectives of the CICCL was 
to enable the Saudi consumer to credibly threaten recourse to the IDC against insurers who 
wrongly cut payment claims. It follows that the administrative tribunal model on which the 
IDC is based ought to be more effective than the litigation model. In other words, the expenses, 
protracted nature and unpredictability of litigation ought to be avoided or reduced by 
channelling disputes into an administrative system. However, after a critical analysis of the 
rules governing the IDC, it was concluded that the IDC is not a better dispute resolution option 
than litigation; at least, from a theoretical perspective. The provision adopting the principle by 
                                                          
3 As noted in Chapter 1, satisfaction has been demonstrated to be a surrogate measure of effectiveness and a 
reliable arbiter of the success of public organisations. See H Hill et al, Customer Satisfaction (Cogent 2007) 18-
28. See also AW Gatian, ‘Is User Satisfaction a Valid Measure of System Effectiveness?’ (1994) 26(3) 
Information & Management 119, 119-131. Satisfaction has been studied from different aspects with the focus 
largely on the expectations of users prior to the experience of using the services or products and the perception of 
the users after using the service or product. Thus, satisfaction as a measure determines how services or products 
meet the expectations of users. See RA Westbrook and RL Oliver, ‘The Dimensionality of Consumption Emotion 
Patterns and Consumer Satisfaction’ (1991) Journal of Consumer Research 84, 84-91. Also, satisfaction data are 
established indicators of perceptions, and it has been shown that satisfaction is highly correlated with effectiveness 
and efficiency. See E Hirons et al, ‘External Customer Satisfaction as a Performance Measure of the Management 
of a Research and Development Department’ (1998) 15(8/9) Journal of Marketing 21, 21-31; S Joo, ‘How are 
Usability Elements – Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Satisfaction – Correlated with Each Other in the Context of 
Digital Libraries?’ (2010) ASIST 1, 1-2. 
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which IDC Committees are bound to precedents is ill-defined; the Working Rules of the CICCL 
do not distinguish between binding, mandatory and persuasive authority; and the Rules are 
ambiguous regarding the basic elements that all Committee decisions should contain, how 
decisions should be enforced, and the grounds for objection and appeal. These uncertainties 
make the administration of justice by the IDC less predictable and promote arbitrariness. Cook 
warned that for ‘laws to be made meaningful, it is necessary that they have that specificity 
necessary for prediction, either by those to whom they apply, or by administrators who are to 
implement them.’4 Hence, the doctrinal analysis revealed that the CICCL does not give the 
IDC that specificity necessary for prediction. 
In Chapter 4, an attempt was made to determine whether some key ADR options (negotiation, 
mediation and arbitration) may be preferable to the administrative tribunal model (IDC), given 
the flexibility provided by these forms of ADR over the choice of forum, and substantive and 
procedural law. However, it was shown that there is no requirement or even expectation of 
consistency in the way in which negotiation should be conducted. Also, although all parties to 
insurance-related disputes in the KSA are required to seek mediation before submitting a claim 
to the IDC, the mediator is without authority to impose a settlement and parties cannot ensure 
that the mediator would not be guided by personal opinions, values and feelings. With regard 
to arbitration, it is shown to be very appealing because of expedited proceedings, timely 
determinations, reduction in costs, and increased confidence in the reliability of the outcome. 
However, the Arbitration Regulation and Implementing Regulations do not adequately address 
the risk that the parties may appoint an arbitrator who is not technically competent or does not 
have a good grasp of the Shariah as it is applied in the KSA. Nonetheless, it is concluded that 
arbitration is better than the administrative tribunal model (IDC). The parties to the arbitration 
are provided the same protection as disputants in the IDC as regards fairness and privacy, but 
parties to arbitration are likely to achieve a more expedient resolution and benefit from cost 
savings. Also, arbitral awards that comply with the Shariah are more likely to be final. Lastly, 
parties that are familiar with arbitration in a country that has ratified the New York Convention 
and adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law will be generally prepared to engage in arbitration in 
the KSA because of the similarities between their arbitration regimes. 
 
The doctrinal analysis therefore revealed that the IDC has important flaws, and arbitration may 
be the best option for the Saudi consumer seeking to take action against the insurer that has 
                                                          
4 T Cook, ‘Law, Arbitrariness and Ethics’ (1942) 30(2) California Law Review 151, 168. 
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wrongly cut a payment claim. However, the statement by Cook cited above is to the effect that 
laws are made meaningful when they have that specificity necessary for prediction, either by 
those to whom they apply or by administrators who are to implement them. Those to whom the 
CICCL applies in this context are Saudi consumers, while administrators who implement the 
CICCL are IDC Committee members or adjudicators. It may therefore be important to 
determine whether the CICCL and its Working Rules have that specificity necessary for 
prediction by Saudi consumers and IDC adjudicators. This is because what obtains in practice 
may be different from the conclusions of the doctrinal analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4. 
This chapter therefore conducts a practical inquiry with the objective of determining whether 
Saudi consumers are satisfied5 with the way the CICCL and its Working Rules are applied by 
the IDC to resolve their claims against insurers.  
 
It must be noted that indemnity should normally occur when a consumer or policyholder suffers 
a particular damage or loss as the result of the occurrence of an insured event, and the insurer 
becomes obligated to financially compensate the policyholder for that loss.6 Generally 
speaking, the indemnity payment under an insurance contract must be paid if the insured event 
occurs within the contract term and a timely claim is made by the policyholder.7 Under Article 
44 of the Implementing Regulations for the CICCL, ‘the settlement period for the covered 
individuals’ claims shall not exceed fifteen days from the receipt of the claim accompanied by 
the documents.’ This period of time is intended to enable the policyholder to obtain the 
indemnity as soon as possible, which indicates that it is not permissible to extend this period 
arbitrarily. 
 
As noted in the previous chapters, the insurance company may arbitrarily interpret the terms of 
the insurance contract in a manner that is contrary to the interests of the policyholder. In Appeal 
No. 3/AS/695 of 1431H, the insurer interpreted the contract as imposing an obligation on the 
policyholder to pay a sum of money above the cash value of the policy. The policy allowed the 
policyholder to borrow against the cash value of the policy before it was surrendered or sold. 
However, the insurer argued that the policyholder had to pay a sum of money above the money 
                                                          
5 As noted above, satisfaction is used by the General Secretariat as a measure of the effectiveness of the IDC. 
Hence, it is assumed that the effectiveness of the IDC is highly correlated with the satisfaction of the users of this 
administrative tribunal. 
6 RA Al Saud, Principles of Insurance (Arab House 2000) 355; EC Kulakowski and LU Chronister, Research 
Administration and Management (Jones and Bartlett 2006) 373. 
7 W Courtney, Contractual Indemnities (Hart Publishing 2014) 276; N Andrews, Arbitration and Contract Law: 
Common Law Perspectives (Springer 2016) 222. 
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that the latter had paid as premiums because the insurer contended that premium costs were 
lower where the premiums paid by policyholders were invested and enabled the insurer to earn 
from the investments. Thus, where the policyholder takes money out of the policy, the insurer 
earned less from the investment of the policyholder’s premiums. However, the Board of 
Grievances held that the insurer could not arbitrarily interpret the contract to require the 
policyholder to pay a sum of money above the cash value. Moreover, the Board noted that the 
additional payment amounted to riba which is impermissible under the Shariah. Thus, if the 
insurer’s interpretation was upheld, the contract would be void because it contained riba. 
 
What is important to note here is that the policyholder may be denied coverage in an arbitrary 
manner and it may be difficult for the latter to successfully challenge the adverse coverage 
determination, where the insurer’s interpretation of the contract does not undermine the 
Shariah. It is shown in section 5.4.1 below that in the KSA the insurer’s determination may be 
arbitrary because of exclusions in the policy that render the insurer’s liability illusory or the 
insurer’s interpretation of ambiguous policy provisions that negate the reasonable expectations 
of the policyholder. As shown in Chapter 3, these problems related to insurance coverage are 
not unique to policyholders in the KSA. Nonetheless, the laws of the KSA do not clearly 
identify an avenue in which policyholders may successfully challenge insurers’ arbitrary 
adverse determinations in a consistent manner. Without attention to power asymmetries, there 
is the risk that in the event of loss or damage, policyholders with fewer resources and in urgent 
need of compensation will be unable to compel insurance companies to indemnify them. In 
other words, the insurance company will not be denied an unconscionable advantage in the 
policy provisions. 
 
In the KSA, prior to the enactment of the CICCL, insurance companies could be challenged in 
court (litigation) or via means outside of the courtroom such as the alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) options, including negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Given the 
shortcomings of these options, the CICCL and its Implementing Regulations provide for the 
creation of a domestic dispute resolution forum that is deemed to be a cheaper and more 
efficient alternative regarding disputes involving policyholders. This domestic forum is an 
administrative tribunal called the IDC. Chapters 3 and 4 conduct a doctrinal analysis of the 
sources of law that guide and constrain Saudi judges, mediators, arbitrators and the IDC. The 
line of progress for these different options available to policyholders is charted. It is then shown 
that litigation is slow, costly and unpredictable and works in favour of the insurer. Also, it is 
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noted in Chapter 2 that conventional insurance contracts are seldom recognised and enforced 
by Shariah courts because they are based on uncertainty (gharar), which is prohibited by the 
Shariah. In Appeal No. 1228/AS/6 of 1431H, the Board of Grievances held that conventional 
insurance contracts are void under the Shariah because they enable the insurer to take money 
from policyholders for free. This is in cases where the policyholder pays premiums for defined 
period of time, but nothing happens to the insured property. The Board also held that 
conventional insurance contracts based on speculation regarding the occurrence of the insured 
event are contrary to the Shariah which forbids gharar or uncertainty and risk. Also, in Appeal 
No. S/2/2713 of 1435H, the Board of Grievances refused to enforce a conventional insurance 
contract on the grounds that it contains gharar and riba. 
 
The hard line taken by the Board of Grievances was particularly problematic with sale contracts 
that included an insurance agreement or policy to cover an eventual loss or damage of the 
subject matter. Thus, many parties who have entered into insurance contracts were unable to 
seek redress from courts in the KSA. An article published by the Middle East paper in 2006 
noted that there was a backlog of more than 10,000 insurance-related cases in the Board of 
Grievances of the East region of the KSA because of the Board’s intransigent posture towards 
conventional insurance contracts.8 Then, in Appeal No. Q/7138 of 1432H, the Board of 
Grievances refused to hear an insurance coverage dispute on the grounds of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Board noted that such disputes should be settled by the IDC which had the 
requisite authority. 
 
 
However, in Chapter 3, it is argued that the expenses and unpredictability of litigation cannot 
be avoided or reduced by channelling insurance-related disputes into the current administrative 
system, the IDC. This is because of the lack of clarity in IDC procedures, and ambiguities 
within the empowering legislation. As noted above, unlike the previous chapters, the inquiry 
conducted in this chapter is practical. The emphasis is on what IDCs do in practice9 and the 
level of satisfaction of the users who are consumers or policyholders. Kevelson contrasts the 
                                                          
8 See <http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=9896&article=341849#.XKdKn6SEaEc>, accessed on 14 
November 2019. 
 
9 For a concise definition of practical inquiry, see JD Wallace, ‘Practical Inquiry’ (1969) 78(4) The Philosophical 
Review 435, 435-436. 
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systems of inquiry proposed by Bentham10 and Pierce11 and shows that the latter emphasised 
the dynamic development of the whole justice system because it does not only rely on the logic 
of justification in the traditional doctrinal sense but also on discovery and inquiry that account 
for procedures in practical life.12 Thus, practical inquiry aligns with the attempt by legal realism 
to eliminate any contradiction between legal theory and legal praxis.13 It follows that the legal 
researcher should be engaged with the law on the level of ideas, development in thought, and 
practical legal procedure. Kevelson therefore concluded that ‘What is needed … is not a 
doctrine, but a method such that the consequences of discovery and inquiry in thought may be 
understood as representations of actual phenomenal processes in the world of experience.’14 
This chapter examines the workings of the IDC on the ground with the objective of instructing 
adjudicators within the Committees, as well as Saudi policymakers and legislators in their 
consideration of the problems confronted by policyholders and guide them in the more efficient 
and effective resolution of insurance coverage disputes. Given the shortcomings of the statutes 
(discussed in chapters 3 and 4), this chapter seeks to determine whether in practice IDC 
adjudicators have devised strategies of providing better protection to policyholders confronted 
with problems such as illusory coverage and unconscionable advantages in policy provisions. 
This chapter therefore assesses the practical application of insurance law and their interplay 
with the theoretical analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4. The assessment is based on the 
following advice given by Woodhouse: 
The disease of disjunction between legal education and the profession is not caused by 
too much theory or too little doctrine and practice, but by too little attention to their 
essential interplay in a complex and interconnected world. The cure I prescribe is not 
further polarization but a more thoughtful integration not only of theory, doctrine, and 
                                                          
10 For an analysis of Bentham’s system of inquiry, see J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation (Hafner Publishing 1948) 334. 
11 For an analysis of Pierce’s system of inquiry, see R Kevelson, Charles S. Pierce’s Method of Methods (John 
Benjamin’s Publishing 986) 45-56; R Kevelson, ‘Pierce’s Dialogism and Continuous Predicate’ (1982) 18 
Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 110. 
12 R Kevelson, ‘Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and Discovery in Law from the 
Perspective of Pierce’s Speculative Rhetoric’ (1986) 61(3) Indiana Law Journal 355, 356. 
13 Ibid. Realist empirical studies have been criticized for producing knowledge and developing ideas without 
practical application or any concrete benefit to lawyers and judges. See K Llewellyn, ‘On What Makes Legal 
Research Worth While’ (1956) 8 Journal of Legal Education 399, 401 (noted that ‘the Hopkins ebullition and its 
partial counterparts at Yale had a single notable effect. For twenty-five years, they pretty thoroughly choked off 
foundation interest in such research in law as quested beyond doctrine’). See also W Twining, Karl Llewellyn and 
the Realist Movement (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 388-443. 
14 Kevelson (n12) 359. 
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practice in the classroom, but of the complementary roles of scholar, teacher, and 
lawyer in ourselves and in our understanding of each other.15  
An attempt is made here to assess the interplay between the CICCL and Working Rules and 
the working of the IDCs in practice in the complex Saudi system. It seeks to ascertain whether 
consumers who have submitted claims to the IDC are satisfied with their experience and why. 
This may entail determining what standards are used by the Committees to determine whether 
a contract provides actual or illusory coverage and when the policyholder should reasonably 
expect to be indemnified. The researcher believes that this will provide a more thoughtful 
integration of the theories and doctrines analysed in the previous chapters and the working of 
the IDCs in practice.  
The inquiry is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the level of satisfaction of 
parties who appear before the IDCs. It analyses data collected by the General Secretariat. The 
second part focuses on decisions rendered by the Primary Committees and SAMA Appeal 
Committee within the IDC structure, and the third part examines decisions of the Board of 
Grievances. The objective of the second and third parts is to explain the level of satisfaction 
ascertained in the first part. 
5.3 Statistics on the Use of the IDC 
The statistics presented and analysed in this section were published by the General 
Secretariat.16 Since 2012, the General Secretariat has in accordance with the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 190 of 9/5/1435H17 and the Council of Ministers’ Resolution No. 215 
of 29/06/1430H collected and analysed data in large quantities with the objective of 
ascertaining the number of disputes filed with the three IDC Primary Committees and the 
SAMA Appeal Committee.18 The General Secretariat assesses the process and duration of 
                                                          
15 BB Woodhouse, ‘Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life’ (1993) 91 Michigan Law 
Review 1977, 1997. 
16 They are contained in three documents: General Secretariat, 10th Annual Report (SAMA 2014) 4-5 < 
http://www.idc.gov.sa/en-us/Downloads/The%20Annual%20Report%20for%202014.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019 (‘2014 Annual Report’); General Secretariat, 11th Annual Report (SAMA 2015) < 
http://www.idc.gov.sa/en-us/Downloads/The%20Annual%20Report%20for%202015.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019 (‘2015 Annual Report’); General Secretariat, 12th Annual Report (SAMA 2016) < 
http://www.idc.gov.sa/en-us/Downloads/The%20Annual%20Report%20for%202016.pdf> accessed 14 
November 2019 (‘2016 Annual Report’). 
17 This should not be confused with the Council of Ministers Resolution No 190 of 19 June 1989 that sets out the 
procedural rules of the Board of Grievances.  
18 Article 13 of Resolution No. 190 provides that General Secretariat shall classify and publish the decisions of 
the Committees and prepare annual statistics on the decisions. It does not specify what motivated the Saudi 
legislator to require the publication of the decisions of the Committees. However, it may be assumed that the 
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dispute resolution via these Committees and compares the efficiency of the process to that of 
another dispute resolution mechanism, namely mediation. This is because parties are required 
to seek mediation with the General Secretariat before submitting complaints to the relevant 
Primary Committee. The annual reports by the General Secretariat also include results of user 
satisfaction surveys conducted with the objective of understanding the views and experiences 
of the users. 
Tables I summarises the General Secretariat’s annual reports with regard to the total number 
of disputes filed with the three Primary Committees. 
 
Table I: Total Number of Cases Received by IDC Primary Committees 
Year Motor Insurance Health Insurance Other Total 
Number of 
Cases 
2014 880 (89.52%) 75 (7.63%) 27 (2.85%) 982 
2015 1774 (88.67%) 123 (6.93%) 88 (4.4%) 1985 
2016 1473 (88.09%) 119 (7.12%) 80 (4.79%) 1672 
     Source: General Secretariat 
Table I shows that policies covering theft or damage to vehicles and policies covering the risk 
of incurring medical expenses account for most of the coverage disputes resolved by the IDCs 
between 2014 and 2016. Also, the total number of cases received by the three Primary 
Committees increased sharply between 2014 and 2015 but then dropped in 2016. Nonetheless, 
between 2014 and 2016, the total number of cases increased by more than 45 per cent. The 
General Secretariat also revealed that the number of persons visiting their office to make 
inquiries increased by 5 per cent between 2015 and 2016, while case registration requests 
increased by about 93 per cent within the same period.19 
The General Secretariat does not explain the increase. However, it may be contended that this 
may be explained by increased awareness of the services provided by the IDC and also the 
satisfaction of the users. The General Secretariat previously noted that the primary objective of 
                                                          
objective is to enhance transparency, accountability and efficiency of the IDC since the publication increases 
access to information about the dispute resolution process and also enhances the predictability of the system. 
19 2016 Annual Report, 22. 
161 
 
the IDC is ‘to achieve justice and raise awareness of rights and insurance through the 
publication of decisions issued by the Committees and the Appeal Committee.’20 The choice to 
publish decisions of the Committees was made in accordance with Article 1 of the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 215 and Article 13 of the Rules and Procedures of the Committees 
for Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations.21 The publication of decisions puts all 
parties and members of the public on notice of the Committees’ decisions in specific matters, 
including how the Committees viewed the facts, assessed the disputants’ arguments, and 
interpreted and applied the law. It is shown in Table IV below that user satisfaction increased 
between 2014 and 2016. Thus, the enhanced perception of fairness of the procedures and 
outcomes may be linked to the increase in the number of inquiries and complaints submitted.22 
It must be noted that the Secretariat has qualified and experienced conciliators who work 
independently. They examine claims and advise the claimants on appropriate settlements. 
Thus, they assist the parties via mediation before they can proceed to the Committee. It may 
also be contended that the confidence of Saudi policyholders and insurers may explain the high 
number of inquiries and claims submitted. 
 
Table I also shows that motor insurance (compulsory and comprehensive) account for a 
majority of cases filed against insurance companies in the IDCs. Health or medical insurance 
accounted for only 6 and 7 per cent of the total number of cases. Hence, the IDCs mostly deal 
with policyholders seeking to enforce policies that cover goods purchased for personal use. 
Although the General Secretariat does not provide statistics on private and commercial 
vehicles, it may be because the IDC is only deal with small claims. The results of the surveys 
shown in Table IV below therefore indicate that consumers are generally satisfied with their 
experience with the IDCs. Table II summarises the General Secretariat’s annual reports with 
regard to the total number of appeals received by the SAMA Appeal Committee. 
                                                          
20 General Secretariat, ‘Vision and Methodology’ (IDC 2017) <http://www.idc.gov.sa/en-
us/CommitteesDecisions/Pages/VisionandMethodology.aspx> accessed 14 November 2019. 
21 See also Article 14(3) of the Council of Ministers Resolution No 190 dated 09/05/1435H. 
22 Many studies have established direct causal relationships between customer satisfaction, service quality and 
customer loyalty in different industries. See for example MH Siddiqui and TH Sharma, ‘Analysing Customer 
Satisfaction with Service Quality in Life Insurance Services’ (2010) 18(3-4) Journal of Targeting, Measurement 
and Analysis for Marketing 221, 235-238; K Liao, ‘The Causal Effects of Service Quality, Brand Image, Customer 
Satisfaction on Customer Loyalty in the Leisure Resort Enterprise’ (2012) 11(5) China-USA Business Review 
631, 637-639; RA Spreng and RD Mackoy, ‘An Empirical Examination of a Model of Perceived Service Quality 
and Satisfaction’ (1996) 72(2) Journal of Retailing 201, 208-2012; JB Gotlieb et al, ‘Customer Satisfaction and 
Perceived Quality: Complementary or Divergent Constructs?’ (1994) 76(6) Journal of Applied Psychology 875, 
875-885; JJ Cronin and SA Taylor, ‘Measuring Service Quality: A Re-examination and Extension’ (1992) 56(7) 
Journal of Marketing 55, 56-67. 
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Table II: Total Number of Cases Received by SAMA Appeal Committee 
Year SAMA Appeal Committee 
Rulings 
Appeal 
Requests 
2014 / / 
2015 532 140 
2016 281 330 
      Source: General Secretariat 
The General Secretariat does not provide statistics on the number of appeal requests made in 
2014, as well as the number of decisions issued by the SAMA Appeal Committee. However, it 
notes that between 2012 and 2014, the Committee received 1210 appeals.23 In 2015, the Appeal 
Committee made 532 rulings, which may be explained by the backlog from previous years. 
But, the number of appeal requests made in 2016 was more than twice the number made in 
2015. This sharp increase in the number of appeal requests may be explained by the fact more 
parties were not satisfied with the decisions in 2016 than in 2015. Also, given that people are 
increasingly aware of the services provided by the IDCs, they equally become aware that the 
Appeal Committee’s decision, not that of the Primary Committee, will be the final word in the 
case.  
Research has shown that appellate review is important because it helps to protect the fairness 
of the system and ensure accuracy through the assessment of the rationale behind the decisions 
of trial judges.24 This is what motivates parties who are not satisfied with judges’ decisions to 
apply to a higher court for the reversal of the decisions. Meador and Bernstein noted that appeal 
is another opportunity to be heard: ‘[n]othing else affords the same assurance that the judges 
in fact have been confronted with the theories and arguments of the parties and have put their 
minds to the case.’25 As such, the increase in the number of appeal requests may be held to be 
evidence that the SAMA Appeal Committee provides the assurance to policyholders that the 
Primary Committees have been confronted with theories and arguments of the disputants. 
Nevertheless, only a small percentage of Primary Committee decisions are appealed. In 2015, 
                                                          
23 2014 Annual Report, 25. 
24 See JC Dobbins, ‘New Evidence on Appeal’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review 2016, 2016-2018; BJ Gorod, 
‘The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding’ (2011) 61 Duke Law Journal 1, 3-5. 
25 DJ Meador and JS Bernstein, Appellate Courts in the United States (West Publishing 1994) 82-84. 
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there were 2001 decisions but only 140 appeal requests. Also, in 2016, there were 1672 
decisions but only 330 appeal requests.  
As noted above, the General Secretariat also conducted surveys in order to ascertain the level 
of satisfaction of two main users of the IDC, namely claimants and defendants. A customer of 
the IDC may be involved in a dispute as a claimant (the person or undertaking who submitted 
the complaint) or as a defendant (the undertaking or person against whom the complaint was 
submitted). IDC cases predominantly relate to claims for indemnification. Many of the disputes 
are about adverse coverage determinations made by insurance companies that appear as 
defendants. 
However, the General Secretariat’s data does not include demographic details. Thus, a profile 
of respondents cannot be developed on the basis of their answers.26 This is most likely because 
the General Secretariat did not find that demographic variables are determinative of the 
respondents’ experience. Hence, the survey focused mainly on the respondent’s role in the 
process, whether a claimant or defendant.  
Table III: The Status of Respondents 
Year Claimants (%) Respondents (%) 
2014 53 47 
2015 56.07 43.03 
2016 60.3 39.7 
  Source: General Secretariat 
Table III shows that the majority of respondents were claimants. Given that the claimants were 
mostly policyholders with small claims, their answers are relevant to this study because they 
show that most policyholders who submitted claims to the IDCs are satisfied with this option 
of challenging the adverse coverage determinations of insurance companies. The status of the 
respondents is also important because it is determinative of the IDC’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. Where a majority of claimants have positive views and experiences, it may be 
contended that the IDCs are productive and easily operative or afford good service to the 
                                                          
26 For an explanation of a feasible method of carrying out a robust survey of civil court claimants and defendants, 
see Ministry of Justice UK, ‘A Survey of Civil Court Users: A Feasibility Study’ (2015) Analytical Summary 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/449575/civil
-court-users-survey.pdf>, accessed 14 November 2019. 
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highest number of policyholders. Hence, the General Secretariat sought to determine whether 
IDCs are increasingly used by persons who are satisfied with their experience.  
Nonetheless, no distinction was made between the perspectives of claimants who are 
policyholders and claimants who are insurance companies. Thus, in each case, it is uncertain 
whether the satisfaction of claimants who are policyholders is linked with the same variables 
as the satisfaction of claimants who are insurance companies.  
Also, the General Secretariat’s surveys do not include an assessment of the users’ satisfaction 
with the outcomes of the dispute resolution process in the Primary Committees. It may only be 
contended that the rate of appeal of the decisions of the Primary Committees is a strong 
indicator of the users’ satisfaction with the decisions. The General Secretariat used the same 
methodology and design for the surveys conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016. This allowed for 
a meaningful comparison of the findings of the three surveys.  
5.3.1 User Satisfaction 
In order to improve the level of services provided by the IDCs, each year the Internal Audit 
Unit of the General Secretariat conducts a survey that measures the quality of services from 
case registration to the issuance of a ruling.27 The data was collected using emails, and 
questionnaires that were distributed to parties after the Committees’ rulings. Telephone 
interviews were also used. As shown in Table III above, in 2014, there were 636 respondents; 
340 or 53 per cent of the respondents were claimants and 296 or 47 per cent of the respondents 
were defendants. In 2015, there were 946 responders; 563 or 56.7 per cent of the respondents 
were claimants and 410 or 43.3 per cent of the respondents were defendants. In 2016, there 
were 1037 respondents; 784 or 60.3 per cent of the respondents were claimants and 523 or 39.7 
percent of the respondents were defendants. It follows that the General Secretariat was able to 
survey 2619 parties to insurance coverage disputes. This is a good-sized sample for the 
purposes of identifying significant differences and associations that are present in the target 
population. Although the annual reports do not discuss the methodology used to assess the 
representativeness of this sample,28 it may be contended that the analysis of information 
obtained from the sample may allow statistical inference to be made about the larger group of 
                                                          
27 2016 Annual Report, 8. 
28 For ways of assessing sample representativeness, see A Omair, ‘Sample Size Estimation and Sampling 
Techniques for Selecting a Representative Sample’ (2014) 2(4) Journal of Health Specialities 142, 142-147; S 
Bertino, ‘A Measure of Representativeness of a Sample for Inferential Purposes’ (2006) 74(2) International 
Statistical Review 149, 149-159; CA Ramsey and AD Hewitt, ‘A Methodology for Assessing Sample 
Representativeness’ (2005) 6 Environmental Forensics 71, 72-73. 
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all parties who have submitted claims to IDCs. This is because consecutive sampling was used 
by the General Secretariat, whereby all potential respondents available were selected, and 
information was collected without regard to the respondents’ knowledge and quality of their 
responses.29  
The General Secretariat used an eight-dimensional service quality instrument together with a 
structural equation modelling to determine the effects of the service on the satisfaction of the 
parties who submit claims to the IDCs. For each question, there were five options ranging from 
‘excellent’ to ‘poor’. Excellent means satisfaction with the relevant service, process or 
outcome, and poor means dissatisfaction. Tables IV and V below summarise the survey 
findings in 2014, 2015 and 2016 in regard to the eight dimensions. It focuses only on the 
‘excellent’ and ‘poor’ responses in order to determine the number of respondents who indicated 
that they were satisfied. Those who indicated ‘very good’, ‘good’ and ‘fair’ may have been 
satisfied, but they are not included in this analysis because the focus is only those who were 
entirely satisfied with the service, process or outcome. 
 
Table IV: Percentage of Respondents Who Said They Had an Excellent Experience 
Dimension 2014 2015 2016 
Registration of the 
compliant 
73% 77.9% 81% 
Staff conduct 83% 85.5% 86% 
Responses to case-
related inquiries 
67% 71.1% 74% 
Procedures for 
communicating hearing 
dates 
70% 74.3% 75.5% 
How hearings were 
conducted 
65% 67.7% 70% 
Time taken to resolve 
the case 
48% 49.8% 53% 
                                                          
29 For an analysis of consecutive sampling, see E Dumholdt, Rehabilitation Research: Principles and Application 
(Elsevier Saunders 2005) 112-113. 
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Compliance with 
timeframe for 
delivering ruling 
59% 63.8% 68% 
E-services provided by 
the Secretariat 
56% 62.2% 66.5% 
Source: General Secretariat 
Table V: Percentage of Respondents Who Said They Had a Poor Experience 
Dimension 2014 2015 2016 
Registration of the 
compliant 
3% 2.5% 2% 
Staff conduct 1% 0.08% 0.7% 
Responses to case-
related inquiries 
3% 3% 2.5% 
Procedures for 
communicating hearing 
dates 
2% 1.7% 1.5% 
How hearings were 
conducted 
7% 5.8% 5% 
Time taken to resolve 
the case 
17% 14.8% 13% 
Compliance with 
timeframe for 
delivering ruling 
8% 6.3% 5.5% 
E-services provided by 
the Secretariat 
17% 15% 12% 
Source: General Secretariat 
Tables IV and V show the percentage of parties who said they had an excellent experience and 
the percentage of parties who said they had a poor experience. Thus, parties who submitted 
claims to IDCs between 2014 and 2016 generally had an excellent experience regarding the 
registration of the claims, the conduct of the Committee personnel (including the clerks and 
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adjudicators), the responses to parties’ inquiries, the conduct of the hearing, compliance with 
the scheduling requirements, and the quality of electronic services provided by the General 
Secretariat. As shown in Table III, the majority of the respondents were claimants. Also, the 
majority of claimants were policyholders who submitted small claims. As such, it may be 
contended that the majority of policyholders with small claims who have challenged adverse 
determinations by insurance companies in IDCs have been satisfied with their experience. 
 
The only concern shared by most of the respondents is the time taken by the Committees to 
resolve the disputes. Table IV shows that in 2014 and 2015, less than half of the respondents 
were happy with the duration of the proceedings. Thus, the CICCL and Working Rules did not 
speed up the process of dispute resolution, making way for rapid verdicts. It is noted in Chapter 
3 that when the timeline for a case is lengthy, the accumulation of fees along the way may be 
significant. It was also noted that this is often exacerbated by the procedural formalities 
required when pursuing a case in the ordinary courts. However, administrative tribunals are 
more flexible and informal. Also, the fact that a party may pursue a claim before the Primary 
Committee without counsel implies that parties are more likely to save time and money by 
submitting disputes to the IDC. The data collected by the General Secretariat supports this 
argument. The lengthy timeline for cases dealt by the IDCs is not exacerbated by procedural 
formalities. Hence, a majority of the respondents were happy with the way the hearings were 
conducted, as well as with the Committees’ compliance with the timeframe for rendering 
verdicts. 
5.4 Why Are the Users Satisfied with the IDC? 
Table II shows that in 2016 there were 330 appeal requests made to the SAMA Appellate 
Committee. Hence, out of 1672 disputes resolved by the Primary Committees, only 330 appeal 
requests were made. It may therefore be contended that the IDC is efficient in practice. This is 
because it is productive and easily operable30 and affords good service to the highest number 
of disputants.31 It also supports the finding on the satisfaction of the users shown in Table III, 
viz., 70 per cent of the parties surveyed stated that the conduct of the hearings in the Primary 
Committees was excellent. The rate of appeals to the SAMA Appellate Court is therefore only 
19 per cent of the total number of disputes resolved by the Primary Committees. The researcher 
                                                          
30 See CE Clark, ‘Making Courts Efficient’ (1961) 8 UCLA Law Review 489, 489 (describes the efficiency of a 
court system in terms of productiveness and operability). 
31 See H Harley, ‘An Efficient County Court System’ (1917) 73 Justice Through Simplified Legal Procedure 189, 
189 (describes efficiency as the provision of service to the highest number of litigants). 
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was unable to find any statistics on the rate of appeals from Shariah courts (or appeals received 
by the Board of Grievances), as well as data about the mass of cases from trial stage through 
the appellate stage. Nevertheless, the rate of appeal of 19 per cent in tried cases is relatively 
low when compared to other jurisdictions.32 
Despite the high level of user satisfaction, the General Secretariat’s surveys identified areas of 
service delivery and performance that require improvement. These include better management 
of expectations of the duration of the proceedings and the ascertainment of differential response 
rates among claimants and defendants and individuals and undertakings in relation to their 
route into the IDC. The absence of such data may be the reason why no explanation is provided 
for the reduction in satisfaction levels between 2014 and 2015, and slight increase in 2016. 
In Chapter 3, the Working Rules governing the IDC were analysed and it was noted that there 
is no conclusive evidence that the IDC is a better dispute resolution option than litigation when 
the laws governing the IDC are analysed. This is because it is uncertain whether the persons 
serving on the Primary Committee possess the necessary independence to perform essentially 
judicial functions. In some instances, the members may have previously served as 
administrators within SAMA. Thus, despite the Primary Committee’s independence, its 
members may be more susceptible to political interference and might not maintain the same 
respect for an independent outlook as ordinary judges. 
It was also noted that IDCs are not subject to the same set of uniform procedures as the ordinary 
courts, which could potentially lead to arbitrary and inconsistent decisions from the Primary 
Committees and Appeal Committee. The Working Rules and the Law of Procedure provide 
little guidance to the Committees on the content that is required for their rulings. It follows that 
the Primary Committees are not compelled to rely on precedent or provide reasons or a 
rationale for their decisions.33 This makes it difficult for a party to challenge the decision of 
the Primary Committee on appeal, insofar as such an appeal is permissible. 
 
                                                          
32 Eisenberg for example revealed that between 1988 and 2000, the appeal rate in tried cases in district courts in 
the United States was 39.6 per cent, and 40.96 per cent in tried cases with definitive judgements. See T Eisenberg, 
‘Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Non-tried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate 
Outcomes’ (2004) 1(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 659, 686-687. 
33 Article 9 of the Working Rules, the Committee is instructed to decide cases ‘in accordance with the laws and 
regulations regulating the nature of the dispute, the applicable rules and rulings reached at by the judiciary and 
the comparative jurisprudence for settling insurance disputes and violations.’ 
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Despite these shortcomings, the data collected by the General Secretariat reveal that the total 
number of cases received by the three Primary Committees increased by more than 45 per cent 
between 2014 and 2016. Also, a vast majority of the persons surveyed by the General 
Secretariat are happy with the experience as shown in Tables IV and V above. Most of the 
respondents indicated that they had an excellent experience regarding the registration of their 
claims, the conduct of the Committee personnel (including the clerks and adjudicators), the 
responses to their inquiries, the conduct of the hearing, compliance with the scheduling 
requirements, and the quality of electronic services provided by the General Secretariat. It 
follows that the shortcomings of the IDC identified by the doctrinal analysis conducted in 
Chapters 3 and 4 do not adversely affect this administrative tribunal in practice. This 
demonstrates the importance of a practical inquiry that reconciles the legal theory and legal 
praxis. 
 
Also, given that the General Secretariat did not collect qualitative data on the specific views of 
the respondents, it is difficult to explain in detail why a majority of the respondents indicated 
that their experience was excellent. It is uncertain whether they for example satisfied with the 
experience because they were able to save the money which they would have spent on court 
costs, expert and counsel fees or because they believed the procedure or outcome was fair. As 
shown above, the eight-dimensional service quality instrument used by the General Secretariat 
demonstrates that the IDC has been efficient. But, the drive for efficiency may have been 
detrimental to the fairness and effectiveness of the system.34 The next section therefore 
examines the advantages to the users in order to determine the benefits that accrue in the IDC. 
The criteria used in Chapter 4 to assess arbitration are also used in this section. These include 
privacy, flexibility, duration and cost, neutrality, finality and enforceability and predictability.  
5.4.1 Determining the Effectiveness of the IDC  
5.4.1.1 Cost and Duration  
 
The ability to achieve an expedited resolution is one of the main attractions of a dispute 
resolution option in insurance law. This is because in most cases, policyholders have suffered 
loss and desperately need money to replace the damaged property or item. This is especially 
the case where the property or item is a necessity. However, the IDC rules do not provide any 
                                                          
34 See J Easton, ‘Where to Draw the Line? Is Efficiency Encroaching on a Fair Justice System?’ (2018) 29(2) The 
Political Quarterly 246, 246-253 (arguing that the drive for efficiency jeopardises the fundamental principles of 
justice and undermine the role of an independent judiciary in making decisions that are fair. 
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guidance on a timeframe within which a case must be concluded, leaving the parties with 
significant uncertainty as to how long their case will continue. The statistics published by the 
General Secretariat (Table IV) reveal that in 2014 and 2015, less than 50% of the users were 
very satisfied with the time taken to resolve their cases. In 2016, only 53% were satisfied. This 
is the lowest percentage of all eight categories. Also, the percentages of those who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the time take to resolve their cases were highest in Table V.  
It must however be noted that although the IDC does not resolve disputes as quickly as 
arbitration, it is much faster when compared to litigation. A study on the duration of litigation 
involving physicians in the KSA revealed that seventy per cent of cases lasted for two years or 
more.35 Another study revealed that eighty per cent of litigations in the KSA lasted for more 
than two years.36 On the other hand, the General Secretariat noted that a case brought for 
resolution before the IDCs can take up to six months at the initial stage and another six months 
or longer if appealed.37 Thus, the users of the IDC are more likely to compare the Committees 
to the Shariah courts, which explains why 53% of the users in 2016 stated that they were 
satisfied with the time taken to resolve their cases. Also, Table IV shows that between 2014 
and 2016, more than 59% of the users were satisfied with the Committees’ compliance with 
the timeframe for delivering rulings. 
5.4.1.2 Shariah Compliance 
 
The Primary Committees do not refuse to hear claims because they are based on conventional 
insurance contracts which are generally not Shariah-compliant. Thus, the Committees 
recognise and enforce conventional insurance contracts that potentially violate the Shariah, 
rather than only cooperative insurance (takaful) contracts. However, the Committees cannot 
overlook the Shariah given that the Constitution of the KSA is the Holy Quran. 
5.4.1.3 Impartiality 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the impartiality of the adjudicator ensures that the final decision is not 
tainted by bias. There are no neutrality or impartiality provisions in the CICCL and Working 
Rules requiring the parties to the select the members of the Committee to adjudicate their 
                                                          
35 SA Alkindy, ‘Expatriate Doctors, Medical Litigations and Overall Patient Care: Taif Study’ (2016) 4 Saudi 
Surgery Journal 104, 104-107. 
36 E Habib, ‘Obstetricians’ Perception of Medico-Legal Problems in Al Madinah Al Munawarah Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia’ (2010) 5 Journal of Taibah University Medical Sciences 66, 66-74. 
37 General Secretariat, The 11th Annual Report for 2015 (n 16) 22.  
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dispute. Nonetheless, Table IV shows that between 2014 and 2016, more than 83% of the users 
of the IDC stated that they were very satisfied with the conduct of the IDC staff. The latter 
includes members of the Committees who act as adjudicators. Thus, the fact that the users do 
not select adjudicators makes the IDC attractive given that neutrality provisions may be abused 
by insurance companies where they include the names of friendly mediators in the insurance 
contract of adhesion.  
Adjudication by the IDC is public in nature and the decisions of the Committees are published 
on the General Secretariat’s website. As such, the IDC does not provide a private and 
confidential forum for settling disputes. The eight-dimensional service quality instrument used 
by the General Secretariat does not include privacy but includes ‘how hearings were 
conducted’. Hence, users who prefer to keep their matters private are unlikely to say they are 
happy with the way the hearing was conducted. However, insurers are more likely to cherish 
privacy and confidentiality than consumers given that insurers generally do not want 
proceedings or decisions to establish a negative precedent upon which future policyholders 
may rely. Also, where the proceedings are confidential, insurers may adopt inconsistent 
positions knowing that their statements and arguments will not be revealed to other 
policyholders. It follows that it may be argued that it is more advantageous to consumers that 
there are no privacy provisions in the CICCL and the Working Rules that protect the 
confidentiality of the processes. This may explain why Table IV shows that the percentage of 
users (mostly consumers) who are happy with the way the hearings were conducted by the 
Committees has always been above 65%. Also, the percentage of users who were not happy 
with the way the hearings were conducted has always been less than 7%.  
5.4.1.4 Flexibility 
 
The IDC does not offer the same flexibility and party autonomy as arbitration. In the IDC, 
parties cannot choose the substantive law or rules that will serve as the procedural 
framework for the proceedings. They are bound to the substantive and procedural rules 
enshrined in the CICCL and Working Rules. Also, the parties cannot determine who will 
hear the dispute as well as the language that will be used by the Committee. However, the 
General Secretariat’s eight-dimensional service quality instrument shown above revealed that 
more than 67% of the users were very satisfied with responses to case-related inquiries between 
2014 and 2016; more than 70% of the users were very satisfied with the procedures for 
communicating dates; and more than 56% of the users were very satisfied with the services 
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provided by the General Secretariat. As such, despite the fact that the IDC does not offer the 
same flexibility and party autonomy as arbitration, the users of the IDC believe this model 
takes into account the circumstances, times and place.  
It must be noted that prior to the enactment of the CICCL, insurance-related disputes were 
heard by the Board of Grievances. Hence, the users of the IDC are more likely to compare the 
IDC to the Board and Shariah courts. Thus, the flexibility of the Committees in interpreting 
and enforcing contracts may be contrasted with the Shariah courts and Board of Grievances 
which (prior to the creation of the IDC) consistently showed no motivation to behave in a way 
that was benevolent to policyholders, where the insurance contract or an element of the contract 
violated the Shariah. As mentioned above, the Board simply refused to enforce the contract 
regardless of the fact that this was more detrimental to the policyholder who had paid premiums 
over a certain period and desperately needed compensation after suffering loss or damage. It 
may therefore be contended that the users of the IDC believe that this model is not too flexible 
because it offers security and predictability, and it is also not too rigid because it can adapt to 
changing circumstances and needs. 
5.4.1.5 Predictability 
 
The process is the same among the three Primary Committees. Although the General 
Secretariat did not seek to determine specifically whether the institutional characteristics of the 
IDC influence predictability, consistency, and stability, it must be noted that parties that are 
familiar with adjudication in the Riyadh Primary Committee will be generally prepared to 
submit a claim in Jeddah and Dammam. This lends predictability to decisional law given that 
parties may rely on the prior decisions of any of the three Primary Committees. This may also 
explain why more than 65% of the users stated that they were satisfied with the responses to 
their inquiries, the communication by the IDC and the way the hearings were conducted. Parties 
are therefore able to manage their affairs effectively. 
In light of the above section showing that the IDC confers specific advantages to users, the 
next section seeks to determine whether the high level of satisfaction may also be explained by 
the fairness of the decisions of the Primary Committee and SAMA Appeal Committee. 
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5.4.2.1 The Relationship between Users’ Satisfaction and the Fairness of 
Outcomes in Primary Committees 
In Case No. 360714,38 following an accident, the claimant sought compensation from the 
policyholder’s insurance company under an automobile third-party liability insurance policy. 
The insurance company made an adverse determination on the grounds that the policy was void 
for fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the policyholder. The Jeddah Primary Committee 
ruled in favour of the claimant, holding that the insurance company failed to adduce evidence 
showing that facts disclosed by the policyholder were incorrect or the policyholder had forged 
the policy. The Committee then held that since it had been shown that the policyholder was at 
fault in the accident, the insurance company had to pay for the physical damage to the third 
party’s or claimant’s vehicle. Also, the Committee held that the insurance company could not 
raise a defence of improper disclosure by the policyholder where the claimant is a third party. 
The insurance company could only raise a partial defence, arguing that the claimant was 
partially at fault. Thus, the total amount of compensation received by the claimant was reduced 
according to his degree of fault. 
The Committee’s decision reveals that third-party insurance is recognised in the KSA as a form 
of liability insurance purchased by the policyholder for protection against the claims of 
damages and loss made by a third party. Thus, although conventional insurance is prohibited 
under Islamic law, the IDC seems to recognise and enforce agreements whereby a party 
protects itself against the risk of bearing damages suffered by another. Nevertheless, the 
elements of interest and gambling are present in third-party insurance in the same way as they 
are present in first-party conventional insurance contracts. The Jeddah Primary Committee 
does not justify its recognition and enforcement of the contract. It would have been appropriate 
to state whether third-party insurance is for example allowed as an exception under principles 
such as Dharurah (necessity) and Hajah (need). It is also uncertain how the Committee 
determined that only a partial defence is allowed. It did not cite any Islamic principle or 
precedent to justify its decision. 
Nonetheless, it may be contended that the Primary Committee established that it is unfair for 
third parties to be harmed by the sale of third-party liability insurance policies that contain 
illusory coverage. The latter does not eliminate the insurance company’s obligation to pay 
                                                          
38 Case No. 360714, Jeddah Primary Committee, Decision No. 343/C/1436 AH. 
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compensation for third-party claims.39 Although the Committee did not use the term ‘public 
policy’, it may also be assumed that it held that the insurance company was liable under the 
insurance policy once it was established that the policy was valid because a contrary decision 
would violate Saudi public policy. Such public policy is embodied in the Shariah,40 which all 
adjudicators in the KSA are required to apply. In other words, injustice is avoided by the 
enforcement of the insurance company’s promise. 
In another case with similar facts, Case No. 370207,41 the Dammam Primary Committee held 
that the insurance company was liable to pay compensation to the third party. The Committee 
also failed to justify its decision to recognise and enforce the contract despite the elements of 
uncertainty and gambling. It also held that the insurance company should pay additional 
compensation for the delay caused by its adverse determination. This is because Article 44 of 
the Implementing Rules provides that the period of indemnity shall not exceed fifteen days 
from the date of the submission of the claim, unless the insurance company notifies the 
comptroller. The additional compensation for the unreasonable delay caused by the insurance 
company may then act as a deterrence and compel insurance companies to pay compensation 
in a timely manner. This is very important for policyholders or third parties who are in urgent 
need of money after suffering loss or damage covered by the policy. Nonetheless, the decision 
renders little or no assistance to the jurisprudence given that the Committee did not way or 
balance the relevant legal considerations. The members of the Committee largely appealed to 
their own personal values or sense of justice. Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 3, the CICCL 
and Working Rules seem to favour legalistic justification given that they allow Committees to 
cite and apply precedent and even consider principles developed in foreign jurisdictions. 
The personal values of the Committee members favour the protection of policyholders where 
there is uncertainty. Such a pro-policyholder stance may help to explain why the IDC users 
who are claimants are very satisfied with their experience. They believe in the fairness of the 
                                                          
39 In the same vein, in Case No. 261154, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1429-44, the Primary 
Committee held that after compensating the policyholder, the insurance company may subrogate the policyholder 
and assume his rights to the claim from a third party at fault. See also Case No. 300734, Riyadh Primary 
Committee, Decision No. Case No. 261154. 
40 Public policy in this context may be defined as the set of neutral rules and values that override individual 
interests and aim to promote or realise public interest (al-maslaha al-dmm). See the Egyptian Court of Cassation 
Decision Nos. 16 and 26, Year 48, 17 January 1979. See also M Berger, ‘Public Policy and Islamic Law: The 
Modern Dhimmi in Contemporary Egyptian Family Law’ (2001) 8(1) Islamic Law and Society 88, 89, 102-105; 
N Murtaza and U Financial Crimes in Perspective of Public Policy and Islamic Law: Case of Pakistan’ in DS 
Mutum DS et al (eds), Advances in Islamic Finance, Marketing and Management (Emerald 2016) 159-184. JN 
Neels, ‘The Positive Role of Public Policy in Private International Law and the Recognition of Foreign Muslim 
Marriages’ (2012) 28(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 219, 219-230. 
41 Case No. 370207, Dammam Committee, Decision No. 83/D/1437 AH. 
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outcomes. However, it does not explain why most insurance companies (and defendants) 
surveyed by the General Secretariat were also satisfied with their experience. This may be 
because the Primary Committees have also endorsed insurance companies’ interpretation of 
policies where they were deemed reasonable. In Case No. 360310,42 the Riyadh Primary 
Committee endorsed the insurance company’s interpretation of the terms of the policy to the 
effect that the claimants were not beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and could not claim 
on the policy. The insurance company argued that only the person whose life was covered had 
standing to submit a claim to enforce the policy. The Committee agreed, thereby implying that 
the claimant’s expectation of coverage was not reasonable.  
Also, in Case No. 330440,43 the policyholder submitted a complaint to the Primary Committee 
in August 2011 because the policyholder’s daughter, who was covered under the policy, 
suffered injury to her foot as a result of falling on sharp glass and receiving treatment in 
Cambridge in the United Kingdom. The insurance company refused to pay the monetary 
compensation to the policyholder for the costs of his daughter’s medical treatment because the 
claim was made outside the coverage period of the policy. The insurance contract at issue was 
a form a travel insurance that corresponded to the daughter’s two international travel 
documents that covered the periods of June 15 through July 15, 2011, and July 21 through 
August 20, 2011. It turned out that the daughter was admitted for treatment on July 20, 2011, 
not in August as the policyholder had alleged. The court found that this was a day prior to the 
effective date of the second travel insurance document and the insurance company was not 
required to pay the policyholder’s claim as the occurrence was outside of the fixed term agreed 
to by the parties. 
 
The above cases demonstrate that the Committees focus on what the members consider fair in 
the circumstances. It is uncertain whether this is based on prevailing preferences or moral 
principles. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether it is fair to use such preferences and principles 
as the basis for settling disputes where they have not acquired authority by reason of their 
adoption by legislators or courts. It follows that it is uncertain whether subsequent Committees 
are duty-bound to apply the same preferences and principles.  
 
                                                          
42 Case No. 360310, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 276/T/1436 AH. 
43 Case No. 330440, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1433-210. 
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Nonetheless, in some cases, logical deductions lead to sound and fair outcomes. In Case No. 
360134 for example,44 the Riyadh Primary Committee held that a claimant must satisfy a 
threshold requirement of sufficient standing before the claimant may be permitted to proceed 
with a claim for review by the Committee. Thus, the claimant must demonstrate to the 
Committee sufficient connection to the action to support the claimant’s participation in the 
dispute resolution process. Thus, only the policyholder may sue to enforce rights in the policy 
or claim compensation under the policy.45 But, as noted above, it is uncertain whether, as a 
general rule, the Committee recognises the rights of third parties for whose benefit the contract 
was made.  
 
It may be argued that in practice the Committees provide protection to policyholders by 
conceiving of the problems such as illusory coverage or unconscionable advantages in policy 
provisions as interpretive. Also, their interpretation of the terms of policies is in accordance 
with the stance adopted in other jurisdictions to interpret the terms of insurance contracts.46 For 
example, the fact that the non-drafting party’s interpretation is disregarded when it is 
unreasonable has been described as the ‘basic bedrock insurance rule of contra proferentem.’47 
Other decisions of the IDCs support the argument that the Committees generally decide cases 
not by established rules of law but by moral preferences and policy considerations. Hence, the 
decisions are largely justified on their merits rather than legal prescriptions. 
In Case No. 361263, the Dammam Primary Committee interpreted the terms of the insurance 
policy in light of the parties’ reasonable expectations.48 Maintaining that the principles of 
compensation and indemnification are among the most important principles in insurance law, 
the Committee held that a clause providing for the payment of a predetermined amount by the 
insurance company may only be enforced where the amount exceeds the repair value of the 
damaged vehicle. This is because the parties both read and assented to the terms of the policy 
and therefore had a reasonable expectation that the predetermined amount would be paid to the 
policyholder in the event of damage or loss. Expectation was deemed reasonable in light of the 
moral preferences of the members of the Committee. 
                                                          
44 Case No. 360134, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 323/R/1436 AH. 
45 See also Case No. 320247, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 21/T/1437 AH. 
46 S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (WHE Jaeger edn, 3rd edn, Baker, Voorhis and Co 1959) 621. 
47 EM Holmes, Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis 1996) 99. 
48 Case No. 361263, Dammam Primary Committee, Decision No. 259/D/1436 AH. 
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Also, in Case No. 290773,49 the claimant sought to recover damages from an insurance 
company under a contractor’s all risks insurance policy.50 However, the insurance company 
argued that the damages sought by the claimant, despite being covered by the insurance policy, 
fell within the deductible that was the responsibility of the claimant. The Committee examined 
the language of the contract and noted that the claimant had knowingly agreed to the deductible 
and could not reasonably expect that the deductible would not be his responsibility before 
recovering damages from the insurance company.51 Although it is uncertain whether 
deductibles are allowed under Islamic law, the Committee neither appealed to any Sharia 
principle or provision of the CICCL. Once again, it determined what was, in the opinion of the 
members, logical and fair in the circumstances. 
These decisions may be said to be in line with Llewellyn’s contention that it is fair to enforce 
standardised terms in a contract where they are not manifestly unfair and do not undercut the 
meaning or significance of the bargained-for terms.52 It may then be argued that although there 
is no established interpretive principle for standardised insurance policies in the KSA, the users 
of the IDC are satisfied with their experience because the Primary Committees prefer 
interpretations that are fair and reasonable to interpretations that lead to unreasonable or unfair 
outcomes. 
Also important is that Primary Committees do not refuse to hear claims because they are based 
on conventional insurance contracts which are generally not Shariah-compliant.53 They deal 
with this problem in different ways. The Primary Committee has for example held that an 
agreement between the insurance company and the policyholder for the payment of a specified 
amount of money to the latter’s relatives in the event of his death may be enforced as wergild. 
This is an ancient Middle Eastern and Germanic custom of the restorative payment of a penalty 
to the relatives of a person who had been killed.54 In Case No. 370783,55 the Dammam Primary 
Committee held that where the policy covers the vehicle that caused the accident resulting in 
the death of the claimant’s relative, the defendant is obligated to pay compensation to the 
claimant if it is established that the defendant was solely responsible for the accident. This is 
in accordance with Article No. 8 of the Executive Regulation of Traffic Law, as well as the 
                                                          
49 Case No. 290773, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1432-4. 
50 Decision of the Primary Committee (Riyadh) 1432-4. 
51 See also Case No. 301101, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1429-67. 
52 K Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little Brown & Co 1960) 370-371. 
53 See Chapter 2. 
54 See RC Winters et al, An Introduction to Crime and Crime Causation (CRC Press 2014) 24. 
55 Case No. 370783, Dammam Committee, Decision No. 192/D/1437 AH. 
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Unified Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy. The insurance company may then assist 
the defendant in making the payment. Thus, the claimant seeks compensation from the 
defendant and does not rely on the insurance contract to obtain compensation from the 
insurance company. As shown above, the Committees have also focused on the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to determine whether the claimant is entitled to compensation. 
Nonetheless, unlike in Case No. 370783, the Primary Committee has hardly appealed to the 
prescriptions of the relevant statutes or IDC precedent. The members rely on their own personal 
sense of justice. This is arbitrary and renders no assistance to the jurisprudence. 
The next section seeks to determine whether the SAMA Appeal Committee also relies on moral 
preferences and personal values or legal considerations to protect policyholders against 
arbitrary adverse coverage determinations by insurance companies. 
5.4.2.2 The Relationship between Users’ Satisfaction and the Fairness of 
Outcomes in the SAMA Appeal Committee 
Articles 20 and 22 of the CICCL state that appeals from the Primary Committees are to be 
submitted to the Board of Grievances. The authority of the Board of Grievances to hear appeals 
was further granted in the Law of the Board of Grievances which provided that administrative 
courts within the Board were competent to decide on ‘cases of repeal of final administrative 
decisions submitted by all concerned, whenever a challenge is about lack of capacity, there is 
a deficit in form or in reasoning, violation of laws and regulations, misapplication or 
misinterpretation of them, or misuse of power, including disciplinary decisions, and all 
decisions issued by quasi-judicial bodies.’56 Given that the Primary Committee is a quasi-
judicial body, its decisions fall within the jurisdiction grants of both the CICCL and the Board 
of Grievances Law. 
 
However, subsequent legislation provided for the creation of an Appeal Committee within 
SAMA to hear grievances against the decisions of the IDC’s Primary Committees. The Appeal 
Committee was officially formed and commenced operations in 2012.57  The Committee was 
later reformed in 2013 at the direction of the Council of Ministers for a period of three years.58 
                                                          
56 Law of the Board of Grievances issued under Royal Decree No 78/M dated 19/9/1428H, art 13(B). 
57 Royal Order No 35258 dated 22/9/1434H. 
58 Council of Ministers’ Resolution No 457 dated 27/11/1435H. 
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The Appeal Committee does have the authority to limit its examination of decisions to those 
under 50,000 riyals; but, such a limitation is not mandatory.59  
 
An assessment of the decisions of the Appeal Committee reveals that they have equally been 
based on the members’ evaluation of the conscionability of the contractual terms and the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. Little regard is given to legalistic justification. In Appeal 
No. 2370029,60 the Appeal Committee affirmed the Primary Committee’s decision that a clause 
in an insurance contract that limits the amount of exposure that an insurance company faces in 
the event a claim is made violates the Civil Liability Rules issued by SAMA. Hence, the Appeal 
Committee views limitation of liability clauses as exculpatory clauses that are unenforceable 
where they violate SAMA’s policy. Both SAMA and the SAMA Appeal Committee have 
therefore adopted the view that an obligation owed by a party under a contract outweighs the 
regard for freedom of contract. This is in accordance with the tradition of strict judicial scrutiny 
of contractual clauses that specify an agreed amount of damages or compensation upon breach 
or ripeness of a claim.61 Nonetheless, this tradition has not been expressly adopted by the Saudi 
legislator or court. The Appeal Committee therefore failed to justify its decision on the grounds 
of precedent or any specific provisions of the CICCL. 
 
It may however be assumed that Appeal Committees will refuse to enforce exculpatory clauses 
that deny policyholders the right to seek compensation from the insurance companies if the 
Committees find that the clauses are contrary to SAMA’s policy. Nonetheless, it remains 
uncertain whether the Committees apply a specific rule governing the enforcement of limitation 
of liability clauses. Appeal No. 2370029 was an opportunity for the Appeal Committee to craft 
a clear rule that is tailored to the Saudi market and can be applied consistently. This is because 
caution may be exercised to ensure that risk is not allocated to insurance companies to such an 
extent as to jeopardise the viability of the insurance market due to exposures that are largely 
disproportionate to the income derived by the companies. They ought to be able to limit their 
liability in specific instances. 
                                                          
59 Working Rules, Article 8. 
60 Appeal No. 2370029, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 96/A/1437 AH. 
61 For analyses of the approach in the United States, see JN Cohen, ‘Sound the Alarm: Limitations of Liability in 
Alarm Service Contracts’ (2016) 85(2) Fordham Law Review 813, 819; CJ Geotz and RE Scott, ‘Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 554, 554. 
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In Appeal No. 2370054,62 the Appeal Committee overruled the Primary Committee in part by 
holding that an insurance company cannot be required to pay for delay where it only became 
aware of the claim on the date of the first hearing at the Primary Committee. The Appeal 
Committee ruled that the charge payable by the insurance company for withholding 
compensation past the statutory timeframe should be calculated from the date of the first 
hearing at the Primary Committee. This is because it would be unconscionable to impose an 
obligation on the insurance company to indemnify policyholders who have suffered loss or 
damage but have not submitted a claim to the insurance company. Moreover, the requirement 
to submit a claim before being indemnified does not deprive the policyholder of coverage that 
is reasonably expected,63 except where compensation is then withheld after the claim has been 
made. 
The Appeal Committee also placed emphasis on the reasonable expectation of the parties in 
Appeal No. 237002664 where it held that as a factual matter, the policyholder reasonably 
expects to be indemnified when a claim is submitted in a timely manner. Thus, the submission 
of a claim to the insurance company in a timely manner creates a reasonable expectation of 
indemnification. Although the Appeal Committee did not specifically refer to the ambiguity 
principle and contra proferentem, it may be contended that it applied these principles to 
interpret the ambiguous language in the insurance policy to the effect that the insurance 
company was under an obligation to indemnify the policyholder who had submitted a valid 
claim in a timely manner. The use of these principles as interpretive devices is well established 
in other jurisdictions as noted in Chapter 2. Thus, the fairness of the outcomes of proceedings 
in the Appeal Committee was largely enhanced by their indirect use. Nonetheless, it is 
uncertain whether the Appeal Committee will consistently focus on the reasonable expectations 
of the parties and the conscionability of the terms of the contract. Also, if this is answered in 
the affirmative, it is uncertain whether the Appeal Committee, as well as the Primary 
Committees, will consistently defer to certain standards to determine what constitutes 
reasonableness and conscionability. 
                                                          
62 Appeal No. 2370054, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 139/A/1437 AH. 
63 See also Appeal No. 3370036, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 191/A/1437 AH and Appeal No. 1330265, 
Appeal Committee, Decision No. 629/A/1436 AH where the Appeal Committee upheld the Primary Committee’s 
decision of enforcing the terms of the policy on the basis of what the parties reasonably expected on the basis of 
their interpretation of the terms. 
64 Appeal No. 2370026, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 79/A/1437 AH. 
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It must be noted that despite the importance of an outcome-based assessment as shown above, 
it is difficult to determine whether the high level of satisfaction with IDCs may be explained 
by the users’ acceptance of the administrative justice system due to the perceived fairness of 
the procedure rather than their perception of the outcomes. Tyler and Huo examined the 
experience of the general public with the justice system of the United States and found that 
perceptions of the process accounted for 44 per cent of variance in satisfaction while the 
perception of outcomes accounted for only 1 per cent.65 Also, Rottman’s survey of members 
of the public in the state of California identified the belief that courts deliver procedural justice 
as the strongest indicator of the public approval of courts.66 
Although the surveys conducted by the General Secretariat, discussed above, are not reported 
in detail, Tables IV and V show that procedural fairness accounts for more variance than any 
variable. It comprised the following factors: procedures for communicating hearing dates, how 
hearings were conducted, time taken to resolve the case, and compliance with the timeframe 
for delivering the ruling. The respondents were therefore keen on whether the Committees 
followed the rules, respected the rights of parties, and were sufficiently flexible to hear parties’ 
arguments and assess their expectations. Nonetheless, the analysis of the findings of the surveys 
and decisions of the Committees shows that the high level of satisfaction with IDCs may be 
explained by both the users’ perceived fairness of the procedure and their perception of the 
outcomes. Hence, the drive for efficiency has not been detrimental to the fairness and 
effectiveness of the system. The next section seeks to determine how the IDC in practice may 
then be compared to the other options of insurance dispute resolution. 
5.4.3 Comparing the IDC to Litigation and Arbitration 
It may also be argued that the high level of satisfaction with the IDC may be explained by the 
fact that users believe the IDC is better than litigation and arbitration. The flexibility of the 
Committees in interpreting and enforcing contracts may be contrasted with the Shariah courts 
and Board of Grievances which (prior to the creation of the IDC) consistently showed no 
motivation to behave in a way that was benevolent to policyholders, where the insurance 
contract or an element of the contract violated the Shariah. The Board of Grievances for 
example consistently declined to hear disputes involving insurance contracts that violated the 
                                                          
65 TR Tyler and YJ Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russell 
Sage Foundation 2002) 77. 
66 DB Rottman, ‘Trust and Confidence in the California Courts: A Survey of the Public and Attorneys, Part I: 
Findings and Recommendations’ (2005) National Center for State Courts 1, 24 < 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf> accessed 14 November 2019. 
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Shariah regardless of whether the policyholder desperately needed compensation and had 
relied on the policy or reasonably expected that he would be indemnified in the event of loss.67 
The Board of Grievances’ intransigence virtually negated all coverage, which in many cases 
was unfair to the policyholder. 
The stance adopted by Shariah courts may be explained by the fact that insurance contracts 
were not recognised and enforced in the KSA until the takaful or cooperative insurance 
schemes were developed. This is discussed in Chapter 2. Given that the takaful is built on the 
principles of the Shariah, courts assumed that it was the only insurance contract that could be 
enforced under the Shariah. Also, the absence of codification made it difficult for Shariah 
courts to assess conventional insurance contracts in light of specific guidelines. It was easier to 
simply refuse to recognise the contracts. 
Prior to the creation of IDCs, foreign parties therefore relied on foreign arbitral awards. 
However, these awards often endorsed insurance contracts that provided for interests (riba) or 
activities considered speculation or hazard (gharar), which are forbidden by the Shariah. In 
Decision No. 11/D/A/15 of 2008 for example, the Board of Grievances refused to recognise 
and enforce an arbitral award because it violated the Shariah. The claimant, a Saudi company, 
had demanded that the charge of interest should be dropped because they had expected that this 
would be unenforceable in the KSA. However, the foreign arbitrator maintained the charge and 
the Board of Grievances refused to enforce the award.  
Also, in Jadawel International (Saudi Arabia) v Emaar Property PJSC (UAE), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) issued an award dismissing Jadawel’s claim of $1.2 
billion in damages from Emaar for breach of contract. Jadawel was also required to pay legal 
costs to Emaar. The Board of Grievances refused to enforce the ICC award, re-examined the 
merits of the dispute and ordered Emaar to pay damages of $250 million to Jadawel.68 This 
case also shows that despite the advantages of arbitration shown in Chapter 4, the difficulty to 
enforce arbitral awards makes this option less attractive. 
                                                          
67 See the following Board of Grievance cases: Case No. 3/1136 Year 1430; Case No. Q/2/7402 Year 1432; Case 
No. Q/2/2886 Year 1427H; Case No. 2887 Year 1433H; Case No. Q/1/488 Year 1405H. 
68 See E Al Tamimi, The Practitioner’s Guide to Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (JurisNet 2009) 
371. However, the Enforcement of Law of 2012 transferred the powers of enforcement from the Board of 
Grievances to an enforcement judge. Article 9 provides for compulsory enforcement upon the presentation of the 
final arbitral award and an executive deed. Nonetheless, the enforcement judge must comply with the principle of 
reciprocity, recognising only awards from countries that would enforce Saudi awards and judgements. Also, the 
appeal of the enforcement judge’s decision suspends enforcement. 
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It must be pointed out that the Board of Grievances has been flexible at other times holding 
that the illegal or void part of a contract is considered severed from the contract, in order for 
the contract to be enforced as if it did not contain the illegal or void part.69 Nonetheless, it is 
still largely uncertain when the Shariah courts would refuse to recognise an insurance contract 
or arbitral award and when they will sever the non-compliant clauses so that the remaining of 
the contract or award survives. This confusion is compounded by the Islamic Fiqh Council 
Decision No. 5 of 12 September 1977 (First Session) that maintained that conventional 
insurance contracts violate the Shariah, and only cooperative insurance (takaful) contracts 
should be enforced in the KSA. This was a major obstacle to the liberalisation and 
modernisation of the Saudi insurance market. Although all thirty-two insurance companies in 
the market are required to operate under the takaful system,70 they also enter into agreements 
to cover losses that may arise from international sale contracts. Multinational insurance 
companies operating in the KSA such as Allianz SF, AXA and MetLife AIG therefore enter 
into insurance agreements or issue policies that cover eventual losses or damages of the subject 
matter of contracts involving non-Saudi businesses. Such agreements or policies may contain 
elements that violate the Shariah. The decision not to recognise or enforce them may be 
detrimental to the Saudi insurance market as well as Saudi policyholders seeking 
indemnification under the agreements. 
Some Islamic scholars have argued that where there are no uncertainties regarding the 
obligations of the parties, as well as no illicit gains made by one party, the contract may be 
enforced under the Shariah.71 It seems, unlike the Shariah courts, the IDCs have adopted the 
latter approach. This is logical because it has been noted that quasi-judicial bodies such as the 
Committee for the Settlement of Insurance Disputes and subsequently the IDCs were 
established to adjudicate disputes involving insurance contracts that Shariah courts considered 
invalid or unenforceable.72 Thus, operating out of the Shariah court system, IDCs have been 
able to focus on the reasonable expectations of parties and the fairness of the procedures and 
                                                          
69 See Decision No. 1851/1415 of 1994; Decision No. 1903/1415 of 1994; and Decision No. 208/1418 of 1997. 
70 See Albilad Capital, ‘Saudi Insurance Sector’ (2018) Sector Reports 1, 4 <http://www.albilad-
capital.com/Research_EnglishReport/InsuranceSectorQ417EN.pdf>, accessed 14 November 2019. 
71 See J Zarabozo, ‘The Question of Insurance Outside of the “Lands of Islam” (2003) AMJA Conference, 
Copenhagen 1, 5 <http://www.jamaalzarabozo.com/audio/insurance.pdf>, accessed 14 November 2019; M 
Ustaoglu, ‘Public Awareness, Understanding and Attitudes Towards Interest-Free Insurance (Takaful) Services 
Evaluation by Education Level: Survey Based on Empirical Analysis for Turkey’ (2015) 50(4) Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 445, 445-456. 
72 See MI Aleisa, A Critical Analysis of the Legal Problems Associated with the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Will the New Saudi Arbitration Law 2012 Resolve the Main Legal Problems?  
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Essex 2016) 32-34. 
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outcomes. Given that ambiguity or uncertainty is forbidden by the Shariah, where a dispute is 
based on an ambiguity in the contract, the Shariah courts would refuse to hear the case because 
the contract is deemed invalid.73 Nonetheless, as shown above, the IDCs would hear the case 
and resolve the ambiguity by taking into account the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
Surprisingly, the IDCs are applying a traditional Islamic philosophy of prioritising the 
legitimate expectations of parties, which the Shariah courts have generally overlooked.74 
5.4.4 Comparing the IDC to Mediation and Negotiation 
It may also be argued that the high level of satisfaction with the IDC may be explained by the 
fact that users believe it is better than mediation and negotiation. The first point of contact for 
the claimant in the IDC process is the General Secretariat. This is because the General 
Secretariat is tasked with providing administrative support to parties to insurance coverage 
disputes. Article 13 of the Working Rules provide that the General Secretariat shall provide 
trained impartial persons with authoritative knowledge to assist the parties in reaching a 
settlement. When mediation fails, the General Secretariat acts as the office of administration 
that provides resources and information for the administration of the IDC. It receives all case 
documents, manages cases, and coordinates the parties and the Committees. 
 
In the annual reports discussed above, the General Secretariat did not provide an estimate of 
the total number of insurance coverage disputes that were resolved between 2014 and 2016. 
Thus, it is difficult to determine the percentage of disputes resolved by the IDCs and other 
forms of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, given that the IDC dealt with most of the disputes 
involving small claims. Also, parties are required to seek mediation at the General Secretariat 
before submitting claims to the relevant Primary Committee. Given that negotiation naturally 
precedes mediation, it may be contended that all the disputes resolved through the IDC first 
went through negotiation and then mediation. 
 
The General Secretariat noted that in 2014, 148 cases were settled via mediation.75 In 2015, 
337 cases were settled via mediation, resulting in an increase by 56.08 percent.76 However, in 
                                                          
73 See M Zarqa, The General Fiqhi Entrance (Dar Alqalam 1998) 742. 
74 See G Sayen, ‘Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia’ (2003) 24(4) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Economic Law 909, 943; NJ Coulson, Commercial Law in Gulf States: The 
Islamic Legal Tradition (Graham and Trotman, 1984) 82-93. 
75 2014 Annual Report, 22. 
76 2015 Annual Report, 23. 
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2016, the number fell to 143.77 The General Secretariat did not explain the rise and fall in the 
numbers between 2014 and 2016. Also, it did not conduct a survey on the parties in mediation 
in order to determine their satisfaction with procedures and/or outcomes of this ADR option. 
Nonetheless, in 2016, 1672 disputes were resolved (see Table I above) and 1815 complaints in 
total were submitted to the General Secretariat. Given that parties are required to seek 
mediation first, out of the 1815 complaints submitted, only 143 cases were resolved via 
mediation. Thus, it may be argued that mediation is not an effective option given that the vast 
majority of cases proceeded to the Primary Committees.  
The findings of the study conducted by the General Secretariat are consistent with the results 
of the study conducted by Alkhenizan and Shafiq on the litigation for medical errors in the 
KSA.78 The latter results are to the effect that only 7 per cent of cases that reached the Shariah 
Medical Panels79 were resolved through mediation. The Shariah Medical Panels are set up in 
a similar way as the Primary Committees of the IDC and parties are required to first submit 
disputes through the mediation process of the Ministry of Health and relevant hospital 
investigation committee or the Saudi Centre for Patient Safety. Nonetheless, the mediation 
process is neither transparent nor formally structured. The statistics provided by Alkhenizan 
and Shafiq show that a large majority of disputants are not satisfied with this ADR option, as 
93 per cent of cases proceed to the Shariah Medical Panels.80 These statistics, as well as those 
reported by the General Secretariat support the conclusion drawn in Chapter 4 that despite the 
fact that the culture of negotiation and mediation was adopted and promoted by the Holy 
Prophet, and subsequently, the successors of the Holy Prophet, Khalifahs, they are not viable 
options of dispute resolution because the parties can reject the settlement agreement recorded 
by the negotiator and mediator. The latter are without authority to impose a settlement. Also, 
there is no clearly defined mechanism by which negotiators and mediators in the KSA may 
maintain neutrality. 
5.5 The Disconnect between Legal Theory and Praxis 
 
This chapter has examined the practical effects of the use of the IDC option, focusing on an 
objective and external observation of this dispute resolution option. As noted above, the 
                                                          
77 2016 Annual Report, 27. 
78 See AH Alkenizan and MR Shafiq, ‘The Process of Litigation in Medical Errors in Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom’ (2018) 39(11) Saudi Medical Journal 1075, 1075-1081. 
79 The panels were to resolve disputes involving health care professionals. See Articles 31 and 32 of the Law of 
Practicing Healthcare Professionals of 2005. 
80 Alkenizan and Shafiq (n 78). 
186 
 
practical inquiry aligns with the attempt by legal realism to eliminate any contradiction between 
legal theory and legal praxis. In light of the findings discussed above, it may be stated that there 
are contradictions between the theoretical analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4 the practical 
application of insurance law. Thus, it is important that these contradictions are eliminated. 
Table VI below summarizes the contradictions. 
Table VI: The disconnect between the theoretical analysis and practical inquiry 
Effectiveness of the IDC Results of the Theoretical 
Analysis 
Results of the Practical 
Inquiry 
Duration and cost 
 
When compared to litigation 
and other forms of ADR, the 
IDC does not provide a 
shorter and more cost-
effective path towards 
making a comprehensive set 
of remedies available to 
policyholders. 
Although less than 50% of 
the users were very satisfied 
with the time taken to resolve 
their cases in 2014 and 2015, 
in 2016, 53% were satisfied.  
 
Also, the Committees can 
take up to six months at the 
initial stage and another six 
months or longer if appealed. 
Litigation on the other hand 
lasts for up to two years or 
more. 
Shariah compliance 
 
 
 
The Primary Committees do 
not refuse to hear claims 
because they are based on 
conventional insurance 
contracts which are generally 
not Shariah-compliant.  
However, the Committees 
cannot overlook the Shariah 
given that the Constitution of 
the KSA is the Holy Quran. 
 
Where there are no 
uncertainties regarding the 
obligations of the parties, as 
well as no illicit gains made 
by one party, the contract 
may be enforced under the 
Shariah 
Impartiality There are no neutrality 
provisions in the CICCL and 
Working Rules. Parties 
cannot select the adjudicators 
and must rely on IDC 
members selected by the 
General Secretariat. 
 
Hearings are public in nature 
and Committee Decisions are 
published. The CICCL and 
Working Rules are silent on 
the issue of confidentiality. 
More than 83% of the users 
of the IDC stated that they 
were very satisfied with the 
conduct of the IDC staff, 
which includes members of 
the Committees who act as 
adjudicators. 
 
More than 65% of users were 
satisfied with the way 
hearings were conducted and 
less than 7% were unhappy. 
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Flexibility The flexibility offered by the 
IDC is poorly defined and 
may obstruct the Committees 
from complying with the 
Shariah. The IDC does not 
offer the same flexibility as 
arbitration and is almost as 
rigid as litigation. 
More than 67% of the users 
were very satisfied with 
responses to case-related 
inquiries; more than 70% of 
the users were very satisfied 
with the procedures for 
communicating dates; and 
more than 56% of the users 
were very satisfied with the 
services provided by the 
General Secretariat. 
Predictability  The IDC rules do not provide 
any guidance on a timeframe 
within which a case must be 
concluded, leaving the 
parties with significant 
uncertainty as to how long 
their case will continue. The 
provision adopting the 
principle by which IDC 
Committees are bound to 
precedents is ill-defined and 
the Working Rules are 
ambiguous regarding the 
basic elements that all 
Committee decisions should 
contain, how decisions 
should be enforced, and the 
grounds for objection and 
appeal. 
 
65% of the users stated that 
they were satisfied with the 
responses to their inquiries, 
the communication by the 
IDC and the way the hearings 
were conducted. Parties that 
are familiar with 
adjudication in one Primary 
Committee will be generally 
prepared to submit a claim in 
other Committees. 
Source: Researcher 
Table VI shows that there are contradictions between legal theory and legal praxis. It may be 
important to eliminate these contradictions in order to properly depict the essential display 
between theory and practice in the complex and interconnected world of insurance dispute 
resolution. As Kevelson81 advised, what is needed is not further doctrinal analysis but a method 
that demonstrates that discovery and inquiry in thought are representations of actual 
phenomenal processes in the world of experience. In other words, the theories and doctrines 
analysed in the previous chapters must be integrated with the working of the IDCs in practice. 
An attempt was made in the previous section to achieve this objective. It was argued that the 
high level of satisfaction of users revealed in the statistics published by the General Secretariat 
                                                          
81 Kevelson (n 12) 359. 
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may be highly correlated with the fairness of the decisions of the Primary Committees and the 
Appeal Committee. 
All the decisions published by the General Secretariat were critically analysed and it was 
revealed that the Committees focus on what the members consider fair in the circumstances. 
Thus, in practice, the Committees provide protection to policyholders by conceiving of the 
problems such as illusory coverage or unconscionable advantages in policy provisions as 
interpretive. As such, most users of the IDC (who are consumers) may be satisfied with their 
experience, not because privacy, flexibility, expedience are offered but because the 
Committees decide cases on the basis of moral preferences and policy considerations that 
favour consumers. However, these decisions may be justified on their merits but not by the 
relevant legal prescriptions. Also, although Primary Committees do not refuse to hear claims 
because they are based on conventional insurance contracts which are generally not Shariah-
compliant, it is uncertain whether they can consistently overlook the Shariah. Such an approach 
is not sustainable in the KSA where the Constitution is the Holy Quran. Nonetheless, it remains 
difficult to state whether the high level of satisfaction with the IDC may be explained by 
perceptions of the process (as shown in Table VI) or the fairness of the outcomes as shown in 
section 5.4.2 or simply by the fact that the IDC is better than the other dispute resolution options 
as shown in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has used the findings of surveys conducted by the General Secretariat and the 
decisions of the IDC Committees to show that the Saudi legislator’s choice of the 
administrative tribunal model for resolving insurance coverage disputes is justified in practice. 
The surveys show that the data collected by the General Secretariat reveal that the total number 
of cases received by the three Primary Committees increased by more than 45 per cent between 
2014 and 2016. Also, a vast majority of the persons surveyed by the General Secretariat are 
happy with the registration of their claims, the conduct of the Committee personnel (including 
the clerks and adjudicators), the responses to their inquiries, the conduct of the hearing, 
compliance with the scheduling requirements, and the quality of electronic services provided 
by the General Secretariat. The majority of the respondents were claimants, and the majority 
of claimants were policyholders who submitted small claims. Thus, it may be contended that 
the majority of policyholders with small claims who have challenged adverse determinations 
by insurance companies in IDCs have been satisfied with their experience.  
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Also, the analysis of the findings of the surveys and decisions of the Committees shows that 
the high level of satisfaction with the IDC may be explained by the privacy, flexibility, and 
neutrality offered by the CICCL and Working Rules, as well as the predictability of the process 
and outcome. It is also argued that the high level of satisfaction may be explained by both the 
users’ perceived fairness of the procedure and outcomes. Hence, the drive for efficiency has 
not been detrimental to the fairness and effectiveness of the system. It must however be noted 
that the General Secretariat’s data does not include demographic details. Thus, a profile of 
respondents cannot be developed based on their answers. No distinction was made between the 
perspectives of claimants who are policyholders and claimants who are insurance companies. 
Thus, in each case, it is uncertain whether the satisfaction of claimants who are policyholders 
is linked with the same variables as the satisfaction of claimants who are insurance companies. 
Also, the General Secretariat’s surveys do not include an assessment of the users’ satisfaction 
with the outcomes of the dispute resolution process in the Primary Committees. Then the 
reports do not discuss the methodology used to assess the representativeness of the sample. 
Notwithstanding, the practical inquiry has also enabled the researcher to ascertain the standards 
used by IDC Committees to determine whether a contract provides actual or illusory coverage 
and when the policyholder should reasonably expect to be indemnified. These standards protect 
policyholders against arbitrary adverse coverage determinations by insurance companies. 
Operating out of the Shariah court system, some Committees have been able to focus on the 
reasonable expectations of parties and the fairness of the procedures and outcomes. Where for 
example a dispute is based on an ambiguity in the insurance contract, the Shariah courts are 
more likely to refuse to hear the case because the contract would be deemed Shariah non-
compliant. Nevertheless, some Committees have heard such cases and resolved the ambiguities 
by taking into account the reasonable expectations of the parties. Nonetheless, the decisions 
are not decided by reference to the CICCL or precedent. Thus, it is uncertain whether the 
Committees will consistently defer to the same moral preferences and policy considerations to 
satisfy the parties. What this chapter nevertheless accomplishes is that is shows that the 
shortcomings of the IDC identified by the doctrinal analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 do 
not adversely affect this administrative tribunal in practice. The next chapter attempts to 
determine why. In other words, the next chapter seeks to explain the disconnect between legal 
theory and praxis by focusing the inquiry on the perceptions and justifications of IDC 
adjudicators. The latter are in the best position to explain why they sometimes defer to moral 
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preferences and policy considerations and why users are satisfied with their experience with 
the IDC despite the shortcomings of the model. 
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Chapter 6: A Qualitative Study of the Perceptions of IDC Adjudicators: 
Reconciling the Doctrine and Practice 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, it was noted that it is surprising that the IDC enjoys a high level of institutional 
legitimacy despite the absence of clear guidance by the Working Rules regarding the 
Committees’ use of precedent, what the content of the Committees’ decisions must entail, and 
what the procedures for enforcing the decisions should be. Nonetheless, the researcher argued 
that the level of satisfaction of parties, specifically consumers or policyholders, is strongly 
linked with their satisfaction with the outcomes of the hearings or whether they believe the 
adjudicator’s decision is fair. Empirical data was collected from a sample of IDC adjudicators 
to test this theory. This Chapter discusses and analyses the findings of the test.  
The study undertaken was qualitative because such studies generally seek to understand people 
or phenomena as they occur in their natural environment.82 Given that behaviours, including 
learning and decision-making, are very complex, it is important that they are examined. 
Qualitative research is exploratory in nature and enables the researcher to develop theories and 
explanations of the phenomenon that he or she has observed.83 In this study, the researcher 
focused on adjudication in the IDC, and more particularly how IDC adjudicators perceive the 
IDC as a dispute resolution option, and what they do to protect consumers or policyholders 
challenging arbitrary adverse coverage determinations by insurers. Thus, the research question 
that this Chapter seeks to answer is whether consumers are satisfied with the IDC. Answering 
this question enables the researcher to determine the relationship between the doctrinal analysis 
of the law governing dispute resolution by the IDC (conducted in Chapters 3 and 4) and the 
practical inquiry conducted in Chapter 5.  
The qualitative study was approached using the five-stage process developed by Hess.84 This 
involved the study design and ethics, sampling, data collection, data analysis, and the report. 
                                                          
82 See P Aspers and U Corte, ‘What is Qualitative in Qualitative Research’ (2019) 42(2) Qualitative Sociology 
139, 139-141; M Bengtsson, ‘How to Plan and Perform a Qualitative Study Using Content Analysis’ (2016) 2 
NursingPlus Open 8, 8-9; AL Strauss and JM Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures 
for Developing Grounded Theory (2nd edn, Sage 1998) 10-11. 
83 B Johnson and L Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Approaches (4th 
edn, SAGE 2012) 366-367. 
84 GF Hess, ‘Qualitative Research on Legal Education: Studying Outstanding Law Teachers’ (2014) 51(4) Alberta 
Law Review 925, 928-938. The five-stage process is based on a synthesis of two important studies on educational 
research. The first study conducted by Johnson and Christensen (n 2, 377-378) proposed eight steps for qualitative 
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This chapter explains how the researcher accomplished each phase. Emphasis is placed on the 
discourse analytic method which the researcher employed to capture and analyse the 
perspectives of the IDC adjudicators. It is shown that from a holistic viewpoint, the IDC 
adjudicators believe that consumers are satisfied with the IDC adjudication because the 
procedures are cost-effective and speedy, the Committees are impartial and apply Islamic law, 
the procedures are flexible, and decision-making is predictable. This confirms the theory 
developed by the researcher. 
6.2 Study Design and Ethics 
The components of this study were informed by a critical review of the existing literature 
undertaken in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, as well as the critical examination of IDC cases undertaken 
in Chapter 5. The literature comprises books, peer-reviewed journal articles and conference 
presentations describing how legislators, courts and commentators in many jurisdictions have 
developed mechanisms to help policyholders who are denied coverage by insurers in an 
arbitrary manner. It is for example noted in Chapter 2 that in some jurisdictions such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the policyholder may ask the court or tribunal to assess 
the policy under the illusory coverage doctrine. Some commentators have pointed out that the 
recognition of the doctrine is justified because it would be unfair to enforce the exclusion clause 
as it was written given that the clause makes the coverage worthless.85 Other commentators 
have noted that that the interpretation of insurance contracts in the United States and other 
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom is generally geared towards determining the nature 
of the bargain that both parties sought to make, thereby justifying the courts’ suspicion of 
policies that contain illusory coverage.86 In the same vein, many commentators have observed 
that courts in the United States, Canada and United Kingdom protect policyholders or 
consumers by denying insurance companies unconscionable advantages in insurance policies 
and honouring the reasonable expectations of the policyholders or intended beneficiaries.87 
                                                          
research. These include, selecting a topic, determining research questions, designing the study, collecting data, 
analysing data, generating results, validating the results, and writing a report. The second study conducted by 
Creswell placed emphasis on six steps. These steps include identifying the research problem, critically reviewing 
the literature, ascertaining the purpose for the research, collecting data, analysing and interpreting the data, and 
reporting and evaluating the study. See JW Creswell, Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and 
Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research (4th edn, Pearson 2012) 7-11. 
85 See for example, I Weiss, ‘The Illusory Coverage Doctrine: A Critical Review’ (2018) 166 University of 
California Law Review 1545, 1548-1554; G Munro, ‘Exposing “Illusory” Underinsured Motorist Coverage’ 
(2003) Trial Trends 28, 28-36. 
86 See S Williston and RA Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (4th edn, West Group 1993) 32:2. 
87 See RE Keeton, ‘Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions (Parts I and H)’ (1970) 83 Harvard 
Law Review 961; RE Keeton, ‘Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade’ (1976) 12 FORUM 275; RE 
Keeton and A Widiss, Insurance Law (West Publishing 1988) 6.01-6.10. For the use of the reasonable expectation 
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Also, others have noted that courts in these jurisdictions construe ambiguous clauses in 
insurance contracts against the insurance companies that drafted and often imposed the 
contracts on policyholders.88 
With regard to Middle Eastern or Muslim-majority countries such as the KSA, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates, some commentators have critically assessed 
their consumer protection laws.89 They have noted that laws of all of these countries, except 
Lebanon, focus on the quality of goods and services offered to consumers and place little 
emphasis on the use of unfair or unconscionable terms in consumer transactions.90 Thus, only 
Lebanon specifically prohibits the use of unfair terms in market transactions on the grounds 
that it is contrary to the Shariah. However, many commentators tend to broadly interpret 
Islamic law concepts such as good faith, general welfare and disclosure as protecting 
consumers against unfair practices.91 Thus, they do not identify specific principles or concepts 
that can be used by Islamic judges to protect consumers in a consistent and predictable manner. 
It is uncertain whether it is important to develop such specific principles or concepts. It is 
shown in Chapter 5 that adjudicators in the Primary Committees do not use these concepts but 
refuse to enforce contractual terms which they believe to be unfair. 
 
It may therefore be stated that the review of the extant literature and IDC case law in the 
previous chapters played three important roles regarding the design of the qualitative study. 
First, it documented the need for this study, viz., filling the gap in the literature regarding 
specific principles that can be used to protect consumers in the Saudi insurance market. Second, 
it set out the phenomenon that this study explored: adjudication in the IDC. Third, it provided 
theoretical underpinning for the study. Hence, the researcher sought to determine whether the 
                                                          
doctrine to interpret contracts containing ambiguities in Canada, see O Brand, ‘Contract Terms: Judicial 
Approaches to the Interpretation of Insurance Contracts’ in J Burling and K Lazarus (eds), Research Handbook 
on International Insurance Law and Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011) 112-113. 
88 This is known as the rule of contra proferentem. See EM Holmes and JA Appleman, Holmes’ Appleman on 
Insurance (Lexis Law 1996) 6.1; RH Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2012) 25A. See 
also J Stempel, ‘Reassessing the Sophisticated Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation’ (1993) 42 
Drake Law Review 807, 810-811. 
89 See for example, M Fayad, ‘A Glance at Unfair Terms in Consumer Transactions in Arab Legal Systems and 
Islamic Law: What Arab Lawyers Can Learn from the European Experience’ (2012) 5(2) International Journal 
of Private Law 200, 200-201, 211-214; K Khan and S Aftab, ‘Consumer Protection in Islam: The Case of Pakistan’ 
(2000) 39(4) Australian Economic Papers 483, 484-503; MA Khan, Islamic State and Consumer Protection 
(Grin-verlag 2011) 5-8. 
90 Fayad, ibid.  
91 MA Khan, ‘Consumer Protection in Islamic Law (Shariah): An Overview’ (2011) 45(31) AL-ADWA 77, 78-
93; SM Schwebel, ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco Arbitrate the Onassis Agreement’ (2010) 3(3) The 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business 245, 245-256. 
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interpretation of insurance contracts by IDC adjudicators generally leads to fair outcomes 
which in turn explains the high level of satisfaction of IDC users. However, given that the 
qualitative research methodology adopted for this chapter was phenomenology, the 
researcher’s conclusions are based on the perceptions of IDC adjudicators. Thus, the existing 
theories identified in the review of literature and court decisions did not shape the researcher’s 
view of the data. 
6.2.1 Ethical Issues 
Ethical considerations are very important for qualitative studies because such studies intrude 
in the lives of participants.92 Following the design and before the collection of the data, the 
researcher ensured that the study complied with the relevant ethical standards. In the United 
Kingdom, the Code of Practice for Research published by the Research Integrity Office93 
requires all research that involves human participants, human material or personal data to 
comply with all legal and ethical requirements, as well as the relevant guidelines. Also, the 
Office requires all organisations and researchers to set up systems that ensure ethical and 
regulatory review of projects that involve human participants or personal data. Under such 
systems, the research projects must be reviewed by the relevant ethics committee and abide by 
the committee’s recommendations following the review.94 Also, the organisations and 
researchers must ensure that the personal data relating human participants remain confidential 
and secured.  
Given that this research involves human participants and personal data, the researcher carefully 
reviewed and followed the University’s regulations. The researcher ensured that it complied 
with all legal and ethical requirements, as well as the relevant guidelines. The researcher 
submitted the Ethical Review Form (see Appendix III) through the system set up by the 
University to ensure ethical and regulatory review of research projects that involve human 
participants or personal data. The research was therefore reviewed by the Ethics Committee. 
Also, the researcher ensured that all participants signed a consent form (see Appendix II). The 
researcher kept the answers provided by the participants confidential and they were only 
                                                          
92 See SN Khan, ‘Qualitative Research – Phenomenology’ (2014) 10(21) Asian Social Science 298, 306. 
93 This is an advisory body funded by the UK Higher Education Funding Councils, Royal Society and the 
Department of Health. The Code of Practice for Research was first published in 2009 and seeks to support research 
organisations and researchers in meeting the highest standards in the conduct of studies. The Code is published 
on the organisation’s website: <https://ukrio.org/publications/code-of-practice-for-research/> accessed 14 
November 2019. 
94 Ibid. 
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identified only by a code number as shown below. The data has always been locked in a secure 
place and will be destroyed after the researcher has been awarded a PhD. 
6.3 Sampling 
It is important for qualitative researchers to identify the persons they seek to study. These 
persons ought to well informed with regard to the research aim and questions.95 In this study, 
the researcher did not articulate a set of attributes that the participants ought to possess given 
that the objective was to study adjudicators of the IDC only. Thus, the researcher did not seek 
to construct a suitable sample of subjects to study. The adjudicators of the IDC who were 
available and accepted to participate in the study comprised the sample. It may therefore be 
stated that the sampling strategy used by the researcher was purposive sampling. This is a 
strategy that is widely used in qualitative research for the selection of persons with a wealth of 
information related to the phenomenon of interest.96 It enables researchers to make effective 
use of limited resources. In addition to their knowledge, participants are also selected on the 
bases of availability and willingness to take part in the study, as well as their readiness to 
communicate opinions and experiences in an articulate and reflective manner.97 This sampling 
strategy also helps towards achieving one of the main goals of qualitative methods, viz., 
saturation. This involves achieving the depth of understanding by continuing to sample until 
no new information can be acquired.98 
There are several purposeful sampling strategies. These include the selection of cases with 
maximum variation; the selection of extreme (outlier) or deviant cases; the selection of 
homogenous cases (for group interviewing); and the selection of cases that meet a 
predetermined criterion of importance.99  The researcher used criterion-based purposeful 
sampling to describe and illustrate what is typical to adjudicators of the IDC. The goal was to 
narrow the range of variation and focus on the similarities in their decision-making processes: 
how do they protect consumers or policyholders who are in desperate need of money and are 
challenging the arbitrary adverse determinations by insurers. 
                                                          
95 See HR Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (3rd edn, Alta 
Mira Press 2002) 16-21. 
96 See MB Miles and AM Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (2nd Sage 1994) 24. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See M Mason, ‘Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews’ (2010) 11(3) Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research 1, 2. 
99 MQ Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd edn, Sage 2002) 239-240. 
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The researcher however encountered some difficulties in the use of the purposeful sampling 
strategy. It was uncertain what was the range of variation in the sample of IDC members or 
adjudicators from which the researcher took the purposive sample. Hence, the researcher 
assumed that all IDC members or adjudicators are potential information-rich participants 
without regard to whether the adjudicators who accepted to participate in the study were 
actually as knowledgeable as the adjudicators who did not participate in the study. Also, the 
researcher was unable to use an iterative approach of sampling and re-sampling100 in order to 
select a suitable sample of adjudicators who actually possessed a wealth of information. It may 
be argued that the researcher could have for example selected only adjudicators who had issued 
more than 100 decisions or served as adjudicators or judges for more than 10 years. However, 
such criterion would still not ensure that the adjudicators who participated in the study were 
actually as knowledgeable or even more knowledgeable when compared to adjudicators who 
did not participate in the study. Nonetheless, since the researcher used the phenomenological 
approach (as shown below), the researcher did not rely on the sampling to ensure that 
theoretical saturation occurred,101 but on the theory that emerged from the data. 
The size of the sample that was selected was 34 adjudicators or members of the IDC, whether 
they served as legal advisors or panel members drawn from the insurance industry.102 A single 
criterion was used to select a sample of these nominees to include in the study: active IDC 
members or adjudicators who were available and willing to participate in the study. The 
researcher sent an email to everyone on a list of IDC members or adjudicators that had been 
provided by the General Secretariat of the Committees for the Resolution of Insurance Disputes 
and Violations (General Secretariat). The researcher had previously sent a post mail and called 
the General Secretariat’s head office in Riyadh asking for a list of all IDC members who 
adjudicate disputes in the three Primary Committees. It is uncertain whether the General 
Secretariat sought and obtained the consent of the members or adjudicators before including 
their names and contact details on the list given to the researcher. The General Secretariat 
neither confirmed nor denied when the researcher asked if it had obtained the consent of the 
                                                          
100 This involves moving back and forth between the cases that have been selected for data collection and analysing 
the data as they are collected. Subsequent sampling decisions are then determined by what emerges from the 
analysis of the data. See MN Marshall, ‘Sampling for Qualitative Research’ (1996) 13(6) Family Practice – An 
International Journal 522, 523-524. 
101 For a thorough discussion on how this can be achieved in qualitative studies, see B Saunders et al, ‘Saturation 
in Qualitative Research: Exploring Its Conceptualization and Operationalization’ (2018) 52(4) Quality and 
Quantity 1893, 1893-1905. 
102 It is noted in Chapter 3 that each Primary Committee comprises a panel of three members; a legal advisor is 
the head of the panel and two other members from the insurance industry who have an accounting and finance 
background. 
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potential participants. Nonetheless, the researcher sent emails or called all the members or 
adjudicators of the IDC on the list.  
19 of the 34 adjudicators decided to participate in the study. It may be contended that the sample 
is broadly representative of IDC adjudicators given that it comprises a majority of the 
adjudicators. The findings of this study are therefore based on the responses given by 19 IDC 
male adjudicators using a questionnaire. All the participants voluntarily participated in the 
study. 8 participants serve as adjudicators at the Riyadh Primary Committee, 6 serve as 
adjudicators at the Jeddah Primary Committee, 3 serve as adjudicators at the Dammam Primary 
Committee, and 2 serve as adjudicators at the SAMA Appeal Committee. The findings 
regarding the participants’ background information are as follows: 
 Among the 19 participants, 10 responded that they were within the age range of 46-66; 
while 8 were within the age range of 25-45. Only 1 was above the age of 66 and he 
served at the SAMA Appeal Committee 
 All 19 participants had a bachelor’s degree or above; 2 had Doctorate degrees.  
 Among the 19 participants, 5 had served as IDC adjudicators for more than 3 years but 
less than 5 years; and 14 had served for less than 3 years. 
 Among the 19 participants, 3 had served as adjudicators for less than 5 years; 11 had 
served as adjudicators for more than 5 years but less than 10; 4 had served as 
adjudicators for more than 10 years but less than 15 years; and 1 had served as 
adjudicator for more than 15 years. 
 All 19 participants had experience working as an arbitrator, negotiator or mediator in 
an insurance-related disputes. 
 Among the 19 participants, 1 had served as a judge in an Islamic Court when it handled 
insurance litigation. 
It follows that the pool of IDC adjudicators comprises educated and fairly experienced men. 
The fact that they all had bachelor’s degree or higher may be explained by the requirement that 
qadis who give judgements in Islamic courts should have degrees in Shariah law from a 
recognised Islamic university in the Kingdom.103 Some are also required to obtain a post-
                                                          
103 See A Baamir, Sharia Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration (Routledge 2010) 187. 
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graduate qualification from the Institute of Higher Judiciary.104 Thus, legal advisors who head 
the panels of the Primary Committees are also required to have degrees in Shariah law. They 
are assisted by two members who are drawn from the Saudi insurance industry with 
background in accounting and finance. This ensures that the panels combine legal and 
insurance expertise. As such, the participants of this study were well versed with the studied 
phenomenon. This enhanced the dependability and conformability of the findings given that 
their knowledgeable responses are likely to be true over time and under different conditions, 
and there is a strong potential for congruence between their responses and those of other 
adjudicators in the KSA.105 
Also, all the participants had experience working as arbitrator, neighbour or mediator in an 
insurance-related dispute. This enhances the reliability of their assessment of the IDC as a 
dispute resolution in comparison to other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. However, 
their experience may be explained by the fact that the General Secretariat ensures that disputes 
are submitted for mediation before going to the relevant Primary Committee. Thus, as members 
of the IDC, all the participants must have been given the opportunity to act as mediator.  
6.4 Data Collection 
After the designing the study, ascertaining the appropriate sampling strategy, and ensuring that 
the study complied with the relevant ethical standards, the researcher began to collect the data. 
There are generally four types of methods used in collecting data for qualitative research, 
namely observation, interviews, focus groups and questionnaires.106 The researcher could not 
use observation because it involves collecting data by observing the subjects in the field. Thus, 
it was impractical for the researcher to determine how IDC adjudicators protect consumers or 
policyholders by observing the 19 adjudicators in different tribunals in Riyadh, Jeddah and 
Dammam. Proceedings in the IDC last for at least three months. Hence, the researcher could 
not take the role of participant observer and record information during the proceedings. 
Moreover, the motivations and decision-making process of IDC adjudicators could not be 
observed. The researcher did not need to observe the proceedings in order to determine whether 
an adjudicator thought the parties were satisfied with the outcome. 
                                                          
104 See FE Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 81. 
105 With regard to the trustworthiness of qualitative content analysis based on dependability, credibility, 
transferability, authenticity and conformability. See S Elo et al, ‘Qualitative Content Analysis: A Focus on 
Trustworthiness’ (2014) 4(1) Sage Open 1, 1-10. 
106 See J Sutton and Z Austin, ‘Qualitative Research: Data Collection, Analysis and Management’ (2015) 68(3) 
The Canadian Journal of Hospital Pharmacy 226, 226-231. 
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The researcher did not use interviews because of the cost implications and logistical challenge 
of travelling to different cities across the KSA to conduct face-to-face interviews. Although 
phone interviews are more convenient and cost-effective than face-to-face interviews and they 
reliable and efficient as regards collecting data,107 the social expectations of the medium could 
not be overlooked. From personal experience, the researcher believed that in the KSA 
conversations over the phone are generally deemed to be social or trivial. Also, interviewing 
elderly persons and senior public servants such as judges can be challenging because they are 
often task oriented as regards using phones. Then those without a reliable connection would be 
excluded from the process,108 and even where the connection is reliable, fatigue and inattention 
may subsequently impact on the quality of the responses after about thirty or forty-five minutes. 
It would have been very difficult for the researcher to keep the conversation short and task 
focused over more than one hour. Moreover, the respondents were less likely to provide 
detailed information over the phone during the short time scheduled for the interviews. 
It was also not possible for the researcher to use a focus group given that the researcher could 
not unite all IDC adjudicators in order to conduct a group interview. Some of the adjudicators 
serve in Primary Committee in Riyadh while others serve in the Primary Committee is 
Dammam and others served at the Primary Committee in Jeddah.  
6.4.1 The Use of the Questionnaire 
The researcher used the questionnaire to collect qualitative data. The researcher did not have 
to rely on his verbal communication skills and strong probes to keep the conversation on track. 
Also, the researcher did not have to find a boardroom or private space with little or no 
background noise. The respondents were able to complete the questionnaires diligently in the 
calm of their offices or home. This was very important because some of the questions required 
the participants to explain their opinions or viewpoints. They had the opportunity to read up on 
the relevant issues to refresh their memories before responding to the questions. This would 
not have been possible if the researcher had used the face-to-face or telephone interviews. It 
would have been unrealistic to expect that the respondents would remember accurate details 
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about the shortcomings of the Board of Grievances or the IDC as regards settling insurance 
disputes (Question number 12, Appendix II) or concerns consumers or policyholders may have 
expressed to him or his clerk (Question number 24, Appendix II). Nonetheless, the fact that the 
participants had to type or write their answers limited the amount of information they could 
provide. 
The questionnaire (see Appendix II) was delivered to participants in an electronic format via 
email. It was accompanied by instructions. In order to ensure better sample coverage and 
minimise coverage error, the Internet-delivered questionnaire was sent to all 34 individuals in 
the Saudi population who had a chance of inclusion in the sample. These individuals included 
all those in the list of IDC members or adjudicators submitted by the General Secretariat. The 
use of the Internet-delivered questionnaire was low cost and practical for all potential 
participants.109 The electronic questionnaire also helped to reduce measurement error and 
ensure a better response rate.110 
The questionnaire was designed with the objective of asking research questions in a neutral 
and objective manner. The original version of the questionnaire was in Arabic. The questions 
were drafted in such manner that they were easily understood, interpreted and answered. This 
therefore increased the accuracy of answers. All the answers were also in Arabic. Despite 
having 26 questions, the questionnaire was not unreasonably long given that nine questions 
focused on the participant’s background information. The questionnaire therefore began with 
simple factual questions, then proceeded to open and attitudinal questions requiring deeper 
concentration. Hence, the likelihood of the participants skimming through the questions or 
misinterpreting complex questions was low.111 It must be noted that the motivation felt by the 
participants may affect the extent to which they concentrate in completing the questionnaire.112 
Participants who are convinced that they or their employers or society will benefit from the 
outcome of the study are generally more motivated to complete questionnaire.113 This explains 
why in the information sheet attached to the Questionnaire (see Appendix II), the researcher 
emphasised the importance of studying the perception of the IDC as a dispute resolution option 
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regarding disputes involving consumers. As shown below, some of the participants agreed that 
it is important to inform the Saudi government about the strengths and weaknesses of the IDC 
and proposed ways in which this dispute resolution option can be enhanced.  
The researcher carefully reviewed the sequence of the questions when the questionnaire was 
structured. This was geared towards increasing the usability of the questionnaire. Thus, 
questions were grouped under three common themed headings to enable the participants to 
contextualise each question. The order of the questions was aimed at biasing the participants 
to give more information and not to give more favourable answers. The first nine questions 
were biographical and required very short answers or entering checks or marks as responses. 
Within these sections, ranges were used for questions on the respondents’ ages and number of 
years of experience. This was deemed to be less invasive than requiring the respondents to state 
their ages. The researcher also ensured that each question would have the same meaning for 
every participant. The frame of reference was clear: Saudi insurance law. The information to 
the participants attached to the questionnaire contextualised the questions. Nonetheless, the 
questions were kept short and simple in order to increase the likelihood that the participants 
understood them and provided accurate answers. There was no question requiring the 
participants to interpret the terms or concepts used by the researcher. Also, leading questions 
were avoided, and emphasis was placed on questions about the participants’ opinions. In the 
same vein, questions that invite socially desirable responses were avoided.114 Examples of such 
questions are those that require the participants to express support or disapproval of a verse in 
the Quran or to criticise a policy endorsed by the monarch. The researcher did not want to relay 
any biases or incite some of the participants to provide a biased set of responses. Although the 
participants were encouraged to answer the questionnaire based on their own experience, they 
were also asked to make their own personal interpretations. 
6.5 Data Analysis 
In order to prepare the data for analysis, the data was organised into file folders, with one 
document for each of the 19 adjudicators who participated in the study. Each document 
contained over 11 pages of data. Thus, the researcher organised a total of 209 pages in file 
folders. The researcher examined the data three times. The repeated examination enabled the 
researcher to have a general sense of the theories and themes that emerged from the data.  
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In order to validate the accuracy of the results, the researcher had to eliminate or minimise the 
effect of researcher bias.115 This may occur whenever there is an influence that distorts the 
findings of the study.116 This may be where the method used to collect or analyse the data is 
too closely aligned with the researcher’s personal agenda. Thus, the researcher did not analyse 
the data in a way that affirmed his own perceptions because he was able to recognise and 
control his biases through critical self-reflection.117 This allowed the data to determine the 
results. It has been shown that where self-reflection is explanatory, it can result in less bias.118 
Self-reflection is explanatory when a person contemplates why he or she has certain traits or 
proclivity. Hence, the researcher contemplated why he was empathetic, benevolent and 
rational. Also, it has been shown that accountability manipulations may enhance self-reflection 
as a bias mitigation tool.119 Thus, given that the researcher is expected to justify his work to 
expert supervisors and examiners, the researcher was compelled to engage in pre-emptive self-
criticism in order to ensure that he does not present distorted findings to the experts who will 
assess his work. 
After mitigating bias, the researcher had to ensure that all the people and events (adjudicators 
and their court-room experiences discussed in the questionnaires) are described accurately in 
order to enhance the descriptive validity of the findings. The researcher could not use 
investigator triangulation120 to enhance descriptive validity because the researcher conducted 
the study alone. There were no co-researchers available to observe or examine the participants’ 
responses in order to cross-check observations for the purposes of determining whether there 
was consensus on critical aspects of the participants’ responses. Thus, the researcher had to 
examine the data several times and ensure that descriptions in the questionnaires corresponded 
to descriptions in the analysis.  
Closely related to the descriptive validity concern was the internal validity concern. This arises 
where the researcher does not justify a cause and effect relationship that is identified in the 
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findings.121 Internal validity may also be fostered through investigator triangulation. However, 
as noted above, this method was not available to the researcher. Also, the researcher could not 
rely on methods triangulation given that only one method was used to collect the data, viz., 
questionnaire. Nonetheless, the researcher used data triangulation by comparing and analysing 
data collected from the 19 participants. Given that this constitutes the majority of IDC 
adjudicators (the target population), external validity did not pose a  challenge as internal 
validity. Thus, the findings of this study may be generalised to all IDC adjudicators in the three 
Primary Committees and SAMA Appeal Committee. The researcher is confident that this study 
accurately identifies the practices common to IDC adjudicators who seek to protect consumers 
or policyholders in insurance coverage disputes. 
6.5.1 The Phenomenological Approach 
There are generally four qualitative research methodologies, namely case study, grounded 
theory, ethnography and phenomenology.122 The researcher did not use the case study method 
because it is not suitable to determine cause and effect and discover generalisable truths,123 
which are among the main objectives of this empirical inquiry. Also, the researcher sought to 
obtain data from all IDC adjudicators, not narrowly focus on a few.  
Although the researcher sought to identify and analyse theories and themes that emerged from 
the data, the researcher did not adopt the grounded theory methodology because it emphasises 
inductive analyses.124 However, deduction is the form of analytic thinking that was employed 
by the researcher. In other words, as shown below, the analysis moved from the general to the 
particular. The researcher established a theory following the doctrinal analyses (shown in 
Chapters 3 and 4) and the practical inquiry (shown in Chapter 5) and empirical data was then 
collected to test this theory. This is how the researcher answered the research question related 
to the satisfaction of consumers with their satisfaction with the outcomes of IDC hearings. As 
noted above, data was gathered using a questionnaire with 19 subjects. 
The researcher did not conduct an ethnographic study because cost and logistical challenges 
prevented the researcher from living within the Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah communities of 
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the IDC adjudicators studied.125 Also, participating in the decision-making process in the 
Committees was not a plausible option. 
Creswell advised that where a research problem requires in-depth understanding of human 
experiences common to a defined group of people, phenomenology is the best qualitative 
research method to use.126 Thus, it was deemed to be the most appropriate method by the 
researcher because the research problem required a profound understanding of the experiences 
common to IDC adjudicators and their motivations in assessing the law and facts and arriving 
at conclusions. Padilla-Diaz notes that the role of the phenomenological researcher is to build 
the studied object according to its own manifestations and components.127 As such, the 
researcher delved into the experiences, perceptions and perspectives of IDC adjudicators and 
used these elements to construct a theory regarding how consumers are satisfied with the IDC 
because adjudicators issue fair decisions. 
Creswell also noted that members of the group of people that is studied should be able to 
articulate their lived experiences; and the experiences should not be diverse.128 Given that IDC 
adjudicators are jurists or persons with expertise in finance and accounting, it was assumed that 
they are able to articulate their lived experiences. Also, their experiences as IDC adjudicators 
cannot be diverse since they resolve similar disputes. The comparability of their experiences 
enabled the researcher to identify common meanings and underlying essences that were then 
attributed to all IDC adjudicators. The fact that it was important for the participants to have 
comparable experiences explains why the suitable sampling strategy was purposeful sampling. 
As noted above, purposeful sampling incorporates specific criteria that must be met by all 
potential participants at the time of selection. Hence, only persons who served as IDC members 
or adjudicators in the Primary Committees and SAMA Appeal Committee could be selected. 
The analysis of data in a phenomenological study involves three things: identifying common 
meanings and essences; horizontalization of the data; and textual and structural analysis of the 
data.129  
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6.5.1.1 Identifying Common Meanings and Essences 
The researcher began by describing his own perception of the IDC (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) in 
order to distinguish them from the participants’ perception. Welman and Kruger noted that ‘the 
phenomenologists are concerned with understanding social and psychological phenomena 
from the perspectives of people involved.’130 Thus, a researcher applying phenomenology is 
concerned with the lived experiences of participants, what they did or refrained from doing in 
order to achieve stated objectives. Van den Berg (translated by Van Manen) summarised the 
task as follows: 
[Phenomena] have something to say to us – this is common knowledge among 
poets and painters. Therefore, poets and painters are born phenomenologists. Or 
rather, we are all born phenomenologists; the poets and painters among us, 
however, understand very well their task of sharing, by means of word and 
image, their insights with others – an art.131 
Bentz and Shapiro132 and Kensit133 also noted that the phenomenological investigator must 
identify the theory that emerges from the data. Kensit observed that ‘[d]oing phenomenology’ 
means capturing rich descriptions of phenomena and their settings.’ As such, in order to capture 
the rich descriptions of the participants based on their own experiences, some of the questions 
put to the participants in this study included (see Appendix II): 
 What is your opinion of the IDC as a dispute resolution body?  
 What is your opinion of the Board of Grievances as an insurance dispute resolution 
body?  
 What is your opinion of arbitration, negotiation and mediation as insurance dispute 
resolution options?  
 Do you oppose or support the requirement to submit all insurance-related disputes to 
the IDC? 
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 Do you think most consumers are satisfied with their experience with the IDC? Why? 
The above questions were directed to the participants’ experiences, perceptions, viewpoints 
and convictions about the IDC. Conducting research from the participants’ perspective may be 
referred to as bracketing.134 The respondents were asked to articulate their experiences about 
adjudication by the IDC, Board of Grievances, mediators, negotiators and arbitrators; and then 
share their reflection on the value of the experiences. The researcher was also able to bracket 
his own preconceptions and enter into the respondents’ lifeworld in order to analyse the 
responses as an objective interpreter.135 Bracketing is related to the Greek concept ‘epoche’ 
which is used to describe the process of identifying common meanings and essences in 
phenomenological studies.136  Epoche refers to the suspension of judgments or pre-conceptions 
by the researcher in order to delve into the perceptions and perspectives of the participants.137 
In other words, the researcher excludes his own meanings, perceptions and interpretations and 
enters into the participant’s unique world. This ensures the objectivity of the analysis of the 
data that is collected. 
6.5.1.2 Horizontalization of the Data 
This step involved listing each of the relevant ideas and themes that emerged from the data. 
The ideas and themes were given equal value regarding the expressions of the participants. 
Thus, the researcher extracted and isolated expressions that illuminated the researched 
phenomenon. The list of the expressions extracted from the responses was scrutinised and 
redundant expressions were deleted from the list. This explains why the responses of some 
participants are provided below, while the responses of other participants are not provided. The 
importance of the ideas or meanings in the expressions was determined by the number of times 
an idea or meaning was mentioned by the participants. With the list of units of expressions, the 
researcher elicited the meaning of the expressions from a holistic perspective. 
The researcher was then able to form clusters of themes by grouping the units of expressions 
and their meanings together. A summary of all the themes that emerged from the data (non-
redundant units) provides a holistic perspective. The researcher also identified themes that were 
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common to most or all of the responses, as well as variations. What is important here is 
succinctly captured in the following statement: 
Whatever the method used for a phenomenological analysis, the aim of the 
investigator is the reconstruction of the inner world of experience of the subject. 
Each individual has his own way of experiencing temporality, spatiality, 
materiality, but each of these coordinates must be understood in relation to the 
others and to the total inner world.138  
The researcher therefore captured the perceptions of the participants, which constitute their 
‘inner world of experience.’ He then compared and contrasted each participant’s way of 
experiencing the IDC and drew conclusions regarding the phenomenon studied: adjudication 
in the IDC. Sadala and Adorno noted that the phenomenological investigator ‘transforms 
participants’ everyday expressions into expressions appropriate to the scientific discourse 
supporting the research.’139 Also, Coffey and Atkinson stated that the researcher does not 
simply present rigorous data but he also develops ideas and theories from the data.140 Hence, 
the most appropriate way of developing the ideas and theories is by transforming the non-
redundant expressions of the participants into scientific discourse. This is what the researcher 
achieved via the textual and interpretative analysis of the data. 
6.5.1.3 The Textual and Interpretative Analysis 
The textual analysis involved describing the participants’ perceptions and viewpoints, while 
the interpretative analysis involved interpreting the participants’ feelings, perceptions and 
viewpoints. As noted above, the horizontalization of the data involved transforming the 
participants’ expressions into expressions appropriate to the scientific discourse. What the 
researcher did to achieve this was group units of expressions by different participants to form 
clusters of themes and then identify the ideas or theories that emerge from these themes which 
represent a holistic perspective. It follows that the textual and interpretative analysis involved 
linking different expressions in order to ascertain a common and distinct perspective on the 
effectiveness of the IDC as a dispute resolution body with regard to the protection provided to 
consumers or policyholders. Thus, the textual and interpretative analysis essentially involved 
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analysing discourse. This was done using the discourse analytic method as shown in the next 
section. 
6.5.2 The Discourse Analytic Method 
This method was developed in sociology and social psychology to ascertain a given social 
reality from the meaning of language.141 The researcher using the method is able to identify 
common meanings within the defined context. It must be noted that the term ‘discourse’ may 
be ascertained in a range of forms. This study limits the term to perspectives and ideas.142 
Emphasis was placed on verbal discourse in written form because this was the medium used 
by the participants to produce and transmit meaning to the researcher.143 The researcher sought 
to ascertain the perceptions of IDC adjudicators in order to explain the satisfaction of IDC users 
(specifically policyholders) despite the flaws in the laws governing adjudication in the IDC. It 
was assumed that the IDC adjudicators are in the best position to assess the benefits perceived 
by the policyholders and the implementation of the laws governing adjudication in the IDC. 
The analysis was conducted at the textual and interpretative level. Thus, discourse was 
considered to be information, persuasion or a social product. The ultimate objective of the 
analysis was to interpret the discourse and ascertain the information conveyed by the 
participant or determine his persuasion. It follows that there are consistent language units or 
expressions that can be identified from the information conveyed by participants. These units 
comprise the ‘interpretative repertoire’.144 As such, the respondent is not the basic analytic unit 
because the researcher’s objective is to identify and analyse the interpretive repertoire. 
Wetherell and Porter explained as follows: 
Repertoires could be seen as building blocks speakers use for constructing 
versions of actions, cognitive processes, and other phenomena. Any particular 
repertoire is constructed out of a restricted range of terms used in a specific 
stylistic and grammatical fashion. Commonly, these terms are derived from one 
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or more key metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be signalled 
by certain tropes or figures of speech.145 
The researcher therefore built the interpretative repertoire by identifying terms or expressions 
that were consistently used by the participants to describe the phenomenon studied. In other 
words, the responses provided by the IDC adjudicators were systematised and the researcher 
was then able to ascertain a common perspective on the effectiveness of the IDC and the 
satisfaction of policyholders who have submitted claims to the IDC. The discourse analysis 
was conducted in three steps, namely the textual analysis; the identification of the interpretative 
repertoire; and linking the interpretative repertoire to the research question or theory that was 
being tested. 
As noted above, the textual analysis involved determining the structure of the discourse. The 
researcher sought to ensure that the analysis was not limited to a reduced version of the 
discourse but rather to all non-redundant expressions of the participants. The researcher was 
able to achieve this because of the horizontalization of the data prior to the analysis. Thus, the 
responses of the participants were fragmented into pertinent clusters of themes and then 
categorised. Responses that were similar were placed under the same category. As shown in 
Appendix II, the questionnaire was divided into three sections, namely the participants’ 
background information; their experience with the IDC; and their perceptions about the 
experiences of IDC users, specifically consumers or policyholders. This facilitated the process 
of categorising the responses.  
6.5.2.1 Participants’ Statements and Clusters of Themes 
The participants were asked specific questions regarding adjudication in the IDC and the 
satisfaction of policyholders in disputes resolved by the IDC. As noted above, the objective 
was to explain the satisfaction of IDC users (specifically policyholders). The questions were 
divided into two broad categories, viz. the participants’ experience with the IDC; and the 
participants’ thoughts on the experience of the parties. 
6.5.2.1.1 Participants’ Experience with the IDC 
The participants were asked to state and explain their opinion of the IDC as a dispute resolution 
body (Question number 10, Appendix II). Of the 19 participants, 16 indicated that they had a 
very position opinion about the IDC while 3 indicated that they had a positive opinion about 
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the IDC. The participants who indicated that they had a very positive opinion explained this 
opinion as follows: 
Participant 1: 
We provide an alternative means for the amicable resolution of disputes. This is does not avail 
the parties of their right to seek other amicable options. It is a better alternative because we 
apply the Shariah in a faster and more flexible way than the courts.  
 
Participant 2: 
 
The Committees are implementing regulations in the Kingdom that protect policyholders and 
insurance companies. Policyholders cannot be abused as it was in the past. They bring their 
claims to the Committees and they are treated equally. Insurance companies have resources, 
but they had to wait for one or two years before courts could issue judgments. Now, it is very 
fast.  
 
Participant 3: 
 
The insured are given the opportunity to act quickly and receive compensation in a timely 
manner. They do not have attend many sessions over many months or years to receive 
compensation. This system was created to protect insurers and punish wrongdoers who take 
money under insurance agreements but then refuse to pay when something bad happens to the 
insured.  
 
Participant 8: 
 
The panel has an obligation to protect members who have contributed to a system which must 
protect them against loss. This is the best way of compelling the insurance companies to pay 
these members. The courts are slow and backlogged. Arbitration is expensive and insurance 
companies don’t take mediation seriously. 
 
Participant 14: 
 
Claimants do not pay lawyers’ fees and will get a decision in a matter of a few months. We 
decide what is fair for the parties and direct insurance companies on how to pay compensation 
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in a manner that is pleasing for all. If they have a good case, they receive a quick decision and 
their lives are not disrupted. 
 
The participants who indicated that they had a positive opinion about the IDC responded as 
follows: 
 
Participant 6: 
 
This is one of the targets of the Vision 2030. The insurance industry suffered in the past because 
the courts could not handle many customer complaints. Now insurance companies know these 
complaints are handled swiftly and they must compensate customers in time. 
 
Participant 9: 
 
This is a very good system because anyone with a good cause to believe the insurance company 
is refusing to settle a claim finds justice. This is a very fair system because we enforce 
agreements and also enforce Islamic law.  
 
Participant 12: 
The cost is minimal for the insured. The resolution of the dispute is swift. The insured receives 
fair compensation for the contributions he has made to the insurance company. Dishonesty is 
punished in a swift manner. 
It is uncertain what motivated 3 participants to indicate that they had a positive opinion rather 
than a very positive opinion as the other 16 participants. This is because their explanations are 
similar. Given that the researcher employed the discourse analytic method, the responses of the 
participants may be said to be contextual and reflexive. This means that the participants 
communicated an evaluation of the IDC within the context of their respective Committees. The 
version may be interpreted as indicating that the IDC is an effective dispute resolution option 
because it is cost-effective and renders fair decisions in a timely manner and in accordance 
with the principles of the Sharia. This explains the use of terms such as ‘treated equally’, ‘fair’, 
‘swift’, ‘cost’ and ‘Shariah’. These terms that are highlighted and underlined in the quotes 
above constituted the interpretative repertoire and were also categorised as themes. 
Despite the positive and very positive opinion of the IDC, the participants were not critical of 
the Board of Grievances. They were asked to indicate and explain their opinion about the Board 
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of Grievances as an insurance dispute resolution body (Questions number 12 and 13). Among 
the 2 adjudicators of the SAMA Appeal Committee, Participant 9 noted that the IDC should be 
compared to the summary court rather than the Board of Grievances, and Participant 12 stated 
that the Board of Grievances performs similar functions as the SAMA Appeal Committee but 
the Board has more experienced and better trained judges than the IDC.  
The reluctance to criticise the Board, which was the first form of administrative tribunal created 
in the KSA, may be explained by the fact that the Board of Grievance remains a very influential 
institution in the Kingdom and may still hear appeals from the Primary Committees as shown 
in Chapter 3. However, the researcher had expected the participants to discuss the fact that the 
Board declined to adjudicate disputes based on conventional insurance contracts on the grounds 
that such contracts violated the Shariah.146 Hence, it is uncertain whether the IDC marks an 
improvement upon the Board from the participants’ standpoint.147  Also, the participants did 
not discuss why the settlement of insurance disputes by the Board was deemed unsatisfactory 
to the point of creating an administrative tribunal separate from the Board to settle these 
disputes.148 
The participants were also asked to state and explain their opinion about other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, namely arbitration, negotiation and mediation (Questions 
number 14 and 15). The participants responded as follows: 
Participant 1: 
Arbitration laws mainly target foreign investors. The arbitration law took into account many 
practical considerations, but the regime is very complex and expensive for the local insured 
with few resources. Negotiation and mediation are good options, but the weaker parties are 
not comfortable sitting with big insurance companies across the table. 
Participant 3: 
Alternative resolution options are good. but they do not work for poor people. In insurance, 
the dispute must be resolved quickly. Arbitration can take many months or even years. 
                                                          
146 See especially Appeal No. 3/T/141 of Year 1407H (the Board declined to hear the dispute despite a 
recommendation by the Governor that the Board should make a judgment about the disputed matter).  
147 See also Appeal No. 1228/AS/6 of Year 1431H; Appeal No. S/23973 of Year 1436; Appeal No. S/2/324 of 
Year 1432H (the Board of Grievances held that a contract was void because it contained elements of riba and 
gharar). 
148 In Appeal No. Q/7138 of Year 1432H, the Board of Grievances declined to hear an insurance dispute on the 
grounds that the IDC is the competent authority to hear such disputes. 
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Mediation is unreliable. The poor person does not know whether the insurance company will 
obey the mediator. 
Participant 4: 
Mediation is voluntary. Arbitration is voluntary. There are many centres that handle these. 
However, they have not been successful with insurance claims. They have procedures and rules 
that many people think are complex. 
Participant 8: 
When we receive cases, it is because negotiators and mediators have failed, and the parties do 
not want to go arbitration. If these options were good, we would not be receiving so many 
cases. 
Participant 12: 
Most people are devout Muslims. They want to enter into agreements and settle disputes 
according to the laws laid down by the Great Prophet (peace be upon him). Arbitration can be 
done according to a foreign law. Negotiators may not be trained Shariah judges or advisors.  
The participants communicated an evaluation of ADR options within the context of the Saudi 
insurance market. The version communicated may be interpreted as indicating that the ADR 
options are not effective in the KSA because they are ‘complex’, ‘expensive’, protracted, and 
‘unreliable’. This assessment may be contrasted with the doctrinal analysis in Chapter 4 which 
concluded that ADR options emphasise speed, efficiency, simplicity and cost-effectiveness. 
Thus, there is a disconnect between an independent investigator’s analysis of the ADR options 
and the assessment by persons who are part of the system. The perception of the IDC 
adjudicators is that policyholders are not satisfied with the ADR options because they are 
inaccessible to persons with few resources due to huge costs and delays. Also, they do not 
apply the Shariah. However, in Chapter 4, it was noted that the shortcomings of negotiation 
and mediation are related to the absence of clear procedural guidelines,149 while arbitration is 
a commendable dispute resolution option, but insurers may impose arbitrators on policyholders 
through contracts of adhesion. 
It is therefore unsurprising that 16 of the 19 participants indicated that they strongly support 
the requirement to submit all insurance-related disputes to the IDC (Question number 16). 3 
                                                          
149 As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, parties who submit disputes to the IDC are required to seek mediation first.  
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participants indicated that they moderately supported the requirement and explained their 
choice (Question number 17) by stating the importance of ‘choice’ and the respect for ‘party 
autonomy’.150 Participant 9 made the following pertinent remark: 
All these options are important means of settling disputes, even the courts. But the disputes 
concern agreements that the parties freely enter. They must also be free to choose the arbiter 
and place and even the law. This is called party autonomy. This freedom is recognised under 
Islamic law unless the agreement has haram elements. 
The participants were also asked whether there is any hierarchy or priority of sources of law 
when applying precedent (Question number 18). The objective was to determine whether the 
Committees observe the doctrine of precedent in practice. In Chapter 3, it was noted that in 
accordance with the CICCL, the Committees have the ability to create precedent through the 
publication of their decisions. 15 IDC decisions are published on the General Secretariat’s 
website and all 15 cases are analysed in Chapter 5. The doctrinal analysis then concluded that 
by publishing the Committees’ opinions, even if anonymised, the public is enlightened on what 
the law is and how it is applied in practice; and predictability is enhanced.  
However, the 19 participants noted that they are required to apply the Shariah or Islamic law 
first and then the relevant legislation and regulations. In fact, 8 of the 19 participants simply 
wrote Islamic law or Shariah. As such, in practice, the doctrine of precedent does not seem to 
have taken hold. The IDC adjudicators did not think about previous decisions when asked about 
any hierarchy or priority of sources of law. This once again demonstrates the disconnect 
between the doctrinal analysis and the perception of persons who are part of the system. The 
doctrinal analysis concluded that the use of precedent is an important advantage of the IDC. 
However, the empirical inquiry reveals that adjudicators do not even consider precedent when 
discussing the sources of law. 151  
The question about precedent is closely related to that about whether there is a requirement to 
provide a well-reasoned explanation of the law applied and demonstrate the route taken to reach 
conclusions (Question number 19). The participants contended that this was so obvious as to 
need express requirement. They stated as follows: 
                                                          
150 The IDC has recognised the freedom of parties to execute their agreement. In Case No. 250036, the Primary 
Committee recognised and enforced an agreement between the policyholder and insurer on an indemnity payment, 
although the policyholder agreed only because he was in desperate need of money. 
151 This is consistent with the fact that the researcher was able to obtain 102 decisions of the Committees and 
Board of Grievances, and none of the decisions relied on or even cited precedent.  
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Participant 3: 
When you grant a decision, you must also explain the process of making that decision. That is 
the only way that the parties will understand your decision. If your decision is not well-
reasoned, then it is not a good decision. 
Participant 11: 
Judges have always explained their conclusions. Even mediators and negotiators explain their 
conclusions. They show how it is related to the Shariah and how it is related to the decree that 
they are applying. It has always been the practice. 
Participant 15: 
Yes, there is a requirement. It is a requirement for all judges in all courts. We must provide a 
well-reasoned explanation of the facts and the law and we must show the parties why one 
party’s argument is strong and the other is weak.  
Participant 16: 
The Quran wants us to be fair. We must judge everyone according to what is fair and good, 
and we must show them – explain to them so that they can understand, and everyone can 
understand. That is what we do as judges. 
It is noted in Chapter 3 that the requirement that a tribunal provides the reasons supporting its 
decision coincides with the policy reasons for making tribunal decisions public and assist in 
the development of precedent. The absence of such a requirement makes it difficult for an 
aggrieved party to challenge the decision on appeal, to the extent such an appeal is even 
permissible, or otherwise pursue judicial review of any alleged impropriety within the 
proceedings. The perception of the participants is that there is no need for an express 
requirement given that this is the essence of judging. Thus, judges and panels have ‘always’ 
‘explained’ or ‘shown’ how their decision is ‘fair’ and conforms to the ‘Shariah’.  
However, it is noted in Chapter 3 that Article 180 of the Law of Procedure requires the 
objection brief (application for appeal) to contain the grounds for the objection, the requests of 
the objector, and the reasons in support of the objection. In other words, the appellant must 
specifically plead the reason they believe the Primary Committee erred in rendering its 
judgment and make a claim for the relief sought. It was then noted that what is noticeably 
absent from the Law of Procedure is any clear delineation of the grounds for objection and 
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appeal. In the decisions of the Committees published by the General Secretariat, the 
adjudicators do not provide a well-reasoned explanation of the law applied and demonstrate 
the route taken to reach their conclusions. They briefly discuss the facts and state their 
decisions. As such, there is once again a disconnect between the doctrinal analysis and the 
perception of the actors in the system. The doctrinal analysis concluded that there is no 
guidance on how the Committees should clearly inform the parties as to the grounds on which 
they can appeal a decision. However, the IDC adjudicators contend that they always provide a 
well-reasoned explanation. 
The participants were also asked whether there is any guidance or timeframe within which the 
case must be concluded (Question Number 20). The participants responded as follows: 
Participant 1: 
We do not have the same formalities as courts. We decide cases after a few months. It may 
take up to seven months where the evidence is complex, but it is usually a matter of a few 
months. 
Participant 3: 
The flexibility of the Committee allows for swift decisions. Cases are concluded here much 
faster than in ordinary courts because the rules are simple, and parties do not even need 
lawyers to defend their interests. 
Participant 10: 
There is no guidance or timeframe unless after the decision has been granted. Then the parties 
have a timeframe for filing an appeal. Committees make decisions in a quick but fair manner. 
That is why the Committees were created. 
Participant 14: 
Parties have enough time to present evidence and arguments. Then we examine the evidence 
and the arguments and decide. This usually happens in three months. It may take a longer time, 
but it is always very short compared to courts or arbitration. 
The participants therefore communicated that there is no guidance or timeframe within which 
cases must be concluded. However, they noted that they provide faster resolutions to disputes 
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when compared to ordinary courts because of ‘simple’ or informal and ‘flexible’ procedures. 
They also noted that the timeline for a case is often a ‘few months.’152 
6.5.2.1.2 Deference to Moral Preferences and Policy Considerations 
In Chapter 5, it was contended that the high level of user satisfaction with the IDC may be 
explained by the fact that the Committees grant decisions that the users consider fair. It was 
also argued that users may consider decisions fair because IDC adjudicators defer to moral 
preferences and policy considerations. 
The participants were asked about the importance of moral/religious preferences and policy 
considerations in deciding cases (Question Number 21) and whether they consider the 
conscionability of the contractual terms and the reasonable expectations of the parties when 
deciding cases (Question Number 22).  
With regard to the importance of moral and religious preferences and policy considerations, all 
the participants pointed out that they had an obligation to apply the Shariah.  
Participant 3: 
The Shariah is the Constitution. It is the foundation of laws. Moral/religious preferences 
dictate our actions and decisions. If your action violates the Shariah, we will decide against 
you. If you are dishonest, if you are trying to deceive the other person, then you are not a good 
Muslim and we will decide against you. 
Participant 4: 
We must apply the Shariah. That is the main law. It is a religious law, but it is also positive 
law. We consider policy if it is in accordance with the Shariah.  
Participant 13: 
The Judge must be a good and devout Muslim. Moral/religious preferences are very important. 
They determine who wins the case.  
With regard to the consideration of the conscionability of the contractual terms and the 
reasonable expectations of the parties when deciding cases, the participants stated as follows: 
                                                          
152 This is consistent with the findings of the study conducted by Nimmer that the views of adjudicators are 
important determinants of the stress laid by Courts on administrative goals such as timeliness. See R Nimmer, ‘A 
Slightly Moveable Object: A Case Study in Judicial Reform in the Criminal Justice Process: The Omnibus 
Hearing’ (1976) 48 Denver Law Journal 206, 230. 
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Participant 1: 
Parties must act in good faith. Islamic law imposes a good faith obligation on all persons. If 
the contract is unconscionable, then one party acted in bad faith and cannot be given a 
favourable judgement. 
Participant 3: 
Conscionability and reasonable expectation depend on what is fair in each case. If the 
expectations are reasonable and fair, then we have to take that into account. If contractual 
terms are not conscionable from my standpoint as a judge, then yes, I will not enforce those 
terms. 
Participant 9: 
The expectations of the parties are very important if they are reasonable and the parties are 
honest. Did they have those expectations when entering into the contract? Did the other party 
know they had those expectations? Is it fair to make these assumptions? These are all important 
factors. 
Participant 13: 
There are many complaints about insurance companies imposing one-sided contracts on 
customers. We do not enforce such contracts against customers where they no choice and have 
contributed to the pool.  
Participant 17: 
We consider the conscionability of the contractual terms when the terms are the insurance 
company’s terms and the customer was not given the opportunity to negotiate. We consider 
the reasonable expectation of the parties if it is fair to both parties. Islamic law requires 
fairness. We can adopt foreign models if they comply with the Shariah. 
The participants therefore communicated that moral and religious preferences are part and 
parcel of the Shariah which they must apply as ‘good and devout Muslims.’ The participants 
also communicated that they may take into account the conscionability of the contractual terms 
and the reasonable expectation of the parties if it is ‘fair’ in the circumstances and the parties 
acted in ‘good faith’. This is because the ‘Shariah’ requires fairness. The participants did not 
state that they consider unconscionability and reasonable expectation as principles guiding the 
interpretation of contracts. They simply endorsed the values underpinning these principles. 
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Hence, the principles may be said to be an inevitable consequence of efforts geared at achieving 
fair outcomes.  
The responses of the participants are concordant with the contention in Chapter 5 that in 
practice the Committees provide protection to policyholders by conceiving of problems such 
as illusory coverage or unconscionable advantages as interpretive. This reinforces the 
submission in Chapter 5 that the high level of user’s satisfaction with the IDC may be explained 
by the fairness of outcomes in the Primary Committees and Appeal Committee. 
6.5.2.1.3 Participants’ Perspective on the Experience of Users 
The participants were asked to explain why most consumers are satisfied with their experience 
with the IDC (Question number 23) and whether they know of any concerns that consumers 
have with the IDC (Question number 24).  
With regard to high level of consumers’ satisfaction, the participants explained as follows: 
Participant 1: 
Consumers are happy with the Committees because it is a better alternative than the courts 
and arbitration. They are given the opportunity to settle through mediation but most of them 
prefer the Committees. We apply the Shariah in a fast and flexible way.  
 
Participant 6: 
 
The Committees protect consumers. They are satisfied because they cannot be abused by the 
insurance companies. They are treated fairly by the Committees and they obtain swift 
compensation.  
 
Participant 13: 
 
Consumers are satisfied because the process is fast, cheap and straightforward. The 
Committees were created to protect them. So, they satisfied with the protection provided by the 
Committees which is better than what mediation offers.  
 
Participant 14: 
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They satisfied because they get a decision in a matter of a few months. We decide what is fair 
for the parties and direct insurance companies on how to pay compensation in a manner that 
is pleasing for all. There is no better and more effective system than this. 
 
Participant 18: 
 
The Committee gives them the opportunity to challenge insurance companies. They can do so 
with limited resources and they obtain compensation after a few months.  
 
With regard to any concerns that consumers may have with the IDC, the participants responded 
as follows: 
 
Participant 3: 
 
Some of the insurance contracts do not comply with the Shariah and we cannot recognise and 
enforce them. This is where we cannot sever the non-compliant parts from the rest of the 
contract. It can be very difficult for consumers who have contributed for many years and need 
compensation. 
 
Participant 4: 
 
Some are not happy with a strict application of the Shariah. Others are not happy because the 
Committees are too liberal. They are not always sure about how we will apply the Shariah. 
 
Participant 8: 
 
Many consumers need immediate compensation. They come to us because the insurance 
companies do not want to compensate them for their loss. Going through the process and 
waiting for six months for a decision can be very difficult. 
 
Participant 15: 
 
Sometimes procedures are slow and complex. They have to travel to Jeddah or Riyadh for the 
hearing. There are important costs involved especially where the process takes several months. 
 
The participants communicated that the high level of satisfaction of consumers may be 
explained by the fact that the IDC applies the Shariah, the parties are treated fairly by the 
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Committees, and the process is speedy, cost-effective and simple. They also stated that the IDC 
is ‘better’ or more effective than litigation and other ADR options.  
The participants also communicated that the Committees do not always enforce contracts that 
are not Shariah-compliant, and for some consumers, the process is slow, costly and 
unpredictable. Nonetheless, this is concordant with only two of the six shortcomings of the 
IDC discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5: cost and duration and unpredictability. The IDC 
adjudicators did not mention privacy, flexibility, neutrality, and finality and enforceability. 
6.5.2.1.4 Participants’ Conclusions and Recommendations 
In conclusion, the participants were asked whether the current substantive and procedural laws 
allow Committees to address the concerns of consumers (Question number 25). The 
participants were also asked to make recommendations of changes they would like 
implemented (Question number 26).  
With regard to the current substantive and procedural laws and recommendations, the 
participants testified as follows: 
Participant 1: 
Our insurance market is relatively new and continues to evolve every year. The Cooperative 
Insurance Law and the Shariah regulate this market in a flexible manner. It is important for 
the law to state clearly when insurance from non-Muslim countries applies and when it should 
be rejected outright. 
Participant 2: 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency is the regulator of the insurance market and also the 
appellate body. Our decisions are appealed to this agency. It wields too much power. We need 
more legal checks to encourage more independence. 
Participant 5: 
Some parties still find it difficult to present their case and arguments during the hearings 
before the Committees. 
Part 13: 
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The procedural rules are unclear. The Committees have a very broad discretion as to matters 
of evidence and procedure. Parties are not sure whether they can rely only on written 
declarations or testimonies to support their cases. 
Participant 15: 
The physical location of the Primary Committees was moved out of the premises of the 
Monetary Agency but there are still only three Primary Committees and a centre for motor 
insurance claims.  
The participants therefore communicated that the Committees will be able to address 
consumers’ concerns in a more effective way if the law provides for independence of the 
process, more clarity in the procedure, addresses logistical constraints and allows parties who 
are unable engage in oral advocacy to rely on other types of evidence.  
Table I below shows how the researcher identified the interpretative repertoires and used the 
cluster of participants’ expressions or terms to construct meaning. In other words, it shows how 
the participants’ responses positioned the IDC as regards the high level of satisfaction of 
consumers.  
Table I: Interpretative repertoires and how they position the IDC with regard to consumer 
satisfaction 
 
Consumers are satisfied because of … 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
Cost and duration Shariah-
compliance 
Impartiality Flexibility Predictability 
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Procedures are in 
the IDC are cost-
effective and 
speedy: 
 
few months, 
swift, fast, short, 
cheap, less 
expensive, 
enough time, few 
months, better 
alternative, 
resources, 
immediate 
compensation 
 
 
 
The Committees 
apply Islamic 
law: 
 
 
 
Islamic law, 
Shariah, Quran, 
good and devout 
Muslim 
The Committees 
are impartial: 
 
 
fair, treated 
equally, good 
faith, honest 
The procedures 
are flexible: 
 
 
 
simple, not 
complex, 
reasonable, one-
sided, 
opportunity to 
negotiate, 
contributed to 
pool 
Decision-making 
by the 
Committees is 
predictable: 
 
reliable, 
straightforward, 
well-reasoned, 
always explain, 
understand 
 
 
Table I above shows how the researcher used the discourse analytic method to capture the 
participants’ perspective on adjudication in the IDC. The perception of the IDC adjudicators 
who were the participants may explain why the IDC should enjoy such a high level of 
institutional legitimacy (as shown in Chapter 5) despite the absence of clear guidance by the 
Working Rules (as shown in Chapters 3 and 4). The participants’ expressions that were 
extracted and isolated by the researcher are highlighted. These expressions were mentioned 
consistently by the participants and illuminate the research phenomenon. In order to transform 
the expressions into statements appropriate to scientific discourse supporting this study, the 
expressions were grouped to form clusters of themes which represent each column in the table. 
A summary of all the themes provides a holistic perspective on the relationship between the 
high level of satisfaction of consumers and IDC adjudication. As such, consumers are satisfied 
with the IDC adjudication because the procedures are cost-effective and speedy, the 
Committees are impartial and apply Islamic law, the procedures are flexible, and decision-
making is predictable.  
The disconnect between the theoretical/doctrinal analysis and the practical inquiry shown in 
Chapter 5 may be explained by the fact the theoretical/doctrinal analysis was shaped by 
principles and ideals of the United Kingdom and United States given that the analysis is largely 
based on scholarship from these countries. The qualitative study therefore reveals that the high 
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level of satisfaction of users of the IDC may be explained by factors that are unique to the 
Saudi society; factors which may not be easily captured by an investigator who is far removed 
from the society. Thus, the IDC adjudicators have a different conception of what constitutes a 
well-reasoned explanation, and the explanations they provide satisfy the parties, specifically 
consumers. Also, the adjudicators do not consider precedent when discussing the sources of 
law. Hence, neither the adjudicators nor the parties believe creating and applying precedent 
enlightens the public and enhances predictability. Lastly, from the perspective of adjudicators 
and consumers, ADR options are more inaccessible to with regard to cost and duration. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Following the doctrinal analysis (conducted in Chapters 3 and 4) and the practical inquiry 
(conducted in Chapter 5), empirical data was collected justifying the contention that the level 
of satisfaction of parties, specifically consumers or policyholders, is strongly linked with their 
satisfaction with the outcomes of the hearings or whether they believe the adjudicator’s 
decision is fair. A critical review of the existing literature undertaken in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
as well as the critical examination of IDC cases undertaken in Chapter 5 informed the empirical 
inquiry. Given that the qualitative research methodology adopted for the study was 
phenomenology, the researcher’s conclusions are based on the perceptions of IDC adjudicators.  
The sampling strategy used was purposive sampling. The adjudicators of the IDC who were 
available and accepted to participate in the study comprised the sample. The size of the sample 
that was selected was 34 adjudicators or members of the IDC, whether they served as legal 
advisors or panel members drawn from the insurance industry.19 of the 34 adjudicators decided 
to participate in the study. The participants were well versed with the studied phenomenon. 
This enhanced the dependability and conformability of the findings. The researcher used the 
questionnaire to collect qualitative data. The participants were able to complete the 
questionnaires diligently in the calm of their offices or home. They had the opportunity to read 
up on the relevant issues to refresh their memories before responding to the questions. This 
would not have been possible if the researcher had used the face-to-face or telephone 
interviews. The questions were directed to the participants’ experiences, perceptions, 
viewpoints and convictions about the IDC. 
The analysis of the data was conducted at the textual and interpretative level. The researcher 
built interpretative repertoires by identifying terms or expressions that were consistently used 
by the participants to describe adjudication by the IDC. Responses that were similar were 
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placed under the same category. The participants stated that the IDC is an effective dispute 
resolution option because it is cost-effective and renders fair decisions in a timely manner and 
in accordance with the principles of the Shariah. They also stated that the ADR options 
(arbitration, mediation, and negotiation) are not effective in the KSA because they are complex, 
expensive, protracted, and unreliable. They did not consider precedent when asked about any 
hierarchy or priority of sources of law. They simply emphasised the primacy of Islamic law. 
Also, they stated that there was no need for a requirement that a tribunal provides the reasons 
supporting its decision because that this is the essence of judging. Also, they stated that the 
IDC provides faster resolutions to disputes when compared to ordinary courts because of 
informal and flexible procedures. Also, they agreed that they may take into account the 
conscionability of the contractual terms and the reasonable expectations of parties because the 
Shariah requires fairness. 
It was then argued that the disconnect between the theoretical/doctrinal analysis and the 
practical inquiry may be explained by the fact the theoretical/doctrinal analysis was shaped by 
principles and ideals of the United Kingdom and United States given that the analysis is largely 
based on a review of literature from these countries. Thus, the qualitative study reveals that the 
high level of satisfaction of users of the IDC may be explained by factors that are unique to the 
Saudi society; factors which may not be easily captured by an external investigator or one who 
is far removed from the society.  
The next Chapter concludes this study by linking the outcomes of the theoretical/doctrinal 
analysis, practical inquiry and qualitative study to the research aim and questions. It also makes 
recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The following avenues in which consumers may challenge insurers’ adverse determinations 
have been critically assessed in this study:  the IDC (administrative tribunal), litigation, 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. However, in the KSA, parties must submit disputes to 
the IDC. The parties are then required to seek mediation, and if it fails, the dispute is submitted 
to a relevant Primary Committee. It is uncertain what factors motivated the Saudi legislator to 
compel IDC adjudication. This study has sought to determine whether the legislator is justified. 
This Chapter concludes the study by showing how the research questions were addressed in 
order to achieve the research aim. It also makes proposals for reform and recommendations for 
further studies. 
7.2 Addressing the Research Questions and Achieving the Research Aim 
In Chapter 1, it is noted that this study is premised on the contention that the security promised 
by substantive insurance law to consumers is inconsequential if it cannot be delivered through 
an efficient and effective dispute resolution option. In light of this contention, the study set out 
to determine whether the administrative tribunal created by the CICCL as the official and 
compulsory dispute resolution forum for all insurance disputes, the IDC, is the most effective 
dispute resolution option in the KSA. In order to achieve this aim, the following questions are 
addressed: 
 What is the rationale for compelling IDC adjudication?  
 Have IDC adjudicators adopted any specific measures to protect consumers?  
 Are consumers satisfied with the IDC? 
 What is the most effective ADR option for policyholders seeking to challenge the 
adverse determinations of insurers in the KSA? 
 Can an empirical study explain the disconnect between the doctrinal analysis and the 
findings of a practical inquiry of the IDC? 
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In addressing the above questions, this study demonstrates that although the Saudi legislator 
has established a fast and accessible resolution forum for consumers, there are flaws in the 
CICCL and its Implementing Regulations as well as in their implementation that prevent the 
development of a formal and cost-effective forum that is more accessible than courts and other 
forms of ADR. This section shows how each question was addressed.  
 
7.2.1 What is the Rationale for Compelling IDC Adjudication? 
This question is addressed by Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6. In Chapter 2, it is noted that the notion of 
insurance has its roots in early Arabic society. Thus, it is not new in the KSA. Its origins may 
be traced to the concept of Aqilah, which refers to a pool of risk and resources. It was adopted 
by early Islamic authorities and became the cornerstone of the development of the Islamic 
principles of shared responsibility, social solidarity, and mutual cooperation. Hence, it justified 
the provision of mutual financial security against specified risks of loss or damage to 
participants in a cooperative insurance scheme.  
However, it is also noted that conventional insurance remains controversial from the Islamic 
perspective. As a result, the Board of Grievances consistently dismissed claims based on 
conventional insurance policies on the grounds that such policies were not Shariah-compliant. 
Examples are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Thus, consumers were generally unable to 
challenge adverse coverage determinations made by conventional insurers in Saudi courts. This 
problem became pressing at the beginning of this century because in 2002, the Foreign 
Investment Act allowed companies to have foreign majority ownership, and in 2003, insurance 
was removed from the list of sectors in which foreign entities were prohibited from investing. 
Also, in 2004, the Saudi government formally ended its monopoly over the insurance industry 
by inviting private companies to register and trade as public listed companies on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Taduwal). As such, consumers increasingly purchased conventional 
insurance policies from several private insurers, thereby increasing the incidence of insurance-
related disputes between consumers and insurers based on conventional policies.  
In November 2003, the CICCL came into force. Its Implementing Regulations were published 
in April 2004. The CICCL provides that insurance products must be purchased within the scope 
of Islamic finance and its Implementing Regulations. It also empowers the central bank, 
SAMA, to regulate the insurance industry. Importantly, Article 20 of the CICCL provides for 
the creation of Committees that hear and decide insurance-related disputes. This led to the 
creation of the IDC. This local forum has exclusive jurisdiction over insurance-related disputes 
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in the KSA, and participation is not voluntary. Although the CICCL does not prohibit 
arbitration of insurance disputes in the KSA, arbitration clauses in insurance contracts must be 
approved by SAMA, and SAMA’s policy is that all parties should submit disputes to the IDC. 
The rationale for compelling the creation of the IDC is that the creation of an administrative 
forum in which legal and industry experts can resolve disputes related to Shariah-compliant 
insurance policies and Shariah non-compliant conventional policies would ensure the swift, 
flexible and cost-effective resolution of insurance disputes. It must be noted that this conclusion 
is based on the researcher’s assessment of the CICCL and Implementing Regulations, given 
that the government has not explained the motivation behind Article 20 of the CICCL.  
 
An assessment of the IDC Procedural Rules (as amended in 2014) reveals that the IDC 
procedure is streamlined and offers the prospect of a faster and more flexible and accessible 
resolution than litigation. For example, the CICCL does not mandate a specific procedure for 
resolving disputes in the Primary Committees and SAMA Appeal Committee. The adjudicators 
are simply required to give each party an opportunity to be heard and choose the remedy that 
is best adapted in each case. Hence, the adjudicators consider a broad array of evidence from 
oral testimony to sworn statements by witnesses and policyholders may recover their legal fees 
in addition to compensation. Nonetheless, this begs the question whether the IDC represents a 
better dispute resolution option than other forms of ADR which the Saudi legislator could have 
recommended. In other words, has the endeavour to resolve insurance-related disputes in a fast, 
flexible and cost-efficient forum created a better source of compensation for aggrieved 
consumers or policyholders than negotiation, mediation, and arbitration? Finding an answer is 
the main aim of this study. The answer to the question regarding the rationale for compelling 
IDC adjudication leads us to contend the Saudi government believes that the IDC is a better 
source of compensation for aggrieved consumers or policyholders than other forms of ADR 
and litigation. The next section discusses the second question addressed in this study in order 
to achieve the same aim. 
7.2.2 Have IDC Adjudicators Adopted Any Specific Measures to Protect 
Consumers?  
Given the lack of specificity in the provisions of the IDC Procedural Rules regarding panel 
decision-making as well as the broad discretion enjoyed by IDC adjudicators, the decisions of 
the Committees seldom appeal to any Sharia principle or provision of the CICCL. Rulings are 
based on what is, in the opinion of the panel, logical and fair in the circumstances. Hence, some 
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decisions of Primary Committees may be explained by the fact that they prefer interpretations 
that are fair and reasonable to interpretations that lead to unreasonable or unfair outcomes. For 
example, the Primary Committee has ruled that it is unfair for third parties to be harmed by the 
sale of third-party liability insurance policies that contain illusory coverage.1 Also, the Primary 
Committee’s panel of adjudicators largely appealed to its members’ personal values or sense 
of justice in order to rule that policyholders must be protected where there is uncertainty.2 The 
Committees have also focused on what the members consider fair and just,3 and the 
reasonableness of claimants’ expectations that their losses were covered.4 It is equally 
important to note that unlike the Board of Grievances, Primary Committees do not refuse to 
hear claims because they are based on conventional insurance policies which are generally not 
Shariah-compliant or contain prohibited elements such as Gharar (uncertainty) or Riba 
(interest). 
 
It is shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that decisions of the SAMA Appeal Committee have sometimes 
been based on the members’ evaluation of the conscionability of the contractual terms, with 
little regard given to legalistic justification.5 The Appeal Committee has also held that it would 
be unconscionable to impose an obligation on the insurer to indemnify policyholders who have 
suffered loss or damage but have not submitted a claim to the insurer.6 
 
As such, the IDC Committees have adopted specific measures to protect consumers where 
necessary. In fact, in the 102 motor insurance cases resolved between 2007 and 2017 (cited in 
Appendix I), the Committees have only affirmed insurers’ decisions not to pay compensation 
where the losses suffered by the claimants were clearly not covered by the policies.7 Where 
there was illusory coverage or the policyholders reasonably expected that the losses were 
                                                          
1 See Case No. 360714, Jeddah Primary Committee, Decision No. 343/C/1436 AH; Case No. 261154, Riyadh 
Primary Committee, Decision No. 1429-44; Case No. 300734, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. Case 
No. 261154. 
2 See Case No. 370207, Dammam Committee, Decision No. 83/D/1437 AH. 
3 See Case No. 330440, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1433-210; Case No. 370783, Dammam 
Committee, Decision No. 192/D/1437 AH. 
4 See Case No. 360310, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 276/T/1436 AH; Case No. 261187, Riyadh 
Primary Committee; Case No. 250106, Riyadh Committee; Case No. 290206, Jeddah Committee. 
5 See Appeal No. 2370029, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 96/A/1437 AH; Appeal No. 2370054, Appeal 
Committee, Decision No. 139/A/1437 AH. 
6 See Appeal No. 3370036, Appeal Committee, Decision No. 191/A/1437 AH and Appeal No. 1330265, Appeal 
Committee, Decision No. 629/A/1436 AH. 
7 See for example, Case No. 260022, Jeddah Primary Committee; Case No. 270296, Jeddah Primary Committee; 
Case No. 290705, Riyadh Primary Committee.  
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covered, the Committees have decided in favour of the claimants and ordered the insurers to 
pay the claimants’ legal fees in addition to compensation.8 
 
It must however be noted that the Committees have hardly appealed to the prescriptions of the 
relevant statutes or IDC precedent, contrary to Article 9 of the Working Rules. The panels seem 
to rely mainly on members’ personal sense of justice. This is arbitrary and renders no assistance 
to the jurisprudence. It makes it difficult to prognosticate the continuous protection of 
consumers in future. It also makes it difficult to argue that the IDC represents a better dispute 
resolution option than other forms of ADR and litigation. 
7.2.3 Are Consumers Satisfied with the IDC? 
As noted in Chapter 5, previous studies have shown that the level of satisfaction of litigants 
with small claims is strongly linked with their satisfaction with the outcomes of the hearings 
or whether they believe the adjudicator’s decision is fair.9 Also, the influential study conducted 
by Rottman et al revealed that a high level of satisfaction with courts is explained by three 
predictors, namely, belief in fair procedures, belief in courts being affordable and proceedings 
being timeous, and belief in fair outcomes.10 In the same vein, the high level of satisfaction of 
IDC users as shown in the results of the surveys conducted by the General Secretariat in 
Chapter 5 may be attributed to the respondents’ belief in the fairness of procedures and 
outcomes. 
The General Secretariat’s surveys show that procedural fairness accounts for more variance 
than any variable. It comprised the following factors: procedure for communicating hearing 
dates, how the hearing was conducted, time taken to resolve the case, and compliance with the 
timeframe for delivering the ruling. The respondents were satisfied with the way the 
Committees followed the rules, respected the rights of parties, as well as the flexibility of the 
                                                          
8 See Case No. 280188, Riyadh Primary Committee; Case No. 290829, Dammam Primary Committee; Case No. 
340315, Dammam Primary Committee. 
9 See R Gosling, Survey of Litigants’ Experiences and Satisfaction with the Small Claims Process (Department of 
Constitutional Affairs Research Series 2006) 42-43, 239; H Angle et al, Witness Satisfaction: Findings from the 
Witness Satisfaction Survey 2002 (Home Office 2003) 47, 59-61; E Whitehead, Witness Satisfaction: Findings 
from the Witness Satisfaction Survey 2000 (Home Office 2001) 71-73. See also H Genn et al, Tribunals for Diverse 
Users (Department for Constitutional Affairs Research Series 2006) 239 (the outcome of proceedings in tribunals 
is the only variable independently linked to fairness). See also B Hayward et al, Findings from the Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications 2003 (Department of Trade and Industry Employment Relations Research 
Series 2004) 59, 150 (dissatisfaction with successful outcomes may be explained by the levels of compensation 
being lower than expected and the absence of a formal apology). 
10 D Rottman et al, Perceptions of the Courts in Your Community: The Influence of Experience, Race and Ethnicity 
(National Center for State Courts 2003) 53-54. 
231 
 
processes as regards the conduct of the hearing where parties’ arguments were heard in open 
court and their expectations were taken into account by the panel of adjudicators.  
 
Also, it is shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that although the panels of adjudicators in the various 
Committees have not adopted common measures to guide future panels in protecting 
consumers, the panels generally rely on the members’ personal sense of justice to achieve this 
objective. Thus, it is submitted that the level of satisfaction of parties, specifically consumers 
or policyholders, is strongly linked with their satisfaction with the fairness of the outcomes of 
the hearings. It is also submitted that the level of satisfaction of parties provides support to the 
contention that the IDC is an effective dispute resolution option. The next section shows how 
this study achieved the aim of determining whether the IDC represents the best dispute 
resolution for consumers. 
7.2.4 What is the Most Effective ADR Option? 
 
In order to achieve the research aim of determining whether the IDC provides the best forum 
for consumers in the KSA, the IDC is analysed at three levels: doctrinal, practical and 
empirical. The doctrinal analysis of the relevant laws and regulations governing the IDC is 
conducted in Chapters 3 and 4; while Chapters 5 and 6 analyse empirical data collected by the 
General Secretariat and the researcher.  
In Chapter 3, it is noted that the IDC is an administrative tribunal which runs parallel to the 
court system, in a space situated somewhere between executive and judiciary bodies. This 
explains why it is used as a legal control mechanism for decision-making in the administration. 
It is also stated that the choice of the administrative tribunal model is justified from a doctrinal 
standpoint because previous studies have shown that administrative tribunals provide faster 
and more cost-effective resolutions of disputes, compared to the ordinary court structure. Thus, 
a consumer with few resources may pursue a claim before the IDC, either with or without 
counsel, and the lesser procedural burden often results in time and cost savings for the 
consumer.  
Also, the panel of adjudicators have more flexibility than the judges in courts as regards the 
construction of specific and rule-like doctrines. Although in practice, the Primary Committees 
and Appeal Committee do not generally adhere to prior decisions, their decisions can be treated 
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as precedent which may be deferred to by subsequent Committees in resolving disputes.11 This 
enhances the predictability of the process. 
Nonetheless, the doctrinal analysis revealed that when compared to the archetypal 
administrative tribunal, the IDC does not effectively achieve the primary goal of embracing the 
use of an administrative tribunal, which is to improve parties’ access to justice via a competent 
adjudicative authority within the relevant industry. This is because of the following reasons: 
 There is a noticeable lack of guidance on who may be eligible for appointment to the 
adjudication panel of the Primary Committee. 
 The Working Rules are silent on the impartiality and competence of adjudicators or 
Committee members. Unlike trial judges, who are subject to strict rules on conflicts and 
recusal, there are no comparable provisions governing Committee members. 
 Article 9 of the Working Rules requires the Committees to decide cases ‘in accordance 
with the laws and regulations that determine the nature of the dispute, the applicable 
rules, and rulings reached at by the judiciary, and the comparative jurisprudence for 
settling insurance disputes and violations.’ However, it does not provide for any 
hierarchy or priority of these sources. There is for example no delineation of binding or 
mandatory versus persuasive authority, along with an established order of authority, in 
order for the system to generate predictable and consistent decisions. Such ambiguity 
creates a substantial risk of bias towards the policy preferences of adjudicators. Thus, 
each dispute brought before a Primary Committee is essentially resolved in an ad hoc 
manner. 
 Article 170 of the Law of Procedure provides that ‘[i]f the wording of the judgment is 
vague or confusing, the litigants may request an interpretation from the court that 
rendered the judgment.’ However, this does not shed light on what should be routinely 
included in the Primary Committee’s decision. 
 The Working Rules are silent on the available grounds for objection and appeal, as well 
as the scope of the review upon appeal. This is true for the Appeal Committee (whose 
limited to examine claims of less than 50,000 riyals by Article 8 of the Working Rules). 
                                                          
11 The CICCL requires the Committees to establish and rely on precedents. 
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 The Working Rules are silent on the issue of enforcement. Although the decisions 
issued by courts and arbitral tribunals are subject to enforcement under Enforcement 
Law, Article 2 of this Law expressly excepts administrative decisions. However, it is 
uncertain whether this means decisions rendered in administrative forums or simply, 
decisions related to administrative matters. 
The doctrinal analysis also reveals that the litigation-based model (court system) has the same 
shortcomings as the IDC. This is because of the following reasons: 
 Consumers are likely to face the expenses, delays, and effort required to litigate in the 
IDC. Consumers who have suffered loss and are in desperate need of compensation 
may seldom have sufficient resources to devote to the prolonged IDC adjudication as 
well as litigation.  
 The system is laden with rules, and can be unpredictable, especially where cases are 
decided on an ad hoc basis. 
 No legislation compels courts to specifically address the imbalance of power between 
insurers and consumers which underpins the difficulty of consumers to negotiate terms 
of policies on an equal footing. 
 Where a dispute implicates the substantive laws of more than one country, all Saudi 
courts and administrative tribunals must apply Saudi law as the most appropriate law 
to resolve the dispute. As such, a foreign party with little or no grasp of the Shariah as 
it is applied in the KSA is more likely to avoid both the Saudi court and the IDC. 
Despite the above shortcomings, the doctrinal analysis reveals that the IDC compares 
favourably to negotiation and mediation, but not to arbitration. It is noted that negotiation has 
the following advantages: 
 It is traditionally the preferred method for settling disputes following from the Sulh, 
which means resolving or fixing with emphasis on the importance of religion. Hence, 
disputants in the Middle East have traditionally preferred negotiation because they 
emphasise building personal relations by socialising and settling disputes through 
continued interaction in the Muslim society. A cycle of revenge is avoided and the 
bonds between parties are affirmed.  
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 It is the best option when it becomes clear to the parties that unilateral action through 
the courts or tribunals would impose a heavy toll on both sides.  
 It is more a cost-effective and swifter process for settling disputes than litigation in 
courts and administrative tribunals.  
However, it is pointed out that negotiation has not been very successful because of the 
following reasons: 
 Parties are often too partial and emotionally invested to make rational and objective 
decisions.  
 The effectiveness of negotiation largely depends on the cultural background of the 
parties. It is more likely to be effective where the parties are locals or resident in the 
KSA. They may easily deal with each other directly or through respectable advisors in 
the local community.  
 The absence of any official guidelines is problematic. There is no requirement or even 
expectation of predictability and consistency in the way in which negotiation should be 
conducted. 
With regard to mediation, it is noted that parties are required to seek mediation before 
submitting the disputes to the relevant Primary Committee. It is also noted that this dispute 
resolution option has the following advantages: 
 The culture of mediation was adopted and promoted by the Holy Prophet, and 
subsequently, the successors of the Holy Prophet, Khalifahs, were considered 
mediators.  
 Like negotiation, mediation promotes solidarity between Muslims who must come 
together as members of the community and settle their disputes in a manner that ensures 
peace.  
 Given that mediation is by definition private, it is easier for the parties to ensure the 
confidentiality of the process and even the dispute, unlike litigation, public tribunal 
adjudication or even arbitration.  
 Mediation ensures the achievement of outcomes deemed fair by both parties. 
However, it is noted that mediation has the following disadvantages: 
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 Decisions of the mediator that do not comply with the Shariah are unenforceable.  
 If a party refuses to sign the mediator’s decision, it does not become legally binding on 
both parties. Hence, a party can reject the settlement agreement recorded by the 
mediator.  
 If a party is not willing to assist in reaching an amicable settlement, the mediator cannot 
intervene.  
 Given the absence of official guidelines on qualifications, weaker parties or foreigners 
may be less keen on selecting mediation since it may be difficult to find a mediator who 
is impartial, equidistant and regulates discourse in a manner considered fair by both 
parties. 
With regard to arbitration, it is stated that the CICCL does not prohibit the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses in insurance policies. This option has the following advantages: 
 Like negotiation and mediation, the culture of arbitration was adopted and promoted by 
early Muslims. The Shariah even allows the Dhimmiyin or Jews and Christians who are 
resident in Muslim countries to create a framework for settling their disputes. Thus, 
parties may submit disputes to arbitrators of their choice. However, where one of the 
parties is Muslim, the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools require a Muslim adjudicator 
to settle the dispute, although they also recognise non-Muslim arbitrators where both 
parties consent. 
 Article 16 of the Arbitration Law preserves the arbitrator’s impartiality by requiring 
that an arbitrator should have no vested interest in the dispute.  
 Arbitration defers to party autonomy in resolving disputes allowing the parties to 
choose the arbitrators, seat of arbitration and applicable law. 
 Arbitration is flexible because the arbitral tribunal may apply the laws of a foreign, non-
Muslim country, although it is expected to take the Shariah into account where 
enforcement is anticipated to take place in the KSA.  
 Article 40 of the Arbitration Law requires arbitrators to render their decision within 
twelve months of the initiation of arbitration proceedings.  
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 Given the expediency with which a dispute is resolved through arbitration, the parties 
may benefit from cost savings. 
 The tribunal’s final decision and award are not subject to extensive judicial review or 
appeal.  
 The process is typically the same among varying arbitral institutions, seats, and ad hoc 
models. The Arbitration Law of 2012 is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Thus, there are significant similarities between the KSA’s arbitration regime and that 
of other countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
It is also noted that arbitration has the following disadvantages: 
 Although arbitration ought to provide a private and confidential means for settling 
disputes, there are no privacy laws in the KSA that protect the confidentiality of such 
processes.  
 Consumers are less likely to know impartial and competent arbitrators with no vested 
interest in the case because consumers, unlike insurers, often deal with arbitrators just 
once. 
It must also be noted that although arbitration is the most beneficial option from a 
theoretical perspective, the survey conducted by the General Secretariat shows that 
most users are satisfied with the IDC. 
The comparison of the IDC model to litigation and other forms of ADR from a doctrinal 
perspective is summarised using five criteria for judging the quality of a dispute resolution 
option as shown in Table VII below: 
Table VII: Comparison between the IDC and Other ADR Options 
Dispute 
Resolutio
n Option 
Cost and 
duration 
Shariah-
compliance 
Impartiality Flexibilit
y 
Predictability 
IDC  More 
cost-
effective 
and 
accessible 
than 
litigation. 
 Resolutio
n by 
Primary 
 Decision
s are 
required 
to 
comply 
with the 
Shariah. 
 Insuranc
e 
contract
Lack of guidance 
on eligibility, 
impartiality and 
competence of 
IDC adjudicators. 
Working 
Rules do 
not 
provide 
for any 
hierarchy 
or priority 
of these 
sources. 
 Uncertaint
y 
regarding 
what 
should be 
included 
in Primary 
Committe
es’ 
decisions. 
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Committe
e and 
Appeal 
Committe
e takes 12 
months or 
longer if 
the case is 
complex 
s that are 
non-
complia
nt are 
enforced
. 
 No 
timeframe 
within 
which a 
case must 
be 
concluded
. 
 Uncertaint
y 
regarding 
available 
grounds 
for 
objection 
and 
appeal, 
and the 
scope of 
the review 
upon 
appeal. 
 Decisions 
lack 
finality. 
Litigation Costly and most 
cases last for more 
than 2 years. 
 Decision
s must 
be 
Shariah-
complia
nt.  
 Only 
Shariah-
complia
nt 
contract
s are 
enforced
. 
Clear guidance 
on the eligibility, 
impartiality and 
competence of 
judges. 
Procedure
s are not 
flexible as 
court must 
follow 
rules of 
procedure 
and 
evidence 
strictly. 
 Board of 
Grievance
s has 
enforced 
contracts 
that do not 
comply 
with the 
Shariah in 
a few 
cases. 
 Decisions 
lack 
finality. 
Negotiatio
n 
Cost-effective and 
lasts for a few days 
or weeks. 
Parties may agree 
to enforce 
contracts that are 
not Shariah-
compliant. 
No guidance on 
the eligibility, 
impartiality and 
competence of 
negotiators. 
No 
guidance 
on 
procedure
s. 
 No 
timeframe 
within 
which 
negotiatio
n must be 
concluded
. 
 Decisions 
lack 
finality. 
 
Mediation Cost-effective and 
lasts for a few days 
or weeks. 
Mediation 
through the 
General 
Secretariat must 
No guidance on 
the eligibility, 
impartiality and 
No 
guidance 
on 
 No 
timeframe 
within 
which 
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comply with the 
Shariah.  
competence of 
mediators. 
procedure
s. 
mediation 
must be 
concluded
. 
 Decisions 
lack 
finality. 
 
Arbitration  It is not 
more 
cost-
effective 
than the 
IDC. 
 Arbitrator
s must 
render 
their 
decision 
within 
twelve 
months of 
the 
initiation 
of 
proceedin
gs.  
 
 Parties 
are free 
to 
choose 
the 
applicab
le law 
and seat 
of 
arbitrati
on. 
 The 
arbitral 
award 
must 
comply 
with the 
Shariah 
else it 
would 
not be 
enforced 
in the 
KSA. 
 Arbitrat
ors must 
have no 
vested 
interest 
in the 
case. 
 Insurers 
are more 
likely to 
impose 
arbitrato
rs on 
consum
ers 
through 
contract
s of 
adhesio
n. 
Parties are 
free to 
choose 
any 
language, 
substantiv
e law and 
rules of 
procedure 
 Proceedin
gs are 
typically 
the same 
among 
varying 
arbitral 
institution
s, seats, 
and ad hoc 
models. 
 Decisions 
are not 
subject to 
extensive 
judicial 
review or 
appeal. 
 
Source: Researcher 
In light of the above, it may be concluded that the option with the most advantages for 
consumers as regards successfully challenging insurers’ adverse determinations is arbitration, 
not the IDC administrative model which is prescribed by the CICCL. Although arbitration is 
not as cost-effective and accessible as negotiation and mediation, it is flexible and predictable 
with prescribed rules of procedure, and a clear timeframe within which the arbitration must be 
concluded. The arbitral tribunal must issue the arbitral award within twelve months from the 
date of the commencement of arbitral proceedings. If an award is not issued within this 
timeframe, a party may appeal to the Court of Appeal to issue an order to terminate the 
proceedings. On the other hand, the IDC rules do not provide any guidance on a timeframe 
within which a case must be concluded, leaving the parties with significant uncertainty as to 
how long their case will continue. 
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Without attention to power asymmetries, in the event of loss, a consumer with few resources 
and in urgent need of compensation is more likely to compel insurance companies to indemnify 
him by submitting the dispute to the arbitrator designated in the policy. The arbitrator must 
have no vested interest in the dispute as required by Article 16 of the Arbitration Law. 
Nonetheless, as noted in Chapter 4, insurers may defeat this provision by naming friendly 
arbitrators in contracts of adhesion, whereby consumers are not empowered to negotiate or 
counter the insurers’ offer. This is unlikely to happen at the IDC because parties cannot select 
the panel of adjudicators of the Primary Committee. Hence, the risk that the neutrality 
provisions of the CICCL may be abused in the IDC is minimal.  
It follows that it would be misguided to recommend that the CICCL should compel arbitration 
as the resolution option regarding insurance-related disputes. What this study shows is that 
compelling a specific resolution option cannot be justified given that all available options have 
disadvantages that may be detrimental to different consumers under different circumstances. 
That is why it has been argued that dispute resolution can only be enhanced within the 
framework of ‘process pluralism’ whereby all matters are not subjected to the same treatment.12 
In other words, different parties, structures of disputes and issues should dictate different 
formats of dispute resolution.13 This accords with Fuller’s argument that each dispute 
resolution option has its own norms and ethics (‘integrity’) that produce varied outcomes that 
may be justified in different contexts.14 
Notwithstanding, the Saudi legislator must have intended to compel a cost-efficient, accessible 
and effective alternative to litigation that ensures that the playing field is levelled between the 
parties. Although it is shown here that the IDC does not achieve this goal better than arbitration, 
four landmark studies that influenced this research argued that if the legislator must compel a 
specific resolution option, it ought to be an administrative model. 
                                                          
12 C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes’ (2006) 94 
Georgetown Law Journal 553, 554-558. See also C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Process Pluralism in 
Transitional/Restorative Justice – Lessons from Dispute Resolution for Cultural Variations in Goals beyond Rule 
of Law and Democracy Development’ (2015) 3(1) International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution 
3, 9-12; C Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Policy (Ashgate 
2003). 
13 Menkel-Meadow, ‘Peace and Justice’, ibid, 555. 
14 See LL Fuller and K Winston, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon Fuller (Duke University 
Press 1981) 26-29 (paper on the ideal of legal processes). See also, PS Atiyah, ‘The Principles of Social Order: 
Selected Essays of Lon Fuller, edited With an introduction by Kenneth I. Winston, 1983 Duke Law Journal 669, 
670; C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of America: From the Formal to 
the Informal to the Semi-formal’ in F Steffek et al (eds), Regulating Dispute Resolution; ADR and Access to 
Justice at the Crossroads (Hart 2013) 420-424. 
240 
 
The most influential study was that conducted by Ury et al which introduced the concept of 
dispute systems design, and argued that industry-related disputes are best resolved using 
interest-based processes which may be divided into three ways: resolving disputes according 
to the interests of the parties, the rights of the parties, and their power.15 They also argued that 
resolving disputes by aligning the interests of parties yields the highest satisfaction with 
outcomes and involves the parties negotiating directly with the assistance of a third party.16 
This approach is shown in Chapter 2 to involve the use of both mediation and ombudsmen or 
independent government agencies. Lastly, Ury et al advised that the rights-based processes 
such as arbitration should serve as backup while the use of power should be avoided.17 The 
IDC format is largely consistent with the recommendations by Ury et al. 
The second study was that conducted by Costantino and Merchant which was influential in the 
drafting and implementation of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 and 1996 
in the United States. They recommended the use of both the dispute systems design and ADR 
processes by federal agencies to offer fast, efficient and accessible claims against and by the 
government.18 
The third study was that conducted by Robinson et al which demonstrated that the Dynamic 
Adaptive Dispute System should be used to encourage parties to make decisions and resolve 
disputes by aligning their interests and needs.19 
The fourth study was that conducted by Schwarz, which argued that the creative use of the 
ombudsman best achieves the objective of effectiveness, affordability, and accessibility. which 
are the goals of all ADR approaches that seek to resolve insurance disputes involving 
consumers.20 
This study however shows that some shortcomings must be addressed before the IDC can 
compare with the models recommended by the above authors. These shortcomings are 
discussed above and in Chapters 4 and 5. Nonetheless, this study conducted a practical inquiry 
                                                          
15 Ury WL et al, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict (Jossey-Bass 1988) 
3-9, 14. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 CA Costantino and CS Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive 
and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass 1996) 33-43. 
19 P Robinson et al, ‘DyADS: Encouraging Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems’ (2005) 10 Harvard Negotiation 
Law Review 339, 360-364. 
20 D Schwarcz, ‘Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and American 
Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict’ (2009) 83 Tulane Law Review 735, 790. 
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which provides different findings to the theoretical and doctrinal analysis. The practical inquiry 
affirms the position that the CICCL’s prescription of mediation and the IDC administrative 
tribunal to resolve insurance-related disputes according to the interests of the parties yields a 
very high level of satisfaction with outcomes. Emphasis was placed on the findings of surveys 
conducted by the General Secretariat and decisions of the IDC Committees. Satisfaction was 
used by the General Secretariat as the sole measure of effectiveness because, as shown in 
Chapters 2 and 5, many studies have demonstrated that satisfaction is a surrogate measure of 
effectiveness and a reliable arbiter of the success of public organisations.  
7.2.5 Explaining the Disconnect between the Doctrinal Analysis and the Practical 
Inquiry 
 
The surveys conducted by the General Secretariat reveal that the total number of cases received 
by the three Primary Committees increased by more than 45 per cent between 2014 and 2016. 
Also, a vast majority of the persons (mostly policyholders) surveyed by the General Secretariat 
were very satisfied with their experience at the IDC due to the conduct of the Committee 
personnel (including the clerks and adjudicators), the swift responses to their inquiries, the fair 
and fast conduct of the hearing, strict compliance with the scheduling requirements, and the 
quality of services provided by the General Secretariat.  
Also, the analysis of the decisions of the Committees reveals that the high level of satisfaction 
with the IDC may be explained by the privacy, flexibility, and neutrality offered by the CICCL 
and Working Rules. It is therefore argued that the high level of satisfaction of consumers with 
the IDC may be explained by their perceived fairness of the procedures and outcomes. The 
latter may in turn be explained by the standards used by some Committees to protect consumers 
against arbitrary adverse coverage determinations by insurers. Hence, operating outside of the 
court system, some Committees have been able to use their broad discretion to give significant 
weight to the reasonable expectations of parties and the fairness of the procedures and 
outcomes. 
It follows that there is a disconnect between the results of the doctrinal analysis and the findings 
of the practical inquiry. Despite the shortcomings identified by the doctrinal analysis, the 
practical inquiry reveals that the IDC yields a very high level of satisfaction. This disconnect 
was explained by capturing the perceptions and justifications of IDC adjudicators. These were 
captured from empirical data that was collected from a sample of IDC adjudicators using a 
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qualitative questionnaire. The sampling strategy used was purposive sampling which, as noted 
in Chapter 6, is widely used in qualitative research for the selection of persons with a wealth 
of information related to the phenomenon of interest. 
The qualitative study revealed that the high level of satisfaction of users of the IDC may be 
explained by factors that are unique to the KSA; factors which may not be easily captured by 
an investigator who is far removed from the society. Thus, the IDC adjudicators have a different 
conception of what constitutes a well-reasoned decision, and the explanations they provide in 
their decisions satisfy Saudi parties, specifically consumers. Also, the adjudicators do not 
consider precedent when discussing the sources of law because neither the adjudicators nor the 
parties believe creating and applying precedent enlighten the public and enhance predictability. 
They believe that the dispute resolution process is predictable because of the primacy of Islamic 
law.  
The findings of the practical inquiry and analysis of empirical data provide support to the Saudi 
legislator’s decision to compel parties to submit disputes to the IDC. The IDC’s Committees 
have earned as high level of satisfaction from the consumers and adjudicators. Thus, from this 
standpoint, the IDC is a commendable avenue in which consumers may successfully challenge 
insurers’ adverse determinations. Parties must use mediation before submitting disputes to the 
Primary Committee, and negotiation and arbitration have not been expressly excluded. 
However, the vast majority of disputes in the KSA are resolved by the Primary Committees. 
As such, it may be argued that most claimants believe that the IDC is the most efficient and 
effective dispute resolution option in the KSA. 
7.4 Proposals for Reform 
 
Despite the very high level of satisfaction of IDC users, there is nothing to suggest that the 
users would always be happy with the procedures and outcomes. Without a coherent and 
principled approach adopted by all the Committees, the inefficiencies brought about by the lack 
of specificity in the provisions of the IDC procedural rules would inevitably create higher 
production costs and more delays. In this light, certain reforms are urgently needed. The 
proposals listed below are centred on curbing the discretion of IDC adjudicators and reducing 
the risk of bias towards their policy preferences. 
The proposals are as follows: 
243 
 
 The Implementing Regulations of the CICCL should be amended and clear guidance 
should be provided on the core competencies required for IDC adjudicators. It should 
be clear who may be eligible for appointment to the adjudication panel of the Primary 
Committee and SAMA Appeal Committee. IDC adjudicators should meet a set of 
eligibility criteria. There should be an objective level of experience and education that 
must be attained prior to becoming eligible for appointment, such as a university degree 
or a specific minimum number of years of industry experience. Also, consideration 
should be given to socio-economic factors, such as gender, criminal history, or any 
vested financial interests in the insurance sector. 
 The Working Rules should be amended, and clear guidance should be provided on the 
impartiality and competence of adjudicators. They should be subject to strict rules on 
conflicts, recusal, and disqualification. The provisions should also provide a set of 
ethical principles to guide the conduct of adjudicators on issues of integrity, diligence, 
extra-judicial activities, independence, and the avoidance of impropriety. It may be 
important to consider whether these goals may best be achieved by a tribunal that is 
part of the judicial branch such as the IAT in Pakistan. 
 Article 9 of the Working Rules should be amended in order to provide for a hierarchy 
or priority of sources. It should state which body of law binds the Committees and 
which may only serve as persuasive authority. Although it is shown in Chapter 3 that 
the doctrine of binding precedent does not have binding force in the Islamic judicial 
system, Article 9 should provide that the doctrine of binding precedent has persuasive 
value, and adjudicators should be required to rely on previous decisions while deciding 
cases based on their merit. This is because the KSA follows the civil law tradition and 
codified laws are likely to be more reliable. Nonetheless, an established order of 
authority will generate predictable and consistent decisions.  
 Article 170 of the Law of Procedure should be amended in order to provide guidance 
to the Committees on the content that is required for their decisions. Article 170 should 
provide that the decisions should lay out the background facts, the issues considered by 
the Committee, along with a well-reasoned explanation of the law applied, and the route 
taken by the Committee to reach its conclusions. The panels should also demonstrate 
why the legal reasoning of previous cases do not apply where the previous cases dealt 
with materially similar facts. 
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 The Working Rules should be amended in order to provide clear guidance on the 
grounds on which the Primary Committee’s decision may be appealed, as well as the 
scope of the review by the Appeal Committee and Board of Grievances upon appeal. 
Losing parties have an automatic right of appeal. Thus, it is important that they are able 
to specifically plead the reason why they believe the Primary Committee erred 
rendering its judgment. 
 
 The Working Rules should be amended to provide clarity on whether the enforcement 
of the decisions issued by the Committees are governed by the Enforcement Law. It 
must be clarified whether Article 2 of the Enforcement Law excludes decisions 
rendered in administrative forums such as the IDC or only decisions related to 
administrative matters are excluded. 
7.5 Recommendations for Further Studies 
This study has demonstrated that all the available dispute resolution options have serious 
disadvantages that may be detrimental to different consumers under different circumstances. 
Thus, it may be argued that perfecting the option recommended by the CICCL is less achievable 
than promoting the resolution of disputes within the framework of process pluralism. In this 
light, it may be important to conduct a study on the use of such a framework in the KSA, where 
all insurance-related matters are not subjected to the same treatment. Such a study would 
determine how the law can guide parties towards specific dispute resolution options that are 
cost-efficient, accessible and effective, and have norms and ethics that are tailored to parties’ 
needs and can potentially produce outcomes that may be justified in the relevant contexts. 
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Case No. 330440, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 1433-210 
Case No. 360134, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 323/R/1436 AH 
 
Case No. 360714, Jeddah Primary Committee, Decision No. 343/C/1436 AH 
 
Case No. 320247, Riyadh Primary Committee, Decision No. 21/T/1437 AH 
 
Case No. 361263, Dammam Primary Committee, Decision No. 259/D/1436 AH 
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Jadawel International (Saudi Arabia) v Emaar Property PJSC (UAE) ICC (2006) 
Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co (ARAMCO), ad hoc award, 27 ILR 117 (1963) 
 
Decisions of the Board of Grievances 
 
Appeal No. 1228/AS/6 Year 1431H. Case Number 3/1136 Year 1430; Initial case Number 27/D/1/15 
Year 1431H. Date of the hearing: 2/12/1431H  
Appeal No. S/23973 Year 1436. Initial case No. Q/2/7402 Year 1432. Date of the court hearing: 
19/9/1436  
Appeal No. S/2/324 Year 1432H. Initial case No. Q/2/2886 Year 1427H. Date of the court hearing: 
4/12/1434H 
Appeal No. S/2/2713 Year 1435H. Initial case No. 2887 Year 1433H. Date of the court hearing: 
8/6/1435H 
Appeal No. 3/AS/695 Year 1431H. Initial case No: Q/3/976 Year 1429H. Date of the court hearing: 
19/9/1431H  
Appeal No. 3/AS/361 Year 1430H. Initial case No. Q/3/489 Year 1427H. Date of the court hearing: 
12/11/1430H 
Appeal No. 3/T/141Year 1407H. Initial case No. Q/1/488 Year 1405H. Date of the court hearing: 
2/11/1407H 
Appeal No. Q/7138 Year 1432H. Initial case No: Q/1/1431H Year 1431H. Date of the court hearing: 
4/5/1433H 
Circle Seven Decision No. 157/D/A/7, Case No. K/1/35 (2008) 
 
Summary of IDC Decisions on Motor Insurance Disputes 
 
Decisions in 2007 
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
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receive a 
settlement 
261187 181,500 7 years appealed Yes  141,000 Policyholder Compensated because his 
car was stolen 
280418 14,500 6 months Primary  Yes  7,275 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
250036 69,166 7 months Primary  Yes  25,000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
280454 75,000 2 years Primary  Yes  75,000 Policyholder Adverse determination by 
insurer 
261374 100,000 2 years Primary  Yes  100,000 Policyholder Adverse determination by 
insurer 
250106 300,000 4 years Dismissed  No  N/A Policyholder Because the condition of 
compensation for death 
was not included 
250071 90,000 6 months Dismissed  No  N/A Policyholder Did not attend  
270037 13,000 6 years Primary  Yes  7,500 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
260273 35,000 6 years Appealed  Yes  35,000 Policyholder Adverse determination by 
insurer  
250006 500,000 8 months Primary  Yes  400,000 Policyholder IDC rejected to 
compensate 100,000 for 
expenses   
273427 45,500 6 months Primary  Yes  25,000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
  
 
 
 
 
Decisions in 2008  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
260425 38,606 4 months primary Yes  34,000 Policyholder Defendant did not turn up 
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290206 50,000 8 months Dismissed   no  N/A Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage was not included 
in policy 
270116 126,000 1 year 7 
months 
Primary  Yes  73,000 Policyholder IDC compensated for car 
damage only and rejected 
the treatment expenses 
related to the accident  
270475 12,000 2 years Primary  Yes  6,000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
280316 14,000 1 years Primary  Yes  9000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
280339 120,000 8month primary  yes  20,000 Policyholder Because the accident did 
not happen in the 
coverage period 
260022 370,000 1 year 6 
months 
primary Yes   209,000 Policyholder Some claims not included 
in the policy  
250008 100,000 5 years Primary  Yes  100,000 Policyholder Death penalty  
270296 106,000 7 years Appealed  Yes  33,000 Policyholder Some claims not covered 
in policy  
 
 
Decisions in 2009  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
270500 300.000 2 year Appeal  Yes  100.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
290705 34.000 8 months Dismissed   no  N/A Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
280188 11.000 6 months Primary  Yes  19.000 Policyholder IDC compensated for car 
damage and legal 
expenses  
290829 6000 1 years Primary  Yes  7000 Policyholder for car damage and legal 
expenses  
290774 42.900 1 years Dismissed  No    Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
 
 
249 
 
Decisions in 2010  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
295220 11.460 8 months primary Yes  11460 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer  
293895 700 6 months  primary  Yes  700 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
310616 3.390 6 months Primary  Yes  3390 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
294018 10.300 3 months Primary  Yes  10.300 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
294583 8.600 6 months Primary  Yes  8600 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
300582 8000 8month primary  yes  4500 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
393381 17.000 1 year primary Yes   17.000 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
394681 4.800 1 year Primary  Yes  4800 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
295170 11.600 8 months Primary Yes  11600 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
295205 6500 6 months Primary  Yes  6500 Policyholder  For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
294824 2000 8 months Primary  yes 2000 Policyholder  For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
 
Decisions in 2011  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
310818 62.700 1 year  primary Yes  62.700 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer  
291072 36.500 1 year 3 
months 
 primary  Yes  36.500 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
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320075 50.000 2 years  Primary  Yes  35.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
321888 13.000 8 months Primary  Yes  13.000 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
320464 30.000 1 year Primary  Dismissed   N/A Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
320144 300.000 1 year primary  yes  100.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
324511 25.000 1 year primary Yes   25.000 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
326654 35.000 6 months Primary  Yes  20.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
 
Decisions in 2012  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
321797 63.500 2 year  primary Yes  63.500 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer  
321782 29.700 2 years  primary  Yes  29.700 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
330276 6500 1 year 6 
months  
Primary  Yes  12.000 Policyholder For delay in fixing the car  
321992 300.000 2 year  Dismissed   No   No  Policyholder On the basis of IDC is not 
the competence court for 
this kind of claim  
321955 3700 1 year Primary  Yes    1700 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
3211956 7700  1 year primary  yes  5500 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
321995 3390 1 year 6 
months 
primary Yes   1.300 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
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case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
330364 20.000 8 months Primary  Yes  17.000 Policyholder For car damage only, the 
rest of claim was not 
included in contract 
321997 400.00 2 years  Primary  Yes  200.000 policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
321835 9000 8 months  Primary  Dismissed  No  Policyholder  On the basis of IDC is not 
the competence court for 
this kind of claim 
321697 190.000 1 year  Dismissed  Dismissed    On the basis of IDC is not 
the competence court for 
this kind of claim 
290337 120.000 8 months Primary  Dismissed  No  Policyholder  On the basis of IDC is not 
the competence court for 
this kind of claim 
 
Decisions in 2013  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
330764 150.000 1 year 6 
months 
Primary  Yes  70.000 Policyholder According to the 
conditions of the 
insurance contract 
340064 140.000 2 years  primary  Yes  50.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
331426 65.000 1 year   Primary  Yes  20.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
340315 30.000 8 months  Primary  yes   30.000  Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
340008 81.000 2 year Primary  Yes    40.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
330921 40.600 1 year primary  yes  23.000 Policyholder For car damage only. The 
rest of claims were not 
included in the insurance 
contract 
330412 55.000 2 year  Dismissed  No    No  Policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up in the hearing  
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331704 11.000 8 months Dismissed   No   No  Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
331242 30.000 2 years  Dismissed   no  no policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
340037 58.000 2 year  Appeal   Yes  58.000  Policyholder  For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
340276 25.000 1 year  Primary   yes  13.000  Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
331051 4500 2 year  Primary  Yes  4500  Policyholder  For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
340324 19.500 8 months  Primary  Yes  10.000 Policyholder  Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
 
Decisions in 2014  
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
341509 25.000 1 year  Primary  Yes  25000 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
340975 145.000 2 years  primary  Yes  145.000 Policyholder For car damage according 
to the insurance contract 
with insurer 
342260 80.000 1 year 3 
months   
Dismissed   no  No  Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
342083 69.000 8 months  Dismissed  no   no Policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up in the hearing  
341904 300.000 1 year Primary  Yes    200.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
341406 20.000 1 year primary  yes  15.000 Policyholder For car damage only. The 
rest of claims were not 
included in the insurance 
contract 
331818 320.000 2 year  primary  yes    100.000  Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
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342163 27500 1 year 3 
months 
Dismissed   No   No  Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
342405 50.000 1 years  Dismissed   no  no policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
 
Decisions in 2015  
 
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
350773 50.000 6 months Primary  No  Dismissed Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
350594 8000 8 months  primary  No  Dismissed Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
350761 75.000 6 months Dismissed   no  No  Policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up at the hearing  
350135 100.000 1 year  Primary  Yes    100.000 Policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer 
350194 213.000 1 year Primary  Yes    213.000 Policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer 
350518 63.000 1 year primary  yes  70.000 Policyholder For car damage only plus 
compensation for delay 
in settling this claim  
350270 23.000 8 months primary  yes    10.000  Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
in desperate need of 
money 
350547 53000 6 months Dismissed   No   No  Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
360210 45.000 1 years  Appeal    Yes   Yes  policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer 
350460 100.000 9 months Primary  No  Dismissed   Policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up at the hearing  
350489 75.000 1 year  Primary  No  Dismissed  policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up at the hearing  
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Decisions in 2016  
 
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
370211 31.000 1 year  Primary  Yes  25000 Policyholder Policyholder agreed to 
get this amount and close 
the case ASAP because 
he is in desperate need of 
money 
360755 204.000 1 years  Appeal   Yes  204.000 Policyholder Penalty for death 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer 
360582 645.000 2 year  Appeal    Yes   80.000  Policyholder Policyholder has been 
compensated for only 
which included in 
contract 
370906 85.000 8 months  Dismissed  no   no Policyholder This claim has already 
been settled before case 
registered  
371093 12000 1 year Primary  No     Dismissed  Policyholder Policyholder did not turn 
up at hearing  
370937 13700 1 year primary  yes  14500 Policyholder For car damage according 
to insurance contract plus 
compensation for delay in 
settling this claim  
370933 100.000 8 months  Appeal   yes    100.000  Policyholder For car damage according 
to their insurance contract   
361394 780.000 2 year  Appeal    No   Dismissed   Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
policy 
 
Decisions in 2017 
 
Case No Value How 
long 
take 
How 
resolved  
Did 
claimant 
receive a 
settlement 
What 
was 
amount  
Claimant  Reason for decision   
370844 10.000 1 year  primary Yes  10.000 Policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer  
370347 350.000 1 year 3 
months 
 Appeal   No   Dismissed  Policyholder Because this kind of 
damage not included in 
the contract 
380051 103.000 8 months  Primary  Yes  88.000 Policyholder Claimant agreed to get 
this amount and close the 
case ASAP because he is 
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in desperate need of 
money 
371189 72.000 1 year  Primary  Yes  72.000 Policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer 
371685 100.000 1 year 2 
months 
Appeal   Yes    100.000 Policyholder Death penalty caused by 
car accident.  
380149 188.000 2 year  Appeal   yes  208.000 Policyholder For car damage 
according to the 
insurance contract with 
insurer plus legal 
expenses  
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Appendix II: Questionnaire on Insurance Dispute Resolution by the 
Insurance Dispute Committee in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Addressed to Members (adjudicators) of the IDC 
 
Information for Participants/Consent Form 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to take part in a study that seeks to determine whether the Saudi legislator is 
justified in requiring all claimants to submit insurance coverage disputes to the Insurance 
Dispute Committee (IDC), as well as whether there is a more effective dispute resolution 
option.  
 
I would be grateful if you complete this Questionnaire on your experience as an IDC 
adjudicator. This research is part of a PhD thesis at the University. 
 
Before you decide whether to take part in the study, it is important that you understand what 
the research is for and what you will be asked to do. Please take time to read the following 
information. You have to decide whether or not to take part in light of this information. If you 
decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. You can change your mind and 
withdraw from the study without giving any reason before FRIDAY 27 September 2019. Also, 
providing your name in Part I is optional. Your personal information will be used for 
identification purposes only and no identifying information will be disclosed at any stage of 
this study. The participant will not be identified in any part of this study as the responses will 
be coded.  
 
If the researcher does not receive a completed questionnaire two weeks after the date on which 
the questionnaire was sent to you, it would be assumed that you have withdrawn from the study. 
The standard of care you receive will not change regardless of your decision to participate in 
this study or not. Please call or send an email if you would like any clarification or further 
information. 
 
The focus of the research is on disputes related to coverage determinations - where the 
insurance company arbitrarily refuses to pay the policyholder/consumer. It therefore seeks to 
determine the best option available to the consumer who is in desperate need of money 
following a loss/accident. I would like to ask questions about your experience as an adjudicator 
and steps undertaken to protect consumers.  
 
Analyses of the relevant statutes and surveys of users of the IDC reveal that there is a 
disjunction between doctrine and practice. The doctrinal analysis shows that the IDC has 
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serious flaws when compared to other options such as arbitration. However, the analysis of 
surveys of users of the IDC shows that in practice most consumers are satisfied with the IDC. 
 
The information that you provide will help to explain the disjunction between the doctrine and 
practice. The objective is to determine whether adjudicators adopt measures (not specified in 
any law or guidelines) to protect consumers. The results of the research may also lead onto 
further studies on insurance coverage dispute resolution in Islamic societies. 
 
This Questionnaire will be stored in a locked secure place at all times and the data will be 
protected from intrusion. The Questionnaire will be destroyed at the end of this study. Your 
answers will be treated with full confidentiality, and you will be identified only by a code 
number or false name. I will analyse the Questionnaire. At the end of the study, I will show 
and discuss your answers (without any name acknowledged) in my dissertation. The results of 
this study may subsequently be published in peer reviewed journals or discussed in conference 
papers. You can request a copy of the final report if you wish. No participant will be identifiable 
from any publication or presentation.  
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the 
University. This University is a public research institution with insurance in place to provide 
indemnity for loss due to legal liabilities to members of the public in respect of this study. The 
ethical review application number of this study is ER/AA.  
 
Please send the completed Questionnaire to the researcher’s email address below and do not 
hesitate to contact me if you need further information. 
 
 
Thanking you in anticipation 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
SIGNATURE 
 
I have read this consent form and my questions have been answered. My signature below means 
that I know that I can remove myself from the study at any time before FRIDAY 27 September 
2019 without any problems. 
 
             
Subject         Date 
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This Questionnaire has three parts: 
 
Part I requests basic information about you 
Part II asks for information concerning your experience at the IDC 
Part III asks for your thoughts on the experience of parties  
 
 
 
Part I: General and Background Information 
 
1. Respondent’s Name: _______________________________ 
2. Age range: 
o 25-45 
o 46-66 
o Above 66 
3. What is your gender? _________________ 
4. Please identify the Committee on which your serve: ___________________ 
5. Please indicate the level of the last education qualification obtained: 
o High School Diploma 
o Bachelor’s Degree 
o Master’s Degree 
o Doctorate 
o Other (Please specify): ________________ 
 
6. How long have you served as a Member of the IDC? 
o Less than three (3) years 
o Three (3) to five (5) years 
o More than five (5) years 
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7. How long have you worked as an adjudicator? 
o Less than five (5) years 
o More than five (5) but less than ten (10) years 
o More than ten (10) but less than fifteen (15) years 
o More than fifteen (15) years 
 
8. Do you have any experience working as an arbitrator, negotiator or mediator in an 
insurance-related dispute? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
9. Did you serve as a judge in the Islamic Court when it handled insurance litigation? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Part II: Experience of Dispute Resolution at the IDC 
 
10. What is your opinion of the IDC as a dispute resolution body?  
o Very positive 
o Positive 
o Neutral 
o Negative 
o Very negative 
 
11. Please, explain your answer in ten (10) above. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. What is your opinion of the Board of Grievances as an insurance dispute resolution 
body?  
o Very positive 
o Positive 
o Neutral 
o Negative 
o Very negative 
 
13. Please, explain your answer in twelve (12) above. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. What is your opinion of arbitration, negotiation and mediation as insurance dispute 
resolution options?  
o Very positive 
o Positive 
o Neutral 
o Negative 
o Very negative 
 
15. Please, explain your answer in fourteen (14) above. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Based on your experience and opinion on what would be fairest to consumers, do you 
oppose or support the requirement to submit all insurance-related disputes to the IDC? 
o Strongly support 
o Moderately support 
o Moderately oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
o I cannot say 
 
17. Please explain your answer in sixteen (16) above 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Is there any hierarchy or priority of sources of law when applying precedent? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Are you required to provide a well-reasoned explanation of the law applied and 
demonstrate the route taken to reach your conclusions? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Is there any guidance on a timeframe within which a case must be concluded? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. How important are moral/religious preferences and policy considerations in deciding 
cases? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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22. Do you consider the conscionability of the contractual terms and the reasonable 
expectation of the parties when deciding cases? Why? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Part III: Your Thoughts on the Experience of Parties  
 
23. Do you think most consumers are satisfied with their experience with the IDC? Why? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Do you know of any concerns consumers have with the IDC? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Do you think the current substantive and procedural laws allow Committees to 
address these concerns? Why? 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Are there any changes you would like implemented? 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank You 
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Appendix III: Ethical Review 
 
 
Section A - Checklist 
A1. Will your study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or unable to 
give informed consent or in a dependent position (e.g. people under 18, people with 
learning difficulties, over-researched groups or people in care facilities)? 
 
No 
A2. Will participants be required to take part in the study without their consent or 
knowledge at the time (e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places), and / 
or will deception of any sort be used? Please refer to the British Psychological 
Society Code of Ethics and Conduct for further information. 
 
No 
 
A.3 Will it be possible to link personal data back to individual participants in any 
way (this does not include identifying participants from signed consent forms or 
identity encryption spreadsheets that are stored securely separate from research data). 
 
No 
A4. Might the study induce psychological stress or anxiety, or produce humiliation or 
cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in the everyday 
life of the participants? 
 
No 
A5. Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics (e.g. sexual activity, drug 
use, ethnicity, political behaviour, potentially illegal activities)? 
 
No 
A6. Will any drugs, placebos or other substances (such as food substances or 
vitamins) be administered as part of this study and will any invasive or potentially 
harmful procedures of any kind will be used? 
 
No 
A7. Will your project involve working with any substances and / or equipment which 
may be considered hazardous? 
 
No 
A.8 Will your study involve the taking and/or storage of human tissue that falls under 
the Human Tissue Act (HTA)? 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/governance/erp_overview/humantissue 
 
No 
A9. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses, compensation for 
time or a lottery / draw ticket) be offered to participants? 
 
No 
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A10. If you have answered 'Yes' to ANY of the above questions, your application 
will be considered as HIGH risk. If, however you wish to make a case that your 
application should be considered as LOW risk please enter the reasons here:  
 
N/A 
Ethical Review Form B – Low risk research 
Data Collection and Analysis (Please provide full details) 
B1. PARTICIPANTS: How many people do you envisage will participate, who they 
are, and how will they be selected? 
 
 
 
It is expected that there will be twenty-five (25) participants. The participants are 
members of the Primary Committees of the Insurance Dispute Committee (IDC). The 
IDC is an administrative tribunal set up in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to adjudicate 
insurance coverage disputes between insurers and policyholders. The members of the 
Committees are adjudicators in these tribunals. That is the criterion for selection. 
 
The selection of participants will therefore be purposive. The objective will be to 
ensure representation of important elements of the research question regarding the 
dispute resolution option that best promotes the interests of consumers in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
The sampling strategy will be purposive sampling, and the type of purposive 
sampling that will be employed will be snowball purposive sampling. As such, the 
participants will be selected based on a pre-selected criterion: membership of an IDC 
Committee. The researcher will also rely on chain referral or snowball, whereby 
some participants will refer the researcher to others who may be able to potentially 
contribute.  
 
The sample frame will comprise fifty (50) members of the Committees in Riyadh, 
Jeddah and Dammam. The sample size will be increased by 100% to compensate for 
potential nonresponses. However, the sample size will be based on theoretical 
saturation. Thus, the researcher will include participants until the point where new 
participants will no longer provide additional insights. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that 
more than 25 participants accept to participate. 
B2. RECRUITMENT: How will participants be approached and recruited? 
 
The researcher will obtain their contact details from the General Secretariat of the 
IDC. Emails will be sent to the participants and then followed up by calls that will be 
made to the participants to discuss the project. Given the use of snowball or chain 
referral sampling, some participants will be referred to the researcher by other 
participants who have already accepted to be part of the study. This will help the 
researcher recruit participants that may be otherwise hard to reach. 
 
B3. METHOD: What research method(s) do you plan to use; e.g. interview, 
questionnaire/self-completion questionnaire, field observation, audio/audio-visual 
recording? 
 
Self-completion questionnaire. 
 
The use of self-completion questionnaires will ensure that the data collected helps in 
answering the question regarding the most effective dispute resolution option for 
insurance coverage disputes involving consumers. The research design will be 
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qualitative. The qualitative research methodology will be the grounded theory. 
Hence, the researcher will collect and code data, make the relevant connections, and 
develop theories that are grounded in the data. The new theories will enable the 
researcher to approach the question of the most effective dispute resolution in a 
different way. 
The participants will be required to complete the questionnaires and return them to 
the researcher by email. This is the fastest way of getting information from the 
participants within the time available for this study. Each participant will be required 
to complete a single questionnaire. They will not be required to answer questions for 
which they are not able to provide specific detailed answers. This is because the 
researcher will rely on the answers provided by the participants to develop new 
theories. Thus, the answers have to be reliable. 
The data will be analysed as they are collected. They will be examined for content 
immediately following collection. 
 
 
B4. LOCATION: Where will the project be carried out e.g. public place, in 
researcher's office, in private office at organisation? 
 
The project will be carried out in the researcher’s office. 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
B5. Will questionnaires be completed anonymously and returned indirectly? 
 
They will be completed anonymously but returned directly to the researcher. 
B6. Will data only be identifiable by a unique identifier (e.g. code/pseudonym)? 
 
Yes. The codes will include: Judge #1, Judge #2, Judge #3 etc 
B7. Will lists of identity numbers or pseudonyms linked to names and/or addresses 
be stored securely and separately from the research data? 
 
Yes. 
B8. Will all place names and institutions which could lead to the identification of 
individuals or organisations be changed unless this is consented to explicitly in the 
consent form? 
 
Yes. 
B9. Will all personal information gathered be treated in strict confidence and never 
disclosed to any third parties? 
 
Yes. 
B10. Can you confirm that your research records will be held in accordance with the 
data protection guidelines? (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ogs/policies/information/dpa) 
 
Yes.  
B11. Can you confirm that you will not use the research data for any purpose other 
than that which consent is given? 
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Yes. The records will be kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for 
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed. They will 
be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data of 
participants, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction or damage. 
Informed Consent and Recruitment of Participants 
B12. Will all respondents be given an Information Sheet and be given adequate time 
to read it before being asked to agree to participate? 
 
Yes. 
B13. Will all participants taking part in an interview, focus group, observation (or 
other activity which is not questionnaire based) be asked to sign a consent form? If 
you are obtaining consent another way, please explain under 15a below. 
 
Yes, but only questionnaires will be used. 
B14. Will all participants self-completing a questionnaire be informed that returning 
the completed questionnaire implies consent to participate? 
 
Yes, but they will also have to sign a consent form. 
 
 
B15. Will all respondents be told that they can withdraw at any time during testing 
and can ask for their data to be destroyed and/or removed from the project until it is 
no longer practical to do so? 
 
Yes. 
 
B15a  If you answered NO to any of the above (or think more information could be 
useful to the reviewer) please explain here:  
 
N/A 
Context 
B16. Is DBS (Disclosure and Barring Service) clearance necessary for this project? If 
yes, please ensure you complete the next question. 
 
No. 
B17. Are any other ethical clearances or permissions (internal or external) required? 
Please see the help text (i) for further details. 
 
No. 
 
B17a. If yes, please give further details including the name and address of the 
organisation. If other ethical approval has already been received please attach 
evidence of approval, otherwise you will need to supply it when ready. (You do not 
need to provide evidence of a current DBS check at this point).  
 
N/A 
B18. Does the research involve any fieldwork - Overseas or in the UK? 
 
Overseas. 
 
B18a. If yes, where will the fieldwork take place? 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
B19. Will any researchers be in a lone working situation? 
 
No. 
 
B19a. If yes, briefly describe the location, time of day and duration of lone working. 
What precautionary measures will be taken to ensure safety of the researcher(s)? 
 
N/A 
Any further concerns 
B20. Are there any other ethical considerations relating to your project which have 
not been covered above? 
 
No. 
B20a. If yes, please explain: 
 
N/A 
 
 
Ethical Review Form C – High risk research 
Participants 
C1. Is DBS clearance necessary for this project? If yes, please ensure you complete 
Section C23a 
C2. Are alcoholic drinks, drugs, placebos or other substances (such as food 
substances or vitamins) to be administered to the study participants? 
C3. Can you think of anything else that might be potentially harmful to participants 
in this research? 
C4. Does the project involve working with any substances and/or equipment which 
may be considered hazardous? (Please refer to the University's Control of Hazardous 
Substances Policy). 
C5. Could the nature or subject of the research potentially have an emotionally 
disturbing impact on the researcher(s)? 
C5a. If yes, briefly describe what measures will be taken to help the researcher (s) 
manage this 
C6. Could the nature or subject of the research potentially expose the researcher(s) to 
threats of physical violence and / or verbal abuse? 
C6a. If yes, briefly describe what measures will be taken to mitigate this. 
C7. Does the research involve any fieldwork - Overseas or in the UK? 
C7a. If yes, where will the fieldwork take place? 
C8. Will any researchers be in a lone working situation? 
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C8a. If yes, briefly describe the location, time of day and duration of lone working. 
What precautionary measures will be taken to ensure safety of the researcher(s)? 
C9. Can you think of anything else that might be potentially harmful to the 
researcher(s) in this research? 
 Data Collection and Analysis (Please provide full details) 
C10. PARTICIPANTS: How many people do you envisage will participate, who are 
they, and how will they be selected? 
C11. RECRUITMENT: How will participants be approached and recruited? 
C12. METHOD: What research method(s) do you plan to use; e.g. interview, 
questionnaire/self-completion questionnaire, field observation, audio/audio-visual 
recording? 
C13. LOCATION: Where will the project be carried out e.g. public place, in 
researcher's office, in private office at organisation? 
Ethical Considerations (Please provide full details) 
C14. INFORMED CONSENT: Please describe the process you will use to ensure 
your participants are freely giving fully informed consent to participate. This will 
usually include the provision of an Information Sheet and will normally require a 
Consent Form unless there is justification for not doing so. (Please state this clearly). 
C15. RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL: Participants should be able to withdraw from the 
research at any time. Participants should also be able to withdraw their data if it is 
linked to them and should be told when this will no longer be possible (e.g. once it 
has been included in the final report). Please describe the exact arrangements for 
withdrawal from participation and withdrawal of data for your study. 
C16. OTHER ETHICAL ISSUES: If you answered YES to anything in A.1 above 
you must specifically address this here. Please also consider whether there are other 
ethical issues you should be covering here. Please also make reference to the 
professional code of conduct you intend to follow in your research. 
Data Protection, Confidentiality, and Records Management 
C17. Will you ensure that the processing of personal information related to the study 
will be in full compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)? 
(http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ogs/policies/information/dpa) 
C17a. If you are processing any personal information outside of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) you must explain how compliance with the DPA will be 
ensured.  
C18. Will you take steps to ensure the confidentiality of personal information? 
C18a. Please provide details of anonymisation procedures and of physical and 
technical security measures here: 
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C19. Will all personal information related to this study be retained and shared in a 
form that is fully anonymised (separated from information that can identify the 
participant)? 
C19a.If you answered "no" to the above question you must ensure that any 
limitations to full anonymity are detailed in the Information Sheet and that 
participant consent will be in place. If relevant, please outline limitations here: 
C20. Will the Principal Investigator take full responsibility during the study, for 
ensuring appropriate storage and security of information (including research data, 
consent forms and administrative records) and, where appropriate, will the necessary 
arrangements be made in order to process copyright material lawfully? 
C20a. If you answered "no" to the above question, please give further details: 
C21. Who will have access to personal information relating to this study? 
C22.Data management responsibilities after the study. State how long study 
information including research data, consent forms and personal identification will 
be retained, in what format(s) and where the information will be kept. 
Other Ethical Clearances and Permissions 
C23. Are any other ethical clearances or permissions (internal or external) required? 
Please see the help text (i) for further details 
C23a. If yes, please give further details including the name and address of the 
organisation. If other ethical approval has already been received please attach 
evidence of approval, otherwise you will need to supply it when ready.  (You do not 
need to provide evidence of a current DBS check at this point). 
 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/governance/apply 
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